SHAWN O. THACKER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : JUNE 15, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0430-MR
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SHAWN O. THACKER
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
01-CR-586
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Affirming
Appellant, Shawn Thacker, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in
connection with his convictions by a Hardin Circuit jury of Robbery in the First Degree,
Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, and Persistent Felony Offender in the
First Degree.
Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. §
110(2)(b) .
On September 10, 2001, Appellant entered the Exxon/Stuckey's
Foodmart/Service Station near Interstate 65 in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. Appellant
approached the sales counter with a sleeve of crackers . As the sales clerk, Nora Miller,
began to process his purchase, Appellant stated, "while you have your drawer open,
give me all the money." Miller replied, "Excuse me," and then looked down to see a gun
on the counter. She saw that Appellant had rested the gun on its side using his hand to
partially conceal it from public view. The gun was pointed toward the mid-section of
Miller's body.
Miller emptied the cash register and Appellant left with the money . Miller saw
Appellant and "a black person" drive away. Miller telephoned police and provided a
description of the robber which was broadcast across local police radio . Within the next
two hours, Appellant robbed a Shell Station in Bullitt County . The sales clerk in Bullitt
County told police that two males, one white and one black, were driving an Oldsmobile
with a recognized license plate number northward on Interstate 65. The information
from Bullitt County was also broadcast across local police radio. Shortly after the Bullitt
County robbery, Appellant and a black male were apprehended driving north on
Interstate 65.
During Appellant's arrest, a revolver and miscellaneous cash were found in the
vehicle . Appellant was transported to the Bullitt County Sheriff's Department where he
confessed on videotape to the foregoing crimes . After the confession, officers brought
Miller to the parking lot of the Sheriff's Department inside a police car with tinted
windows . Appellant was brought out in handcuffs, where Miller identified him as the
person who robbed her. She stated that she was certain because she recognized his tshirt.
Appellant was subsequently charged and convicted by a jury of the crimes set
forth above . Appellant now asserts five assignments of error upon which he requests
relief. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm.
I.
In his first assignment of error, Appellant alleges that his conviction for first
degree robbery must be vacated because the jury did not convict him of each and every
element of the crime pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S . 466, 120 S .Ct.
2348, 147 L.Ed .2d 435 (2000) and United States v. Gaudin , 515 U .S. 506, 115 S.Ct.
2310, 132 L.Ed .2d 444 (1995). Those cases hold that criminal convictions must rest
upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of each and every element of the
crime with which he is charged . Apprendi , supra, at 477; Gaudin, supra , at 510. In
Apprendi , supra, the United States Supreme Court held simply : "Other than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. at 490 .
KRS 515.020 sets forth Robbery in the First Degree, in pertinent part, as follows :
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when, in the course of
committing theft, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force
upon another person with intent to accomplish the theft and when he . . .
[i]s armed with a deadly weapon.
(Emphasis added) . The trial court in this case submitted the following instruction
regarding First Degree Robbery' to the jury:
You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Robbery under this
Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county on or about September 10, 2001, and
before the finding of the Indictment herein, he stole currency
from Stuckey's in the Heartland Travel Plaza ;
B. That in the course of so doing and with intent to
accomplish the theft, he used or threatened the immediate
use of physical force upon Norm Miller; AND
C. That when he did so, he was armed with a 22-caliber
revolver.
(Emphasis added) .
' The instruction was in exact accordance with the wording recommended in 1 Cooper ,
Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 6 .14 (4th ed . Anderson 1993) .
3
First-Degree Robbery is a Class B felony and carries a possible sentence
between ten and twenty years imprisonment . By contrast, Second-Degree Robbery,
which does not require a defendant to be armed with a deadly weapon, carries a
possible sentence between five and ten years imprisonment .
KRS 500 .080 lists the definitions for the term "deadly weapon," including "any
weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical
injury, may be discharged ." Appellant claims that the question of whether or not an
object is a "deadly weapon" is an essential element that must be submitted to the jury.
Appellant asks this Court to overturn Hicks v. Commonwealth , 550 S .W.2d 480 (Ky.
1977).
In Hicks , this Court held, "[i]t should never be necessary in the instructions to
define the word `deadly weapon .' Whether the particular instrument is or is not a deadly
weapon should be determined by the court as a matter of law."
