FREDERICK CARL KRAUSE III V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : OCTOBER 19, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
'SixpxMt d1ourf of
2004-SC-1009-DG
AT [9
~ I°a,°ak-r,k0
c~.~
,, Q:
APPELLANT
FREDERICK CARL KRAUSE III
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
03-CA-2092-MR
MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT NO. 03-CR-00162-002
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Reversing. and Remanding
Appellant, Frederick Carl Krause, III, entered conditional guilty pleas in
McCracken Circuit Court to First Degree Possession of a Controlled Substance,
Cocaine; Use/Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Second Offense ; and Possession of
Marijuana . For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to three days' imprisonment and
two and one-half (2
'/2)
years of probation . Pursuant to his conditional pleas, Appellant
took a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals . RCr 8.09. In an unpublished opinion, the
Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions in all respects . Krause v. Commonwealth, 03CA-002092-MR (rendered October 29, 2004). Appellant filed a petition for discretionary
review in this Court, which we granted . CR 76.20.
For the reasons set forth herein,
? I°
we reverse the Court of Appeals' opinion, vacate Appellant's convictions and sentence,
and remand for further proceedings .
The trial court's findings of fact in this case, while sparse, are unmistakably clear.
The trial court found that Trooper Manar of the Kentucky State Police had arrested a
subject for possession of cocaine . The subject told Trooper Manar that he obtained the
cocaine from a house at which Appellant and his roommate, Joe Yamada, resided .
Trooper Manar desired to go to the residence and search it but did not believe he had
probable cause to obtain a search warrant . Because he knew that the residents would
not "consent to a search for drugs," Trooper Manar "fabricated a false story that he
believed would more likely result in the residents' consent to search ."
Accompanied by one or two other law enforcement officers, Trooper Manar
knocked on Appellant's and Yamada's door around 4:00 a.m . When one of the
residents, most likely Appellant, opened the door, Trooper Manar stated that a young
girl had just reported being raped by Yamada in the residence . He asked if he could
look around in order to determine whether her description of the residence and its
furnishings was accurate . The trial court found that Trooper Manar "knew there would
be no such evidence because he knew there was no assault . His intention was to gain
consent to search for drugs."
Despite finding that "the ruse employed [by Trooper Manar] raises serious
Constitutional rights questions and is not an appropriate police practice," the trial court
ultimately concluded "that Defendants voluntarily consented to a search for evidence of
an assault." The trial court speculated that "[plermission to search for evidence of an
assault may well be a much narrower search than for drugs" because "[d]rugs may be
secreted in places that evidence of an assault would not likely be found." However,
because the drugs in this case were found in plain view during this otherwise voluntary
search for evidence of a sexual assault, the trial court concluded that the evidence was
constitutionally obtained . The Court of Appeals affirmed,' holding simply that "the trial
court was correct in denying Krause's request to suppress the evidence against him as
the product of a warrantless search ."
On appeal to this Court, the sole issue for our consideration is whether the
consent given by Appellant and his roommate was constitutionally valid . In Cook v.
Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1992), this Court stated that "consent is one of
the exceptions to the requirement for a warrant ." Id. at 331 (citing United States v.
Watson , 423 U .S. 411, 96 S .Ct. 820, 46 L .Ed .2d 598 (1976)) . We further indicated that
the "test for determining if consent is constitutional is set out in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte , 412 U .S. 218, 93 S .Ct . 2041, 36 L .Ed .2d 854 (1973)." Id .
In Schneckloth , supra , the Supreme Court held that "the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means . . .
[f]or, no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting 'consent' would be no
more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth
Amendment is directed ." Id . at 228, 93 S.Ct. at 2048. Whether consent is the result of
express or implied coercion is a question of fact, id. a t 227, 93 S .Ct. at 2048, and thus,
we must defer to the trial court's finding if it is supported by substantial evidence . RCr
9.78.
In this case, the trial court specifically found that Appellant and his roommate did
not and would not give consent to search for drugs. Thus, Trooper Manar needed to
procure consent to search for something else if he was to achieve his main objective.
Chief Judge Combs dissented from this opinion .
3
When he concocted a story regarding the rape of a young girl and his need to look
around the house for the purpose of determining whether the young girl's description of
their house was accurate, Appellant and his roommate ultimately agreed to allow a
search for this specific purpose. Because Appellant's consent to this limited type of
search was voluntary, the trial court reasoned that any plain view seizures of collateral
criminality made during the search was a necessary product of this initial voluntary
consent.
