BECKHAM B. BARNES V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2004-SC-000197-MR
BECKHAM B. BARNES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
01-CR-00001
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
2004-SC-000258-TG
BECKHAM B. BARNES
V
APPELLANT
ON TRANSFER FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 2004CA000547
WAYNE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 01-CR-00001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Beckham B. Barnes, was indicted for the murder of Troy Miller
by a Russell County Grand Jury. A change of venue was granted to Wayne County
due to difficulty in empanelling a jury in Russell County . In May of 2001, Barnes was
convicted of intentional murder and sentenced to twenty-two (22) years in accordance
with the jury verdict. This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.' In the second
trial ("Barnes II"), also held in Wayne County, Barnes was convicted of murder and was
sentenced, as recommended by the jury, to twenty-five (25) years imprisonment .
Appellant appeals to this Court from his conviction in Barnes II as a matter of right2 and
from the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial under CR 60 .02 .
Appellant is a civil engineer and land surveyor with his office located, at
the time of the shooting, in a barn across from his house. Appellant hired Troy Miller,
the victim, shortly after Miller graduated from high school. Appellant trained Miller as a
land surveyor . Miller eventually became qualified as a land surveyor in his own right,
but continued to periodically use Appellant's expertise, tools, and equipment . When
Miller sought Appellant's help on jobs, Miller would pay Appellant twenty percent (20%)
of the fees generated .
On April 1, 1999, Appellant assisted Miller on such a project, but the
project was interrupted so that Appellant could attend a pie supper at his daughter's
elementary school . Shortly after Appellant returned to his office, Miller did likewise, and
they finished the project around 10:00 p.m. Internal computer logs indicate the project
restarted at 9:45 p.m. and concluded at 10 :07 p .m . 3 Appellant alleges that Miller was
behind on the payment of fees and that he refused to print the project until Miller
satisfied the account. Their usual arrangement was to settle the account quarterly.
Miller left the office and Appellant went back across the street to his house .
Sometime later Appellant was awakened by his barking dog and went to
investigate . Appellant's dog led him to his office where he saw movement in front of a
2
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 91 S .W.3d 564 (Ky. 2002) ("Barnes I").
Ky. Const. §110(2)(b) .
Barnes , 91 S.W .3d at 565.
lit computer screen. Barnes obtained a rifle he kept adjacent to his office and ordered
the person to "freeze ." Barnes alleges that he heard "gunshots" and fired back with his
own rifle and then ran back to his home . He informed his wife that he thought he had
shot the intruder. The internal computer logged additional activity on the pending
project from 12:40 a.m. until 1 :52 a.m. and Paula Barnes, Appellant's wife, called the
"911" emergency operator at 2 :13 a .m . 4 Appellant admitted to shooting Miller, but
argues that the shooting was in self-defense .
On this appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by denying his
request to transfer the case back to Russell County for the retrial. Appellant argues
that denying the retransfer violates his rights under both the United States and
Kentucky Constitutions . Specifically, Appellant claims a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the states by the Sixth Amendment
of our Federal Constitution and Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution .
The trial court relied on Bennett v. Commonwealth s and Hodge v.
Commonwealth s for interpretations of KRS Chapter 452 . This Court held that the
defendants in Bennett and Hodge were not entitled to a change in venue due to the
pre-trial publicity of their respective cases . Bennett was a recent holding by this Court
that trial courts have broad discretion over change of venue questions and their
decision will be overturned only on a showing of an abuse of discretion .' In Hodge the
defendant was retried after an initial conviction was reversed and remanded by this
Court. We held there was not a statutory entitlement to a second change of venue
4 _Id. at 566 .
978 S .W.2d 322 (Ky. 1998) .
s 17 S .W.3d 824 (Ky. 2000) .
Bennett at 325 .
relying on KRS 452.240 .8 The trial judge in the instant case correctly stated that KRS
Chapter 452 applies here .
Although not specifically referred to by the trial court we interpret his
reference as to KRS 452 .240 which allows just one change of venue . The Court of
Appeals previously permitted more than one change of venue,9 but Appellant instead
relies on Commonwealth v. Kellv' ° and argues that the trial court is duty bound to
transfer the case back to the original county when there is no longer a "state of
lawlessness ."
