PATRICK W. MEEKS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MODIFIED : AUGUST 24, 2006
MODIFIED : AUGUST 2, 2006
RENDERED :JUNE 15, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0244-MR
MICHAEL ANTHONY PEAK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
2001-CR-0584-00
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
2003-SC-0271-MR
PATRICK W. MEEKS
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J . KNOPF, JUDGE
2001-CR-0584-00
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
AFFIRMING
Peak appeals from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted him of
intentional murder, first-degree robbery, conspiracy to commit murder and tampering
with physical evidence . He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
probation or parole for twenty-five years .
Meeks appeals from a Judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted him of
wanton murder, first-degree robbery, conspiracy to commit murder and tampering with
physical evidence.
He also was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
probation or parole for twenty-five years.
These appeals have been consolidated in order to render one opinion . The two
defendants raise numerous issues, some of which are the same . We will first address
the individual issue(s) raised by Meeks and Peak and then address their shared issues .
The question presented by Meeks is whether the trial judge erred in refusing to
suppress his taped statement to the police .
The questions presented by Peak are whether the unredacted statement given
by Meeks was improperly admitted ; whether there was an impermissible reference to a
polygraph exam ; whether the trial judge erred in excluding evidence about the
destroyed farmhouse or by failing to give a missing evidence instruction ; whether he
was entitled to an instruction on accomplice testimony; and, whether the evidence was
constitutionally sufficient to support the verdict.
The questions presented by both defendants are whether the trial judge erred in
reducing the number of peremptory challenges ; whether the psychological records of a
third co-defendant should have been provided to Meeks and Peak; whether the alleged
omission of an oath or affirmation to a witness was palpable or structural error; whether
demonstrative exhibits were improperly shown to the jury; whether the trial judge was
divested of jurisdiction because the aggravating circumstances were not charged in the
indictment; and, whether an alleged inconsistent recommendation by the jury as to
sentencing resulted in error.
Peak; Meeks and a third co-defendant, Bearden, were charged with murdering,
robbing and conspiring to murder an unidentified victim following the discovery of his
skeletal remains in a dry creek bed. Peak and Meeks were also charged with
tampering with physical evidence . All three individuals were tried together. Bearden
testified at trial against her two co-defendants and in exchange for that testimony the
Commonwealth agreed not to seek the death penalty against her. Among other
evidence, the Commonwealth also presented the incriminating taped statement Meeks
gave to the police.
The evidence at trial indicated that the three co-defendants had previously
purchased or obtained drugs from the unidentified victim. After learning that he was
trying to sell a kilogram of cocaine, they conspired to murder him and rob him of his
drugs. Bearden claimed that the idea was first proposed to her by Meeks . In the taped
statement given by Meeks, he originally suggested that Bearden and possibly Peak
devised the plan, but later stated he didn't know who came up with it. Although he
admitted that they talked about killing the victim, he claimed that in his mind they were
only going to rob him .
The plan was soon put into action. Meeks obtained a gun and gave it to Peak.
Bearden and Meeks then dropped Peak off at an abandoned farmhouse where Meeks
once lived. Next, Bearden telephoned the victim and told him that she had a buyer for
his cocaine . Having convinced him, she and Meeks transported the victim to the
farmhouse where Peak lay in waiting. When the victim entered, Peak shot him multiple
times and stabbed him in the back of the neck. After the victim was killed, the three codefendants cleaned up the crime scene. Peak, Meeks and a third individual, Cissell,
who was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony ; eventually disposed of the
body of the victim in a dry creek bed.
Peak and Meeks were convicted of all the charges . The only difference was that
Meeks was convicted of wanton murder and Peak was convicted of intentional murder.
They were both sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of probation or parole
for twenty-five years for murder, twenty years for first-degree burglary and five years for
tampering with physical evidence. Meeks was sentenced to ten years for conspiracy to
commit murder and Peak was sentenced to twenty years for the same charge . All the
sentences were eventually ordered to run concurrent by the trial judge . These
consolidated appeals followed .
I. Suppression of Statement by Meeks
Meeks argues that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to
suppress his statement to the police on the night of his arrest because it was not
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given . He contends that the tactics used by the
detective were objectively coercive . Meeks also asserts that he unequivocally asserted
his right to counsel . We disagree .
