JOHN T. BOSTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : APRIL 20, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixprrme Courf of ~i
2004-SC-0469-MR
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JOHN T. BOSTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN SHAKE, JUDGE
02-CR-1135
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND VACATING IN PART
A Jefferson Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, John T. Boston, of three
counts of rape in the first degree, three counts of robbery in the first degree, two counts
of burglary in the first degree, one count of burglary in the second degree, and found
him to be a persistent felony offender ("PFO") in the second degree premised upon six
1982 felony convictions . The offenses that are the subject of this appeal occurred on
three separate occasions and were perpetrated against three different victims at their
respective residences . The following outline is helpful in understanding the nature of
each offense, against whom it was perpetrated, and the sentence fixed by the jury:
1.
Date: September 18, 1994.
Victim : J .A.
Offenses :
(a)
(b)
(c)
2.
Count 1 : Rape in the first degree,
20 years, PFO-enhanced to 50 years ;
Count 2: Robbery in the first degree,
20 years, PFO-enhanced to 50 years ;
Count 3: Burglary in the first degree,
20 years, PFO-enhanced to 50 years .
Date : July 10, 1995.
Victim : K.A.
Offenses:
(a)
(b)
(c)
3.
Count 4:
20 years,
Count 5:
20 years,
Count 6:
10 years,
Rape in the first degree
PFO-enhanced to 50 years ;
Robbery in the first degree,
PFO-enhanced to 50 years ;
Burglary in the second degree,
PFO-enhanced to 20 years .
Date: October 1, 1995.
Victim : L.M.B.
Offenses :
(a)
(b)
(c)
Count 7:
20 years,
Count 8 :
20 years,
Count 9:
20 years,
Rape in the first degree,
PFO-enhanced to 50 years ;
Robbery in the first degree,
PFO-enhanced to 50 years ;
Burglary in the first degree,
PFO-enhanced to 50 years .
The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation that the sentences be served
consecutively for a total of 420 years .' The trial court also ordered the sentences to run
' The length of the sentence is not raised as an issue on appeal . The offenses of
which Appellant was convicted were committed in 1994 and 1995. Although a 1998
amendment of KRS 532 .110(1)(c) set a ceiling of 70 years as the maximum aggregate
indeterminate sentence and KRS 446 .110 permits a defendant to consent to a
retroactive application of a new law that mitigates punishment, Appellant specifically
elected prior to the commencement of the penalty phase of the trial to have his penalty
determined under the law as it existed at the time the offenses were committed . See
Lawson v. Commonwealth , 53 S .W .3d 534, 550 (2001) ("KRS 446.110 . . . require[s]
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consecutively to a 40-year sentence previously imposed for a 1996 conviction of
burglary in another division of the Jefferson Circuit Court . Finally, the trial court
imposed a three-year sentence of conditional discharge pursuant to KRS 532.043(2)
(person convicted of felony offense under KRS Chapter 510, e.g,_, rape in the first
degree, KRS 510 .040, shall also be sentenced to a three-year period of conditional
discharge) .
Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b),
asserting that (1) all three of his convictions of offenses perpetrated against K.A. should
be reversed because the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce at
trial an audiotaped statement made during a ride-around with a police detective in which
Appellant admitted burglarizing K.A .'s residence on two occasions; (2) there was
insufficient evidence to support his convictions of robbery in the first degree of K.A. and
of both burglary in the first degree and robbery in the first degree of L.M.B.; and (3) the
trial court erred in imposing the three-year period of conditional discharge because his
offenses were committed prior to the effective date of KRS 532.043. Appellant does not
assert any error with respect to his three convictions of the offenses perpetrated against
J .A. or his conviction of rape in the first degree perpetrated against L .M .B. However, he
claims he should be resentenced for those convictions because the severity of the
sentences for those offenses indicates that the jury was unduly prejudiced by being
allowed to consider those penalties at the same time it was considering penalties for
offenses for which he should not have been convicted .
courts [sic] to sentence a defendant in accordance with the law which existed at the
time of the commission of the offense unless the defendant specifically consents to the
application of a new law which is 'certainly' or 'definitely' mitigating .").