It is clear that one of the essential elements of Appellant's first degree robbery
charge is being armed with a deadly weapon . This element consists of two questions :
(1) whether the defendant was armed with the object in question, and (2) whether that
object is a deadly weapon . The first inquiry involves a pure question of fact. The
second inquiry, whether an object is a deadly weapon, requires an application of the law
to fact. Pursuant to Hicks , the jury in this case was only permitted to decide the purely
factual question, while the trial judge decided the second inquiry, which involved the
application of law to facts . Appellant argues that withholding the legal determination
from the jury is error. For.the reasons set forth below, we agree.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the idea that a jury is only
required to decide the factual components of essential elements . Gaudin . supra , at
511-515 . In Gaudin, the Supreme Court held that the jury should have been entitled to
decide the entire essential element, including the application of law to fact. To avoid
conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent in Gaudin and Apprendi , we are
compelled to overrule Hicks. In doing so, we reiterate that the "judge must be permitted
to instruct the jury on the law and to insist that the jury follow his instructions ." Gaudin ,
supra, at 513 (citing Sparf v. United States , 156 U .S. 51, 15 S .Ct. 273, 39 L .Ed . 343
(1895)) . Thus, a proper jury instruction may have read :
C. That when he did so, he was armed with a deadly weapon, to
wit: a 22-caliber revolver .
D. As a matter of law, a deadly weapon is defined to include
any weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing
death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged.
Although the change may seem minor, this instruction ensures that the jury
ultimately determines the essential elements of the offense, and acts in
accordance with the law. Courts in other jurisdictions have taken a similar
approach to instructing their juries on robbery. See ea, People v. Runnion, 30
Cal .App .4th 852, 856 (Cal . Ct. App. 1994) (the trial court properly instructed the
jury that the legal definition of a firearm includes a handgun, and left to the jury's
determination the question of whether the weapon in the case was a handgun);
State v. Davis , 506 S .E .2d 455, 481 (N.C . 1998) (holding similarly); Strickler v.
Murray , 452 S.E .2d 648,* 650 (Va. 1995) (an example of a Virginia jury instruction
on robbery) .
The Commonwealth argues that even if the instruction was erroneous, it was
harmless error. RCr 9 .24 requires us to disregard any error or defect in the proceeding
that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. The test for harmless error is
whether there is any substantial possibility that the outcome of the case would have
been different without the presence of that error. Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 646
5
S .W .2d 43, 45 (Ky.1983) . The United States Supreme Court has held that an
erroneous jury instruction that omits an essential element of the offense is subject to
harmless-error analysis . Neder v. United States, 527 U .S . 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144
L.Ed .2d 35 (1999). We do not believe that the outcome of the case would have been
different had the jury been properly instructed, as there is little doubt that the jury would
have found a 22-caliber revolver to be a deadly weapon . The error was harmless.
11 .
Next, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
evidence to sustain a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Appellant argues that the revolver in this case was missing a pin which is designed to
hold the cylinder, and raises doubts as to the gun's operability due to this missing pin.
2 Even though Appellant does not put forth this argument in his brief, we note that the
gun in this case was a deadly weapon regardless of its operability. For purposes of first
degree robbery, the gun's operability is immaterial to the question of whether it is a
deadly weapon . Helpenstine v. Commonwealth , 566 S .W .2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1978)
("Whether the handgun was operable is not relevant."). As defined within the comments
to KRS 515.020, an object is a deadly weapon if it is intended by the user to convince
the victim that it is as such. Merritt v. Commonwealth , 386 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ky. App .
1965) (any kind of pistol, including a toy, falls within the first degree robbery statute);
Kennedy v. Commonwealth , 544 S .W .2d 219, 220-221 (Ky. 1976) (extending the
holding in Merritt to the modern robbery statute); see also, Shegog v. Commonwealth ,
142 S .W .3d 101, 109 (Ky. 2004) (evidence sufficient to support conviction of first degree
robbery where defendant merely referenced the fact that he had a gun, but never
displayed or showed it to the victims).
