GREGORY WILLIAMS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPOR 'ANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COUR T OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : AUGUST 25, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Q
,v,ixprzmE V
.nuxt of
2004-SC-0421-MR
*Arw
DDAT [
GREGORY WILLIAMS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARTIN McDONALD, JUDGE
2001-C R-2322 & 2001-C R-2405
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a conditional guilty plea that convicted
Williams of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, kidnapping, first-degree burglary,
first-degree robbery, theft by unlawful taking over $300, second-degree burglary, two
counts of receiving stolen property under $300 and operating a motor vehicle without an
operator's license . He was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years in prison .
The questions presented are whether the trial judge abused his discretion in
denying the motion by Williams for a continuance and whether Williams was entitled to
substitution of counsel .
According to the briefs and record before this Court, the female victim was
attacked at knifepoint by an intruder who bound, gagged and raped her anally as well
as vaginally . Police investigation led them to Williams and he was later arrested after it
was discovered he was driving a stolen van containing stolen property . Williams
confessed to stealing the automobile and raping the female victim . DNA evidence also
confirmed that Williams was the assailant.
Williams entered a conditional guilty plea to those offenses pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U .S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed .2d 162 (1970), reserving the right
to contest two issues : 1) the denial of his suppression motion ; and, 2) the denial of his
motion for a continuance . This appeal followed . It should be observed that only the
second issue has been presented for our review.
I . Continuance
Williams argues that the trial judge abused his discretion and erred to his
substantial prejudice when he refused to continue the trial despite what he calls a
complete breakdown in communication and a conflict of interest between him and his
attorney . We disagree .
RCr 9.05 allows a trial to be postponed upon a showing of sufficient cause . The
decision of whether to grant a continuance lieswithin the sound discretion of the trial
judge . Snodgrass v. Commonwealth , 814 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1991) . That decision will
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion . Williams v. Commonwealth ,
644 S .W .2d 335 (Ky. 1982) .
Snodgrass , supra, identified the following seven factors that a trial judge should
consider in exercising his discretion with regard to continuances : 1) length of delay; 2)
previous continuances; 3) inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel and the court;
4) whether the delay is purposeful or is caused by the accused ; 5) availability of other
competent counsel ; 6) complexity of the case ; and, 7) whether denying the continuance
will lead to identifiable prejudice . We will address each of these factors in turn.
A. Length of Delay
Twenty-eight months had already passed between the date of the indictment and
the day of the scheduled trial. Williams concedes that obtaining new counsel would
probably involve a sizeable delay . He did not specify a particular attorney he wished to
employ, but rather expressed his lack of trust with his public defender and the entire
Jefferson County Office of the Public Defender. Appointing outside counsel would have
caused significant delay .
B . Previous Continuances
The defendant's trial was originally scheduled for October 8, 2002 . That date
was continued when Williams filed a motion in August 2002 for an in-patient psychiatric
evaluation . He was not admitted for that examination until the last day of October. The
evaluation was completed and a report was sent to defense counsel in the first part of
December. In August 2003, Williams was again sent to KCPC for a second in-patient
competency evaluation . Trial was ultimately set for February 12, 2004. Although there
was only one prior continuance of a set trial date in this case, it was for a substantial
period of time and is attributable to the defendant.
C. Inconvenience
The offenses charged in the indictment occurred between June and September
2001 . Well over two years passed between those times and the final trial date . Courts
may not ignore the concerns of victims in the administration of criminal justice . Morris
v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14,103 S.Ct. 1610, 1618, 75 L.E .2d 610 (1983). Otherwise,
victims might be dissuaded from reporting crimes, especially when it requires public
testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience . Id . Witnesses, prospective
jurors, the Commonwealth and the trial judge were ready to proceed when the
defendant sought the continuance . Clearly, the inconvenience to these parties was
considerable .