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The Commonwealth concedes error with respect to the retroactive application of
KRS 532.043 to Appellant's rape convictions, Purvis v. Commonwealth , 14 S.W .3d 21,
24 (Ky. 2000); Lozier v. Commonwealth , 32 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Ky. App . 2000), and we
vacate that aspect of the sentence. We also reverse Appellant's convictions of the
offenses perpetrated against K.A. and remand those charges for a new trial. We affirm
Appellant's convictions of the offenses perpetrated against J.A . and L.M.B. and the
sentences imposed for those convictions .
I. STATEMENTS MADE DURING RIDE-AROUND.
After Appellant's 1996 arrest for a previous burglary for which he was
subsequently convicted, he admitted committing other burglaries at unidentified
locations in Louisville. To determine whether Appellant was the perpetrator of other
unsolved burglaries within its jurisdiction, the Louisville Police Department requested his
participation in a ride-around with Detective Mike Loran (unaccompanied by his
attorney) to see if he could identify locations where he might have committed other
burglaries . On October 3, 1996, more than five years before the return of the
indictments in the case sub iudice, the presiding judge of Division 8 of the Jefferson
Circuit Court signed the following order :
ORDER
Motion having been made and the Court being sufficiently advised:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT, John Boston be placed in the
custody of Detective Mike Loran of LPD-Burglary and/or Sgt. Jay Pierce of
LPD-Homicide on the 3rd day of October, 1996, and again on the 4th day
of October, 1996, for a period not to exceed 8 hours .
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT, at or before the expiration of 8
hours on the 3rd day of October, 1996, and the 4th day of October, 1996,
that John Boston be returned to the custody of Jefferson County
Corrections .
Nothing Defendant says to be used [sic] against him.
/s/
JUDGE
/s/
ATTY FOR DEFENDANT
10/3/96
DATE
The order was duly entered on the same date, thus it complied with CR 58(1).
Appellant's then-attorney, who signed off on the order agreeing to Appellant's
uncounseled participation in the ride-around, testified at the suppression hearing that
Appellant's participation in the ride-around was a part of the plea negotiations in the
then-pending burglary case . However, the order does not recite and there was no
evidence that Appellant was offered any leniency on that charge for his cooperation or
that he was subject to any penalty for his lack of cooperation . From this we conclude
that Appellant was "hoping" that his cooperation would result in some unpromised
consideration with respect to his pending burglary charge . The former assistant
Commonwealth's attorney who prosecuted that charge testified that the ultimate plea
agreement reached in that case was not premised upon Appellant's cooperation during
the ride-around . Thus, the only consideration given Appellant in return for his
participation was the court order that any statements made by Appellant during the ridearound could not be used against him . Detective Loran audiotaped the statements
Appellant made to him during the course of the ride-around .
Appellant told Loran during the ride-around that he and another man burglarized
K.A .'s residence twice (with Appellant actually entering the residence on one occasion
but only acting as a lookout on the other occasion) and that they pawned some property
stolen from the residence at a nearby pawn shop. He did not admit to raping or robbing
K .A. (and was not asked whether he committed those additional offenses) . K.A.
testified at trial that her assailant entered her bedroom through an open window and
that she got only a brief look at him before he grabbed her, turned her around, and put a
bandana or some other type of covering over her head. The incident occurred at night
and no lights were on in K.A.'s bedroom . K.A. was not requested to make a photopack
identification until March 8, 2002, more than seven years after the burglary, rape and
robbery. She said at the time of the identification that she was "75% sure" that
Appellant was the man who raped her. At trial, she was even more sure . That would
have been sufficient evidence to avoid a directed verdict of acquittal ; however, the
Commonwealth, apparently believing that her identification testimony was not strong
enough to guarantee a conviction, gave pretrial notice of its intent to play the audiotape
of Appellant's statement in which he admitted to Detective Loran that he had entered
K.A .'s residence .
