COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. MICHAEL KELLY
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RENDERED : DECEMBER 22, 2005
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-0385-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
NO. 02-CR-1242
V.
MICHAEL KELLY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE GRAVES
Reversing and Remanding
Appellee, Michael Kelly, was indicted on three counts of trafficking in a controlled
substance and. one count of driving under the influence . Appellee moved to dismiss the
indictments, arguing that the evidence supporting his indictments was seized in violation
of his right to be free from unreasonable seizures . U.S. Const. amend . IV and XIV; Ky.
Const. ยง 10. The trial court granted Appellee's motion, finding that the evidence should
be suppressed due to the fact that it was obtained as the result of an unlawful seizure .
The Commonwealth appealed . The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order in a
two to one (2-1) vote .'
We granted discretionary review and for the reasons set forth
herein, we now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
1 Judge Combs dissented .
The facts, as presented before the trial court indicated the following : On October
10, 2002, Lexington police received a call from two persons who identified themselves
simply as Waffle House employees . The employees reported that they suspected a
recent patron of their restaurant of being intoxicated and that the suspect was about to
drive away from the restaurant. They stated their location and gave details about the
suspect and his vehicle . The suspect was described as being a white male and the
vehicle was identified as being a red, older model Camaro with Tennessee tags.
Lexington dispatch immediately disseminated the information through an "attempt to
locate" broadcast which was sent to all police cruisers in the area . Officer Hilton
Hastings responded to the broadcast and drove to the Waffle House restaurant.
Shortly after responding to the broadcast, Officer Hastings arrived at the Waffle
House location reported by the callers . Upon pulling into the parking lot, Officer
Hastings saw two people standing outside whom he assumed were the employees who
had reported the suspected drunk driver. Upon seeing the police vehicle, the two
people then started pointing in the direction of a night club across the street from the
restaurant . When Officer Hastings looked toward the area where the people were
pointing, he immediately spotted a red, older model Camaro . Officer Hastings drove
across the street to the night club and followed the Camaro to a nearby hotel . He then
activated his emergency lights and proceeded to conduct an investigatory stop of the
vehicle and its driver, who identified himself as Appellee, Michael Kelly.
Officer Hastings candidly stated that prior to stopping Appellee's vehicle, he did
not personally observe any criminal or suspicious activity on the part of Appellee .
However, once the vehicle was stopped, he did detect a strong smell of alcohol
emanating from the vehicle . He also conducted several field sobriety tests which
Appellee failed . The officer then searched Appellee's person and found thirty-eight (38)
Oxycontin pills, $2,800 in cash, and another pill bottle . A search of the vehicle revealed
more pills and a gun. At this point, Appellee was arrested and later indicted on three
counts of trafficking and one count of driving under the influence. The trial court found
that the initial stop of Appellee's vehicle was unlawful and dismissed the indictments .
The Commonwealth now appeals the trial court's ruling to this Court . For the reasons
set forth below, we vacate the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings .
I . LAWFULNESS OF THE INVESTIGATORY STOP
It is well-established that investigatory stops, such as the one performed by
Officer Hastings in this case, are permissible if the officer has reasonable and
articulable suspicion that a violation of the law is occurring . Collins v. Commonwealth ,
142 S .W.3d 113,115 (Ky. 2004) (citing Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U .S. 648, 663, 99
S .Ct . 1391, 1401, 59 L .Ed .2d 660, 673 (1979)) . When reviewing a trial court's order
regarding whether certain evidence should be suppressed, we defer to the trial court's
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and we review de novo the trial court's
application of the law to the facts found . Welch v. Commonwealth , 149 S .W.3d 407,
409 (Ky. 2004) .
In this case, there seems to be no dispute as to the facts as they have been
recounted herein . Rather, the parties dispute whether the facts amount to "reasonable
suspicion," and specifically, whether the tip should be classified as "anonymous." Both
of these determinations involve applying law to the facts found, and thus, we review
these questions de novo . See , etc .., Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky.
2001), United States v. Pasquarille , 20 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 1994) .
We find that the setting and circumstances of this case do not support a
conclusion that the tip was truly "anonymous." While the tipsters did not give their
names, they (1) identified themselves as employees of the Waffle House restaurant ;
and (2) provided the location of the particular restaurant where they worked . This
information alone raises a strong presumption that these informants could likely be
located in the event that their tip was determined to be false or made for the purpose of
harassment . However, in addition to the identifying information given over the
telephone, Officer Hastings reasonably believed that he had face-to-face contact with
the actual tipsters when he pulled into the parking lot of the restaurant and observed
two people (1) waiting outside for him; and (2) pointing toward a vehicle that had the
same description as the one provided in the dispatch broadcast. Cf. State v. Ramey,
717 N .E.2d 1153, 1158 (Oh . App. 1998) ("There is nothing even remotely anonymous,
clandestine, or surreptitious about a citizen stopping a police officer on the street to
report criminal activity ."). When all these facts are considered in their totality (including
and especially the pre-detention investigation which verified most of the information
given by the tipsters), it is clear to us that this tip was generated from identifiable
informants as opposed to anonymous informants .
The significance of whether this tip was generated from "anonymous" informants
or not bears upon our overall determination of reliability. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U .S.