The dissent's contention that the legislature's long standing interpretation of this
phrase should be changed by judicial fiat lacks authority or substance. First, since
operability of the deadly weapon is not an element of first degree robbery, Apprendi and
its progeny are simply not implicated in this instance . _Id. at 477, 120 S .Ct. at 2356 (a
defendant is entitled to "a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged") (emphasis added) . Second, it is a perceptual distortion
to categorize those deadly weapons which are deemed, after the fact, "inoperable" as
"dangerous instruments ." The gun in this case was clearly intended to convince the
victim that it was readily capable of discharging a shot . Thus, to indicate that Appellant
was entitled to an instruction for anything other than first degree robbery by means of
being armed with a deadly weapon would undermine the policy, intent, and purpose of
KRS 515 .020.
6
As such, Appellant claims that the revolver was not a "firearm" under KRS 527.040 .
KRS 527.010(4) sets forth the definition of "firearm" as "any weapon which will expel a
projectile by the action of an explosion ."
We do not believe that this issue was properly preserved for review, as
Appellant's motion for directed verdict did not specify this ground as a basis for relief.
CR 50.01 ; see also Potts v. Commonwealth , 172 S.W.3d 345, 347-48 (Ky. 2005) (a
mere motion for directed verdict without stating the specific ground for relief is
inadequate to preserve the issue on review) . Nevertheless, we believe that there was
sufficient evidence to support Appellant's conviction . "On appellate review, the test of a
directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ."
Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). At trial, Kenny Russell of
the Bullitt County Sheriff's Department testified that the gun could fire, despite the
missing cylinder pin . The jury was free to believe Mr. Russell's testimony, and it was
not clearly unreasonable for them to do so . Appellant was not entitled to a directed
verdict of acquittal .
III .
Appellant claims that the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to use
two concurrent probated sentences as two separate convictions for PFO purposes .
Appellant's prior convictions which formed the basis for his PFO conviction are: (1)
burglary in the second degree and receiving stolen property over $300, and (2)
trafficking in stolen vehicle parts . The first two crimes occurred on November 13, 1998,
and Appellant received a probated five year sentence on each count to run
concurrently. The second crime occurred on June 9, 1999, and Appellant received a
two year sentence, probated for five years . Appellant's probation on his first conviction
was not revoked, despite his reoffense in 1999. As such, Appellant claims that KRS
532 .080(4) treats all the convictions as one conviction because he effectively served
"concurrent or uninterrupted consecutive terms" for all three offenses . We disagree .
In Commonwealth v. Hinton , 678 S .W.2d 388 (Ky. 1984), the defendant was
convicted of three previous felonies in the same manner as Appellant . The defendant's
first two felonies were probated sentences which ran concurrently. While on probation,
the defendant committed a third felony offense . The Court held that the sentence from
the third conviction did not merge into the sentence for the first two convictions, despite
the fact that these sentences were served as uninterrupted consecutive terms .
Appellant argues that his situation may be distinguished from Hinton because his
probation was not revoked at the time he was sentenced for the third conviction . We
do not find this distinction to be of any consequence . Appellant began serving his
sentence on the first two convictions before being charged and sentenced on the third
conviction, and for this reason, the third conviction does not merge with the previous
sentence, regardless of whether or not his probation was revoked.
IV.
Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the victims
of crimes committed in Bullitt County to testify at the sentencing hearing . Appellant's
argument is without merit, and he cites to no authority as support.
V.
Lastly, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the
victim's "show-up" identification of him . Without evaluating whether or not there was an
error in this regard, we will simply state that any error in this regard would certainly be
harmless because Appellant confessed to the robbery.
Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the Hardin Circuit Court are affirmed .
Lambert, C .J ., Graves, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, J .J., concur.
Cooper, J ., dissents in a separate opinion in which Johnstone, J ., joins.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Euva D . May
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Ste . 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : JUNE 15, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
a
,;vixyxrvr Courf of ~rnfurkV
2003-SC-0430-MR
SHAWN O. THACKER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
01-C R-586
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
Since . . . there has been no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment, the entire premise of Chapman review is simply absent.
There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the
question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly
meaningless . There is. no obiect , so to speak, upon which harmless-error
scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a
jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt-not that the jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error.
That is not enough .
