ERIN HENSON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 23, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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ERIN HENSON
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D . WINCHESTER, SPECIAL JUDGE
03-CR-13
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A Laurel Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, Erin Henson, of one count of
sexual abuse in the first degree, KRS 510.110, for which he was sentenced to five years
in prison, and one count of sodomy in the first degree, KRS 510 .070, for which he was
sentenced to life in prison . Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right, Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b), asserting four claims of reversible error: (1) the admission of
testimony regarding uncharged acts of forcible sodomy, (2) the failure to grant a mistrial
after a prosecution witness testified that Appellant was a sex offender, (3) the admission
of hearsay statements that improperly bolstered the Commonwealth's case, and (4) the
impermissible bolstering of the complaining witness's credibility by a police officer.
Appellant also asserts that this Court should vacate the sentencing court's order
overruling his pro se RCr 11 .42 motion and remand that issue for an evidentiary
hearing .
A Laurel County grand jury indicted Appellant on the charges of sexual abuse in
the first degree ("sexual abuse 1st") and sodomy in the first degree ("sodomy 1st") in
January 2003 . The charges arose after his stepdaughter, H .H . (then fourteen), told her
biological father that Appellant had repeatedly sexually abused her when she was
between the ages of about six and ten . H .H . claimed she had reported the abuse to her
mother and stepgrandmother at the time the abuse began, but that they did not believe
her.
After H .H . told her father about the abuse, he contacted the police . Detective
Anderkin, a police officer specializing in child sexual abuse cases, interviewed H .H . and
Appellant . She then presented the case to the Laurel County Multi-disciplinary Task
Force, which recommended presentation to a grand jury. The Commonwealth charged
Appellant with sodomy 1 st and sexual abuse 1 st in connection with two incidents that
occurred when H .H. was six or seven years old. The first incident, resulting in the
sodomy 1st charge, involved H.H . performing oral sex on Appellant after he ordered her
to do so. The second incident, resulting in the sexual abuse 1 st charge, involved
Appellant digitally penetrating H.H.'s vagina.
I. EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED ACTS.
As mandated by KRE 404(c), the Commonwealth notified Appellant of its
intention to introduce evidence under KRE 404(b)(1) "that the sexual abuse to H.H.
occurred on more than one occasion, even though only one offense is charged in order
to prove motive, intent, opportunity, plan, identity, knowledge, or absence of mistake or
accident ." Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his "past
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wrongdoings" because "the probative value of such evidence is strongly outweighed by
its prejudicial effect ." The parties subsequently agreed that the Commonwealth would
present evidence of a pattern of abuse, but not specific instances of conduct . The trial
court then overruled Appellant's motion in limine, finding that "because of the youth of
the victim and the concept of time that children often have at that age . . . these matters
[were] so entwined as to allow for [introduction] under the exception set out in 404(b) of
the Kentucky Rules of Evidence ."
The trial court appears to have ruled that evidence of other acts of abuse by
Appellant against H .H . were admissible because they were "so inextricably intertwined
with other evidence essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be
accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party." KRE 404(b)(2) .
This provision does not apply to the case sub iudice ;' thus, the trial court's ruling was
erroneous. However, we held in Pendleton v. Commonwealth , 83 S.W .3d 522 (Ky.
2002), that "[e]vidence of similar acts against the same victim is admissible under KRE
404(b)(1) as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident ." Id . at 828 (internal quotations omitted) ; see also
Price v. Commonwealth, 31 S .W.3d 885, 888 n .4 (Ky. 2000). Thus, the trial court's
' KRE 404(b)(2) is reserved for situations where the evidence proves an "integral part[]
of one continuous transaction," Caldwell v . Commonwealth , 503 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Ky.
1972), or is necessary to show a "complete, unfragmented picture of the crime and
investigation," Adkins v. Commonwealth , 96 S.W.3d 779, 793 (Ky. 2003) . "[T]he key to
understanding this exception is the word 'inextricably.' The exception relates only to
evidence that must come in because it 'is so interwoven with evidence of the crime
charged that its introduction is unavoidable ."' Funk v. Commonwealth , 842 S .W .2d 476,
480 (Ky. 1992) (emphasis added) (quoting Robert G . Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence
Law Handbook § 2 .20, at 37 (2d ed . Michie 1984) ; see also Metcalf v. Commonwealth ,
158 S .W .3d 740, 743-44 (Ky. 2005); Lawson, supra , § 2.25[4], at 136-40 (4th ed.
LexisNexis 2003).
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decision to admit this evidence was correct though for the wrong reason. Noel v.