The trial judge held a hearing on the motion to suppress at which Meeks testified
as did the two police detectives that interviewed him . Following the hearing, the trial
judge made findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied the motion. Our review
of the record demonstrates that those findings are supported by substantial evidence
and thus, they are conclusive . RCr 9.78 . We offer a brief summary of the facts from
the hearing :
Meeks was arrested at 10:45 p .m. and signed a waiver of his Miranda rights at
10:55 p.m. He was then questioned by police from that point until 2:03 a .m. The
questioning started again at approximately 5 :00 a.m . and lasted until 6 :42 a.m . Only the
last half hour of each session was tape recorded .
Meeks testified at the suppression hearing that he awoke for work on the day of
his arrest at 4:30 a .m. and remained awake twenty-six hours straight when the
questioning by police ended. He complained that during the questioning he did not
move around the room; was constantly yawning and nodding off; and, was physically
and mentally exhausted . Meeks claimed that one of the detectives told him to
cooperate and the judge would be told of the cooperation . He also alleged that he told
the detective that he was scared and that he thought he needed to talk to an attorney.
On cross-examination, Meeks admitted that he had been talking to a detective for
about an hour when he placed himself at the murder scene. He also acknowledged that
he was allowed to go to the bathroom; did not ask for any food ; and, was provided with
a cigar to smoke.
A detective testified that Meeks was offered both food and the ability to take
breaks. He stated that between interview sessions, he saw Meeks sleeping with his
head down . The detective also said that Meeks had no problem drawing a detailed
diagram of the crime scene during the second interview session . He stated he made no
threat or promises to Meeks to get his statement and that he only told him that he would
tell the court that he was cooperative .
A second detective said he saw Meeks yawn,
but never saw him nod off. One detective testified that Meeks never discussed a need
for a lawyer.
In his first taped statement, Meeks admitted that he was given the opportunity to
take breaks, to smoke and to get something to drink . In his second taped statement,
Meeks acknowledges being coherent and that he was given frequent breaks . He does
indicate a lack of sleep, but states that it did not affect his ability to tell the truth.
The confession of Meeks was voluntary . Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d
473 (Ky. 1999) . There is no evidence of police coercion of a confession obtained by
physical violence or a deliberate means calculated to break the will of Meeks. See
Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S . 298, 105 S .Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed .2d 222 (1985). The detective
did not make threats or promises to Meeks to obtain his confession. His representation
that he would inform prosecuting authorities of his cooperation does not render the
confession involuntary . See Skaggs v. Commonwealth , 694 S .W.2d 672 (Ky. 1985) .
Meeks was not deprived food, drink or the ability to take breaks . Although he may have
been tired, he was not forced to stay awake. As correctly determined by the trial judge,
Meeks was not so exhausted from a lack of sleep so as to make his confession
involuntary .
The Commonwealth demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that
Meeks waived his Miranda rights . A statement is not compelled for Fifth Amendment
purposes if an individual voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waives his constitutional
privilege . Colorado v. Spring, 479 U .S. 564,107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L .Ed .2d 954 (1987);
Mills , supra . Meeks signed a written waiver of his rights before being questioned by
police.
There is no evidence that Meeks was incapable of comprehending the waiver of
rights . He admitted to being coherent and that his ability to tell the truth was not
affected by his tiredness . The totality of the circumstances reveals that Meeks made an
uncoerced choice to relinquish his rights and did so with the requisite level of
comprehension . Moran v. Burbine , 475 U.S. 412,106 S .Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed .2d 410
(1986).
His allegation that he told the detectives that he thought he needed to talk to an
attorney is unsubstantiated . Nowhere in the two taped statements does Meeks mention
the need for an attorney. Moreover, one detective testified that he never made such a
request. The determination by the trial judge that Meeks never asked for an attorney is
supported by substantial evidence . It is unnecessary for us to address the alternative
position offered by the trial judge that Meeks statement concerning an attorney was
ambiguous.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the execution of a waiver of rights by
Meeks and his subsequent questioning were constitutionally permissible . The trial
judge did not err in overruling the motion by Meeks to suppress his confession.
ll . Introduction of Statement From Meeks
Peak claims that the trial judge erred by permitting the introduction of the
unredacted statement given by Meeks . We disagree .