The record does not indicate that there was ever a finding of a state of
lawlessness or that the original change of venue was based on that premise . KRS
452 .290 requires transfer back to the original county only when the original transfer has
been made on the basis of a state of lawlessness . In the absence of an express finding
of lawlessness to trigger KRS 452.230, we will not presume the original transfer to have
been on that basis. Instead, the original transfer will be deemed to have been made on
the basis of KRS 452 .210 when, in such circumstances, venue remains in the
transferee county until a complete determination of the case.
Appellant admits to shooting Miller but contends that it was in selfdefense, and as justification claims that Miller, an intruder, fired on Appellant first.
However, the prosecution contends that someone other than Miller, specifically the
Appellant, fired first and then planted the weapon beside Miller's body. To prove this
theory the prosecution produced the testimony of Ms . Zenobia Skinner of the Kentucky
State Police . She compared the gunshot residue from the victim's hands to that from a
Hodge at 835 .
1 Smith v. Commonwealth, 67 S .W . 32 (Ky. 1902) .
18 S .W.2d 953 (Ky. 1929) .
4
8
test firing by Mr. Ronnie Freels, a retired Kentucky State Police Ballistics expert .
Particularly she tested for the presence, or lack thereof, of three specific chemical
substances: antimony, barium, and lead . The test firing results indicated significant
levels of antimony and lead, indicating the gun was an emitter of those two substances .
Appellant objected to Skinner's testimony at trial, preserving the issue for appeal .
Appellant argues that Skinner's analysis is not scientifically reliable, and
that if the trial court had held a Daubertll hearing then Skinner's testimony would not
have been permitted . Daubert requires the trial judge to determine whether an expert's
testimony is relevant and reliable in a preliminary hearing . In Daubert the United States
Supreme Court suggested factors that may aid in that review: (1) can it be tested ; (2)
has it been peer-reviewed ; (3) its rate of error; and (4) acceptance and support within
the relevant community . 12 In City of Owensboro v. Adams 13 this Court stated that even
though a trial court has broad latitude in its discretion regarding the Daubert
examination, it must state at a minimum on the record its Daubert conclusion . 14 The trial
court here stated on the record that it was "applying Daubert" and that it had not heard
enough to disqualify the testimony. The trial court did not, therefore, abuse its
discretion .
If an expert's testimony is admitted over the objection of a party, the
opposing party may either refute the testimony with another expert or lessen its effect
through vigorous cross-examination . Appellant chose only to cross-examine Skinner
and Freels, but did not introduce his own expert . Skinner prepared a report and
1509 U .S . 579, 592-94, 116 S. Ct. 189, 125 L. Ed .2d 469 (1993) .
2 _Id .
13 136 S.W .3d 446 (Ky. 2004) .
14
Id. at 451 .
testified to the presence of antimony and lead on Freels' hand after he test-fired the
weapon . Skinner then compared her results to those from the victim Miller . While the
test subject Freels had significant amounts of lead and antimony on his hands, Miller
had only lead on his hands. Therefore, Skinner concluded that she couldn't state with
certainty whether Miller had fired the weapon .
Appellant's defense counsel cross-examined Skinner on her methodology
and results, causing Skinner to concede that the conditions of the crime scene could be
much different from the test fire range . The cross-examination of Freels led him to
admit that test firing weapons to determine whether a gun was an emitter (causing
significant presence of one of the three chemical substances) is no longer performed by
the Kentucky State Police . The jury heard the evidence, its conflicts and attacks upon it.
It was for the jury to determine the weight of such evidence .
Appellant further argues that the Commonwealth failed to provide
"exculpatory" material in violation of Brady v. Maryland 15 entitling him to a new trial.
This claim arises because Skinner's report on the victim, Miller, did not indicate a
presence of barium or lead, yet she testified at trial that there were significant amounts
of lead and the presence of barium on the swabs of Miller's hand, allowing the
inference that he had fired a gun. This was to Appellant's advantage . The live
testimony was more favorable than the report. It also revealed an inconsistency that
Appellant's counsel used to attack Skinner's testimony .
While the Commonwealth's failure to furnish appellant with a report that
accurately disclosed investigatory findings of probable gunshot residue on the victim's
hands was likely a Brady violation, Skinner's testimony at trial cured the violation by
15
373 U .S . 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L .Ed .2d 215 (1963) .
6
presenting the jury directly with the exculpatory evidence . Accordingly, we find that any
error with respect to the Brady violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. '6
In his next claim of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by
admitting the testimony of Detective Ken Hill regarding tire tracks. Appellant preserved
this issue for appeal by filing a Motion in Limine before trial and objecting during trial .
