CATHY CRESS V. HON. THOMAS B. WINE, JUDGE
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IMPORTANTNOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDOPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PR OMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 25 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-1093-MR
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CATHY CRESS
v
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-001931
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO . 02-CI-008580
V.
HON. THOMAS B . WINE, JUDGE
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION TEN
APPELLEE
and
MEDICAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirmi ng
Appellant, Cathy Cress, appeals from an order of the Court of Appeals denying
her petition for a writ of prohibition filed pursuant to CR 81 and CR 76.36. In her
petition, Appellant asked the Court of Appeals to prohibit the respondent trial court from
allowing further proceedings in an action involving the real party in interest, Medical Life
Insurance Company ("MLI") . For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the Court of
Appeals .
In November 2002, Appellant filed and properly served a complaint against MLI .
The trial court entered default judgments against MLI on December 19, 2002, and
February 14, 2003, because MLI failed to answer or respond to Appellant's complaint .
On June 18, 2004, more than one year after entry of the default judgments, MLI filed a
motion to reopen and set aside the judgments entered against it pursuant to CR 55.02
and CR 60 .02 . Arguing surprise, excusable neglect, fraud, and circumstances justifying
the requested relief, MLI stated that it failed to file an answer because it had come to a
tentative settlement agreement with Appellant the day before the answer was due. In
the days and weeks following the tentative settlement agreement, MLI alleged that
Appellant's counsel simultaneously participated in serious settlement discussions with
MLI and in proceedings to procure default judgments against MLI without MLI's
knowledge and without informing the trial court that Appellant was in contact with MLI
and had received a settlement offer from MLI . MLI further alleged that Appellant
refused to respond to any of its correspondence after the entry of the default judgments
and purposely waited for more than one year to enforce the judgments in order to
prevent MLI from setting the judgments aside pursuant to CR 60.02.
On September 3, 2004, the trial court granted MLI's motion to set aside the
judgments entered against it and reopened the matter for further proceedings, ruling
that MLI "has shown excusable neglect for failing to file an answer." Appellant
immediately filed a petition for writ of prohibition with the Court of Appeals, arguing the
trial court proceeded without jurisdiction or erroneously within its jurisdiction when it
granted MLI's motion to set aside the judgments pursuant to CR 60 .02. Appellant
claimed the trial court had no authority to set aside the judgments because CR 60 .02
provides that motions under the Rule shall not be made more than one year after the
judgment is entered if the motion is based on grounds of excusable neglect . The Court
of Appeals denied Appellant's petition, holding that Appellant failed to satisfy the
threshold requirement for considering the merits of such an extraordinary writ.
Appellant appealed the Court of Appeal's order to this Court and we consider it as a
matter of right. CR 76 .36(7) .
It has been established that a writ of prohibition "is an 'extraordinary remedy'
that Kentucky courts `have always been cautious and conservative both in entertaining
petitions for and in granting such relief."' Newell Enterprises, Inc. v. Bowling , 158
S.W.3d 750, 754 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Bender v . Eaton, 343 S .W.2d 799, 800 (Ky .
1961)) . The merits of any such writ will not be considered and the petition denied if the
party requesting the writ cannot first demonstrate a minimum threshold showing of harm
and lack of redressability on appeal . The St. Luke Hospitals, Inc. v . Kopowski, 160
S .W .3d 771, 774 (Ky. 2005).
When conducting the minimum threshold analysis, the Court typically divides
writ cases into "two classes, which are distinguished by whether the inferior court
allegedly is (1) acting without jurisdiction (which includes beyond its jurisdiction), or (2)
acting erroneously within its jurisdiction ." Newell Enterprises, Inc . , supra at 754
(citations omitted) . In this case, Appellant argues the trial court violated CR 60 .02 when
it set aside the judgments previously entered against MLI . Since Appellant is not
arguing that the trial court was totally without subject matter jurisdiction to proceed at all
in this case, Appellant's allegations originate under the latter class of writ cases. See
Chamblee v . Rose, 249 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1952) .
"Under the second class of cases, a writ may be granted upon a showing that the
lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and
there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and
irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted ." Newell Enterprises, Inc . , supra
at 754 (citations omitted) . Appellant argues the Court of Appeals erred by failing to find
that she is without adequate remedy by appeal and/or that she would suffer irreparable
harm . She argues that because she would be forced to "spend thousands of dollars"
and "valuable time" on trial proceedings that would ultimately be vacated on appeal due
to an erroneous pre-trial order, the threshold requirements are met in this case. We
disagree .
While there are very limited circumstances in which a finding of irreparable harm
may not be required, "[I]ack of an adequate remedy by appeal is an absolute
prerequisite to the issuance of this second class of writ." Newell Enterprises, Inc. , supra
at 754, Bender v. Eaton , 343 S .W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961) . A remedy by appeal is not
deemed "inadequate" simply because the judicial process necessary to obtain such a
remedy "may be fraught with delays, inconveniences, postponements, greater financial
outlays, and even possible imprisonment, all of which might be avoided, or greatly
curtailed, by a resort to an original application to this court." Osborn v. Wolfford , 39
S.W .2d 672, 674 (Ky. App. 1931) ; see also , Ison v. Bradley , 333 S .W.2d 78.4, 786 (Ky.
1960) ("[T]he delay incident to litigation and appeal by litigants who may be financially
distressed cannot be considered as unjust, does not constitute irreparable injury, and is
not a miscarriage of justice .") . Although inconvenient, Appellant has an adequate
remedy by appeal and thus, is not entitled to relief through this extraordinary writ.
The order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Joseph Michael Kelly
713 West Main Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Judge Thomas B . Wine
Hall of Justice
600 West Jefferson St.
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTERST
Angela Logan
Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, LLP
2500 National City Tower
101 South Fifth Street
Louisville, KY 40202
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