D. Whether the Delay is Purposeful or Caused by the Accused
Williams concedes that the delay was attributable to him . He refused to see
defense counsel and/or come to court three times in the last month. When he did
decide to talk to his attorney about three weeks before trial, he purposely raised old
issues that had been resolved . Williams claimed that he was not seeking the
continuance to be deliberate, but that his mood was not good and he was not stable .
However, the doctor from KCPC stated that Williams was not psychotic or depressed
on the morning of the scheduled trial. In fact, his thinking was "very, very logical and
very sophisticated from the abstract point of view ."
E . Availability of other Competent Counsel
Williams expressed distrust and displeasure with the entire Jefferson County
Office of the Public Defender, not just the attorney assigned to him. As a result, the
availability of other competent counsel was limited . Moreover, the trial judge explained
to Williams that any new counsel would be randomly assigned and there were no
assurances of his level of competence . The judge also made clear that his current
counsel was not incompetent or inexperienced and had the resources to defend him.
F . Complexity of Case
The crimes here were serious, but this by no means was a complex case.
Williams gave a taped confession to police in which he admitted the crimes involving
the female victim. DNA evidence also connected him to the assault. Additionally,
Williams was arrested after driving up to police in a stolen van containing stolen
property . He confessed to these crimes as well .
G . Identifiable Prejudice
Williams complains that he was faced with the choice of pleading guilty or going
to trial with an attorney he did not trust or communicate with in preparation of his
defense . His so-called Hobson's choice is without merit. Williams has failed to identify
any specific witnesses he could not call or any specific evidence he could not present
absent a continuance . Nor has he identified any defense that he could not raise without
a continuance. Williams has not shown any actual prejudice.
II. Substitution of Counsel
Williams was not entitled to substitution of counsel. A defendant who is
represented by a public defender does not have a constitutional right to any particular
attorney, and he is not entitled to the dismissal of his counsel and the appointment of
substitute counsel except for adequate reasons or a clear abuse by counsel .
Henderson v. Commonwealth , 636 S.W .2d 648 (Ky. 1982).
Snodg,rass requires the
defendant to show: 1) a complete breakdown of communications between counsel and
himself ; 2) a conflict of interest ; or, 3) that his legitimate interests are being prejudiced .
Williams orally requested a continuance on the day of trial because of an alleged
breakdown in communication between himself and his counsel. The trial judge held an
ex pane hearing on the matter. Williams indicated at the hearing that he filed a bar
complaint against trial counsel and sent a letter to his supervisor. Although he was
given ample opportunities, Williams refused to inform the trial judge of the nature of any
complaints except the claim that counsel should have asked for a second competency
evaluation sooner. Trial counsel maintained that he could and would defend Williams
despite the lack of communication . He did not formally request to withdraw, but
informed the trial judge that Williams wanted outside counsel.
Here, Williams has failed to demonstrate a complete breakdown of
communications between himself and his appointed counsel as contemplated by
Snodgrass. Trial counsel indicated some communication problems, but stated that the
defendant has been more communicative in the last three weeks . Moreover, the trial
judge gave the defendant several chances to speak with his attorney on the day of the
scheduled trial and the record demonstrates they communicated extensively.
Filing a bar complaint against a public defender does not automatically entitle a
defendant to new counsel . Sheqoq v. Commonwealth , 142 S .W .3d 101 (Ky. 2004). If
that was permitted, trial delays due to counsel substitutions would be endless. Shegog ,
supra. In this case, the mere filing of the bar complaint was insufficient to create a
conflict of interest between Williams and his public defender. Again, the only complaint
Williams expressed to the trial judge concerned the failure of trial counsel to more
promptly file a motion for a second psychological evaluation . Having already been
found competent, there was nothing to gain by filing a second motion sooner.
Williams has failed to demonstrate in any way that he was prejudiced by the
performance of his appointed counsel . Considering the charges and the sentence
ultimately imposed, it is clear that different counsel could not have performed any better
or achieved a different result .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.