JAMES FAIRROW, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2004-SC-0293-MR
JAMES FAIRROW, JR .
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES W. BOTELER, JR., JUDGE
03-C R-290
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE COOPER
AFFIRMING
A Hopkins Circuit Court jury convicted Appellant, James Fairrow, Jr ., of two
counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, KRS 218A.1412, and
found him to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree, KRS 532.080(3) . He
received enhanced sentences of thirty-five years in prison for each trafficking conviction,
which were ordered to run concurrently . Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of
right, Ky. Const . § 110(2)(b), asserting five claims of reversible error: (1) the admission
of improper character evidence ; (2) the use of a prejudicial nickname during trial ; (3) the
failure to excuse a juror for cause ; (4) the failure to suppress an in-court identification of
Appellant as a result of an unduly suggestive show-up ; and (5) the failure to grant
Appellant directed verdicts of acquittal on both counts of trafficking in a controlled
substance . For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
Appellant's convictions arose out of two sales of cocaine to Ms. Gay Royal, a
confidential informant (C.I .) for the Madisonville Police Department. Royal told the
police that she wanted to "get straight" and needed some money to leave town, and she
offered to participate in a controlled drug buy. The police agreed .
On the morning of July 13, 2003, Detectives Lantrip and Bean of the Madisonville
Police Department arrived at the home of Royal's mother, where the drug buy would
occur. They performed a cursory search of Royal (asking her to empty her pockets and
take off her shoes) to ensure she did not have drugs on her person that could be used
to falsely incriminate someone, but did not search the house . Around 10 :40 a.m ., Royal
telephoned a man whom she referred to as "J-Man," and whom both she and the police
believed to be Appellant . Royal arranged a drug deal as the police recorded the
conversation on audiotape . The detectives equipped Royal with an audiotape to
secretly record the transaction . They also furnished her with thirty dollars in cash and
recorded the serial numbers of the bills .
A short time later, a black Ford Crown Victoria drove up to the house with a male
sitting in the front passenger seat. As the police videotaped the encounter, Royal
approached the car on the passenger side, momentarily reached inside, then returned
to the house . She gave cocaine to the police which she claimed she purchased from
Appellant with the money. She was not searched after the completion of the
transaction .
Soon thereafter, as recorded by a surveillance camera in the Grapevine Pantry, a
convenience store near Royal's mother's residence, Appellant arrived at the store in a
black Ford Crown Victoria and purchased a money order with cash . Appellant
stipulated at trial that the signature on the money order was his . A bill was later found in
the Grapevine Pantry's safe with a serial number that matched one on the bills provided
to Royal for use in the earlier drug buy.
Around 1 :00 p .m . the same day, Detectives Lantrip and Bean set up a second
controlled drug buy using Royal as the C.I . They followed the same general procedures
employed earlier, but this time failed to search Royal or the house before or after the
transaction . They observed the same black Ford Crown Victoria come to the house.
Royal again left the house with money given to her by the detectives and returned with
cocaine . The drug transaction was recorded on videotape and audiotape . Around 9:00
p.m., Brittany Brown, a clerk at the Grapevine Pantry, identified Appellant from a
photograph shown to her by police as the man to whom she had sold a money order
earlier that day. At trial, Detective Lantrip identified the man in the Grapevine Pantry's
surveillance video as Appellant and his car as the vehicle used in both drug
transactions .
I . CHARACTER EVIDENCE.
Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth
to introduce improper character evidence, specifically, by permitting Detective Lantrip to
testify that Royal was a "reliable" informant whose previous work resulted in numerous
convictions .
Prosecution : Has she, had she been reliable in the past?
Lantrip: Yes she had .
Defense Attorney : Objection, your Honor. Calls for a conclusion as to the
facts as to whether she is reliable or not.
Prosecution : Well I think he can .
Judge : The question was, was she relied on.
Prosecution: Reliable, as far as her previous work .
Judge : Well, develop that and I mean, I think it can be. Get into it.
Prosecution : In the past, approximately how many cases has she worked
for you in the past?
Lantrip : I had thought about that . I can count over five, just immediately.
I would have to go back . It's been over a few years.
Prosecution: Okay .
Lantrip: I could say numerous .
Prosecution : The cases that she worked, did they have positive results?
Lantrip: Every case I am aware of resulted in a conviction .
