IMPORT-ANT NOTICE NO T TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CI VIL PR OCED URE PR OHUL GA TED B Y THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
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IMPORT-ANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PR OCED URE PROHUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 22, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-0277-MR
DDAcTI
COREY MCCARY
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN T. DAUGHADAY, JUDGE
02-CR-274
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirming
A jury of the Graves Circuit Court convicted Appellant of Trafficking in a
Controlled Substance in the First Degree. KRS 218A.1412(2)(b) . For this crime,
Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty years' imprisonment . Appellant now
appeals to this Court as a matter of right . Ky . Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . For the reasons set
forth herein, we affirm Appellant's conviction .
In two independent sting operations conducted by two different law enforcement
agencies, Appellant was alleged to have sold cocaine to two undercover informants on
two separate occasions. On January 15, 2002, the Commonwealth alleged that he sold
cocaine to Amanda McReynolds . McReynolds was deployed by the Mayfield Police
Department. She received financial compensation and leniency in sentencing regarding
pending charges for her services . On June 5, 2002, the Commonwealth alleged that he
sold cocaine to Steve Sherfield . Sherfield was deployed by the Graves County Sheriff's
Department and received only financial compensation for his services .
The unrelated charges were joined for trial, and the jury returned verdicts of guilty
on the January 15, 2002, charge, but not guilty on the June 5, 2002, charge. Finding
the conviction to be a second or subsequent offense, the jury recommended, and the
trial court imposed, a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment for the lone trafficking
conviction . Appellant now presents a single issue on appeal : whether the trial court
erred to his substantial prejudice when it denied his request for separate trials . We
affirm .
On the day before trial, Appellant filed a motion to sever the two charges for trial.
The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that the filing was late. Appellant
argues that a motion to sever charges is not considered "late" so long as it is made
before the jury is sworn . See RCr 9 .16. ("A motion for such relief must be made before
the jury is sworn . . . .") We agree that pursuant to RCr 9 .16, the grounds offered by the
trial court were insufficient to justify its ruling . However, we have consistently stated
that the correct result must be upheld, regardless of whether the trial court's reasoning
supports that result. See e.g ., Hodge v. Commonwealth , 116 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Ky.
2003) . Accordingly, in order to grant Appellant relief, we must determine whether the
actual merits of the claim justify reversal.
"The decision to join or sever is within the sound discretion of the trial court and
an exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless clear abuse and prejudice are
shown ." Schambon v. Commonwealth , 821 S .W.2d 804, 809 (Ky. 1991) . Appellant's
sole argument is that he was substantially prejudiced by the joinder because evidence
of both crimes would not have been admissible in separate trials . See Rearick v.
Commonwealth , 858 S .W.2d 185,187 (Ky. 1993) ("A significant factor in identifying such
prejudice is the extent to which evidence of one offense would be admissible in a trial of
the other offense .")
It is true that joinder is generally disfavored in cases where evidence of one
offense would not be admissible in a trial of the other offense. Rearick , supra, at 187.
See , e.g., Marcum v. Commonwealth , 390 S .W.2d 884, 886 (Ky. 1965). However,
joinder can still be permissible in these cases if (1) the crimes are closely related in
character, circumstances, and time, and (2) evidence of each crime is simple and
distinct . See Sherley v. Commonwealth , 889 S .W .2d 794, 800 (Ky. 1994) (citing
Cardine v. Commonwealth , 623 S .W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981)) and Marcum, supra, at 886
("This rule rests upon the assumption that a properly instructed jury can easily keep
such evidence separate in their deliberations and therefore the danger of cumulative
effect of evidence is substantially avoided ."); see also, Brown v. Commonwealth , 458
S .W.2d 444, 447 (Ky. 1970) ("The evidence of each crime was simple and distinct, the
dates of the several offenses were closely connected in time, and even though such
evidence of distinct crimes might not have been admissible in separate trials, the
promotion of economy and efficiency in judicial administration by the avoidance of
needless multiplicity of trials was not outweighed by any demonstrably unreasonable
prejudice to the defendant as a result of the consolidations .")
In this case, the evidence cannot be more distinct or simple - two different
informants claimed that they bought one rock of cocaine from Appellant. Both parties
agree that the "controlled buys" were completely "unrelated," and that the alleged
crimes occurred more than four and one-half months apart. There is also no question
whether the crimes are closely related in character since the incidences involve the
same crime (trafficking in cocaine) and occurred under similar conditions . Rather, the
pivotal question in this case is whether the crimes are too distinct in time and
circumstances to be fairly tried in the same proceeding . See Marcum, supra , at 886 ("It
appears also that time is of some importance in deciding whether offenses may be tried
together.")
We have held that judicial economy justifies the joinder of unrelated offenses
which occurred over a one month period . See Carding v. Commonwealth , 623 S.W.2d
895, 897 (Ky. 1981) . However, in Cargill v. Commonwealth , 528 S.W.2d 735, 736-37
(Ky. 1975), we held that joinder of unrelated offenses occurring some four months apart
was not justifiable . Id . at 736-37 . In this case, while the offenses were simple, distinct,
and closely related in character (they were the same offense), they involved completely
unrelated circumstances and were distant in time. In circumstances such as these, the
likelihood of undue prejudice resulting from the joinder of several similar, but remotely
connected crimes which, in bulk, would not be admissible in separate trials is too great
to justify joinder. Accordingly, we find that joinder in this case was harmless error.
However, on appeal, Appellant must demonstrate more than mere error to be
entitled to a new trial. Sears v. Commonwealth , 561 S .W .2d 672, 674 (Ky . 1978) ; see
also , Car ill, supra, at 737 ("A person who is charged with the commission of crimes
may not always have a perfect trial, but he is entitled to a fair trial .") Rather, Appellant is
required to make "a positive showing of the prejudice which has resulted [from the
error] ." Russell v. Commonwealth , 482 S .W.2d 584, 588 (Ky. 1972), overruled on other
_grounds by Pendleton v. Commonwealth , 685 S .W.2d 549 (Ky. 1985) . "He must show
something more than the fact that a separate trial might offer a better chance of
acquittal or a less severe penalty." Id.
In this case, Appellant was acquitted of one of the two charges submitted to the
jury, and thus, any prejudicial effect from the joinder of the two trials was greatly
diminished . See Jackson v. Commonwealth , 20 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Ky . 2000) ; see also,
United States v. Rehal , 940 F .2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[T]he jury's discriminating verdict
suggests that it properly compartmentalized the evidence as to the various counts and
separately considered defendant's guilt as to each and every one .") Nonetheless, he
argues that prejudice can be positively shown by the fact that the jury recommended the
maximum sentence for the remaining offense . We find this argument unpersuasive
since the sentencing recommendation can just as easily be explained by the fact that
Appellant had been convicted of three prior felonies, two of which were for trafficking .
When the circumstances of this case are considered in their totality, we find that
Appellant has failed to meet his burden to make a positive showing of prejudice
resulting from the trial court's failure to sever his two trials.
The judgment of the Graves Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Karen Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Carlton S . Shier
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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