The premise of the trial court's ruling, of course, is the plain view doctrine . Under
the plain view doctrine, a warrantless seizure of illegal substances or objects is
constitutionally valid so long as the officer has not violated the Fourth Amendment "in
arriving at the place where the evidence could be plainly viewed ." Hazel v.
Commonwealth , 833 S.W .2d 831, 833 (Ky. 1992) . In order to validate a "plain view"
seizure, the Hazel Court explained that "not only must the officer be lawfully located in
a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must have a lawful
right of access to the object itself." Id. (emphasis added).
Pursuant to these standards, the trial court's ruling falters in the fact that Trooper
Manar was only able to reach a location from which he could spy illegal drugs and
related paraphernalia through machination . We addressed the use of ruses by police in
Adcock v. Commonwealth , 967 S .W.2d 6 (Ky. 1998) . In Adcock , an officer disguised
himself as a pizza delivery person in order to coax a resident into opening the door for
the purpose of executing a valid search warrant. Id . at 7. We held that '[t]he guiding
factor in determining whether a ruse entry, to execute a search warrant, constitutes a
'breaking' under the Fourth Amendment should be whether the tactic frustrates the
purposes of the 'knock and announce' rule." Id. at 10.2
The ruse in this instance was employed for the purpose of gaining consent (1) to
make a warrantless entry into a home ; and (2) to conduct a plain view warrantless
search of the residence. Thus, the underlying purpose and policies in this case differ
from the purpose and policies in the Adcock case. The guiding factor here is to
determine whether this particular ruse frustrated the purpose of the constitutional
requirement that consent to make a warrantless entry into and search of a home must
be voluntary, and thus, free of implied or express coercion .
In Schneckloth , supra, the U.S . Supreme Court explained the purpose of the
voluntariness requirement as follows :
'[V]oluntariness' has reflected an accommodation of the complex values
implicated in police questioning of a suspect. At one end of the spectrum
is the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the effective
enforcement of criminal laws . Without such investigation, those who were
innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly
escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved . In short, the
security of all would be diminished. At the other end of the spectrum is the
set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law
cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of
unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to
civilized notions of justice .
Id . at 225, 93 S .Ct. at 2046 (internal citations omitted) . The Schneckloth Court further
emphasized that "[i]t is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the
apprehension of criminals ." Id . at 243, 93 S.Ct. at 2056 (internal quotation omitted) .
In determining whether this particular ruse frustrated the purposes set forth
above, we must make "a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances in a
2 Ultimately, we found that the tactic did not undermine the basic purpose of the rule. _Id .
5
specific case." Cook, supra at 331 . The Schneckloth Court advised that "account must
be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possible vulnerable
subjective state of the person who consents." Id . at 229, 93 S .Ct. at 2049 . The Court
further explained that no decision should turn "on the presence or absence of a single
controlling criterion ." Id. at 226, 93 S .Ct . at 2047.
In this case, Trooper Manar confronted Appellant and his roommate at an
alarming hour (4 :00 a .m .) with unnerving news - a young girl had just been raped and
he needed to look around the house in, order to determine if it was the place that she
had described to police . Stunned and sure that they were not the perpetrators of this
heinous crime (since in fact, it never occurred), Appellant and his roommate made a
split second decision to allow Trooper Manar into the residence in order to assist the
trooper in his investigation . The trooper testified, and the trial court found that Appellant
and his roommate would have never consented to the search if they knew the trooper's
true purpose. Furthermore, Trooper Manar had no legal right, independent of receiving
some kind of valid consent, to enter or search the home . Under these unique
circumstances, we believe that the ruse utilized by Trooper Manar absolutely
undermined the purposes inherent in requiring consent to be voluntarily obtained
without any implied or express coercion .
Our belief that Appellant's consent to search was coerced is based on several
factors . First, given the time and nature of the trooper's ruse, we believe that Appellant
and his roommate were in a particularly vulnerable state. A knock on the door at 4 :00
a .m. by uniformed police officers is a frightening event in and of itself. Couple this
knock with a heinous and shameful accusation, such as the rape of a young girl, and
nearly any person would feel overwhelmed and stunned .
Second, Trooper Manar's tactics were unnecessary in this instance and not
based on any pressing or imminent tactical considerations . In contrast, the ruse utilized
by the police in Adcock was primarily employed for safety reasons and to avoid the
destruction of evidence that commonly takes place when entry into a home for the
purposes of executing a search warrant is delayed or hindered .
