COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. HON. JAMES GREEN, JUDGE JEFFERSON DISTRICT COURT AND DAMON RICHARD CLAYTON; AND DONALD WAYNE DAVIS
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2004-SC-000534-DG
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COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
S-2-
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-000410
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2003-CI-000377
HON. JAMES GREEN, JUDGE,
JEFFERSON DISTRICT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
DAMON RICHARD CLAYTON; AND
DONALD WAYNE DAVIS
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE ROACH
REVERSING
The Commonwealth appeals the denial of its petition for a writ of prohibition
against the Honorable James Green, a Jefferson County District Judge.' The
Commonwealth sought the writ after the District Court granted motions by Davis and
Clayton,2 over the Commonwealth's objection, for bench trials of various misdemeanor
traffic violations, including, for both men, first-offense driving under the influence (DUI).
Although Green was a presiding judge of the Jefferson District Court when this
case originated, he no longer serves in that capacity .
2 Clayton, designated a Real Party in Interest, neither appeared nor filed a brief
before either this Court or the Court of Appeals. As such, this opinion addresses only
those arguments raised and addressed by Davis, the second designated Real Party in
Interest.
At issue is the scope of the Commonwealth's right to demand that such cases be tried
by a jury under RCr 9.26(1) . The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the Commonwealth's
request for a writ and the Court of Appeals affirmed . We granted the Commonwealth's
Motion for Discretionary Review and now reverse the Court of Appeals.
I. Background
The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute . Davis was stopped on the
evening of August 28, 2002 after he was observed running two stop signs . He admitted
to having consumed alcohol, and a breath test determined that his blood alcohol content
was 0 .091, which exceeded the legal limit. Davis was arrested and charged with firstoffense DUl and two counts of disregarding a stop sign .
On September 3, 2002, the district court held a pretrial conference, during which
the case was scheduled for a jury trial to be held on November 27, 2002. On November
19, 2002, Davis's counsel advanced the case and made a motion for a bench trial. The
Commonwealth refused to consent to Davis's waiver of his right to a jury trial, citing RCr
9.26(1) in its objection, and moved for a jury trial, noting that the parties had previously
agreed on this point during the pre-trial conference . Despite the Commonwealth's
3 In reality, the existence of any explicit agreement between the parties as to
whether the trial would be tried to the bench or to a jury is not apparent from the record .
That being said, the Commonwealth implies that the parties agreed to a jury trial at the
pre-trial conference and Davis does not specifically dispute this point. Although not
addressed in his brief, at oral argument Davis's counsel stated :
One point that the Commonwealth made regarding our demanding of a
jury trial. At the arraignment, I think a trial was asked for. I don't know if
we specifically asked for a jury trial or not. It "went down" as a jury trial. It
could have been just a motion for a trial date. We don't have the
transcript, but, you know, at the arraignment trial dates can be made, but
strategy changes later.
objection, the district court granted Davis's motion and the case was set for a bench trial
on January 15, 2003.
On January 13, 2003, the Commonwealth sought a writ of prohibition and
mandamus from the Jefferson Circuit Court prohibiting the district court from proceeding
with the bench trial as scheduled . The Commonwealth argued that, pursuant to RCr
9.26(1), its consent was required before the district court could order a bench trial.
Davis argued that RCr 9 .26(1) was inapplicable because first-offense DUI is a petty
offense and is not "required to be tried by a jury." After a hearing, the circuit court
denied the Commonwealth's request for a writ, holding that RCr 9.26(1) was
inapplicable to cases of this type, that is, a misdemeanor case not charged by
indictment or information . The circuit court also noted that the Commonwealth had not
shown any evidence of "irreparable injury" as a prerequisite for issuance of a writ.
The Commonwealth appealed the circuit court's denial of the writ to the Court of
Appeals which held that, as a petty offense, DUI was not "required to be tried by a jury
for purposes of RCr 9.26(1), and the Commonwealth's consent is not required for a
bench trial to be conducted." We granted the Commonwealth's motion for discretionary
review.