Commonwealth , 76 S.W .3d 923,929 (Ky. 2002) .
The Commonwealth elicited the following testimony during the direct examination
of H.H. :
Prosecution: Did [the defendant] ever physically make you suck his
penis? Do you ever remember a time like that?
H. H. :
There was times that he would force me .
Prosecution : Can you explain to this jury what you mean by force. Okay?
H. H. :
He would grab my hand or my head, and he would force my
head down to his penis.
Defense :
Your Honor I object .
Appellant objected on grounds that the Commonwealth was referring to specific
instances of conduct rather than limiting its examination to a general pattern of abuse,
as the parties had agreed. The trial court implicitly sustained the objection by telling the
Commonwealth's Attorney to focus his questioning on the charged acts. Appellant did
not request any additional relief .
Appellant now asserts it was reversible error to admit the above testimony
because: (1) the Commonwealth's pretrial notice was insufficient under KRE 404(c)
because, although the notice cited acts of "sexual abuse," the prosecutor elicited
evidence of acts of forcible sodomy from H.H., and (2) that the probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. To preserve an issue for
appeal, a party must inform the court of its error and the requested relief . RCr 9.22;
West v. Commonwealth , 780 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Ky. 1989) . Furthermore, "[w]here a
party specifies his grounds for an objection at trial, he cannot present a new theory of
error on appeal ." Gabow v. Commonwealth , 34 S .W.3d 63, 75 (Ky. 2000) ; Ruppee v.
Commonwealth , 821 S .W .2d 484, 486 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Lovett v.
Commonwealth , 103 S .W .3d 72 (Ky. 2002) .
Appellant's objection to H.H .'s testimony did not state either ground of error that
he now asserts on appeal . Furthermore, after his objection was implicitly sustained, he
did not request any additional relief. Therefore, no error in lack of KRE 404(c) notice is
preserved for appeal . Gabow , 34 S.W .3d at 75 ; West, 780 S.W .2d at 602.
Appellant did make a motion in limine to exclude evidence of "past wrongdoings"
on the grounds that the probative value of the evidence would be outweighed by its
prejudicial effect, and such motions normally preserve issues for appeal without need
for an objection at trial. KRE 103(d) . However, to preserve error without further
objection at trial, a motion in limine to exclude evidence cannot be "broad" or "generic ;"
it must "specif[y] what evidence should be suppressed and why . . . ." Davis v .
Commonwealth , 147 S.W.3d 709, 722 (Ky. 2004) . As a result, a general request to
exclude all of Appellant's "past wrongdoings" was not specific enough to preserve for
appeal an objection to a specific instance of misconduct. To preserve the issue,
Appellant needed to object at trial . Id. at 722-23. He did so, but not on the grounds he
now asserts on appeal . Finally, since the trial court did not sustain Appellant's motion in
limine, we assume it concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence did not
substantially outweigh its probative value . KRE 403 . A trial court's balancing of
probative value against prejudicial effect is reviewed for abuse of discretion .
Commonwealth v. English , 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) . We conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in this regard .
I1. MISTRIAL .
Appellant asserts that a mistrial should have been granted after H .H.'s mother
testified on cross-examination that Appellant was a sex offender . The victim's mother
was the Commonwealth's witness, and during defense counsel's cross-examination, he
inquired :
Attorney :
Have you ever been involved with the Cabinet for Families
and Children?
Witness:
Yes.
Attorney :
And how did that come about? First?
Witness:
That's when Erin [Appellant] got out of jail, he, when he got
out, he came to where I lived at. He was drunk, and he
assaulted my eleven year old, and that's when the social
workers found out that he was a sex offender, and they took
my kids from me .
Appellant did not request that the jury be admonished to disregard this testimony and
did not request a mistrial until almost an hour after the testimony was adduced.
The witness's statement about Appellant's status as a sex offender was
undoubtedly prejudicial. However, the question was asked by Appellant's own counsel,
and "[o]ne who asks questions which call for an answer has waived any objection to the
answer if it is responsive ." Mills v. Commonwealth , 996 S .W .2d 473, 485 (Ky. 1999)
(quoting Estep v. Commonwealth , 663 S.W.2d 213, 216 (Ky. 1983)) . The answer here
was responsive to the cross-examination question and was "properly attributable to [the]
actions of the complaining party ." Lawson, supra note 1, § 1 .10[5], at 43 (4th ed .
LexisNexis 2003) . Therefore, Appellant's right to object to the answer or request a
mistrial was waived . Had Appellant wished to foreclose such a response, he might
have asked a question requiring a yes or no answer .