Finally, we believe that if the type of ruse utilized by Trooper Manar was
sanctioned by this Court, citizens would be discouraged from "aiding to the utmost of
their ability in the apprehension of criminals" since they would have no way of knowing
whether their assistance was being called upon for the public good or for the purpose of
incriminating them. Schneckloth, supra , at 243, 93 S.Ct. at 2056 (internal quotation
omitted) . Moreover, widespread use of this type of tactic could quickly undermine "the
set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used
as an instrument of unfairness." Id. at 225, 93 S .Ct. at 2046.
We are careful to note that our holding is limited and narrow. We do not hold that
the use of ruses, in general, is unconstitutional . The United States Supreme Court has
long held that "[a]rtifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in
criminal enterprises ." Sorrells v. United States , 287 U.S . 435, 441-42, 53 S.Ct. 210,
212, 77 L.Ed . 413, 416-17 (1932). Indeed, in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87
S .Ct. 408,17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) and Lewis v. United States , 385 U .S. 206, 87 S.Ct.
424, 17 L.Ed .2d 312 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment is not
violated when police obtain incriminating information through the use of undercover
agents who misrepresent their identity for the purpose of enticing defendants to confide
or disclose wrongdoing. The use of undercover agents and stratagems in police
investigations has long been sanctioned, and we do not question such a practice in this
opinion . See , e.g_, United States v. Baldwin , 621 F.2d 251, 252-253 (6th Cir. 1980)
("[A]n [undercover] agent may legitimately gain entrance into a house by
misrepresenting his identity."); Adcock, supra at 10 (entry into home for purposes of
executing a search warrant by agent posing as pizza delivery person was
constitutional) ; People v. LaGuerre , 815 N.Y.S . 2d 211, 214 (N .Y. App. Div. 2006) (no
due process violation when defendant voluntarily discarded chewing gum from which
DNA sample was taken in the course of a police contrived "Pepsi Taste Test"); State v.
Nedergard , 753 P.2d 526 (Wash. App. 1988) (entry into home by undercover agents
posing as interested buyers responding to "For Sale" sign was permissible means of
establishing probable cause for a search warrant) .
What distinguishes this case most, perhaps, from the bulk of other ruse cases is
the fact that Trooper Manar exploited a citizen's civic desire to assist police in their
official duties for the express purpose of incriminating that citizen . The use of this
particular ruse simply crossed the line of civilized notions of justice and cannot be
sanctioned without vitiating the long established trust and accord our society has placed
with law enforcement. See United States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1990) ("A
ruse entry when the suspect is informed that the person seeking entry is a government
agent but is misinformed as to the purpose for which the agent seeks entry cannot be
justified by consent."); United States v. Turpin, 707 F .2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1983)
("Misrepresentations about the nature of an investigation may be evidence of
coercion ."); SEC v. ESM Government Securities . Inc. , 645 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1981)
("We think it clearly improper for a government agent to gain access to records which
would otherwise be unavailable to him by invoking the private individual's trust in his
government, only to betray that trust."); People v. Daugherty , 514 N.E.2d 228, 233 (III .
App. 1987) ("Where, as here, the law enforcement officer without a warrant uses his
official position of authority and falsely claims that he has legitimate police business to
conduct in order to gain consent to enter the premises when, in fact, his real reason is
to search inside for evidence of a crime, we find that this deception under the
circumstances is so unfair as to be coercive and renders the consent invalid ."); State v.
Schweich , 414 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn . App. 1987) ("Tacit misrepresentation of the
purpose of a search can rise to such a level of deception to invalidate the consent.");
State v. McCrorey, 851 P .2d 1234, 1240 (Wash . App. 1993) (distinguishing between
undercover police activity and police acting in their official capacity actively misstating
their purpose for gaining consent), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Head, 964
P.2d 1187 (Wash . 1998) ; Commonwealth v. Haynes, 577 A.2d 564, 572 (Pa . Super. Ct.
1990) (defendant's consent to be transported to the stationhouse was invalid because
police deceived the defendant as to the true purpose of the trip); United States v.
Giraldo , 743 F.Supp. 152,154 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (defendant's consent was invalid where
officer gained entry to home by claiming to be checking for a possible gas leak).
Accordingly, we find that the deception employed by Trooper Manar in this case was so
unfair and unconscionable as to be coercive and thus, Appellant's consent to a search
of his residence was constitutionally invalid .
Because the record lacks sufficient evidence to support a finding of voluntary
consent, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and Appellant's sentence and
convictions are vacated . This matter is remanded to allow Appellant to withdraw his
guilty pleas pursuant to RCr 8.09 and for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion .
Lambert, CJ, Graves, McAnulty, Minton, and Scott, J.J., concur .
Wintersheimer, J ., dissents in a separate opinion in which Roach, J., joins.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Jeremy Ian Smith
115 North Fourth Street
P .O. Box 7751
Paducah, KY 42002-7751
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Courtney J. Hightower
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : OCTOBER 19, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
(90urf of ~ottfurkg
2004-SC-1009-DG
FREDERICK CARL KRAUSE III
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
03-CA-2092-MR
McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 03-CR-00162-002
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it misinterprets the
clear statement of the circuit judge which found that the police were given consent to
search. The order denying the motion to suppress evidence entered on July 25, 2003
clearly states that the defendants gave consent for the police to search for evidence of
an assault.
The fact that the police intent was to search for drugs did not render the consent
constitutionally invalid . The police ruse did not coerce them into consenting to a
search . The defendants could have refused consent for a search of whatever nature
but chose not to.
Clearly this Court has chosen to substitute its version of the facts for that of the
original trier of the facts. I believe such a substitution is impermissible .
The entry by the trooper and the subsequent search of the residence was proper
because of the voluntary consent and the use of a ruse or deception was justified under
all the circumstances .
The question of voluntary consent turns on the careful scrutiny of all the
surrounding circumstances of any particular case. Cook v. Commonwealth , 826
S .W .2d 329 (Ky. 1992) . In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U .S . 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041,
36 L.Ed.2d. 854 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that the validity of a
purported consent to search was to be determined by a voluntariness test similar to that
which has been used by the court in coerced confession cases. It is a question of fact
to be determined from all of the circumstances. See also 3 LaFave, Wayne R., Search
and Seizure : A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 8.2 (3d Version, 1996) .
Although deception by employment of a ruse is not condoned by the courts, the
limited use of such a device is supported by many cases not only in Kentucky, but also
through the nation . Adcock v. Commonwealth , 967 S .W .2d 6 (Ky. 1998) held that a
ruse used by police to gain entry for the purpose of executing a search warrant, so long
as it is accomplished without the use of force, promotes the underlying purpose of the
Knock and Announce Rule, and is thus constitutional and reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
The majority opinion seeks refuge in the Schneckloth reference to "possible
vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents." Such vulnerability is clearly
misplaced. Krause, then 29-years-of-age, was a person of above average intelligence
who was a director at a local television station . He is a college graduate . He surely
knew he had the right to allow the officer to search without a warrant. The entire
incident was triggered by a tip from a subject arrested by the trooper earlier which
directed the officer's attention to the home on 19th Street.
Persuasive authority can be found in Commonwealth v. Morrison , 275 Pa. Super.
454, 418 A.2d 1378 (1980), in which the consent to search was voluntary even though
procured by police who misrepresented both identity and purpose. State v. Hastings ,
119 Wash.2d 229, 830 P.2d 658 (1992), allowed warrantless entry made after consent
was given as valid despite the use of a ruse; State v. Nedergard , 51 Wash .App . 304,
753 P.2d 526 (1988), held that an undercover officer's use of a ruse to enter the
residence of a suspect by posing as an interested buyer responding to a for sale sign
was permissible as a means of establishing probable cause for a search warrant .
People v. Manieri , 373 N.Y.S. 2d 504 (1975), stated that consent of a hospital patient in
a private room for entry was not vitiated as to police acting in an undercover capacity as
a porter. Other cases following the same general line of the use of deception as Reese
are: Lewis v. United States , 385 U .S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424 (1966); United States v.
Caceres, 440 U .S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979); United States v. White,
401 U .S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed .2d 453 (1971), and United States v. Baldwin , 621
F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1980) ; Commonwealth v. Ginter , 289 Pa. Super. 9, 432 A.2d 1024
(1981). As noted earlier, the voluntariness test for analyzing consent was adopted from
the cases involving coerced confessions . The mere use of a ruse or a strategic
deception does not render a confession involuntary so long as the deception does not
rise to the level of coercion . See Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky.
1999) citing Illinois v. Perkins , 496 U .S . 292, 110 S .Ct. 2394, 110 L .Ed .2d 243(1990) .
When the police deception as to the purpose of the search is used in obtaining
the consent to search, each case must be analyzed with regard to the surrounding
circumstances . United States v. Watson , 423 U.S . 411, 96 S .Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed .2d 598
(1976).