After his arrest, Meeks gave an extensive taped statement to the police
implicating himself as well as his two co-defendants . Four weeks into the joint trial, the
Commonwealth made significant efforts to produce a redacted version of the statement
that could be introduced against Meeks without prejudicing Peak. Meeks objected to
the redacted version of the tape because he felt it made him look to be the trigger man.
Instead, he demanded that the full unredacted version be played . He waived his
5th
Amendment rights and moved to have the audiotape of the statement played in its
original form . Peak then requested bifurcation, mistrial or alternatively, to have portions
of the statement redacted . The trial judge denied Peak's requested relief. Peak then
objected to playing the tape without Meeks taking the stand and testifying. The trial
judge overruled the objection and later denied a second motion for mistrial .
The trial judge made an inquiry concerning the waiver of Meeks' Fifth
Amendment rights . The prosecution clarified with the trial judge that there was no
agreement regarding Meeks testifying. The trial judge concurred with the parties that
anyone involved could call Meeks as a witness subsequent to the waiver of his Fifth
Amendment rights against self-incrimination .
Following the testimony of the police office who interviewed Meeks, the
Commonwealth played the taped interview. The Commonwealth moved to prohibit
Meeks and Peaks from conferring with each other claiming the benefits of the
separation of witnesses rule while contending that Peak was attempting to intimidate
Meeks to prevent his testimony . The trial judge cautioned defense counsel concerning
continued conferring between the two defendants .
Every case involving multiple defendants raises the possibility that evidence
which would be properly admitted in a trial of a single defendant would be improper in a
separate trial of a co-defendant. Such evidence should be closely reviewed prior to
admission because of the potential effect on a co-defendant. There is no question that
the waiver by Meeks and the hearsay exception provided by KRE 801A(b)(1) would
allow the statement to be admitted against Meeks.
Any Confrontation Clause analysis is fundamentally a question of whether the
accused was allowed to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U .S. Const.
Amend . VI . We require live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing. Crawford
v. Washington , 541 U .S. 36 (2004). Although cross-examination is a method typically
used by counsel to tease out the truth of a matter, it is not the only method available.
Id . at 67. Confrontation and not any particular formalized method of confrontation is
how the .determination of the reliability of testimonial statements is achieved . See id . at
69, Willis v. Commonwealth 716 S .W.2d 224 (1986). "The Confrontation Clause does
not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or
explain it." Crawford v. Washington , 541 U .S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).
The trial judge ruled in a manner that applied the hearsay exception rules
properly and afforded Peak the opportunity to test the truth of the statement before the
jury by calling Meeks as a witness . He had no duty to call Meeks as a witness but
certainly had the opportunity .
Had Peak called Meeks to the stand he could certainly
have been called as a hostile witness. He could then have been questioned with
leading questions as if on cross-examination. KRE 611(c). Peak was present at the
entire trial. He chose not to avail himself of that opportunity and waived his right to
confrontation . See Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S . 514 (1972).
Even if error arose, it was harmless, however, we need not determine whether
harmless error analysis should be applied to this situation because there was no error.
Cf. Schneble v. Florida , 405 U .S. 427 (1972). In any event both defendants received a
fair trial.
III .Polygraph Exam
Peak contends that during the cross-examination of Bearden by counsel for
Meeks, it was improperly inferred that Bearden passed a polygraph examination that
she allegedly failed . This issue is completely without merit. Peak cites a lengthy
exchange between Bearden and defense counsel for Meeks, the gist of it being that
Bearden testified that she was interviewed by a detective and answered several
questions posed to her. She also confirmed that she was informed that if she was
deceptive with the prosecution, the death penalty could be. pursued . There is no
mention of a polygraph in any form or fashion during the exchange. The inference
created by Peak is beyond strained . There was no error.
IV. Farmhouse
Peak asserts that the trial judge erred by excluding evidence of and from the
farmhouse where the murder and robbery were committed or by failing to give a
missing evidence instruction to the jury. We disagree .