II. Analysis
A. Prerequisites for the Issuance of an Extraordinary Writ
Because this is a writ case, we must first determine whether the Commonwealth
satisfied the prerequisites for this extraordinary remedy. "We have divided writ cases
into `two classes,' which are distinguished by `whether the inferior court allegedly is (1)
At the very least, Davis acknowledged that the case was initially set for a jury trial
without objection from his counsel . At most, his comment that "strategy changes later"
implies that, at least initially, he intended to try the case before a jury .
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acting without jurisdiction (which includes `beyond its jurisdiction'), or (2) acting
erroneously within its jurisdiction ."' Indep . Order of Foresters v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d
610, 613 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Bender v. Eaton, 343 S .W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961)) . Here,
there is no allegation that the district court acted outside its jurisdiction in granting
Davis's motion for a bench trial . Rather, the premise of the Commonwealth's argument
is that the district court acted erroneously in granting the bench trial . The following
general standard applies in writ cases where the trial court is alleged to have been
acting erroneously :
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing . . . that the lower
court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its
jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise
and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not
granted .
Hoskins v. Maricle , 150 S .W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004); see also Bender, 343 S.W .2d at 801
("In the second class of cases relief ordinarily has not been granted unless the petitioner
established, as conditions precedent, that he (a) had no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise, and (b) would suffer great and irreparable injury (if error has been committed
and relief denied) .").
A petitioner must first show that there will be no adequate remedy by appeal if a
writ does not issue, a requirement that is easily satisfied in this case. If the district court
proceeds with a bench trial, as has been ordered, jeopardy will attach and retrial by a
jury will be prohibited under KRS 505 .030 . This alone is sufficient to demonstrate the
lack of an adequate remedy by appeal .
However, the second prerequisite-that denial of the writ will result in great and
irreparable injury--cannot be established in this case . We have defined the phrase
"great and irreparable" injury as "something of a ruinous nature ." Bender, 343 S.W .2d at
801 . While the Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in ensuring that criminal
proceedings are resolved in an appropriate manner, we simply cannot say that being
forced to try this case before the bench is the sort of grievous injury that justifies the
granting of an extraordinary writ. The fact that the underlying charges in this case are
designated as misdemeanors, as opposed to serious felonies, only reinforces the
soundness of that conclusion. Ultimately, given the facts in this case, we agree with the
circuit court, which wrote in the order denying the writ, "[T]he Commonwealth will still be
able to present evidence in the same fashion as it would before a jury. The fact that it
will have to present the evidence to a judge rather than a jury should have no
detrimental effect on its ability to obtain a fair judgment." The Commonwealth has
simply failed to show that it will suffer great and irreparable injury if this particular case
is tried via bench trial.
Such a failure would normally signal the end of the discussion, but we have, in
some cases, carved out a limited exception to our requirement that the petitioner
demonstrate great and irreparable injury.
[I]n certain special cases this Court will entertain a petition for prohibition
in the absence of a showing of specific great and irreparable injury to the
petitioner, provided a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the
lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is
necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration .
It may be observed that in such a situation the court is recognizing that if it
fails to act the administration of justice generally will suffer the great and
irreparable injury.
Bender , 343 S .W .2d at 801 . This narrow exception has typically applied "in those
limited situations where the action for which the writ is sought would blatantly violate the
law, for example, by breaching a tightly guarded privilege or by contradicting the clear
requirements of a civil rule." Chauvin, 175 S .W.3d at 616-17. In Bender, our
predecessor court issued a writ to correct a trial court's erroneous application of one of
our civil rules, noting :
(I]f an erroneous order results in a substantial miscarriage of justice and
the orderly administration of our Civil Rules necessitates an expression of
our views, we may, and in the proper case should, decide the issue
presented .
If, as contended, the contested order requires the petitioners to
disclose material written information to their adversaries in violation of a
specific Civil Rule, there will be a substantial miscarriage of justice,
particularly since the Rule involved was expressly adopted for the
protection of those in petitioner's position.
In addition, and perhaps this is the most compelling consideration,
the proper construction and application of the Rule in question (CR 37 .32)
is important to the orderly administration of our Civil Rules . This Rule is
relatively new and had no predecessor in our Civil Code or the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. We have not heretofore had occasion to pass
upon its meaning or effect. Under these circumstances, a decision would
be of value to the Bench and Bar of Kentucky.