Several jurisdictions have specifically approved the use of deception by police to
gain consent to search . In State v. Johnson , 253 Kan . 356, 856 P.2d 134 (1993), the
police used deception to obtain consent to search the home of the defendant. The
officers misrepresented to the defendant that they were looking for a parole violator
when they were actually seeking evidence regarding the murder of*the victim. In
People v. Zamora , 940 P .2d 939 (Colo .App . 1997), the officers used a ruse stating that
they just wanted
a quick look at the apartment of the defendant in regard to a domestic
dispute in an adjacent apartment. The officers were actually trying to investigate
whether the apartment matched the sexual assault victim's description of the apartment
to which she had been taken . The Colorado court determined that consent to search
may be voluntary even when the person giving consent is not aware of or is
misinformed as to the purpose of the search. The consent by the defendant was a
product of his own free will and intelligently made and the defendant knew he had a
right to refuse entry . The Court concluded that the deception alone does not invalidate
consent but is one factor to be considered in the totality of circumstances .
In People v. Avaos, 47 Cal.App . 4th 1569, 55 Cal .Rptr.2d 450 (1996), police
stopped the defendant and told him that he had been stopped as part of a burglary
investigation . The officer stated that he wanted to search the truck of the defendant for
stolen property in addition to some other contraband . Actually the investigation was in
regard to narcotics. The Court determined that police properly identified themselves
and permitted the search based on the total circumstances and concluded that the
consent was voluntary .
-Here, the officer told Yamada and Krause that he was looking for evidence of an
assault. In attempting to gain entry to search, the officer stated that he wanted to look
under the bed, bedspread and furniture around the house to see if it was consistent
with the description given by the alleged assault victim . Yamada should have clearly
realized that he had incriminating evidence in his room because he wanted to go back
to the room and clean it up before the search . When the officer, with the consent of
Yamada, accompanied him to his room, Yamada quickly tried to hide the incriminating
evidence behind his back. One of the items was a spoon and Yamada told the officer
that the substance on the spoon was cocaine . Upon additional questioning, Yamada
handed over a bag of cocaine from his robe and stated that was all the drugs in the
home .
The officer also asked if he could search Krause's room, and the trial judge
found that the evidence indicated that Krause consented to the search of his room .
This was a separate and distinct consent which was found to be voluntary . Under any
circumstances, the subsequent search and seizure of the contraband from the room
occupied by Krause was valid .
The circumstances of this matter indicated that the officer had a tip that a person
unknown to him had purchased cocaine from Yamada at the residence several hours
before the search. The officer identified himself as a police officer, was in uniform and
never tried to conceal his identity. His conduct was never threatening or coercive . He
never feigned an emergency or exceeded the scope of the consent .
Krause testified at the suppression hearing that he answered the door and he
knew that the officer needed a warrant and that he could say no when they asked to
come into the house. The evidence indicates that neither resident was uncooperative
in giving any consent. The trial judge found that the evidence indicated that Krause
consented to the search of his room.
The surrounding circumstances were essentially that the officer had a tip that a
person unknown to him had purchased cocaine from Yamada at the residence several
hours before the search. The officer was in full uniform and identified himself as a
police officer. His behavior was not threatening or coercive .
Krause had prior contact with law enforcement because he had been convicted
of possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia . He was in his late-20s with a
college education and worked as a television producer at a local station . Clearly, he
was above average intelligence and had experience in the area., Krause also stated
that he was not doing drugs that evening . Several of the cases cited in support of the
majority opinion's position are based on mere conjecture or speculation . Here, the
officer had probable cause to believe that the person he was attempting to arrest was in
the apartment and he could legitimately enter the premises by means of a deception .
Cf. United States v. Phillipps , 497 F.2d 1131 (9t" Cir. 1974) .
Bumper v. North Carolina , 391 U .S . 543, 88 S .Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968),
held that a search cannot be justified when the consent has been given only after the
official conducting the search has asserted that he possessed a warrant . Justice
Stewart held that when a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home
under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent . That is not the situation
presented in this case . This case involved rape and two charges of felonious assault
and whether a rifle was introduced into evidence as a result of improper search. The
Bumper ruse was indeed a coercive technique . That individual believing that the officer
had a warrant, believed that he did not have the ability to refuse . Krause was not in
that position. He or his drug dealer roommate could easily have told the officer to
leave. It is almost beyond belief that any drug dealer with illegal drugs in an apartment
would not resist to the utmost anything other than a search warrant before letting law
enforcement in the premises.
Under all the circumstances, I believe that consent was given and that this
judgment of conviction should be affirmed in all respects.
Roach, J., joins this dissent.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.