Furthermore, the testimony was excluded in Barnes I and Appellant asserts that it must
also be excluded in Barnes II under the "law of the case" doctrine .
Appellant first questions the relevancy and probative value of Hill's
testimony . Kentucky defines "relevant evidence" under KRE 401 as "evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence ." We have given trial courts broad discretion to determine whether evidence
is relevant and a "slight" showing is sufficient." Hill testified from photos of the scene
where the decedent's truck was found that there were two sets of tire tracks . Hill
attributed one set to a turkey hunter and the second to a rear wheel drive vehicle that
lost traction and made a "fish tail" mark on the gravel road . The "fish tail" was caused
by an accelerated start with the driver over-applying power and losing traction.
The Commonwealth introduced the testimony of Detective Hill to support
its theory that someone had moved the victim's truck in an attempt to place it
in such a position as to support the Appellant's story and then sped off in another
vehicle. KRE 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
16
Chapman v. California , 386 U.S . 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed .2d 705 (1967) .
" "A 'fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action' includes not only a
fact tending to prove an element of the offense, but also a fact tending to disprove a
defense . Relevancy is established by any showing of probativeness, however slight ."
Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S.W.2d 439, 449 (Ky. 1996) (quoting KRE 401) .
7
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence ." Appellant took the opportunity to cross-examine
Hill on his testimony . Since the probative value of Hill's testimony is not substantially
outweighed by any undue prejudicial effect it was not inadmissible . With respect to
Appellant's claim regarding "law of the case," the evidence at issue was excluded by
the trial court in Barnes I . As this ruling favored Appellant, it was not presented to this
Court and we did not address it. Thus, "law of the case" does not apply .
Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth improperly impeached his
parents, Wilbur and Margie Barnes, on collateral facts . Appellant claims this issue was
properly preserved by a citation at trial and by a motion in limine ; however, the
Commonwealth contends the asserted error was unpreserved . We have recently made
clear that while we have not repealed the contemporaneous objection rule, we follow
the plain language of KRE 103(d) over case law to the contrary, and, therefore a proper
motion in limine preserves an issue for appeal .18 The impeachment arose from two
inconsistent lines of testimony by Appellant's parents as to the time they arrived at the
scene and whether they arrived together .
Appellant's mother, Margie, testified before the grand jury that she and
her husband arrived together at the crime scene . To illustrate the position of their car
she sketched the location where they parked their vehicle . However, various police and
ambulance personnel testified that they watched Wilbur drive in alone, and that Margie
must have arrived earlier for her to already be on the scene . Further, the witnesses
18
Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S .W . 3d 14, 21 (Ky. 2005).
stated that Wilbur could not have parked in the location described by Margie because
an ambulance was already parked there .
Margie explained that Wilbur drove slowly into the driveway and she got
out and ran into the house . After reviewing her husband's testimony she admitted she
was wrong and ultimately testified that she was unsure about where they parked . A
neighbor, Ms . Lisa Brumley, also testified that she saw Wilbur pull out in front of her
around midnight as she was coming home from work. The inconsistency between
Wilbur and Margie and between the other uninterested parties, the police, ambulance
personnel, and neighbor reflects a proper basis for the trial court to rule as it did and
allow such impeachment.
The Appellant characterizes Margie's testimony as collateral, but the
Commonwealth says it is material because it fits within its general theory that the
Appellant did not shoot in self-defense, but staged the evidence to appear that he did .
If Wilbur and Margie actually arrived earlier than they said, such as before midnight as
the neighbor Brumley testified, then their testimony is inconsistent with the 911 dispatch
call at 2:13 a.m .
It should have been expected that the Commonwealth would impeach
Margie and Wilbur with their testimony that was inconsistent with each other and with
the testimony of others . We have recognized the approach suggested by Professor
Lawson,' 9 to look at this as a KRE 403 balancing test measuring the probative value
against the prejudicial effect of the evidence and not whether the matter is merely
collateral . Under either analysis, however, there was no abuse of discretion by allowing
'9 Metcalf v.
Commonwealth , 158 S.W .3d 740, 745 (Ky. 2005) (citing Robert G .
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook , § 4.05(3), at 276) .