Although the trial court overruled Appellant's motion to suppress the audiotape, it
found that the Commonwealth had agreed that the statements made by Appellant
during the ride-around could not be used against him . Of course, that finding was
unnecessary because the October 3, 1996, Order was not an agreement but an order
that Appellant's statements could not be used against him. In overruling the motion, the
trial court concluded:
Although weak, sufficient evidence in the record indicates that an
agreement existed between Boston and the Commonwealth that his
statements made pursuant to the October 3, 1996 drive around could not
be used against him . Other evidence in the record, however, also
indicates that Boston lied to Loran and the Commonwealth about several
of the burglaries and crimes in question . Boston did not keep his end of
the bargain . As a result, the Commonwealth is not bound by the terms of
the October 3, 1996 agreement and Boston's statements may be used
against him in the case sub judice . Roberts v. Commonwealth , Ky., 896
S.W.2d 4, 6 (1995) .
The problem with the trial court's conclusion is that Roberts held that statements
made by the defendant in that case could not be used against him even though the
defendant's statements had been neither truthful nor complete . Roberts , 896 S .W.2d at
6. In Roberts , the defendant agreed to give a complete and truthful statement with
respect to other offenses he had committed in exchange for not being charged with
being a persistent felony offender ("PFO") . The Court held that since the defendant had
not lived up to his part of the bargain, the Commonwealth was not required to dismiss
the subsequently charged PFO count . However, the Court held that KRE 410
precluded the Commonwealth from using the statements made by the defendant
against him at trial because they were made during the course of plea negotiations . Id.
The trial court's finding that there was an agreement would seem to bring this
case within the holding of Roberts that KRE 410 precludes use of Appellant's
statements because they were made during the course of plea negotiations .
Regardless, Appellant did not breach any agreement with the Commonwealth . He only
agreed to participate in the ride-around . He did not agree, as did the defendant in
Roberts , to give a complete and truthful statement with respect to other offenses
committed by him . Why should he? Unlike the defendant in Roberts , the
Commonwealth did not offer him a deal in return for a complete and truthful statement.
However, the Commonwealth did promise Appellant that if he participated in the ridearound, any statements he made to Detective Loran during that participation would not
be used against him . Appellant performed his part of the agreement ; it was the
Commonwealth that breached it.
If the government breaks its word, it breeds contempt for integrity and
good faith . It destroys the confidence of citizens in the operation of their
government and invites them to disregard their obligations . That way lies
anarchy. We deal here with a pledge of public faith[:] a promise made by
state officials and one that should not be lightly disregarded .
Workman v. Commonwealth , 580 S .W.2d 206, 207 (Ky. 1979) (quotation omitted),
overruled on other grounds by Morton v. Commonwealth , 817 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky.
1991) . And that would be true even if the Commonwealth's promise exceeded its
authority (which, in this case, it did not). Srock v. Sowders , 610 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Ky.
1980). "[I]f the offer is made by the prosecution and accepted by the accused, either by
entering a plea or by taking action to his detriment in reliance on the offer, then the
agreement becomes binding and enforceable ." Commonwealth v. Reyes , 764 S .W .2d
62, 65 (Ky. 1989) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted) .
When . . . the defendant detrimentally relies on the government's promise,
the resulting harm from this induced reliance implicates due process
guarantees . This basic estoppel principle was recognized by the Court in
Santobello rv. New York, 404 U .S. 257, 92 S .Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427
(1971)]; when a defendant pleads guilty in reliance on an agreement with
the prosecutor, that promise must be fulfilled . Santobello arguably could
be extended to cover the situation where the defendant has not yet
entered the plea, but has relied on the bargain in such a way that a fair
trial would no longer be possible .
