COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. MICHAEL EDWARD SEARS
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
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APPELLANT
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 2003-CA-1006
WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2002-CR-0013-001
MICHAEL EDWARD SEARS
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
REVERSING
This appeal is from an opinion of the Court of Appeals which reversed a
conviction of a licensed dentist for allegedly illegally prescribing a controlled substance
under KRS 218A.1404. Sears entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to
three years, with six months to serve and the remainder probated for three years .
The question presented is whether a licensed dentist has the legal right to
prescribe controlled substances for non-patients for non-medical reasons in return for
payment in drugs. Other issues relate to whether KRS 218A .1404 is applicable ;
whether the indictment is facially valid ; whether the trial judge properly overruled the
motion to dismiss and whether the Court of Appeals committed error in reversing the
decision of the trial judge .
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial judge and this Court
accepted discretionary review.
There is little in the way of evidence in this matter because of the conditional
guilty plea . However, the record indicates that Sears, a licensed and practicing dentist,
was indicted on six counts of illegally prescribing controlled substances in violation of
KRS 218A.1404(3) . All six counts of the indictment were similar except for the name of
the drug and the name of the person receiving the prescription .
Sears moved to dismiss for failure to state a charge and for lack of jurisdiction
prior to trial . The motion was denied. Thereafter, he entered a conditional guilty plea to
three counts of illegally prescribing controlled substances. The Commonwealth
recommended a sentence of one year on each count to run consecutively with Sears
serving only six months in prison with the remainder of the sentence probated for three
years. The trial judge accepted this recommendation and entered judgment.
Sears appealed his indictment, arguing that he could not illegally prescribe
controlled substances pursuant to KRS 218A.1404(3), because he was a duly licensed
and practicing dentist with an appropriate IDEA permit . The Court of Appeals found that
the indictment did not charge a crime because Sears was authorized by law to
prescribe controlled substances. Consequently, he could not be found guilty of illegally
prescribing under the statute . The Court of Appeals mentioned that although it is a
crime for a dentist to prescribe controlled substances for an illegitimate medical
purpose, the Commonwealth did not charge or prove that crime against Sears.
At the hearing on the motion, the prosecution proposed to prove at trial that
Sears, without a legitimate medical purpose, wrote prescriptions for Loracet, Oxycontin
and Lortab for several of his friends in exchange for receiving half of the drugs himself.
KRS 218A.1404(3) provides that "no person shall dispense, prescribe, distribute,
or administer any controlled substance except as authorized by law." Pursuant to ยง4 of
the statute "unless another specific penalty is provided in this chapter" a person
violating the prohibition is guilty of a class D felony for the first offense and a class C
felony for a subsequent offense . Sears had no prior record.
KRS 218A .180 is merely a record keeping and prescription format section.
Thus, misdemeanor penalties under subsection 9 could not usurp the penalty
provisions of KRS 218A.1404(4) . That statute provides that unless another penalty is
provided in this chapter, any person who violates the provisions of subsection 3 shall be
guilty of a Class D felony.
A plain reading of KRS 218A.1404(3) clearly states that the crime involved does
not except dentists or other licensed medical persons from its purview. The statute
reads that "no person shall dispense, prescribe, distribute, or administer any controlled
substance except as authorized by law." The Court of Appeals misinterpreted the
words "except as authorized by law" to mean "except when done by a licensed medical
person ." The prescribing of drugs in a manner authorized by law does not relate
exclusively to the status of the prescriber but to the manner and purpose of the
prescription . Accordingly, when a dentist writes a prescription for a purpose not related
to dental treatment or diagnosis, the act of prescribing is not authorized by law.
The Court of Appeals erred in asserting that Sears should have been prosecuted
under KRS 218A .180(3) and therefore would become subject to a misdemeanor charge
under Section 9 of that statute as distinguished from a felony charge . The Court of
Appeals incorrectly concluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction of the case.
The Court of Appeals interpreted the statute too narrowly as to apply to persons not
otherwise licensed to prescribe drugs. Simply having a license to prescribe drugs does
not mean that every time a prescription is written for controlled substances it will
automatically be considered as lawful . Such a finding is determined by consideration of
appropriate evidence. The Commonwealth intended to introduce evidence that this
dentist was intentionally using his license to get controlled drugs into the hands of
others and to receive some kind of payment in drugs for his own personal use. Such
conduct cannot be considered to come within the meaning of the term "authorized by
law." When a prescription is written by a dentist for purposes not related to dental
treatment or diagnosis and is intended to realize some kind of personal benefit for the
person prescribing, such behavior is not authorized by law.
The first principle of statutory construction is to use the plain meaning of the
words used in the statute . See Revenue Cabinet v. O'Daniel , 153 S .W.3d 815 (Ky.
2005). It is abundantly clear that the legislature proscribed illegal prescribing of
controlled substances by any person, not any person except dentists. It exempted, as
not illegal, those instances that are authorized by law. There is no law that authorizes a
dentist to prescribe controlled substances to a non-patient for the purpose of receiving
illicit drugs from such non-patients .
Any argument that a later inactive penalty statute controls rather than the penalty
set out in KRS 218A.1404 is without merit. The clear language of the statute
immunizes a licensed practitioner from violation only. The obligation of the Court is to
construe the statutes so as to effectuate the plain meaning and unambiguous intent
expressed by the law. See Phelps v. Commonwealth , 125 S.W.3d 237 (Ky. 2004).
