DAVID OSBORNE, ET AL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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DAVID OSBORNE, ET AL.
V.
APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 2002-CA-002280-MR
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION 1, NO. 2001-CI-00195
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE SCOTT
AFFIRMING
This case comes to us on discretionary review of the Court of Appeals'
opinion, which held that county jails, not the Commonwealth, are .responsible for
paying the cost of providing psychotropic medications to inmates incarcerated at
those county jails pursuant to KRS § 441 .045(3) . In so ruling, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Franklin Circuit Court granting a sua sponte
motion for summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Commonwealth of Kentucky.
For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
1.
FACTS
This case arose over a dispute between the jailer at the Daviess County
Detention Center ("DCDC") and the Cabinet for Health Services' ("CHS")
' Following a reorganization of executive branch cabinets, the Cabinet for Health
Services was renamed the Cabinet for Health and Family Services .
regarding the financial responsibility for providing psychotropic medications to
indigent inmates incarcerated at the DCDC. The Appellant, David Osborne,
.
is currently jailer for the Daviess County Detention Center ("DCDC") 2 Prior to
Osborne taking the position, his predecessor, Harold Taylor, initiated a suit in
Franklin Circuit Court, arguing that KRS § 441 .047(1) places the financial
responsibility on the Commonwealth to provide indigent prisoners with
psychotropic medications . Appellants also argued that since KRS § 441 .047
was enacted later in time and is more specific than KRS § 441 .045, it is the
controlling statute and repeals the latter by implication . Appellees, Cabinet
for Health Services and the Department of Finance, in turn argued that KRS §
441 .045(3) directs county jails to cover the costs of providing "necessary
medical, dental and psychological care" for indigent inmates . Appellants'
motion for summary judgment was denied, and the Franklin Circuit Court,
Crittenden, J ., granted a sua sponte summary judgment in favor of Appellees.
In its opinion and order, the Franklin Circuit Court, utilizing statutory
construction, held that the two statutes could, and should, be harmonized so as
to give effect to both. Further, the court noted that if the General Assembly had
intended for KRS § 441 .047 to repeal KRS § 441 .045, it would have done so
explicitly. Notably, the court found that KRS § 441 .047 was enacted to save
taxpayers' money by utilizing state-operated or state-supported psychiatric
facilities as opposed to facilities in the private sector . KRS § 441 .045, on the
other hand, specifically requires the county jail to cover the cost of providing
"necessary medical, dental and psychological care to indigent inmates in the jail ."
2 The other named Appellant in this case is Daviess County, Kentucky .
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The circuit court held that the term "psychological care" encompasses
psychotropic medications, and as such, the jailer remains responsible for paying
the costs of administering these medicines to indigent inmates while they are
incarcerated in the jail.
The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the circuit court properly
construed KRS § 441 .045 to require the county jails to cover the costs of
psychotropic medications as part of necessary psychological care .
II. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Construction
Because the outcome of this appeal turns on whether the lower courts
properly construed the statutes at issue, this Court feels compelled to reiterate
the means by which courts in the Commonwealth must resolve apparent conflicts
between statutory provisions.
Because the construction and application of statutes is a question of law, it
is subject to de novo review on appeal . See Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu v.
Transportation Cabinet ,
983
S.W.2d
488, 490 (Ky. 1998) .
Furthermore, the
Legislature's intention in enacting a statute must be justified by the language,
and no unjustifiable intention may be read into the statute . See Gateway Const.
Co. v. Wallbaum , 356 S.W .2d
247, 249 (Ky.
1962).
The primary rule is to ascertain the intention from the words
employed in enacting the statute and not to guess what the
Legislature may have intended but did not express . Resort must be
had first to the words, which are decisive if they are clear. The
words of the statute are to be given their usual, ordinary, and
everyday meaning.
Id . (citations omitted) .
Although this Court and the Court of Appeals have held that a later
enacted statute generally controls, see e .g ., Brown v. Hoblitzell , 307 S.W.2d 739
(Ky. 1957) ; Williams v. Commonwealth , 829 S .W .2d 942, 944 (Ky.App. 1992),
this Court has also recognized that "[w]here there is an apparent conflict between
statutes or sections thereof, it is the duty of the court to try to harmonize the
interpretation of the law so as to give effect to both sections or statutes if
possible ." Ledford v. Faulkner , 661 S .W . 2d 475, 476 (Ky. 1983) . Furthermore,
this Court presumes that the Legislature knew of pre-existing statutes when it
enacted a later statute on the same subject matter. See Shewmaker v.
Commonwealth , 30 S .W.3d 807 (Ky.App . 2000) . Although repeal by implication
is recognized, there is also a presumption that if the Legislature intended a
subsequent act to repeal a former one, it will express itself to that end so as to
leave no doubt about its purpose . See Tipton v. Brown, 277 Ky. 625, 126
S .W .2d 1067 (Ky. 1939) . In short, courts must use repeal by implication as a last
resort when the repugnancy of the conflict can admit no other reasonable
construction . See Kentucky Off-Track Bettina, Inc. v. McBurney, 993 S.W.2d 946
(Ky. 1999) .
B. The Court of Appeals properly held that county jails remain
responsible for the costs of providing psychotropic medications to
indigent prisoners.
Having thoroughly addressed the rules regarding statutory construction,
we now turn to the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
affirming the circuit court's determination that the county jails are responsible for
the costs of providing psychotropic medications to indigent inmates in the jail.