Virgin Islands v. Scotland , 614 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted) . That is
precisely what occurred here .
The Commonwealth suggests that the error was harmless because Appellant
subsequently admitted during his testimony that he did burglarize K.A.'s apartment,
though he denied raping or robbing her. We have twice rejected similar arguments . In
Salinas v. Commonwealth, 84 S .W .3d 913 (Ky. 2002), we held that defense counsel's
cross-examination of a witness who had been allowed to testify to inadmissible hearsay
evidence did not waive the error.
If that were true, any party against whom evidence was improperly
admitted would be required to forego cross-examination and enhance the
risk of losing at trial, or attempt to cross-examine in an effort to mitigate
the prejudicial effect of the evidence and thereby be deemed to have
acquiesced in the error.
Id. at 919 . Similarly, in Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth , 156 S.W.3d 747 (Ky. 2005), we
held that the defendant's attempt on surrebuttal to attribute an innocent meaning to a
letter that was improperly admitted against him in violation of the hearsay rule, KRE
802, did not waive or cure the trial court's error in allowing the Commonwealth to
introduce the letter in the first place . Id . at 754. Likewise, the trial court's error in
admitting Appellant's statement to Detective Loran that he had burglarized K.A.'s
residence was not waived or cured by Appellant's attempt to mitigate the effect of that
evidence by testifying that he did not also rape and rob K.A. during the burglary .
Thus, we reverse Appellant's convictions under counts 4, 5, and 6 of the
indictment (rape, robbery and burglary of K.A.) for a new trial at which Appellant's
statements made during the ride-around with Detective Loran on October 3-4, 1996, will
not be admitted into evidence .
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
The statutory schemes for the first and second degrees of burglary and robbery
are very similar . The first degree of each offense requires proof of the same elements
as the second degree plus proof of an additional aggravating factor. Thus, the penal
code defines the first and second degrees of burglary as follows :
KRS 511 .030 Burglary in the second degree .
(1)
(2)
A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when, with the
intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully
in a dwelling .
Burglary in the second degree is a Class C felony .
KRS 511 .020 Burglary in the first degree .
(1)
(2)
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the
intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully
in a building, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or
in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the
crime :
(a)
Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon ; or
(b)
Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant
in the crime ; or
(c)
Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against
any person who is not a participant in the crime .
Burglary in the first degree is a Class B felony.
Similarly, the penal code defines the first and second degrees of robbery as follows :
KRS 515.030 Robbery in the second degree.
(1)
(2)
A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when, in the
course of committing theft, he uses or threatens the immediate use
of physical force upon another person with intent to accomplish the
theft.
Robbery in the second degree is a Class C felony .
KRS 515 .020 Robbery in the first degree.
(1)
(2)
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course
of committing theft, he uses or threatens the immediate use of
physical force upon another person with intent to accomplish the
theft and when he :
(a)
Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant
in the crime ; or
(b)
Is armed with a deadly weapon ; or
(c)
Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
instrument upon any person who is not a participant in the
crime .
Robbery in the first degree is a Class B felony.
J .A ., the victim of Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the indictment, testified that her assailant
placed a knife against her neck and threatened to kill her if she did not comply with his
wishes . She also testified that he threatened to cut off her finger if she did not give him
the ring she was wearing. The Commonwealth also proved by DNA evidence that
semen found in J .A.'s vagina during the rape-kit examination was Appellant's semen .
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Thus, Appellant's only defense to Counts 1 (rape) and 3 (burglary) were his claims that
J .A. willingly admitted him to her residence and engaged in consensual sexual
intercourse with him. J .A . testified that Appellant stole a piece of jewelry and her car
keys. Appellant's defense to Count 2 (robbery) was a denial that he either threatened
J .A . with a knife or stole her jewelry and car keys . The jury believed J .A.'s version of
these events and disbelieved Appellant's version . Appellant admits that J .A .'s testimony
was sufficient to convict him under Counts 1, 2, and 3 and has not contested those
convictions on appeal.