Even if Appellant's motion for a mistrial had not been waived, whether to grant a
mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of that discretion . Woodard v. Commonwealth , 147 S.W.3d
(Ky. 2004) . "[A]
63, 68
mistrial is an extreme remedy and should be resorted to only when
there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings which will result in a manifest
injustice ." Gould v. Charlton Co., Inc.,
929
S.W.2d
734, 738 (Ky. 1996).
The fact that
Appellant asked a question on cross-examination that elicited an unexpected and
prejudicial response is not a fundamental defect in the proceedings resulting in manifest
injustice . It is the type of prejudice easily cured by an admonition, Matthews v.
Commonwealth , 163 S .W .3d
858, 865 (Ky. 2000),
11, 18 (Ky .
2005) ; Graves v. Commonwealth , 17
S .W .3d
and Appellant did not request a curative admonition . Therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial .
111111. HEARSAY AND IMPROPER BOLSTERING .
Appellant asserts that his conviction should be reversed because multiple
hearsay statements at trial in the form of prior consistent statements had the effect of
improperly bolstering H .H .'s credibility. Conceding that the issue is unpreserved, he
requests palpable error review under
KRE
103(e) . The statements at issue were : (1)
statements by H .H . that she told her mother and stepgrandmother about the crimes
soon after they occurred and informed her biological father when she was fourteen, (2)
a statement by H .H .'s biological father that he contacted the state police after H.H.
confided in him about "some things that [Appellant] may have done to her," and (3) a
statement by Detective Anderkin that H .H . told her about experiencing digital
penetration and oral sex since the age of seven .
The latter two statements were clearly hearsay, i .e . , out-of-court statements
"offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted ." KRE 801(c) . All of the
statements related prior consistent statements made by H .H . and were offered to
bolster her trial testimony that the sexual abuse actually occurred, i .e . , the truth of the
matter asserted . Hearsay is generally inadmissible, KRE 802, and Appellant properly
cites Miller v. Commonwealth , 77 S.W .3d 566 (Ky. 2002), as authority that under KRE
801 A(a) :
[t]here are only three circumstances when a prior hearsay statement of a
witness is admissible as substantive evidence at trial : (1) when the prior
statement is inconsistent with the witness's present testimony ; (2) when
the prior statement is consistent with the witness's present testimony and
is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; or (3) when the prior
statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving the
person.
Id. at 570. H .H. and two other witnesses testified that she made prior statements
consistent with her trial testimony that Appellant sodomized and sexually abused her.
Appellant argues that these statements were inadmissible because they were not
offered to rebut any express or implied charge of recent fabrication, KRE 801 A(a)(2), as
they were elicited during the prosecution's case-in-chief at a time when no charge of
recent fabrication had been made .
Assuming, arguendo , that Appellant's contention is correct, the fact remains that
he did not object to any of the statements at trial. Therefore, we review for palpable
error, or an error that affected Appellant's substantial rights and resulted in manifest
injustice . KRE 103(e); Brock v. Commonwealth , 947 S .W .2d 24, 28 (Ky. 1997).
Palpable error must be such that "a failure to notice and correct [it] would seriously
affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceeding . A court
reviewing for palpable error must do so in light of the entire record ; the inquiry is heavily
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dependent upon the facts of each case ." Ernst v. Commonwealth , 160 S.W.3d 744, 758
(Ky. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted) .
It was pointed out during trial that Appellant was separated from H.H.'s mother
for a period of seven years . During that time, H.H .'s mother had unsuccessfully
attempted reconciliation with H.H .'s biological father and H .H . had lived with her
biological father for short periods of time. Prior to the separation, Appellant had
disciplined H .H ., and H .H . admitted that she and Appellant did not get along well .
Appellant moved back in with the family only three or four days before H .H . reported to
her biological father that Appellant had molested her some eight years before . This
evidence strongly suggested that H.H . reported the alleged molestation to her biological
father in order to get rid of Appellant or, at least, so that she could live permanently with
her biological father. In fact, defense counsel recounted this evidence during closing
argument as giving H.H . a "reason to lie ." During cross-examination of H .H ., defense
counsel also opined to the trial judge within hearing of the jury that H .H had been
"coached" by the prosecutor, to which the judge replied that "the jury will decide whether
she has been coached." In light of these insinuations and considering the entire record,
we conclude that any bolstering of H .H .'s testimony by introduction of her prior
consistent statements did not rise to the level of manifest injustice . Cf. Reed v.
Commonwealth , 738 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Ky. 1987) (when rehabilitation evidence is
admitted before credibility is attacked, any error is harmless as long as credibility is in
fact later impeached) . Therefore, there was no palpable error.