The corporation that owned the land on which the farmhouse was located signed
a conditional consent permitting the police to search the house and the surrounding
grounds . The police agreed to conclude their search by October 25, 2000 and not to
interfere or intervene in any destruction of the farmhouse by the owner if, after
November 11, 2000, it elected to do so. The house was destroyed sometime before
the defendants were indicted .
Peak has not demonstrated any prejudice in the destruction of the farmhouse .
The structure was not evidence and the claim that exculpatory evidence may have been
found inside is pure speculation . Even if we were to conclude that the destruction was
improper, Peak has utterly failed to demonstrate that the Commonwealth acted in bad
faith . See Perdue v. Commonwealth , 916 S.W .2d 148 (Ky. 1996) . A missing evidence
instruction would not have been proper in this case. See Estep v. Commonwealth , 64
S.W .3d 805 (Ky. 2002), which states that absent some degree of bad faith a defendant
is not entitled to an instruction that the jury may draw an adverse inference from the
failure to preserve or collect any evidence . No error occurred .
V. Instruction on Accomplice Testimony
Peak was not entitled to an instruction cautioning the jury on accomplice
testimony . He sought, but did not tender, an instruction that advised the jurors that
Meeks, Bearden and Cissell were accomplices and that their testimony was of
questionable integrity and must be carefully weighed in view of their motive and bias .
Kentucky follows the "bare bones" principle when it comes to jury instructions . Hodge
v. Commonwealth, 17 S .W.3d 824 (Ky. 2000), cent. denied, 531 U.S . 1018, 121 S .Ct.
581, 148 L.Ed .2d 498 (2000). The instruction sought by Peak overemphasizes
particular aspects of the evidence . Evidentiary matters should be omitted from the
instructions and fleshed out during closing arguments . Id . The trial judge properly
denied the requested instruction :
VI . Sufficiency of Evidence
The evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support the verdict despite an
alleged lack of physical evidence connecting Peak to any of the charged offenses . The
test for a directed verdict is whether, drawing all fair and reasonable inferences from the
evidence in favor of the Commonwealth, the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) .
Here, among other evidence, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
Bearden and the taped statement of Meeks. Both were consistent with respect to
Peak's involvement in the crimes . A conviction can be sufficiently supported even by
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Hod e, supra , citing Murphy v.
Commonwealth, 652 S.W .2d 69 (Ky. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U .S . 1072, 104 S .Ct.
1427, 79 L .Ed .2d 751 (1984). The absence of physical evidence is partially explained
by the testimony that Peak participated in cleaning the crime scene and disposed of the
gun as well as the body of the victim. The evidence was sufficient to support the
convictions .
VII . Peremptory Challenges
Meeks and Peak complain that the trial judge erred by reversing a prior ruling
and reducing the number of peremptory challenges available to each defendant one
week into voir dire. We disagree .
Following a discussion with the parties, the trial judge originally designated nine
peremptory strikes for each of the three defendants and twelve for the Commonwealth .
During voir dire and before any strikes were made, the lead prosecutor informed the
court that she was not in the courtroom when that discussion took place . She pointed
out that the number of strikes did not comport with the law and gave too many to the
defendants .
The trial judge determined that the prior discussion was preliminary and not
binding . He admitted his mistake and concluded that the co-defendants were entitled to
fifteen peremptory strikes and the Commonwealth to nine. Three more peremptory
strikes were granted to the defense, one per defendant, for a total of eighteen .
There is no question that the trial judge eventually granted the defendants the
correct number of peremptory challenges. See RCr 9.40 . See also Springer v.
Commonwealth , 998 S .W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999) . Neither defendant offers any convincing
argument that they were prejudiced by his ultimate ruling . CR 47.03 which deals with
peremptory challenges in civil matters has no application here . There was no error or
abuse of discretion .
VIII . Psychological Records
Peak and Meeks claim that the trial judge erred by denying their motion for
access to the psychological records of Bearden. We disagree .