Bender , 343 S .W.2d at 802 .
The central dispute in this case involves the proper interpretation and application
of one our criminal rules, namely RCr 9.26(1), which is instrumental in determining
whether a criminal defendant's trial will be conducted before either a jury or a judge .
Although we have had numerous cases considering other aspects of RCr 9.26, this is
the first case where we have been presented with the issue of the applicability of the
rule's waiver requirements, particularly the Commonwealth's ability to demand a jury
trial, in cases involving misdemeanor offenses . Moreover, even with the limited record
that is before us, it appears that RCr 9.26(1) has been applied inconsistently by some of
the state's trial courts . In its Motion for Discretionary Review, the Commonwealth
documented several other cases in which Jefferson Circuit Court judges issued writs to
prohibit the district court from conducting bench trials over the Commonwealth's
objection on misdemeanor DUI charges. Ultimately, though we are not defining the
contours of a newly-enacte d rule, as was the case in Bender, ensuring the proper
application and construction of RCr 9.26(1) is of sufficient importance to justify
considering the Commonwealth's writ petition.
B. The District Court's Order for a Bench Trial
Having determined that the extraordinary remedy of a writ is available in this
case, we now turn to the merits of the Commonwealth's claim,-namely, whether the
district court erred in ordering a bench trial over the Commonwealth's objection . As we
have alluded, this case primarily involves the proper construction of RCr 9.26(1) which
reads :
Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant
waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent
of the Commonwealth .
Understanding the phrase "cases required to be tried by a jury" is the key to our
decision here because it delineates the class of cases to which the rule applies . The
meaning of this phrase, however, is somewhat ambiguous .
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental guarantee of our legal system .
Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed," and Section 7 of
the Kentucky Constitution, which provides that "[t]he ancient mode of trial
by jury shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate,"
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to trial by jury.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 113 S .W.3d 128,131 (Ky. 2003). Although the
constitutional guarantee of a jury trial has traditionally been limited to the prosecution of
"serious" offenses, the General Assembly of Kentucky has expanded the jury trial
guarantee to all criminal prosecutions . KRS 29A.270(1) provides :
Defendants shall have the right to a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions,
including prosecutions for violations of traffic laws, in the Circuit and
District Courts. The defendant may request a jury trial at any time prior to
the time his case is called for trial.
By its terms, of course, RCr 9.26(1) is only applicable to those "cases required to be
tried by a jury" and would not necessarily apply in a case where a jury trial might be
available, but is not technically required . This subtle distinction is at the heart of Davis's
argument and is the key to our decision herein.
In its opinion and order denying the Commonwealth's writ petition, the circuit
court cited to Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, which sets forth some of the
basic rights afforded to a criminal defendant, among them the right to a jury trial. That
section provides, in relevant part:
[The accused] cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor
can he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment
of his peers or the law of the land ; and in prosecutions by indictment or
information, he shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
vicinage . . . .
The Circuit Court held, based on the language of Section 11, that the only criminal
"cases required to be tried by jury" are "prosecutions by indictment or information" and
that the consent requirement of RCr 9 .26(1) did not apply because the defendants in
this case had not been prosecuted in that manner. While the simplicity of this approach
is somewhat appealing, it ignores significant complicating factors .
Among these factors are several older cases discussing the common law right to
trial by jury under Kentucky law. Because they were decided before both the adoption
of the relevant criminal rule and the enactment of KRS 29A.270, these cases are not
dispositive of the issue . They are nonetheless informative as they trace the
development of the common law on this issue, culminating in the adoption of RCr 9 .26.
Until 1975, our predecessor court had uniformly held that a defendant who had
pleaded not guilty was prohibited from waiving his right to a jury trial in a felony case .