Testimony about a C .I .'s reliability is appropriate in an affidavit taken to establish
probable cause when the police are seeking to obtain a search warrant. Illinois v.
Gates , 462 U.S . 213, 230, 103 S .Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Lovett v.
Commonwealth , 103 S.W .3d 72, 77-79 (Ky . 2003) . However, admission of such
evidence at a criminal trial is a different matter. Lantrip's testimony that Royal was a
reliable informant whose work had always resulted in convictions was inadmissible
character evidence under KRE 404(a) . Caudill v. Commonwealth , 120 S.W.3d 635,
659-60 (Ky. 2003) (testimony that victim was a "cautious" person was inadmissible
character evidence) . The rule states that "[e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion . . . ." According to Professor Lawson :
The word "character," used most narrowly and accurately, describes the
personal disposition or personality of an individual . . . . [A] person's
character is an intermediate fact that is offered to prove some other
ultimate fact, primarily to support an inference that a person acted (or did
not act) in conformity with his or her character on a given occasion .
Robert G . Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 2.15[2], at 97 (4th ed.
LexisNexis 2003) .
At first blush, it might seem that this evidence was admissible under KRE 608,
which permits the admission of character evidence to attack or support a witness's
credibility.' The rule provides in pertinent part that:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion
or reputation, but subject to these limitations : (1) the evidence may refer
only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of
truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or
otherwise .
(b) Specific instances of conduct . Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness'
credibility, . . . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence . They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness : (1)
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . .
KRE 608 (emphasis added) .
Initially, KRE 608 could not apply to Lantrip's testimony because he was the
Commonwealth's first witness and Royal had not yet testified when he attempted to
bolster her credibility. United States v. Hernandez , 873 F.2d 925, 929 (6th Cir. 1989)
("Critical to the resolution of this issue, however, is the fact that at the time [the police
detective] was questioned about [the informant's] truthfulness and reliability, the
informant has yet to take the stand and testify himself. Because [the informant] was not
a 'witness,' Rule 608 is inapplicable.") . Even if Royal could be regarded as a witness
(because she testified later), Lantrip's testimony was still inadmissible because KRE
608(a)(2) requires credibility to be attacked before it is supported. Brown v.
' The trial took place on February 9 and 10, 2004, after the July 2003 revision of KRE
608.
Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Ky. 1999) (citing Pickard Chrysler, Inc . v.
Sizemore, 918 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Ky. App. 1995)) . Since Lantrip was the
Commonwealth's first witness, Royal's credibility as a witness had not been attacked
prior to Lantrip's testimony . However, Royal's credibility was attacked on crossexamination during her subsequent testimony, and we have held that when
rehabilitation evidence is admitted before credibility is attacked, any error is harmless as
long as credibility is, in fact, later impeached . Reed v. Commonwealth , 738 S.W.2d
818, 821 (Ky . 1987) (citing Summitt v. Commonwealth , 550 S.W .2d 548, 550 (Ky .
1977)) . Thus, if Lantrip's testimony had focused on her character for truthfulness
(instead of reliability), the evidence in question would have been proper rehabilitation of
her credibility under KRE 608 despite having been erroneously admitted out of order .
The rule, however, "leaves no room for proof of anything other than the specific
trait of character that is pertinent to credibility, namely truthfulness or untruthfulness, a
restriction that has been part of Kentucky's law for at least half a century ." Lawson,
supra, §4.20[3], at 302-03 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Minutes, Evidence
Rules Review Commission, Commentary on Amended KRE 608 (September 28,
2001)). See also McHargue v. Perkins , 295 S .W.2d 301 (Ky. 1956) (construing former
CR 43 .07, which contained almost identical language as KRE 608(a)(1)) ; People v.
Bouchee , 253 N .W .2d 626, 632-33 (Mich . 1977) ("[C]haracter evidence offered to
impeach or support a witness's credibility, other than evidence of prior conviction for
crime, must be limited to the particular character trait of truthfulness or untruthfulness .")
(footnote omitted) . While a character for "truthfulness" might arguably be inferred from
a character for "reliability" under some circumstances, Lantrip was not referring to
Royal's truthfulness as a witness but to her "reliability" as an informant, i .e . , in the
context of the primary meaning of "reliable," viz: "dependable ." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Lan_cLuage Unabridged 1917 (1993) . In other
words, he was referring to the fact that her work as a confidential informant always
resulted in successful "buys" that led to convictions . The evidence was offered to prove
that she had accomplished two more successful "buys" from Appellant for which he
should be convicted . Obviously, admission of this testimony constituted error.