Sullivan v. Louisiana , 508 U.S. 275, 280,113 S .Ct. 2078, 2082, 124 L.Ed .2d 182
(1993) . As in Sullivan , Appellant was denied the right to a trial by jury on the offense of
robbery in the first degree .
Conviction of robbery in the second degree ("robbery 2nd"), a Class C felony,
requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that in the course of committing theft,
the defendant used or threatened the immediate use of physical force upon another
person with intent to accomplish the theft. KRS 515.030 . Robbery in the first degree
("robbery 1st"), a Class B felony, requires the jury to find those identical elements and
additionally to find beyond a reasonable doubt one of three aggravating factors, i .e . , that
the defendant (a) caused physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime ; (b) was armed with a deadly weapon ; or (c) used or threatened to use a
dangerous instrument upon any person who is not a participant in the crime . KRS
515 .020(1).
Appellant did not use physical force upon the victim, and the victim was not
physically injured . KRS 500.080 contains the following definitions pertinent to this case:
"Dangerous instrument" means any instrument . . . . article, or
substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable
of causing death or serious physical injury ;
(4)
"Deadly weapon" means any of the following :
(b)
Any weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing
death or other serious physical injury, may be
discharged . . . .
Appellant was convicted of robbery 1 st under an instruction that read as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO . 5
FIRST-DEGREE ROBBERY
You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Robbery under
this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt all of the following:
A . That in this county on or about September 20, 2001, and before
the finding of the Indictment herein, he stole currency from Stuckey's in
the Heartland Travel Plaza ;
B. That in the course of so doing and with intent to accomplish the
theft, he used or threatened the immediate use of physical force upon
Nora Miller ;
AND
C . That when he did so; he was armed with a .22-caliber revolver.
As held by the majority opinion, the trial court erred in deciding as a matter of law
that the .22 caliber revolver was, in fact, a deadly weapon . Blakely v. Washington , 542
U.S . 296, 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 159 L. Ed .2d 403 (2004) ("[T]he 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely
on the basis of the facts reflected in the fury verdict or admitted by the defendant.") ;
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S . 584, 609,122 S.Ct. 2428, 2443, 153 L.Ed .2d 556 (2002)
(Because "aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.") (citation
and quotation omitted) ; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S . 466, 490,120 S.Ct. 2348,
2362-63, 147 L .Ed .2d 435 (2000) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt ."). Further, "the
characterization of a fact or circumstance as an 'element' or as a 'sentencing factor' is
not determinative of the question 'who decides,' judge or jury." Rin , 536 U.S. at 60405, 122 S.Ct . at 2441 (citing Apprendi , 530 U .S . at 492, 120 S.Ct. at 2363-64) . Thus, I
agree that Hicks v. Commonwealth , 550 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1977), must be overruled (as
must Commonwealth v. Potts , 884 S.W .2d 654, 656 (Ky. 1994) ; Helpenstine v.
Commonwealth , 566 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Ky. 1978) ; Little v. Commonwealth , 550 S.W .2d
492, 494 (Ky. 1977) ; and Commonwealth v. Hammond , 633 S.W .2d 73, 75 (Ky. App.
1982)) .
I also agree that the error would have been harmless if the evidence had been
"overwhelming" that the .22 caliber revolver was a "weapon from which a shot, readily
capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged." KRS
500.080(4) . See Neder v. United States , 527 U .S. 1, 16,119 S.Ct. 1627, 1837, 144
L.Ed .2d 35 (1999) (error in failing to instruct jury that it must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that misstatements in tax return and in affidavit filed in support of loan application
were "material" deemed harmless error because evidence of materiality was
overwhelming) . Here, the revolver was defective because the pin that holds the
revolving cylinder in place was missing. Thus, when the weapon is held upright in its
natural firing position, the cylinder would fall out, making firing impossible . A Bullitt
County deputy sheriff testified that despite the missing cylinder pin, the gun could fire .
However, he admitted that he did not test-fire the gun to see if it would do so. Under
this evidence, the jury could well have believed that the .22 revolver was not a "weapon
from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury,
may be discharged," thus was not a deadly weapon .
