F RAYMOND L . SMITH V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,sixprowr (gourf of
2004-SC-0402-TG
RAYMOND L. SMITH
V.
F
APPELLANT
TRANSFER FROM COURT OF APPEALS NO . 2004-CA-439
APPEAL FROM MEADE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT A . MILLER, JUDGE
2003-CR-040
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING_ IN PART, VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Smith of
four counts of second-degree burglary, three counts of receiving stolen property over
$300, one count of receiving stolen property under $300, possession of drug
paraphernalia, possession of marijuana and being a first-degree persistent felony
offender . He was sentenced to a total of 70 years in prison .
The questions presented are whether the trial judge erred by running the
sentences consecutively so that the aggregate exceeded 20 years ; whether Smith was
entitled to a directed verdict on the burglary charges ; whether a pawn shop receipt was
erroneously admitted into evidence ; whether the prosecution failed to establish the
value of the property on the receiving stolen property charges ; and whether the
prosecution's alleged comment on the defendant's silence denied him a fair trial .
A series of four house burglaries occurred in Meade County from February 20,
2003, through and including February 27, 2003. A variety of personal items were taken
as a result of the burglaries . At least one member of each of the households testified
about the break-ins at their homes . Even though there was more than one victim in
each instance, for the purposes of this opinion, we will identify each household as one
victim and do so in the order of the date of the crime .
Some of the stolen items were located at the home of Mary House, who resided
there with her boyfriend, Smith . She advised police that Smith had brought the items to
her residence . House and Smith were arrested and tried together. House cooperated
with the police and produced some of the other stolen property . She testified against
Smith at their joint trial . Smith testified in his own defense and denied being the
burglar, claiming he was in jail in Missouri during the relevant time . He admitted he had
pawned a knife and two rings in Missouri, but said he did not know that the items were
stolen and that he had been asked to sell them by the boyfriend of House's daughter .
The jury convicted Smith on all counts. He was sentenced to 15 years for each
of the three felony offenses of receiving stolen property over $300, 15 years for each of
the four counts of second-degree burglary and twelve months for each of the three
misdemeanor offenses . The jury recommended that the sentences be served
consecutively for a total of 108 years . The trial judge reduced the sentences to 70
years based on his interpretation of KRS 532.110 . Upon transfer from the Court of
Appeals, this appeal followed .
I . Sentence
Smith argues that the trial judge erred by running his sentences consecutively so
that the aggregate exceeded the highest sentence that could be imposed by statute for
a Class C felony . He claims that KRS 532 .110 limits the sentence the trial judge could
impose to 20 years pursuant to KRS 532.080(6)(b) .
KRS 532.110(1)(c) states :
The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not
exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which
would be authorized by KRS 532 .080 for the highest class of
crime for which any of the sentences is imposed . In no event
shall the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms
exceed seventy (70) years .
KRS 532 .080 reads in pertinent part as follows :
(6) A person who is found to be a persistent felony offender
in the first degree shall be sentenced to imprisonment as
follows :
(b) If the offense for which he presently stands convicted is a
Class C or Class D felony, a persistent felony offender in the
first degree shall be sentenced to an indeterminate term of
imprisonment, the maximum of which shall not be less than
ten (10) years nor more than twenty (20) years .
Second-degree burglary, a Class C felony, was the highest class of crime of
which Smith was convicted . Thus, the maximum sentence that could be imposed here
was twenty years . Cf. Devore v. Commonwealth , 662 S .W .2d 829 (Ky. 1984) . There
is nothing in the pre-sentence investigation report to indicate that this defendant was on
probation or parole at the time of these offenses . The sentence imposed by the trial
judge is vacated and the matter of sentencing is remanded to the circuit court for the
imposition of a sentence not to exceed 20 years .
II . Directed Verdict
Smith contends that the trial judge erred by refusing to direct a verdict on the
second-degree burglary charges. He denies the possession of the stolen items and
claims there was no other evidence linking him to the offenses . We disagree .
3
On a motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge must draw all fair and
reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth .
Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W .2d 186 (Ky. 1991). If the evidence is sufficient to
induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty, a directed verdict should not be given . Id. The standard for appellate review of a
denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence is if under the
evidence as a whole, it would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find the
defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal . Commonwealth v.
Sawhill , 660 S.W .2d 3 (Ky. 1983).
It is well settled that where there is evidence of a breaking and entering of a
dwelling and property is taken from there, and the property is found in the possession of
the accused, such showing makes for a jury case . Wahl v. Commonwealth , 490
S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1972) . It is also fundamental in criminal law doctrine that possession
of stolen goods makes at least a prima facie case of the guilt of the one in possession,
and casts the burden upon him to explain his possession consistent with his innocence .
Owen v. Commonwealth , 181 Ky. 257, 204 S.W . 162 (1918) . See also KRS
514.110(2).
Here, there is sufficient evidence linking Smith to the possession of the items
taken in the burglaries and sufficient other evidence connecting him with the
commission of the crimes. Smith lived in a residence with codefendant House, which
was across the street from one of the burglarized homes and within a short distance of
the others. He was also present at the House residence on March 6, 2003, when the
state police conducted their investigation . House testified that it was Smith who brought
the assorted stolen items from the various burglaries to her home .
House also stated that she maintained another residence in Mountain View,
Missouri, and that Smith went to a pawn shop there . A police officer testified that
certain items stolen in one of the burglaries were recovered from that pawn shop .