KRS § 441 .045(3) provides, in pertinent part, that "the cost of providing
necessary medical, dental, and psychological care for indigent prisoners in the
jail shall be paid from the jail budget." (Emphasis added) . Clearly this statute
places the financial responsibility for covering all aspects of an inmate's
psychological care on the county jail . As the lower courts have found,
psychotropic medications must necessarily fall within the rubric of psychological
care . It is our opinion that there can be very little else that this portion of the
statute would otherwise address.
I n contrast, KRS § 441 .047(1) provides that
[w]henever a prisoner confined in the county jail is in need of
psychiatric or similar evaluation, treatment, or services, it shall be
the responsibility of the Commonwealth to provide such evaluation,
treatment, or services at the expense of the Commonwealth at the
nearest state-operated or state-supported facility suitable for the
provision of the required evaluation, treatment, or services at no
cost to the county.
Although Appellees are correct in that KRS § 441 .047 has traditionally
been cited in competency evaluations for criminal defendants, such a conclusion
is irrelevant as to whether or not subsection (1) requires reversal of the Court of
Appeals . The plain language of KRS § 441 .047(1) reveals that this portion of the
statute clearly applies to those situations where an indigent inmate receives
"psychiatric evaluations, treatment or services" at a nearby state-supported or
state-operated psychiatric facility. It is only when this "in-house" treatment is
rendered that the Commonwealth is responsible for the costs associated with
3 KRS § 441 .047(2) deals specifically with psychiatric evaluations of criminal
defendants and the language of this subsection is nearly identical to that found in
subsection (1) cited and addressed in this opinion .
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such services . 4 By "in-house" we mean any treatment rendered at a statesupported or state-operated facility or other suitable private facility outside the
confines of the county jail .
As we have stated on previous occasions, this Court believes that if the
Legislature intended for a later-enacted statute to repeal a former one, it will
express itself to that end . We find no indication the Legislature, in enacting KRS
§ 441 .047, in any way intended to repeal KRS § 441 .045 . In fact, KRS §
441 .047(4) refers back to KRS § 441 .045 for the terms and conditions of
payment . Although Appellants would have this Court find the two statutes at
issue to be in conflict so that we might then have to find the later-enacted and
more specific statute controlling, we find no conflict between the statutes .
It is the opinion of this Court that KRS § 441 .047 was enacted to curtail
the costs to taxpayers associated with "psychiatric evaluations, treatment or
services" provided to indigent inmates and criminal defendants by rendering
these services "in-house" at state-operated or state-supported facilities . If the
Legislature intended for county jails to be absolved of the financial responsibility
of psychological care for indigent inmates, including the rendering of
4 Appellant's argument KRS § 441 .047 does not apply solely to "in-house"
treatment due to the language of subsection (3) is in error. A logical
understanding of the clear language of subsection (3) reveals that the first
sentence provides only for the psychiatric evaluation of criminal defendants at
county jails (or other suitable facilities) in connection with criminal proceedings
when no state-operated or state-supported facility is within a reasonable distance
from the jail . However, the second sentence of subsection (3) does apply to
evaluations, treatments, or services but requires the county jail to first make a
request for CHS to provide the evaluation, treatment or services before CHS has
any obligation to provide such services . KRS § 441 .047(4) also requires the
reasonable costs of providing psychiatric evaluations, treatment, or services to
be paid from the State Treasury when local resources are utilized because it is
either an emergency situation or the Cabinet for Health Services cannot provide
such services .
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psychotropic medications while they are incarcerated in the county jail, it would
have expressed itself definitively to that conclusion, and it would have done so by
expressly repealing KRS § 441 .045.
Finally, we should address any lingering questions as to whether the trial
court was correct in disposing of this case by summary judgment . The standard
for summary judgment in Kentucky is well-settled . In Steelvest . Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc. , 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991), this Court announced that
summary judgment "should only be used `to terminate litigation when, as a matter
of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce
evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor and against the movant."'
(Citation omitted) . A trial court may also grant summary judgment in favor of a
non-moving party "where overruling the [movant's] motion for summary judgment
necessarily would require a determination that the [non-moving party was]
entitled to the relief asked, [and] a motion for summary judgment by the [nonmoving party] would have been a useless formality." Collins v. Duff , 283 S.W.2d
179, 183 (Ky. 1955) . This also requires that the trial judge have all pertinent
issues before him at the time the case is submitted . See Green v. Bourbon
County Joint Planning Commission , 637 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Ky. 1982) .
In reviewing the record before us, the majority of this Court believes that
the trial court correctly applied the law on summary judgments . We do not
believe the Appellants in this case were in any way prejudiced by the court's
granting a sua sponte summary judgment. The circuit court had but one issue to
decide, and the outcome hinged upon a matter of law. The circuit court also had
all pertinent issues before it prior to ruling in favor of Appellees. Furthermore, in
denying Appellants' motion for summary judgment, the trial court needed only to
consider the plain meaning of the statutes at issue and find that, as a matter of
law, Daviess County Detention Center was responsible for covering the costs of
psychotropic medications rendered to indigent inmates incarcerated in that
facility .
For these reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur, except Wintersheimer, J ., who concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS :
C. Thomas Hectus
Randall S . Strause
Hectus & Strause PLLC
804 Stone Creek Pkwy., Suite 1
Louisville, Kentucky 40223
COUNSEL FOR APPELANTS :
Patrick McGee
General Counsel
Finance and Administration Cabinet
Room 374 Capital Annex
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
David E. Fleenor
John Hunter Walker
Wesley R. Butler
Office of General Counsel
Cabinet for Health Services
275 East Main Street, Suite 5W-B
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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