See, e.g., Tackett v. Commonwealth , 302 S.W.2d 299 (Ky. 1959) ("[The] constitutional
right [to trial by jury] cannot be waived in a felony case."). The Court had, however,
departed from the strict no-waiver rules in misdemeanor prosecutions, holding that
misdemeanor defendants were entitled to waive some, if not all, of the protections
afforded by their right to a jury trial:
We think the time has come to abandon the romantic aspects of the
ancient mode of trial by jury and consider the matter pragmatically . No one
questions the right of a defendant in a criminal case to invoke the
protection of any or all of his constitutional rights . On the other hand, we
can find no sound reason to deny him the right of waiving procedural
requirements which exist principally for his benefit. We have recognized
that he can waive a jury completely by pleading guilty . He can waive the
right to counsel, the right to freedom from self-incrimination, the right to
have excluded evidence obtained by unreasonable search or seizure, and
at least in misdemeanor cases, the right to a 12-man jury. On what logical
basis is unanimity a more sacred right?
It is true this Court has heretofore adhered to the theory that in a
felony case the defendant cannot waive a 12-man jury . A serious
question may be raised as to whether a valid distinction can be made
between the waiver of defendant's rights in felony cases on the one hand
and misdemeanors on the other. We do not have that question here and
will not re-examine it .
It is our conviction that at least in misdemeanor cases the
defendant may waive not only a 12-man jury but unanimity of the jurors in
reaching their verdict, provided always that such waiver agreement is
entered into understandingly and voluntarily, and provided of course the
Commonwealth agrees and the trial court approves.
Ashton v. Commonwealth , 405 S.W .2d 562, 571 (Ky. 1965), rev'd in part sub nom.
Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966) (internal citations omitted) . In Short v.
Commonwealth , 519 S .W.2d 828 (Ky. 1975), our predecessor court held that a felony
defendant was entitled to waive his right to a jury trial, although that opinion included an
important caveat: "the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in criminal cases is
of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can
become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court
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must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Id . a t
833. After Short, therefore, criminal defendants in Kentucky, whether charged with a
misdemeanor or felony, were permitted to waive their right to trial by jury, provided that
such waiver was approved by both the Commonwealth and the trial court. In 1981, we
adopted the current RCr 9.26 "which essentially codifies the holding in Short .
Jackson, 113 S.W.3d at 131-32.
Perhaps the most significant complicating factor, however, is the fact that the
General Assembly, via KRS 29A.270, has seen fit to extend the right to a jury trial to
defendants in @ny criminal prosecution . As noted above, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the circuit court's decision denying the writ, but did so for slightly different reasons,
acknowledging the role of KRS 29A.270. The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Donta
v. Commonwealth, 858 S .W.2d 719 (Ky. App . 1993), in which the misdemeanor
conviction of a defendant was upheld despite the fact that he had. been absent from
trial. Donta argued that he was improperly denied his right to a jury trial, as guaranteed
by KRS 29A.270 and the Kentucky Constitution, but the court rejected those arguments,
stating,
True enough, KRS 29A.270 guarantees defendants jury trials in all
criminal prosecutions, including those for even the most minor types of
offenses . However, by stating that a "request" for a jury trial may be made
at any time prior to the time a case is called for trial, this statute by
implication imposes a clear burden on the accused to make a demand for
a jury trial.
Here, appellant never requested a jury trial. Although RCr 9.26(1)
mandates that "[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless
the defendant waives a jury trial in writing," we are of the opinion that in
the absence of a request for a jury trial pursuant to KRS 29A.270, this rule
should not be construed as intending to mandate that a jury trial must be
conducted in every criminal case no matter how minor the charged
offense might be. Indeed, Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution has long
been construed as guaranteeing an accused the right to a jury trial only to
the extent that such a right existed at common law. See Wendlingv
.
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Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S.W. 205 (1911). Further, our courts
have long recognized that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in
cases involving petty offenses because no such right existed in such
cases at common law. See City of Mt. Sterling v. Holly, 108 Ky. 621, 57
S.W. 491 (1900) . It follows, therefore, that if the offense with which
appellant was charged was not one which was required to be tried by a
jury at common law, the court did not err here by failing to conduct a jury
trial .
Id. at 723-24 . Although the factual and procedural circumstances between this case
and Donta are clearly distinguishable, the Court of Appeals concluded correctly that its
earlier opinion had defined the scope of "cases required to be tried by a jury" in RCr
9 .26(1) and that "petty offenses" are not, in and of themselves contained within that
class of cases.