Additionally, the first victim testified that a container of change and her son's wallet
were taken from her home . House admitted that she was the person who cashed in
about $60 in coins that were given to her by Smith. Except for this victim, all of the
other victims recovered some of their property either from the residence shared by
House and Smith, from Smith herself or from the pawn shop . Accordingly, there was
sufficient evidence presented to the jury and it was not unreasonable for it to return a
finding of guilt against Smith .
III . Pawn Shop Receipt
Smith claims that the prosecution should not have been allowed to introduce the
pawn shop receipt from Missouri . A police witness testified that he received the receipt
from the pawn shop and that the fourth victim identified the two rings and a knife as
having been taken from his home . At an in-chambers hearing held prior to the
testimony, defense counsel for Smith argued that the document was hearsay unless
properly authenticated and must be introduced by a person of knowledge . The
Commonwealth responded that the receipt was admissible under KRE 803(6) as a
business record, and also under KRE 803(15) concerning statements and documents
affecting an interest in property . Although he did not specify the reasons, the trial judge
agreed with the Commonwealth and allowed the evidence to be admitted .
The pawn shop receipt was admissible under KRE 803(6) and possibly KRE
803(15) so long as it was properly authenticated . That was not done here . The
document was not certified by a custodian, KRE 902(11), nor was the police officer
shown to be a , witness with knowledge of its authenticity, KRE 901(b)(1) . Although the
receipt was not properly authenticated, the error in its introduction was harmless. There
was other sufficient evidence introduced linking Smith to the pawn shop. House
testified that Smith went to a pawn shop in Mountain View, Missouri, where she
maintained another residence . A police officer testified that he recovered several items
from the pawn shop that were identified as being stolen in one of the burglaries .
Considering this evidence and the entire record, there is no reasonable possibility that
the result of this trial would have been any different absent the pawn shop receipt . RCr
9.24
IV. Value of Property
Smith complains that there was insufficient or inappropriate testimony given to
establish the valuation of items that were taken in the burglaries. He concedes that no
objection was raised during the trial, but seeks review because of palpable error
pursuant to RCr 10 .26 . He asserts that a new trial should be given because the
Commonwealth did not elicit specific details about the property recovered and did not
limit the valuation testimony to those items recovered from the home and the pawn
shop .
The Commonwealth must prove the market value of the stolen items at the time
and place of the theft . Perkins v. Commonwealth , 409 S .W.2d 294 (Ky. 1966).
Testimony of an owner of the stolen property is competent evidence as to value .
Poteet v. Commonwealth , 556 S .W .2d 893 (Ky . 1977). Except for the first victim, all of
the victims here testified that the total value of the property stolen was well over three
hundred dollars . Smith was only convicted of a misdemeanor in relation to the theft of
the first victim . The testimony of the victims was sufficient to allow the jury to make a
determination of the value of the stolen property .
Reliance by Smith on Commonwealth v. Reed , 57 S .W.3d 269 (Ky. 2001), is
misplaced . In Reed , supra, the victim testified that he discovered tools and a tool chest
missing from his garage and valued their worth at over $300 . Based on evidence that
Reed had possessed some of those stolen tools, he was charged with receiving stolen
goods over $300 . The only evidence at trial, however, showed that the value of the
items possessed by Reed was $30 . This Court held that in order to sustain a conviction
for receiving property in excess of $300, the Commonwealth must show that the stolen
items found in the defendant's possession totaled more than $300 .
Reed is clearly distinguishable because the defendant in that case was never
connected to the theft of the items ; he was only shown to possess them . Here,
sufficient evidence was introduced that Smith broke into the homes and took the
various items . Even though the total value of the items recovered from his possession
was indeterminable or less than $300, he did at one time possess the items which were
valued at over $300 . There was no error and certainly no palpable error under these
circumstances .
V. Prosecutor's Comments
Smith maintains that the prosecutor erred by commenting on his post-arrest
silence. He concedes that this issue is not preserved for appellate review, but claims
that it is palpable error under RCr 10 .26 .
A police officer was asked by the prosecutor if Smith was given an opportunity to
make a statement . He responded affirmatively. The police officer was next asked
Smith's reaction and he answered, "He did not want to speak to me ." Later, defense
counsel asked another police officer if he had talked to Smith and that officer stated,
"Yes, well, when I brought him down to the jail, he was Mirandized and didn't want to
say anything ."
During cross-examination of Smith, the prosecutor questioned him on why he did
not inform police officers that he was in jail in Missouri when the crimes were committed
and was now stating that at trial when it could not be verified . Smith responded that he
was standing up for his Miranda rights . The prosecutor followed up on that answer by
asking Smith if it was to be accepted that he didn't tell the one officer what he knew
because he had the right to remain silent . Smith responded in the affirmative . The
prosecutor next asked if Smith misstated the truth to another officer because of his right
to remain silent . When Smith did not comprehend the question, she then asked him,
"You told [the police officer] you didn't know anything about the burglaries, you just got
here from Missouri, that wasn't true was it?" Smith replied that he did not know
anything about the burglaries until he got arrested for them .
There were no objections to any of the questions or the statements complained
of by Smith . One of those statements was introduced during defense counsel's crossexamination of a witness . Even if these isolated occurrences were deemed improper
comments on silence, they certainly do not rise to the level of palpable error. RCr 10 .26
Smith received a fundamentally fair trial and he was not deprived of any due
process under either the federal or state constitutions .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed, but the matter is remanded to the circuit
court for sentencing in accordance with this opinion .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Euva D . May
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.