K.A ., the victim of Counts 4, 5, and 6, testified that Appellant entered her
bedroom through an open window, grabbed her, turned her around, and put a bandana
or other type of covering over her head. He then removed her clothing, made her get
down on her hands and knees, and raped her. K.A. testified that the intruder stole
$500.00 from her purse and departed through the same window through which he had
entered . There was no evidence that Appellant was armed with explosives or a deadly
weapon while in K.A.'s residence, or that he used or threatened K.A. with a dangerous
instrument . K.A . testified that Appellant did not hurt her. Thus, Appellant asserts that
he could not be convicted of either robbery in the first degree or burglary in the first
degree with respect to K.A .
The issue was first raised at trial by Appellant's motion to dismiss the charge of
burglary in the first degree because of the Commonwealth's failure to prove one of the
three aggravating factors as required by KRS 511 .020(1) . The trial court gave the
prosecutor until the following day to research the issue. The next day, the prosecutor
conceded that he could find no case law holding that proof of sexual intercourse by
forcible compulsion alone satisfied the definition of "physical injury" contained in KRS
500 .080(13) ("substantial physical pain or any impairment of physical condition" ).2
Thus, he moved to amend Count 6 of the indictment from burglary in the first degree to
burglary in the second degree, and the trial court sustained that motion. Appellant then
moved to dismiss the charge of robbery in the first degree on the same grounds. The
prosecutor responded by moving to amend Count 5 to delete the language "caused
physical injury to [K.A.], who was not a participant in the crime," and the trial court also
sustained that motion . Inexplicably, however, the trial court instructed the jury on
robbery in the first degree with respect to Count 5 as follows :
Robbery in the First Degree
You will find the defendant, John Boston, guilty of First-Degree
Robbery under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A)
That in this county on or about July 10, 1995, he unlawfully
took items from [K.A.]; and
B)
That in the course of so doing and with intent to accomplish
the theft, he used or threatened the use of physical force
upon [K.A.] .
Thus, although the trial court allowed the jury to convict Appellant of robbery in
the first degree under this instruction, the instruction, in fact, defined the offense of
robbery in the second degree . Equally inexplicable is the fact that, although Appellant
moved to dismiss the charge of robbery in the first degree and the prosecutor agreed
that the elements of that offense had not been proven, neither party objected to the trial
court's instruction that the jury could convict Appellant of robbery in the first degree on
evidence that proved only robbery in the second degree. The Commonwealth virtually
In Van Dyke v. Commonwealth , 581 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1979), we held that it was error
for the trial court to permit the prosecutor to argue to the jury that every rape is in and of
itself a "physical injury," but that the error was harmless because the victim did, in fact,
suffer a facial bruise and scratches on her thighs. Id. at 565. The prosecutor in the
case sub iudice conceded that K.A. did not sustain a physical injury and the
Commonwealth has not requested that we revisit Van Dyke .
-12-
concedes the error in its brief, but claims it was not preserved for appellate review . To
preserve a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to prove a particular theory of the case
involving multiple counts and varying theories, the defendant must object to the giving of
an instruction on that count or theory. Commonwealth v. Wolford , 4 S .W.3d 534, 535
(Ky. 1999); Seay v. Commonwealth , 609 S.W.2d 128,130 (Ky. 1980) . Since Appellant
did not tender instructions or object to the instruction as given, the claim of insufficiency
of the evidence to prove robbery in the first degree is not preserved .
However, because the conviction under Count 5 is being reversed and remanded
for a new trial on other grounds, the failure to preserve this error does not amount to
manifest injustice as required for reversal for palpable error. RCr 10 .26 . The only effect
of the failure to preserve the error is that the Commonwealth will have another chance
to prove its case. If the evidence is the same, we presume the error will not recur.