Prior to the testimony of Bearden, counsel for Meeks asked that he be given the
psychological records of Bearden. Specifically, he asked that it be produced ". . . in
terms of a consistent or inconsistent statement. . ." Counsel for Peak joined that
request . Counsel for Bearden objected to the records being turned over to the other
co-defendants, noting that the report was prepared by a private psychiatrist he retained
and was for Bearden's defense . He stated he would not call the psychiatrist who
prepared the report in the guilt phase . When the Commonwealth admitted that it had
recently received a copy of the report, Meeks and Peak renewed their claim that they
were entitled to it. The trial judge informed the parties he would consider the matter.
A few days later the issue was revisited . Counsel for Meeks asked that the
Commonwealth turn over a copy of the report to the trial judge for him to review in
camera so he could determine whether the statement by Bearden was a verbatim
statement. The trial judge complied with the request after being provided with a copy
by counsel for Bearden . Upon review, the trial judge provided Meeks and Peak with a
portion of the report that involved what Bearden said about the crimes . He excluded
information concerning the psychiatric evaluation. Counsel for Meeks asked that the
entire copy of the report be included in the record for appeal purposes and counsel for
Peak specifically objected to not having the entire report. The trial judge indicated that
the report was privileged and that Bearden had not waived the same by turning it over
to the Commonwealth, finding that it was not something she had to turn over.
In Commonwealth v. Barroso . 122 S .W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003), which was decided
after the trial in this case, the Court held that:
(1) If the psychotherapy records of a crucial prosecution witness contain evidence
probative of the witness's ability to recall, comprehend, and accurately relate the
subject matter of the testimony, the defendant's right to compulsory process
must prevail over the witness's psychotherapist-patient privilege, and
(2) In camera review of a witness's psychotherapy records is authorized only upon
receipt of evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the records
contain exculpatory evidence .
Initially, it must be noted that the present case is different than Barroso , supra , in
at least two significant respects . First, although Bearden testified favorably for the
Commonwealth, the psychological report was prepared in preparation of her defense .
Second, unlike the situation in Barroso , the Commonwealth at one point did possess
the report. Neither Meeks nor Peak raises any type of Brady violation, nor would the
record support such a claim.
The psychological report was originally requested by Meeks and Peak for
purposes of examining the statement made by Bearden concerning the crime . The trial
judge complied with the request that he review the information in camera and then
provided Meeks and Peak with that portion of the report so requested . Following that
decision, counsel for Meek indicated that he was entitled to the entire report by asking
that it be preserved in the record . Counsel for Peak specifically stated that he believed
he was entitled to the entire report. At no time, however, did Peak or Meeks
demonstrate sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable belief that the records
contained exculpatory evidence .
There is no clear indication that Bearden voluntarily waived the psychotherapistpatient privilege . Her defense counsel did provide the report to the Commonwealth, but
14
he apparently believed, erroneously ; that he was compelled to do so. KRE 510 states
that a claim of privilege is not defeated by a disclosure that is compelled erroneously or
made without the opportunity to claim the privilege . The report has been made part of
the record on appeal and was ordered unsealed by this Court . It is obvious from the
briefs that appellate counsel for Meeks and Peak have reviewed it.
Having reviewed the psychological report ourselves and the record, we find no
error in the decision of the trial judge. Bearden was cross-examined about her
extensive drug and alcohol abuse. There is no other information in the report that
would be probative of the witness's ability to recall, comprehend, and accurately relate
the subject matter of the testimony.
IX. Swearing In of Witness
There was no palpable or structural error from the alleged failure of the trial
judge to swear in the Commonwealth's expert witness, a forensic anthropologist . The
parties were at a bench conference when the witness took her seat at the witness
stand. There was some type of. exchange between the witness and the bailiff, but there
is no clear indication on the videotape record that she was sworn in as a witness. None
of the parties objected to the alleged omission . The witness proceeded to testify to the
victim's physical traits and injuries. Upon consideration of that testimony and the entire
record, we can conclude that there was no palpable error. Nor is the failure to
administer an oath or affirmation a structural error. Cf. Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S .
279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).