Although Kennedy v. Commonwealth , 544 S.W .2d 219, 220-21 (Ky. 1976), did
purport to carry forward into the penal code the common law notion that "an object is a
deadly weapon if it is intended by the user to convince the victim that it is such," Blakely ,
Ring, and Apprendi would now require a jury instruction on that theory . In fact, that
theory was never discussed at the trial level. I believe that the scenarios in Kennedy
and in the case sub iudice more properly fall within the third aggravating factor in KRS
515.020(1)(c), i.e., "use[d] or threatenfedl the immediate use of a dangerous instrument
upon any person who is not a participant in the crime ." (Emphasis added.) A gun that
is not a "deadly weapon" because it is not one "from which a shot, readily capable of
producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged" could still be a
"[d]angerous instrument . . . which, under the circumstances in which it is used,
attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or
serious physical injury ." KRS 500.080(3) . In fact, Appellant did not threaten to shoot
Miller; he only laid the .22 revolver on the counter, which Miller took to be a threat since
Appellant was also demanding money. In fact, Appellant could have used the gun to
bludgeon Miller, and it would have been proper to instruct the jury under that theory .
Finally, Appellant is entitled to a new trial because of the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury on robbery 2nd as a lesser included offense in the event the jury failed
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defective .22 caliber revolver was a deadly
weapon . It is the duty of the trial court in a criminal case to instruct the jury on the
whole law of the case, RCr 9.54(1), and this rule requires instructions applicable to
every state of the case deducible from or supported to any extent by the testimony .
Webb v. Commonwealth , 904 S .W.2d 226, 228 (Ky. 1995) ; Reed v. Commonwealth ,
738 S .W.2d 818, 822 (Ky . 1987) . A defendant has the right to have every issue of fact
raised by the evidence and material to the defense submitted to the jury on proper
instructions . Haves v. Commonwealth , 870 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Ky. 1993) . He is entitled
to an instruction on any lawful defense that he has, Slaven v. Commonwealth , 962
S.W.2d 845, 856 (Ky. 1997), including the defense that he is guilty of a lesser included
offense of the crime charged . "Although a lesser included offense is not a defense
within the technical meaning of those terms as used in the penal code, it is, in fact and
principle, a defense against the higher charge ." Id. ; see also Brown v. Commonwealth ,
555 S .W.2d 252, 256 (Ky. 1977) . An instruction on a lesser included offense is required
if the evidence would permit the jury to rationally find the defendant not guilty of the
primary offense, but guilty of the lesser offense . Commonwealth v. Wolford , 4 S.W .3d
534, 539 (Ky. 1999) (citing Smith v. Commonwealth , 737 S .W .2d 683, 688 (Ky. 1987)).
Failure to instruct the jury on a lawful defense is not harmless error. Mondie v.
Commonwealth, 158 S.W .3d 203, 209-210 (Ky. 2005) (failure to instruct jury on defense
of protection against burglary required reversal) ; Nichols v. Commonwealth , 142 S.W .3d
683, 690 (Ky. 2004) (failure to instruct on voluntary intoxication as defense to intentional
assault was prejudicial because it deprived defendant of lesser included offenses of
wanton or reckless assault in the fourth degree) ; Edwards v. Commonwealth , 429
S .W .2d 859, 860 (Ky. 1968) ("The court did not affirmatively instruct the jury so as to
encompass this theory of defense. The failure to so instruct was error . . . . In the
circumstances shown in this case the defendant was entitled to an affirmative
instruction within the rationale of the authorities cited, and we must reverse the
judgment of conviction for the failure of the court to so instruct the jury.") ; Evitts v.
Commonwealth , 257 Ky. 586, 78 S .W.2d 798, 799-800 (1935) ("We have held
repeatedly that, where an accused admits the offense, or essential elements of the
offense, but relies upon facts or circumstances amounting to an avoidance of the crime,
he is entitled to a concrete instruction upon his theory of the case, and a mere general
instruction is not sufficient. . . . We are of the opinion that the failure of the court to give
a concrete instruction on the defendant's theory of this case was sufficiently prejudicial
to require reversal ."); Sebastian v. Commonwealth , 585 S .W.2d 440, 441 (Ky. App.
1979) ("We conclude that Sebastian was at least entitled to an instruction on his
defense of entrapment . Failure to give such an instruction constitutes reversible
error.").
Accordingly, I dissent.
Johnstone, J ., joins .
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