Lantrip's testimony that Royal's work for the police had always resulted in
convictions was also inadmissible because character cannot be proven by specific
instances of conduct. When admissible, character may only be proven by "testimony as
to general reputation in the community or by testimony in the form of opinion ." KRE
405(a). "By providing only for the use of reputation or opinion evidence in this situation,
the rule plainly implies a prohibition on evidence of particular acts of conduct ." Lawson,
supra, § 2 .20[4], at 116 . See also Purcell v. Commonwealth , 149 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Ky.
2004) . In limited circumstances, specific instances of conduct may be admissible as
character evidence . See KRE 405(c) & KRE 608(b) . However, neither of those rules
applies in this case . Therefore, Lantrip's testimony that Royal's work with the police
always resulted in convictions was inadmissible . See United States v. Murray , 103 F.3d
310, 321-23 (3d Cir. 1997) (admission of similar evidence held to be reversible error
when admitted after credibility of confidential informant attacked) ; United States v .
Taylor , 900 F .2d 779, 780-81 (4th Cir. 1990) (same).
2 Under KRE 405(c), specific instances of conduct are admissible if a person's character
is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense . Those circumstances are not
present in this case . Under KRE 608(b), testimony about specific instances of conduct
to attack or support a witness' credibility may not be proved by extrinsic evidence, but
may be elicited on cross-examination of the witness whose conduct is at issue. Here,
the testimony in question was elicited during the direct examination of Detective Lantrip,
not during cross-examination . Thus, KRE 608(b) does not apply.
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However, admission of Lantrip's testimony does not require reversal for a new
trial because the error was not properly preserved for appellate review. KRE 103(a)(1) .
Appellant's objection to Lantrip's testimony as to Royal's reliability was not on the
ground that it was improper character evidence but on the ground that it "calls for a
conclusion as to the facts as to whether she is reliable or not." When Lantrip later
testified to the facts supporting his "conclusion," i .e. , that the cases Royal worked
always resulted in convictions, Appellant did not object at all. When a party states
grounds for an objection at trial, that party cannot assert a different basis for the
objection on appeal . Tamme v. Commonwealth , 973 S .W .2d 13, 33 (Ky. 1998) ; Ru
ee
v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Ky. 1991) . Nor are we satisfied that the
admission of improper evidence of the character of a mere witness affected Appellant's
substantial rights and constituted manifest injustice so as to require reversal as palpable
error. KRE 103(e) .
II . NICKNAME .
Appellant filed a motion in limine to suppress any reference at trial to his
nickname, "J-Man," asserting that the jury could assume from the fact that he had a
nickname that he was, in fact, a criminal. Appellant was repeatedly identified on the
audiotapes as "J-Man," so removing any such reference at trial would have required
suppression or substantial redaction of the audiotapes . The Commonwealth objected
because Royal and Lantrip knew Appellant primarily as "J-Man," the name was only a
contraction of Appellant's real name, "James," and that he had always been known as
"J-Man," even in high school . The trial court noted that it was not as if Appellant's
nickname was "Crack-Man," and overruled the motion, finding that the nickname did not
suggest criminal activity, thus would not unduly prejudice Appellant . However, the trial
court believed it would be disrespectful for the witnesses to otherwise refer to Appellant
by his nickname and ordered all witnesses to refer to Appellant by his given name when
testifying from the witness stand .
The trial court's decision whether to exclude evidence because of its prejudicial
effect is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. English , 993 S .W.2d
941, 945 (Ky. 1999) . "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's
decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles ."
Id . We agree that Appellant's nickname does not suggest criminal activity; thus, the trial
court's decision to allow limited use of the nickname was more than reasonable and
certainly not an abuse of discretion .
III . FAILURE TO EXCUSE JUROR FOR CAUSE.
Appellant asserts error in the trial court's failure to excuse Juror No. 87 for cause .
Appellant exercised all of his peremptory strikes and Juror No. 87 actually sat as a juror
on the case. Juror No. 87's son had troubles with alcohol and may have been involved
with drugs, indicating possible bias against a defendant charged with trafficking in a
controlled substance . However, when questioned, Juror No . 87 said she could be fair
and impartial .