X. Demonstrative Evidence
There was no error in allowing the Commonwealth to present the grave
wrappings of the victim. During the testimony of a police detective, the Commonwealth
15
introduced several exhibits consisting mainly of blankets and clothing in which the . body
of the victim had decomposed . The smell of the items apparently necessitated them
being sprayed during the presentation with some type of deodorizer. Counsel for Peak,
joined by the other two co-defendants, objected to the dramatic and unnecessary
introduction of the exhibits. The trial judge overruled the objection, stating that the
prosecution had a right to put on its case. When counsel for Peak questioned the
necessity of the spraying, the prosecutor explained that it was done to mask the smell.
That explanation was accepted and the bench conference concluded .
The trial judge correctly determined that the Commonwealth was entitled to
introduce the evidence to prove its case. The exhibits did not unfairly inflame the jury.
Cf. Ernst v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 744 (Ky. 2005). There was no abuse of
discretion by the trial judge.
Nor was there any error in allowing the presentation of the jaw and shoulder
bone of the victim during the testimony of the forensic anthropologist . The three
defendants objected to this evidence, suggesting that photographs would be sufficient.
The trial judge overruled that objection .
Skeletal remains of a victim are admissible if relevant . Tamme v.
Commonwealth , 973 S .W.2d 13 (Ky. 1998) . Here, the Commonwealth offered the
remains to illustrate the wounds and to help identify the victim . It was relevant to
illuminate the cause of death of the victim and to establish his identity. The probative
value of this demonstrative evidence outweighed the prejudice and it did not unfairly
inflame the jury. There was no indication that animals had mutilated the body. The trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in overruling the objection .
XI . Jurisdiction/Aggravating Circumstances
Meeks and Peak allege that the failure to specifically charge statutory
aggravating circumstances in the indictment left the trial judge without jurisdiction to try
them on aggravating circumstances or to sentence them to an aggravated penalty . We
disagree .
There is no requirement to charge statutory aggravating circumstances in the
indictment. Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 121 S .W.3d 173 (Ky. 2003). The indictment
was valid on its face and conformed to statutory requirements . Meeks and Peak were
properly notified of the aggravating circumstances prior to trial. The federal authorities
cited by the defendants are not contrary to our procedures . In no way was the trial
judge divested of jurisdiction under these circumstances .
XII . Sentencing
Peak and Meeks argue that they were denied fair and reliable sentencing when
the jury recommended two distinctly different sentences and the trial judge failed to
sentence them to the lesser of the two . We disagree .
During the penalty phase, the jury, using separate forms for each defendant,
made recommendations as to the sentences to be imposed. On jury verdict form #2,
the jury found the existence of an aggravating circumstance, or circumstances in the
case of Peak, and recommended that they be sentenced to life without the possibility of
probation or parole for twenty-five years . On verdict form #6, the jury recommended
how the sentences were to be served . In the space provided for murder, the number
25 is written in each case.
On the form for Meeks, it was recommended that his "25" years for murder be
served concurrently to the twenty-years for first-degree robbery and consecutively to the
17
ten years for conspiracy and five years for tampering for a total of forty years in prison.
As to Peak, the jury recommended that his "25" years for murder be served
consecutively to his twenty-years for robbery, twenty years for conspiracy and five years
for tampering for a total of seventy years.
Neither of the defendants offered a proper objection to the alleged error at trial .
It was only raised in a post-trial motion that was denied. Ultimately, the trial judge
accepted the recommendation of the jury as to the term for each sentence, specifically,
life without the possibility of probation or parole for twenty-five years for the murder, but
ran all the sentences concurrent.
It is clear that the jury recommended that both defendants be sentenced to life
without the possibility of probation or parole for twenty-five years for the murder of the
victim. Once the jury was polled, none of the defendants contested that fact at trial .
The trial judge, who is not bound to accept the recommendation of the jury as to
sentencing, Dotson v. Commonwealth , 740 S .W .2d 930 (Ky. 1987), ultimately imposed
that sentence . The confusion arose when the jury was asked to designate consecutive
or concurrent terms and to total the terms . The jury improperly represented the life
sentence as a twenty-five year term in order to accomplish that task. A sentence for a
term of years merges with a life sentence . Neal v. Commonwealth , 95 S.W.3d 843 (Ky.
2003). The trial judge remedied that situation in the final judgment by running all the
terms concurrently.
