MICHAEL ALLEN TANNER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL ATOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 23, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-0641-MR
MICHAEL ALLEN TANNER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN GRISE, JUDGE
2002-CR-0588
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING AND VACATING IN PART
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Tanner of
first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, theft
by unlawful taking and being a second-degree persistent felony offender . He was
sentenced to life in prison.
Tanner presents the following two questions for review: 1) whether he was twice
placed in jeopardy for the same offense when he was convicted and sentenced for firstdegree robbery and theft; and 2) whether the prosecutor impermissibly defined
reasonable doubt.
The victim testified that someone crashed through her door one evening, forcibly
subdued her and covered her head . She was then beaten, raped, sodomized and
robbed . The victim heard two different voices, but was unable to identify the individuals
because the one who had first subdued her had covered his face as well as her own .
She was able to confirm that the burglars had taken a .22 caliber rifle, a shotgun, a $20bill and a collection of commemorative state quarters .
Tanner and Phelps were eventually arrested for the crimes. As it turns out, both
individuals had previously done some yard work at the home of the victim. Phelps
testified against Tanner at his trial. According to him, Tanner was the one who
suggested burglarizing the home of the victim . Phelps admitted that he kicked in the
door and forcibly subdued the victim. He also stated that both he and Tanner kicked
the woman in the side . Phelps denied committing any of the sexual assaults . He did
indicate that he carried out of the house the stolen items collected by Tanner.
The jury convicted Tanner of rape, sodomy, burglary and robbery, all in the first
degree, as well as theft by unlawful taking and being a second-degree persistent felony
offender . He was sentenced to an enhanced term of life in prison on all of the charges
except the theft, for which he received an enhanced term of ten years in prison. This
appeal followed .
l . Double Jeopardy.
Tanner argues that he was twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when
he was convicted and sentenced for first-degree robbery and theft. He admits that this
issue was not properly preserved, but seeks review pursuant to RCr 10.26 . The
Commonwealth concedes error.
Although this argument is not preserved, this Court continues to adhere to the
rule that double jeopardy questions may be reviewed on appeal despite the failure to
preserve the issue in the trial court . Beaty v. Commonwealth , 125 S .W.3d 196 (Ky.
2003); Baker v. Commonwealth , 922 S.W .2d 371, 374 (Ky. 1996) ; Sherley v.
Commonwealth , 558 S .W .2d 615, 618 (Ky. 1977) .
The test in Kentucky for determining whether multiple prosecutions are
impermissible for the same course of conduct parallels the federal rule announced in
Blockburger v. United States , 284 U .S . 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed . 306 (1932). See
Beaty, 125 S .W.3d at 210 ; Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S .W.2d 805 (Ky. 1996) . In
Blockburger, the Supreme Court determined that :
The applicable rule is that, where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one is whether'each provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.
Blockburger, 284 U.S . at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182 . This test was expressly adopted in
Burge, and was codified in KRS 505 .020.
On the morning of trial, the theft count was amended to eliminate the language
"valued over $300." The reason being, two of the alleged items stolen were a shotgun
and a rifle and the stealing of a firearm is a class D felony regardless of its value . Both
the instruction on first-degree robbery and theft by unlawful taking were premised on
Tanner stealing firearms, cash and coins, although the latter charge specified the
firearms were a shotgun and a rifle.
Under the facts presented here, because all of the elements of theft as set forth
in KRS 514 .030 are incorporated into the robbery statute (KRS Chapter 515), Tanner
was impermissibly subjected to double jeopardy . United States Constitution
Amendment V; Kentucky Constitution, Section 13 ; Jordan v. Commonwealth , 703
S.W .2d 870 (Ky. 1985); McKee v . Commonwealth , 720 S .W .2d 343 (Ky.App. 1986);
KRS 515.020 commentary (1974) . Consequently, we must reverse and vacate that part
of the judgment that convicted Tanner of theft by unlawful taking and sentenced him to
an enhanced term of ten years in prison .
II . Defining Reasonable Doubt
Tanner contends that his conviction should be reversed because the prosecutor
allegedly sought to define reasonable doubt during voir dire. He concedes that this
issue is not preserved, but asks this Court to review it under our palpable error rule.
RCr 10.26 and KRE 103(e) .
The comments by the prosecutor were to the effect that "beyond a shadow of a
doubt" is not the same as "beyond a reasonable doubt." Notably, he stated that neither
he, nor defense counsel, nor the trial judge could define reasonable doubt because
such a definition was up to the jury to determine . The prosecutor here made virtually
the same statements in Johnson v. Commonwealth ,
S .W.3d
(Ky. 2005), and
we determined that at worst, the error was harmless in that case . Accordingly, there
can be no palpable error here.
The judgment of conviction is affirmed, except that part which convicts Tanner of
theft by unlawful taking and sentences him to an enhanced term of ten years in prison
is reversed and vacated .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Julie Namkin
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Ian G . Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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