Although the point is vigorously argued by the Commonwealth, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the crimes for which Davis has been charged, including first
offense DUI, are "petty offenses," at least as that term has been used in the common
law. The division between "petty" and "serious" offenses has been addressed
repeatedly by the United States Supreme Court which has stated, "[W]e have found the
most relevant [objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the
offense] in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty . In fixing the maximum
penalty for a crime, a legislature include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a
judgment about the seriousness of the offense ." Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489
U.S . 538, 541 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) . While the
Supreme Court has declined to define any bright line rule setting apart the two
categories, it has noted "that a potential sentence in excess of six months' imprisonment
is sufficiently severe by itself to take the offense out of the category of `petty ."' Id. at
542, n . 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) . Using this framework, the
Blanton Court held that first offense DUIwhich at the time in Nevada carried a
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maximum penalty of 90 days in jail, up to 48 hours of community service, and a fine of
$1,000-was a "petty" offense and there was no requirement that such a case be tried
to a jury.
Kentucky's first offense DUI law allows the following penalty: "For the first offense
within a five (5) year period, [a violator will] be fined not less than two hundred dollars
($200) nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), or be imprisoned in the county jail for
not less than forty-eight (48) hours nor more than thirty (30) days, or both . . . . " KRS
189A.010(5)(a). Applying the logic of Blanton , we can only conclude that DUI first
offense is a "petty offense ." As such, and given that Davis was not prosecuted "by
indictment or information" as used in Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, there is
no common law, and thus no constitutional requirement that his case be tried to a jury.
Having determined that there is no constitutional requirement for a jury trial in this
case, the operation of KRS 29A.270 is the only factor which can potentially transform
this into a case "required to be tried by a jury." We believe, as set forth in Donta, that
"by stating that a `request' for a jury trial may be made at any time prior to the time a
case is called for trial, [KRS 29A.270(1)] by implication imposes a clear burden on the
accused to make a demand for a jury trial." Donta, 858 S.W.2d at 723. Once a
defendant has satisfied that burden and asserted . his right to a jury trial, however, we
believe his case is one "required to be tried by a jury" under RCr 9.26(1) :
Ultimately, we disagree, with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Davis did not
make a request for a jury trial as required by KRS 29A.270. Although the trial court
record is limited, there is sufficient reason to believe that at his initial appearance Davis
requested a jury trial. At oral argument, Davis's counsel stated that the case was
originally scheduled for a jury trial during a pre-trial hearing, but that "strategy changes
- 1 2-
later." While this is not a clear acknowledgment that Davis's right to a jury trial had
been asserted before the trial court, the clear implication is that Davis offered his motion
for a bench trial after reconsidering the wisdom of his decision to proceed before a jury.
This is enough to trigger the operation of RCr 9 .26(1), including its requirement that the
Commonwealth consent to a waiver of the right to a jury trial in any case that is required
to be so tried . Thus the district court's decision to grant Davis's motion for a bench trial,
despite an objection by the Commonwealth, was error.
Having already determined that this is an appropriate case for the availability of
an extraordinary writs we now reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to
the Jefferson Circuit Court for entry of a writ of prohibition preventing the Jefferson
District Court from conducting a bench trial in the matter herein without the consent of
the Commonwealth .
Lambert, C.J . ; Graves, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur.
Cooper, J., dissents by separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Paul W. Richwalsky, Jr.
Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Jefferson County Attorney's Office
Hall of Justice
600 West Jefferson Street
Second Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Christopher A. Melton
Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Jefferson County Attorney's Office
Hall of Justice
600 West Jefferson Street
Second Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
APPELLEE:
Hon . James Green
Judge, Jefferson District Court
One Financial Square
Louisville, Kentucky 40270
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, DONALD WAYNE DAVIS :
John H. Harralson, III
600 West Main Street
Suite 100
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, DAMON RICHARD CLAYTON:
Wallace N. Rogers
Mulhall, Turner, Hoffman & Coombs
440 South Seventh Street
Suite 300
Louisville, Kentucky 40203
RENDERED : JUNE 15, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Suprrmt Courf of "tufurhV
'Pt
2004-SC-0534-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-410
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2003-CI-377
HONORABLE JAMES GREEN, JUDGE,
JEFFERSON DISTRICT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
DAMON RICHARD CLAYTON ; AND
DONALD WAYNE DAVIS
(REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST)
APPELLEES
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
Relief by way of prohibition or mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy and we have always been cautious and conservative both in
entertaining petitions for and in granting such relief . This careful approach
is necessary to prevent short-circuiting normal appeal procedure and to
limit so far as possible interference with the proper and efficient operation
of our circuit and other courts . If this avenue of relief were open to all who
considered themselves aggrieved by an interlocutory court order, we
would face an impossible burden of nonappellate matters .