Peak and Meeks received a fundamentally fair trial. They were not denied any of
their due process rights under the state or federal constitutions .
Both judgments of conviction are affirmed .
Lambert, C.J., Graves, Johnstone, and Scott, JJ ., concur. Roach, J., concurs in
result only. Cooper, J., files a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT PEAK:
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT MEEKS :
Donna L. Boyce
Appellate Branch Manager
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : JUNE 15, 2006
TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uprQnzr C~aixrf of ~tnfurkV
2003-SC-0244-MR
MICHAEL ANTHONY PEAK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J . KNOPF, JUDGE
2001-CR-584-01
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
AND
APPELLEE
2003-SC-0271-M R
PATRICK W. MEEKS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J . KNOPF, JUDGE
2001-CR-584-02
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
CONCU RRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
I concur with the affirmance of the conviction of Meeks. However, I dissent from
the affirmance of the conviction of Peak and would remand his case for a new trial
because of a clear violation of the rule -announced in Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S .
36, 124 S .Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed.2d 177 (2004).
No doubt, this was a difficult case to try. There were three defendants, all
indicted for the capital murder and robbery of an unknown drug dealer whose
decomposed remains were found wrapped in a blanket and dumped in a run-off ditch.
One defendant, Bearden, had an agreement with the Commonwealth that if she testified
truthfully, the death penalty would be "taken off the table" as to her. Another defendant,
Meeks, had given an audiotaped post-arrest statement to the police that incriminated
both him and Peak (but mostly Peak) . Both Meeks and Peak indicated their intent to
exercise their respective Fifth Amendment rights not to testify . Thus, because Meeks
could not be cross-examined by Peak, the Commonwealth could not introduce those
portions of Meeks's statement that inculpated Peak. Lilly v. Virginia , 527 U .S . 116, 13738, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1900-01, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) ; Bruton v. United States , 391 U .S .
123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed .2d 476 (1968).
As is often the case, Meeks's statement minimized his own role in the, murder
and robbery while pointing the finger at Peak as both the planner and the triggerman .
No physical evidence connected Peak to the murder and robbery, so the primary
evidence against him would be the testimony of Bearden, an admitted heroin and
cocaine addict. In a pretrial ruling, the trial court correctly held that the Commonwealth
could not introduce Meeks's unredacted statement. However, the Commonwealth's
attempt to produce a redacted version, completed only after several weeks of trial,
made it appear as if Meeks had confessed to being the triggerman . At this point, Meeks
advised the court that he would waive his Fifth Amendment right not to testify so that the
Commonwealth would not read the redacted version of his statement . However,
instead of calling the now-available Meeks to the stand and thereby subjecting him to
cross-examination by Peak (and running the risk that Meeks might change his story),
the Commonwealth simply played the unredacted audiotape of Meeks's statement to
the jury. Compounding the error, the jury was allowed to hear the audiotape again
during its guilt-phase deliberations .
In Crawford , the United States Supreme Court held that "[w]here testimonial
evidence is at issue . . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law
required : unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination ." Crawford, 541
U .S. at 68, 124 S .Ct. at 1374 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth does not assert
that Meeks's statement was not testimonial in nature . "Whatever else the term covers,
it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury,
or at a former trial; and to police interrogations ." Id . at 68, 124 S .Ct. at 1374 (emphasis
added) . In fact, the statement that required reversal in Crawford was also the product of
a police interrogation . Meeks's statement violated both aspects of the holding in
Crawford. Peak did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine Meeks, and Meeks
was not unavailable . "Even where the defendant had such an opportunity [to crossexamine], we excluded the testimony where the government had not established
unavailability of the witness ." Id. at 57, 124 S.Ct. at 1367-68.
The majority opinion suggests that Peak could have cured the error by calling
Meeks as a witness during his case-in-chief and asking him about the statement. Of
course, it is not the obligation of a criminal defendant to cure a trial court error.