"When there is reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot
render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence, that juror shall be excused as not
qualified ." RCr 9.36. However, prospective jurors are qualified to sit on a case provided
reasonable grounds exist to believe they can render a fair and impartial verdict based
solely on the evidence presented at trial . Maxie v. Commonwealth , 82 S .W .3d 860, 863
(Ky. 2002) ; Sanders v. Commonwealth , 801 S .W.2d 665, 670 (Ky. 1990) . Whether a
juror should be excused for cause is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and
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will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion . Maxie , 82 S.W.3d
at 863 ; Caldwell v. Commonwealth , 634 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Ky. 1982) . The question
becomes whether it was reasonable for the trial court to find that Juror No. 87 was
qualified to sit as a juror. Maxie, 82 S.W.3d at 863.
Juror No . 87 assured the trial court that she could find Appellant not guilty if the
evidence was insufficient to convict. That assurance provided the trial court with a
reasonable basis for concluding that she could be fair and impartial . Id. ; Sanders , 801
S .W.2d at 670. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion
to excuse Juror No. 87 for cause .
IV. SHOW-UP IDENTIFICATION .
Appellant asserts the trial court erred by allowing the Grapevine Pantry clerk,
Brittany Brown, to identify him at trial based on her earlier out-of-court identification from
a photograph shown to her by the police. During the evening on the day of the
controlled drug buys, the police showed Ms. Brown a photograph of Appellant and
asked if he was the man who had purchased the money order from her. She responded
in the affirmative . Because only one person is presented for identification, such "showups" are highly suggestive and must be viewed with caution . Rodrigue z v.
Commonwealth , 107 S .W .3d 215, 218 (Ky. 2003); Myers v. Commonwealth , 499
S .W.2d 277, 279 (Ky. 1973) .
The United States Supreme Court has identified five factors to weigh in
assessing the possibility that the witness would make an irreparable misidentification
from a show-up, based upon the totality of the circumstances.
[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of
misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal
at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of
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the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation .
Neil v. Biggers , 409 U .S. 188, 199-200, 93 S .Ct . 375, 382, 34 L.Ed .2d 401 (1972). We
have adopted this five-part test. Savage v. Commonwealth , 920 S .W.2d 512, 513-14
(Ky. 1995) ; Wilson v. Commonwealth , 695 S .W.2d 854, 857 (Ky. 1985) .
In the case sub iudice , Brown had an unobstructed view of Appellant in a well-lit
store during broad daylight . She testified that although she did look down to operate the
money order machine, she was paying attention and observed Appellant . Furthermore,
her description of Appellant provided prior to the show-up proved to be fairly accurate .
Brown was very certain that the person in the photograph was the man who bought the
money order. She testified that he was a regular customer at the store and that she
was already familiar with him . Lastly, the time period between when Appellant
purchased the money order and Brown's identification was around ten hours, certainly
not an unreasonably lengthy period of time .
Although it would have been preferable for the police to have shown Brown an
array of photographs to overcome the inherent suggestiveness of the show-up
procedure, the totality of circumstances, as illustrated by the five Neil factors, indicates
that the show-up identification did not violate Appellant's due process rights .
V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
Finally, Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions and the trial court should have sustained his motions for directed verdicts of
acquittal . On a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, all fair and reasonable inferences
are drawn in the Commonwealth's favor. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S .W .2d 186,
187 (Ky. 1991) . However, judgment as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
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the evidence are left exclusively to the jury. Id. ; see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 5
S.W.3d 126, 129 (Ky . 1999) . On appellate review, we determine whether, under the
evidence viewed as a whole, it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to have found the
defendant guilty . Commonwealth v. Sawhill , 660 S .W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983) .
More than enough evidence was introduced at trial to support Appellant's
conviction . Royal testified that Appellant was the man who sold her the cocaine, and
the transactions were recorded on audiotape and videotape . Appellant is shown on
videotape entering the Grapevine Pantry and purchasing a money order, and he
identified the signature on the money order as his own . Brown identified Appellant as
the man who purchased the money order with cash . One of the bills given to Royal by
Detective Lantrip was found in the Grapevine Pantry's safe. The evidence was
sufficient to support Appellant's convictions .
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed by the Hopkins
Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Emily Holt Rhorer
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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