Bender v. Eaton, 343 S .W .2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961) : Whether to issue a writ has always
been within the sound discretion of the appellate court in which the petition is filed.
Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Ky. 2004) . "[W]hether to grant or deny a petition
for a writ is within the appellate court's discretion. And, appellate review of that decision
is limited to an abuse-of-discretion inquiry, except for issues of law which are reviewed
de novo ." Rehm v. Clayton, 132 S.W .3d 864, 866 (Ky. 2004) (citations and quotations
omitted) . Less than four months ago, the author of today's majority opinion accurately
wrote :
A petitioner must make a significant showing for a writ even to be
available in a given case because extraordinary writs inherently intrude
into the workings of the lower courts and bypass the normal appellate
process . Even in those rare cases when a writ is available as a remedy,
the court originally hearing the petition retains its discretion to grant or
deny the writ after examining the merits .
Powell v. Graham , 185 S .W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2006) . Yet, the majority of this Court
today concludes that the Jefferson Circuit Court abused its discretion in denying the
Commonwealth's petition for a writ to prohibit a bench trial of this petty offense, despite
finding:
(1) The case is not one that is required to be tried by a jury, ante , at
(slip op.
at 8);
(2) There exists no explicit agreement, ante , at
clear acknowledgment, ante , at
ever requested a
n.2 (slip op. at 2 n .2), no
(slip op . at 13), and certainly no proof that Davis
jury trial; and
(3) The Commonwealth will not suffer great injustice and irreparable injury if the
case is tried without a jury, ante , at
(slip op . at 5) .
The district court record reflects only that on September 3, 2002, the district
judge set the case for trial by jury to be held on November 27, 2002; that on November
19, 2002, Davis's counsel made a motion for a bench trial, i .e. , waived his right to trial
by jury, see, ,eg Jackson v. Commonwealth , 113 S .W .3d 128, 131 (Ky. 2003) ("It is
.,
now well settled that an accused, in the exercise of a voluntary and intelligent choice,
may waive his right to a jury trial . . . . . (Citation and quotation omitted.)) ; and that the
2
district judge then set the case for a bench trial on January 25, 2003. Forty-seven days
later and just two days before trial, the Commonwealth filed this petition for a writ to
prohibit the trial court from conducting a bench trial. This is precisely the kind of
interference with trial dockets that we have held warrants the denial of a writ.
Now, the majority of this Court holds that, while the Court of Appeals' legal
analysis is correct, "there is sufficient reason to believe that at his initial appearance
Davis requested a jury trial," and "the clear implication is that Davis offered his motion
for a bench trial after reconsidering the wisdom of his decision to proceed before a jury."
In fact, there is no reason to assume that the trial court did not sua sponte set the case
for trial by jury on the assumption that a criminal defendant would always prefer a trial
by jury over a trial by judge . Absent proof, I do not believe that "sufficient reason to
believe" and "clear implication" suffices to prove that the Jefferson Circuit Court abused
its discretion in denying the writ.
But even if that were not so, KRS 29A.270(1) gives the defendant the discretion
as to whether a petty offense with which he or she is charged shall be tried by judge or
jury. Because, as the majority opinion holds, RCr 9.26(1) does not apply to petty
offenses, the Commonwealth simply is without standing to preclude the defendant from
waiving his right to trial by jury or the trial court from permitting him to do so . Compare
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 S.W.2d 229, 230-31 (Ky. 1995) (Commonwealth has
the right to demand trial by jury of sentencing phase of capital trial) .
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court and the Court
of Appeals in all respects .
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