213, 103 S .Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed .2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court stated
that "an informant's 'veracity,' `reliability' and `basis of knowledge' are all highly relevant
in determining the value of his report ." Id . at 230, 103 S .Ct. at 2328 . When determining
whether a set of facts is sufficient to generate reasonable suspicion, we must look at the
the totality of the circumstances in each case . Alabama v. White , 496 U .S . 325, 330,
110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L .Ed .2d 301 (1990).
In cases involving identifiable informants who could be subject to criminal liability
if it is discovered that the tip is unfounded or fabricated, such tips are entitled to a
greater "presumption of reliability" as opposed to the tips of unknown "anonymous"
informants (who theoretically have "nothing to lose") . See Florida v. J .L . , 529 U .S . 266,
276, 120 S .Ct. 1375, 1381, 146 L.Ed .2d 254 (2000) (Kennedy, concurring) ("the ability
of the police to trace the identity of anonymous telephone informants may be a factor
which lends reliability to what, years earlier, might have been considered unreliable
anonymous tips") . Moreover, the tip in this case is entitled to even greater deference
than it normally might be accorded due to its status as a "citizen informant" tip. See
Gates, supra at 233, 103 S .Ct. at 2330 ("rigorous scrutiny of the basis of [a citizen
informant's] knowledge [is] unnecessary") . What distinguishes a "citizen informant" tip
from other types of tips is the fact that such tipsters are almost always bystanders or
eyewitness-victims of the alleged criminal activity . Paquarille , supra, at 689 ("Thus,
because the informant's account was based on firsthand observations as opposed to
idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture, we presume that the statements are reliable .")
(internal quotations and citations omitted) ; see also , Gates, supra, at 233-35 ("[E]ven if
we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed
description of wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed
firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case .").
"Whereas other informants, who are often intimately involved with the persons informed
upon and with the illegal conduct at hand, may have personal reasons for giving shaded
or otherwise inaccurate information to law enforcement officials, such is not true of
bystanders or eyewitness-victims who have no connection with the accused." United
States v. Phillips, 727 F .2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citations
omitted) .
Indeed, many federal and state jurisdictions have held that tips provided by
citizen informants who either (1) have face-to-face contact with the police ; or (2) may be
identified are generally competent to support a finding of reasonable suspicion (and in
some cases, probable cause) whereas the same tip from a truly anonymous source
would likely not have supported such a finding. See , e.g ., Paquarille , supra, at 687-88
(face-to-face contact with police by an anonymous citizen informant who simply
identified himself as "a transporter of prisoners" was sufficient to support a finding of
probable cause where informant claimed he had just witnessed an individual attempting
to sell drugs at a truck stop); United States v. Perkins , 363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004)
("Where the informant is known or where the informant relays information to an officer
face-to-face, an officer can judge the credibility of the tipster firsthand and thus confirm
whether the tip is sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion.") ; United States v .
Tucker, 305 F .3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir. 2002) (tips from identifiable citizen informants
are presumed to be reliable); Pasiewicz v. Lake County. Forest Preserve Dist . , 270 F.3d
520, 524 (7th Cir. 2001) ("When police officers obtain information from an eyewitness or
victim establishing the elements of a crime, the information is almost always sufficient to
provide probable cause for an arrest in the absence of evidence that the information, or
the person providing it, is not credible.") ; Frazer v. State , 94 S .W.3d 357, 361 (Ark. App .
2002) (telephone tip by a citizen informant who gave his name was sufficient to support
an investigatory stop of a vehicle that the informant suspected was being operated by
an intoxicated person); State v . Larson , 15 P.3d 334, 336 (Idaho App. 2000) ("Where
the information comes from a known citizen informant rather than an anonymous tipster,
the citizen's disclosure of her identity, which carries the risk of accountability if the
allegations turn out to be fabricated, is generally deemed adequate to show veracity and
reliability."); State v. Manuel, 796 So.2d 602, 605 (Fla . App. 2001) ("A tip by a citizeninformant, as opposed to an anonymous tipster, is entitled to a presumption of reliability
and does not require further corroboration to provide the requisite reasonable suspicion
for a stop .").
Finally, the reliability and veracity of the tip in this case was corroborated by
Officer Hastings to the extent that : (1) he was able to verify most of the details given in
the tip, including the identity of the tipsters ; and (2) he was able to personally observe
the tipsters . When all of these circumstances are considered in their totality, we are
unable to conclude that Officer Hastings lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to
justify his stop of Appellee that night .
Appellee argues, nonetheless, that this case may be distinguished on the
following fact : at the hearing, Officer Hastings admitted that it is police department
policy to stop any vehicle or person that is identified through an "attempt to locate"
message which is broadcast over the dispatch. Thus, he argues that even if Officer
Hastings did not identify and personally observe the actual tipsters in this case, he
would have conducted the stop anyway once he was able to verify the identifying
information broadcast over the dispatch. Assuming that this is true, it is of no
consequence to this decision since the subjective intentions of police officers are
irrelevant to judicial determinations of reasonableness . Wilson v. Commonwealth , 37
S .W .3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S . 806, 116 S .Ct.
1769, 135 L. Ed .2d 89 (1996)).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed ; the trial court's order of dismissal is vacated and the case is remanded for
proceedings consistent with this opinion .
Lambert, C.J ., Graves, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, J.J . concur. Cooper,
and Johnstone, J .J. concur in result only.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
George G . Seelig
Courtney J . Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Robin L. Webb, Esq.
404 W . Main Street
Grayson, KY 41143
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