This interpretation does not deviate from the plain and unambiguous intent of the
legislature.
The contention that the charge should have been that of a Class A misdemeanor
is equally specious. The obvious purpose of the statute is to prohibit illegally allowing
drugs to get into the possession of those seeking them for an unlawful purpose . The
grand jury properly indicted Sears for the felonious acts he was conducting .
The indictment is valid on its face and conforms to the requirements of RCr 6.10.
There is nothing defective or facially invalid about the indictment here. The trial judge
properly rejected an attempt by Sears to summarily defeat a valid indictment .
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 905 S.W .2d 83 (Ky.App .1995), states that "the law in
Kentucky concerning the dismissal of an indictment is clear. The rule is that there is no
authority for the use of summary judgment procedure in a criminal prosecution . . .." The
indictment is regular on its face and contains a plain, concise and definite statement of
the essential facts which comprise the offenses which are charged . Sears knew exactly
what he would have to defend against in this criminal prosecution . He was given notice
by the indictment itself, and the trial judge ordered full disclosure of the prosecution
case against Sears. He also had an opportunity to seek clarification of the indictment
further by moving for a bill of particulars but rather chose to move to dismiss . Cf.
generally Commonwealth v. Welch , 243 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1951).
It is the holding of this Court that a licensed dentist with a required IDEA permit
does not have the lawful authority to prescribe controlled substances to non-patients for
non-medical reasons in return for payment in the form of the illicit drugs . KRS
218A.1404 is applicable and the indictment is valid.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the conviction and
sentence rendered by the trial judge is affirmed and reinstated . The trial judge was
correct in overruling the motion to dismiss the indictment.
Roach, Scott and Minton, JJ., concur . Lambert, C.J., dissents by separate
opinion and Graves and McAnulty, JJ ., join.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Robert E . Prather
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Darrell L. Saunders
700 Master Street
P.O. Box 1324
Corbin, KY 40702-1324
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 22, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
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Courf of irufurhV
2004-SC-000738-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-001006
WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT NO. 02-CR-00013-001
MICHAEL EDWARD SEARS
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
Appellee, Michael Sears, is a duly licensed dental practitioner . Sears was
charged with six counts of illegally prescribing controlled substances, a felony under
KRS 218A.1404(3) . The Commonwealth alleged that Sears prescribed controlled
substances for persons who were not his patients in return for their agreement to share
the substances with him.
After Sears' motion to dismiss the indictment was denied, an agreement
was made with the Commonwealth whereby three of the charges were dismissed and
he entered a conditional guilty plea to the three remaining charges. The trial court
sentenced Sears to one year on each count to run consecutively for a total of three
years, with incarceration probated . The Court of Appeals reversed Sears' convictions .
The indictment charged Sears with the felony of illegally prescribing a
controlled substance in violation of KRS 218A .1404(3) . This statute provides :
No person shall dispense, prescribe, distribute, or administer
any controlled substance except as authorized by law.
However, subsection (4) of KRS 218A .1404 provides in pertinent part:
Unless another specific penalty is provided in this chapter,
any person who violates the provisions of . subsection . . . (3)
of this section shall be guilty of a Class D felony for the first
offense and a Class C felony for subsequent offenses[ .]
Sears contends that as he is a licensed dental practitioner and is thereby
authorized by law to dispense, prescribe, distribute or administer controlled substances,
he cannot be guilty of violating the statute under which he was charged because KRS
218A .1404(4) mandates that another statutory provision be applied to his conduct .
Rather, Sears insists that KRS 218A .170(3)(a) and KRS 218A.180(3)(a) are controlling .
If this is so, by the mandate of KRS 218A.1404(4), we must apply the other statutory
provisions.
Analyzing Sears' claim, it appears that pursuant to KRS 218A .170(3)(a), a
practitioner may prescribe a controlled substance "only for a legitimate medical purpose
and in the course of professional practice ." It is undisputed that Sears is a practitioner
authorized to prescribe, etc., but from the evidence it is equally clear that his prescribing
in this case was not for a legitimate medical purpose and in the course of his
professional practice . Thus, it would appear that KRS 218A.1 70(3)(a) is applicable .
The next section, KRS 218A.180(3)(a), appears to precisely cover Sears' conduct. This
statute conditions the validity of the prescription of a controlled substance on whether it
is "for a legitimate medical purpose by a practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice ." Manifestly, Sears' conduct was not for a legitimate medical
purpose nor was it in the usual course of his professional medical practice, but he was
indeed a practitioner . The conclusion is inescapable . Sears violated KRS 218A.180(3) .
As required by KRS 218 .1404(4), where there is "another specific penalty"
it must be applied . The penalty for violating KRS 218A .180(3) is found in KRS
218A .180(9). A first offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor . As it is
undisputed that this was Sears' first offense, his offense was a misdemeanor .
In another circumstance, where two statutes apply, this Court might have
the option of concluding that either are applicable and affirm a judgment whereby a
party is convicted of one or the other. But that is not the case here. The reason is that
KRS 218A .1404(4) tells us that subsection (3) may be used only if no other "specific
penalty is provided in this chapter." As another specific penalty is provided in this
chapter, i.e., KRS 218A.180(9), it must be applied or KRS 218A.1404(4) is rendered
meaningless .
Accordingly, I dissent.
Graves and McAnulty, JJ., join this dissenting opinion .
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