Furthermore, Peak's case-in-chief would have been days later, and to call Meeks to the
stand for the purpose of examining him about his statement would simply have
reminded the jury of those statements that inculpated Peak. Lastly, if Peak had called
Meeks as his witness, it would have been on direct examination, and he could not have
exercised that primary advantage of cross-examination, i.e. , the right to ask leading
questions . KRE 611(c) . Instead, when the Commonwealth simply played the audiotape
of Meeks's unredacted statements, Peak could not cross-examine Meeks at the time of
its introduction because Meeks was not on the witness stand . The audiotaped
statement was introduced during the testimony of a police officer .
The majority opinion seeks solace from a statement taken out of context from a
footnote in Crawford , ante , at
(slip op. at 9), viz:
The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.
Crawford, 541 U.S . at 59 n.9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 n :9 . At that point in the opinion, Justice
Scalia was responding to concerns expressed in Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion that the reliability of some out-of-court statements "cannot be replicated even if
the declarant testifies to the same matters in court." Id. (emphasis added) . Obviously,
both Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist were assuming that the declarant would
testify, but the Chief Justice believed that the prior statement might be more reliable
than the in-court testimony . Immediately prior to this discussion, footnote 9 also states :
Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all
on the use of his prior testimonial statements . See California v. Green ,
399 U .S. 149, 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed .2d 489 (1970) .
Id . The issue in Green was whether a testifying witness's prior inconsistent statement
could be introduced during the witness's own testimony . The Court held that the
statement was admissible under those circumstances . However, the Court also had
some cogent things to say about the right of Confrontation :
Our own decisions seem to have recognized at an early date that it
is this literal right to "confront" the witness at the time of trial that forms the
core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause :
"The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which *he gives his testimony whether he is
worthy of belief." Mattox v . United States, 156 U .S . 237, 242-243,
15 S .Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed . 409 (1895) .
Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court
statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject
to full and effective cross-examination .
This conclusion is supported by comparing the purposes of
confrontation with the alleged dangers in admitting an out-of-court
statement. Confrontation : (1) insures that the witness will give his
statements under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the
matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for
perjury ; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the
"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth" [citing 5
Wigmore ยง 1367] ; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate
to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus
aiding the jury in assessing his credibility .
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,157-158, 90 S.Ct. 1930,1934-35, 26 L.Ed.2d 489
(1970) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) .
Accordingly, I dissent from the affirmance of Peak's conviction and would remand
his case for a new trial. I also believe it was unnecessary for the Commonwealth to
introduce the putrid death wrappings in which the victim's body had decomposed . While
this evidence was being displayed to the
jury,
an assistant to the prosecutor can be
seen spraying the object with a deodorizer; an assistant to counsel for Meeks can be
seen holding her nose ; and unidentified persons can be heard gagging in the
background . However, because no specific objection was registered to the display of
this evidence, I would not reverse on that ground .
Lambert, CJ ; and Scott, J ., join
'Supreme Courf of ~irufurhv
2003-SC-0244-MR
MICHAEL ANTHONY PEAK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J . KNOPF, JUDGE
2001-CR-0584-00
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
2003-SC-0271-MR
PATRICK W. MEEKS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
2001-CR-0584-00
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER
The Commonwealth of Kentucky's motion to add Honorable Dennis W. Shepherd
as additional counsel for the Commonwealth in the above-styled case is hereby
granted .
The Opinion of The Court rendered June 15, 2006, is modified on its face by
substitution of the attached pages 1 and 19 in lieu of pages 1 and 19 of the original
opinion . Said modification does not affect the holding of the original Opinion of the
Court.
ENTERED : August 2, 2006
,wr
CHIEF JUSTICE
,*ixprsme Cjauif mf Amfurhv
2003-SC-0244-MR
MICHAEL ANTHONY PEAK
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
2001-CR-0584-00
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
AND
2003-SC-0271-MR
PATRICK W. MEEKS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS J. KNOPF, JUDGE
2001-CR-0584-00
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
GRANTING MODIFICATION
Appellant Peak's petition for rehearing is denied. Appellant Meeks'
petition for modification of the opinion rendered June 16, 2006, and modified August 2,
2006, in the above styled case is hereby granted with the substitution of pages 1, 5, and
7 attached hereto .
The correction of these pages does not affect the holding of this opinion .
All concur.
ENTERED : August 24, 2006.
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