IV. IMPERMISSIBLE BOLSTERING .
Appellant next asserts that Detective Anderkin further improperly bolstered H.H.'s
credibility by testifying that "[H .H] answered the questions to the best of her ability."
Again, there was no objection to this testimony ; thus, we review only for palpable error .
KRE 103(e) .
A police officer may not testify that he or she believes the complaining witness
told the truth . Alexander v. Commonwealth , 862 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Ky. 1993), overruled
on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth , 956 S .W .2d 883, 859 (Ky. 1997) ;
Bussey v. Commonwealth , 797 S.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Ky. 1990) . However, Detective
Anderkin did not state that she believed H .H told her the truth. She simply stated that
H .H . answered the questions to the best of her ability, implying that H .H . was
cooperative during the interview. The admission of Detective Anderkin's testimony that
H.H . answered the interview questions "to the best of her ability" was not erroneous,
thus could not have been palpable error.
V. RCr 11 .42 MOTION .
Appellant prepared a pro se RCr 11 .42 motion alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel . During his sentencing hearing, the court took notice of the motion, heard
argument from Appellant, his counsel, and the Commonwealth's Attorney, and overruled
the motion . Appellant now asks this Court to vacate the sentencing court's order
overruling his RCr 11 .42 motion and to remand his motion for an evidentiary hearing .
First, this issue is not properly before us. This aspect of Appellant's appeal is from the
denial of his RCr 11 .42 motion, not from his conviction and sentence of twenty years or
more in prison, Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). Therefore, he should have appealed the denial
of his RCr 11 .42 motion to the Court of Appeals . KRS 22A .020(1) . 2 Nevertheless, in
2 CR 73.01(2), made applicable to criminal cases by RCr 12 .02, details the appellate
procedure that should have been followed in this case .
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the interest of judicial economy, we will review the issue rather than remand it to the
Court of Appeals .
Appellant alleged in his RCr 11 .42 motion that his counsel was deficient in : (1)
failing to request a mistrial immediately after H.H.'s mother, in response to a question by
Appellant's counsel on cross-examination, mentioned that Appellant was a sex offender,
(2) failing to present evidence of Appellant's genital birthmark after H .H . testified that
she noticed nothing unusual about Appellant's genitals, and (3) failing to present an
allegedly favorable defense witness.
When an RCr 11 .42 motion is filed, certain procedures must be followed .
1 . The trial judge shall examine the motion to see if it is properly signed
and verified and whether it specifies grounds and supporting facts that, if
true, would warrant relief . If not, the motion may be summarily dismissed.
2 . . . . [T]he trial judge shall determine whether the allegations in the
motion can be resolved on the face of the record, in which event an
evidentiary hearing is not required . A hearing is required if there is a
material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i .e. ,
conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record. The
trial judge may not simply disbelieve factual allegations in the absence of
evidence in the record refuting them.
3. If an evidentiary hearing is required, counsel must be appointed to
represent the movant if he/she is indigent and specifically requests such
appointment in writing. If the movant does not request appointment of
counsel, the trial judge has no duty to do so sua sponte .
Fraser v . Commonwealth , 59 S .W .3d 448, 452-453 (Ky . 2001) (internal citations
omitted) .
In addressing the motion, the sentencing court followed the procedure outlined in
Fraser. The court examined the motion and allowed Appellant to proceed, presumably
finding that the motion "specifie[d] grounds and supporting facts that, if true, would
warrant relief ." Id . at 452 . Appellant's claim with respect to the motion for a mistrial was
subject to resolution from the face of the record. As previously noted, the introduction of
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the evidence in question was not grounds for a mistrial . The other two claims could not
be resolved from the face of the record because to substantiate them Appellant needed
to present proof that he had a genital birthmark to show that its existence would have
impeached H.H .'s credibility, and proof that his allegedly favorable witness would have
testified to his advantage . Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was required .
Appellant was given an opportunity to produce whatever would have supported
his claims of ineffective assistance and did not proffer any evidence in support of his
allegations . He was represented by trial counsel at the hearing and did not request that
a new and different attorney represent him on the motion . As the failure to move for a
mistrial did not prejudice Appellant and no evidence was presented to prove his other
claims, the sentencing court did not err in overruling Appellant's RCr 11 .42 motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences imposed by the Laurel
Circuit Court and the denial of Appellant's RCr 11 .42 motion .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Irvin Halbleib, Jr .
P .O . Box 16175
Louisville, KY 40256
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive, Suite 200
Frankfort, KY 40601
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