As with respect to the offenses perpetrated against K.A., there was no evidence
that Appellant was armed with explosives or a firearm when he perpetrated the offenses
against L.M.B ., or that he threatened L.M .B. with a dangerous instrument . L.M .B . did
not testify that she sustained a physical injury during the commission of the crimes ; but,
unlike K .A ., neither did she testify that she did not sustain a physical injury . She did
testify that, after raping her, Appellant bound her wrists and ankles together and left her
lying on the bed. Nine photographs of L.M .B. taken at the police station on the day she
was assaulted were introduced cumulatively at trial as Commonwealth's exhibit 14. The
officer who took the photographs, Maurice Raque, testified that they revealed bruises
3 "The Commonwealth fully appreciates the wording of the instructions as given, and
how they compare with specimen instructions, but asserts no error was preserved for
review." Brief for Commonwealth, at 35.
- 1 3-
and discoloration on L.M.B .'s arms and wrists . The jury could reasonably believe the
bruises and discoloration resulted from Appellant tying her wrists together.
"Any impairment of physical condition," as used in KRS 500.080(13), simply
means "any injury ." Commonwealth v. Potts, 884 S .W .2d 654,656 (Ky. 1994) . Thus, in
Meredith v. Commonwealth , 628 S .W.2d 887 (Ky. App . 1982), a superficial knife wound
was held to be a physical injury. Id . at 888. In Key v. Commonwealth , 840 S .W.2d 827
(Ky. App. 1992), sore ribs and having one's breath knocked out were held to be physical
injuries . Id. at 829 . In Covington v. Commonwealth , 849 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. App . 1992), a
facial bruise and a scratch below the eye were held to be physical injuries . Id . at 564.
Applying these precedents, we have no difficulty in holding that the bruises and
discoloration of L.M .B.'s wrists were physical injuries. Thus, the evidence was sufficient
to prove the physical injury aggravator necessary to convict Appellant of both robbery in
the first degree and burglary in the first degree with respect to the offenses perpetrated
against L.M.B.
III. REQUEST FOR RESENTENCING .
Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that the reversal of convictions
and sentences for some jointly tried offenses requires reversal for resentencing of other
convictions that do not otherwise require reversal, and we are aware of none. In United
States v. Tucker , 404 U.S . 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court reversed for resentencing a bank robbery conviction where the
sentencing judge explicitly considered three previous felony convictions, two of which
were later found to be constitutionally invalid because they were obtained without right
to counsel, id . at 444-45, 448-49, 92 S .Ct. at 590, 592, which the Court characterized as
"misinformation of a constitutional magnitude ." Id . at 447, 92 S .Ct. at 592. That is a far
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cry from what occurred here . During the sentencing phase of Appellant's trial, the jury
had before it, in addition to the ride-around evidence, K.A .'s own testimony that
Appellant burglarized her home and raped and robbed her, the evidence on which it
convicted him of the crimes perpetrated against J .A. and L.M .B ., and evidence of
convictions of six prior felony offenses in 1982 and of another felony offense in 1996.
We decline to hold that whenever one or more convictions of multiple jointly-tried
offenses are reversed, every other conviction of a jointly-tried offense must also be
reversed for resentencing .
Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's convictions and the underlying sentences
imposed under Counts 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10 (PFO) of the indictment, but vacate the
additional three-year conditional discharge sentence imposed for the rape convictions ;
and we reverse Appellant's convictions under Counts 4, 5, and 6 of the indictment and
the sentences imposed therefor, and remand those charges to the Jefferson Circuit
Court for a new trial in accordance with the content of this opinion .