9
the jury to consider the credibility of each witness to determine the weight it should
have.
Appellant's next claim of error is that the verdict form improperly shifted
the burden to the Appellant . Appellant objected to the verdict form at trial and thereby
preserved the issue for appellate review. The instructions are properly described as a
"form" with standard language beginning with the Presumption of Innocence:
A. The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime
and the Indictment shall not be considered as evidence
or as having any weight against him . You shall find the
defendant not guilty unless you are satisfied from the
evidence alone and beyond a reasonable doubt that he
is guilty . If upon the whole case you have a reasonable
doubt that he is guilty, you shall find him not guilty .
B . If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Defendant would be guilty of Intentional
Murder under Instruction No . 313(1), except that you
would have a reasonable doubt as to whether at the time
he killed Troy Miller he was or was not acting under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance, you shall not
find the Defendant guilty of Intentional Murder under
Instruction No. 313(1), but shall find him guilty of First
Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No. 413(1).
While the form provided for alternative findings by the jury, such as first-degree
manslaughter instead of intentional murder, in no way does it "shift the
burden" to Appellant . The instructions properly described the presumption of
Appellant's innocence and the burden of proof of the Commonwealth .
Finally, Appellant argues that statements made by the prosecutor during
opening statement, and by police witnesses about whether the weapon found beside
the victim was "clean" of fingerprints entitle Appellant to a new trial under CR 60 .02
based on newly discovered evidence . Appellant timely filed a motion for a new trial as
required by CR 60.02 and upon denial of the motion appealed to the Court of Appeals .
10
That appeal was transferred to this Court and consolidated with the matter of right
appeal .
During the Commonwealth's opening statement the prosecutor stated that
Detective Hill had inspected the gun with a magnifying glass, that he could not find any
blood or fingerprints, and "[i]t was a totally clean gun planted at the scene ." Hill and
Freels both testified at trial that they checked for fingerprints and found none. Hill also
testified that the victim, Miller, had blood on both hands and his upper body, but none
was detected on the gun by naked eye examination or by use of a magnifying glass.
Hill did not check further for prints but sent it to the lab for latent prints, blood, body
fluids, and test firing for gun residue . Freels stated that the gun was dusted and no
prints were found. However, Appellant discovered through an open records request to
the Kentucky State Police that the pistol and bullets were not examined for fingerprints .
The difference between the trial testimony of finding no fingerprints and
the post-trial revelation that no laboratory examination was actually made is Appellant's
basis for claiming a new trial under CR 60.02. This inconsistency between the
testimony of the two officers and what actually occurred is, perhaps, the most troubling
aspect of this appeal.
The trial court, however, addressed those concerns and found them as
unworthy and even characterized them as speculative .
The Court does not find that the information the Defendant
recently obtained from the Kentucky State Police is contrary
to representations made by the Commonwealth Attorney or
the evidence presented by the Commonwealth .
Furthermore, the Defendant does not claim that the
Commonwealth deliberately withheld information from the
Defendant, and the Defendant had more than three years to
review the discovery provided by the Commonwealth, [sic]
Both Sgt. Ken Hill and Ronnie Frees [sic] testified at an
earlier trial of the case and the Defendant does not claim
their testimony changed substantially from the first trial . If
the Defendant had questions about the exact type of
analysis conducted on the pistol, based on the discovery
provided by the Commonwealth and the earlier testimony of
Sgt. Ken Hill and Mr. Ronnie Freels, the Defendant could
have raised those concerns long before now. It is
speculation at best to suggest that if further tests had been
conducted on the pistol the victim's fingerprints would have
been found on the pistol .
We agree that failure of the laboratory to test for fingerprints provides no basis for CR
60 .02 relief. Our decision in Folev v. Commonwealth 20 requires discovery of evidence of
such a character that "it would, with reasonable certainty, change the verdict or that it
would probably change the result if a new trial should be granted. "21 This standard has
not been met.
For the foregoing reasons this Court affirms the conviction of the
Appellant .
Lambert, C. J ., and Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Roach, and
Wintersheimer, JJ., concur . Scott, J ., dissents .
20
2'
55 S .W .3d 809, 814 (Ky. 2001) .
Id . at 814.
12
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
William E. Johnson
David J. Guarnieri
JOHNSON, TRUE & GUARNIERI, LLP
326 West Main Street
Frankfort, KY 40601-1887
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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