Lambert, C.J . ; Cooper, Johnstone, and Roach, JJ., concur . Wintersheimer, J .,
dissents by separate opinion, with Graves, and Scott, JJ ., joining that dissent .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
J. David Niehaus
Deputy Appellate Defender
Office of the Louisville Metro Public Defender
200 Advocacy Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Dennis W . Shepherd
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : APRIL 20, 2006
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,$ixVrrxrtr Courf of ~rufixr.~ ..~
~
2004-SC-0469-MR
JOHN T. BOSTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN SHAKE, JUDGE
2002-C R-1135
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
I must respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which reverses the
conviction under counts 4, 5 and 6 because the trial of this matter was fundamentally
fair and another trial is not required .
The majority opinion accepts Boston's argument that his convictions for the rape,
robbery and burglary of the second victim were rendered fundamentally unfair by the
use of evidence obtained in violation of a court order that prohibited use of that
evidence . I disagree .
On October 3, 1996, a circuit judge from the eighth division of the Jefferson
Circuit Court entered an order that permitted the release of the defendant to the
custody of a detective of the Louisville police department . The purpose of this order
was to permit the defendant to "ride-around" with the detective and point out locations
where crimes had occurred . Handwritten above the circuit judge's signature line is a
sentence that reads, "Nothing Defendant says to be used against him ." Also
handwritten on the order is the signature and name of the defense counsel in that case.
There is no signature by anyone representing the Commonwealth .
In the present case, Boston filed a motion to suppress his statements to police
made on October 3, 1996 . The trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
motion, at which the detective who conducted the ride-around testified, as did a former
prosecutor and a defense attorney, both of whom were involved in the previous criminal
case against Boston . The detective stated that he informed Boston of his Miranda
rights before any statements were made during the ride-around and that the defendant
did not indicate that he did not want to talk. He was unaware of any agreement that
would preclude the use of any statements .
The former prosecutor testified that she did not make a deal with Boston
precluding the use of his statements . She also stated that she would never make an
immunity deal outside of what would be contained in a plea agreement . Her signature
was not on the October 3, 1996 order. The former defense attorney stated that he
would not have made the handwritten notation on the order without agreement and
notice to the Commonwealth .
Citing Workman v. Commonwealth , 580 S .W.2d 206 (Ky. 1979), defense
counsel argued that the statements made pursuant to the agreement should have been
suppressed. She asserted that the defendant upheld his end of the bargain . The
Commonwealth responded that there was a lack of evidence that an agreement
existed . It also disagreed that Boston upheld his end of the bargain .
The trial judge initially noted that Kentucky prosecutors have no authority to
immunize anyone from future prosecution for criminal offenses . Putty v.
Commonwealth , 30 S.W .3d 156 (Ky. 2000). She then found that, although weak, there
was sufficient evidence to indicate that an agreement existed between Boston and the
Commonwealth that his statements made pursuant the October 3, 1996 ride-around
could not be used against him. However, the trial judge determined that other evidence
in the record indicated that Boston lied to the detective and the Commonwealth about
several burglaries and crimes in question. She concluded that because Boston did not
keep his end of the bargain, the Commonwealth was not bound by the terms of the
agreement and that Boston's statements could be used against him .
On appeal, Boston argues that the unambiguous order cannot be disregarded by
testimony of two attorneys who could not recall whether an agreement was reached
before entry of the order. This is a different argument than was presented to the trial
judge and, thus, is not properly preserved for appellate review. Commonwealth v.
Duke , 750 S .W .2d 432 (Ky . 1988).
A careful review of the record indicates there was sufficient evidence to support
the findings of fact made by the trial judge. RCr 9 .78. The evidence of any agreement
may be weak, especially considering the lack of any signature by the Commonwealth
on the order. Nevertheless, there is also evidence in the record that Boston lied to the
detective and failed to uphold his part of the bargain . Consequently, the
Commonwealth was not bound by the terms of the October agreement and it was
permissible to use Boston's statements against him . The trial judge did not err in
denying the motion to suppress .
Reversal on this aspect of the trial is not needed nor is re-trial .
Graves and Scott, JJ . join .
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