THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CI VI_ L PROCED URE PR OMUL GA TED B Y THE IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
;SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CA SL` INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
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2004-SC-0269-MR
WILLIAM R. PAYNE
V
ODA7 E
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM TAYLOR CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
02-CR-00042
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant, William Payne, was convicted of nine counts of First-Degree Rape
and five counts of First-Degree Sodomy . The jury also found that Appellant was a
persistent felony offender . He contends 1.) that the trial court erred in overruling his
motion for a directed verdict; 2) that he was denied the right to a fair trial based upon
prosecutorial misconduct ; and 3) that he was denied the right to a fair trial due to
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Appellant did not properly preserve the
directed verdict and prosecutorial misconduct issues, and ineffective assistance of
counsel claims cannot be raised on direct appeal, we reject Appellant's claims of
error. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
II. BACKGROUND
Appellant met Brenda Hatfield, the victim's mother, in March or April of 1999.
Later that year, in October, Appellant moved inl with Brenda and her four children .
Although Appellant and Brenda had known each other for a few months before the
move, the relationship did not become sexual until about three months after
Appellant moved in . Appellant stayed with Brenda and her family until December of
2001, when he was arrested for violation of parole .
Two months later, the victim attended a church sponsored lock-in . While at
the lock-in, Karen Benningfield, one of the church leaders, found the victim sitting
alone in a pew, praying . When asked why she was in the sanctuary, the victim told
Benningfield that men had been touching her in inappropriate ways . After their
conversation, Benningfield called Child Protective Services and informed them of the
victim's allegations .
After conducting an investigation, Appellant was indicted for fifty counts of
First-Degree Rape, ten counts of First-Degree Sodomy, and one count of being a
First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender . At trial, the Commonwealth called Brenda
Hatfield to testify about her relationship with Appellant and the victim . Hatfield stated
that she did not believe the allegations that her daughter had made concerning
Appellant and that her daughter had a reputation for untruthfulness. The
prosecution also asked Hatfield if she had ever referred to her daughter as a
"whore," but she denied doing so . The prosecution also called Dr. Jasbir Dhillon, the
E .R. physician who examined the victim on February 25, 2002, shortly after the
allegations were made . According to Dr. Dhillon, the victim's hymen was perforated,
indicating, though not proving, that she had engaged in sexual intercourse . Dr.
Dhillon also said that the victim tested positive for chlamydia, a sexually transmitted
disease, and that her cervix appeared "red and irritated ." Based upon his
examination, Dr. Dhillon prescribed medicine for the chlamydia . Next, the
prosecution called Dr. Kevin Dew, a gynecologist who examined the victim on March
7, 2002 . Dr. Dew testified that the victim presented indications of sexual activity,
including a perforated hymen and a condition known as bacterial vaginosis, which is
caused by the transmission of foreign bacteria into the vagina .
Libby Caulk, a teacher at the victim's school whose daughter played volleyball
with the victim, testified that she was with the victim at the initial visit from Child
Protective Services and when the victim went to the Taylor Regional Hospital for an
examination . Further, Caulk said that she had heard Brenda Hatfield refer to the
victim as a "whore." The prosecution also called Elizabeth Shelton, the social
worker assigned to the case, to testify. She, too, stated that she heard Hatfield refer
to her daughter as a "whore." Shelton also said that she visited the victim at
Campbellsville Middle School, finding her in "the fetal position, rocking, sucking her
thumb, and crying ." Based upon her interview with the victim, Ms . Shelton arranged
for the victim's transfer to live with her father.
Finally, the prosecution called the victim . During direct examination, the
victim testified to nine instances of rape and five instances of oral sodomy,
describing the encounters and identifying Appellant as the alleged perpetrator.
At the close of the Commonwealth's case, Appellant's attorney made a
motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support
finding Appellant guilty of the charged offenses . The court, after listening to the
prosecution's argument that the evidence was sufficient to support finding Appellant
guilty, denied the motion. Appellant's attorney renewed the motion for a directed
verdict at the close of all evidence, stating that the motion should be granted for the
reasons already articulated in the initial motion . Again, the court refused to grant
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict, and the case went to the jury.
Although the indictment contained sixty-one counts, including fifty counts of
First-Degree Rape, ten counts of First-Degree Sodomy, and one count of FirstDegree Persistent Felony Offender Status, the trial court only instructed the jury on
nine counts of First-Degree Rape and five counts of First-Degree Sodomy. The jury
convicted Appellant of all fourteen counts in the instructions, found that he was a
persistent felony offender, and recommended a total enhanced sentence of thirty
years imprisonment. The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the
jury's recommendation . Appellant appeals to this court as a matter of right .'
111 . ANALYSIS
We address the issues in the order in which they appear in Appellant's brief.
A. Directed Verdict
Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for a
directed verdict because the evidence offered by the prosecution was insufficient to
support a conviction on the charged offenses .
First, we note that this issue has not been properly preserved for review . CR
50.01,2 which is applicable in criminal cases, says that "[a] motion for a directed
1 KY. CONST. §110(2)(b) .
2 Rules of Civil Procedure .
3 RCr 1 .02(2) ("These rules govern procedure and practice in all criminal
proceedings in the Court of Justice . To the extent that they are not inconsistent with
these rules, the regulations, administrative procedures, and manuals published by
the Administrative Office of the Courts upon authorization of the Supreme Court
relating to internal policy and administration within the Court of Justice shall have the
same effect as if incorporated in the rules .").
verdict shall state the specific grounds therefore . ,4 In this case, Appellant's attorney
moved for a directed verdict, arguing only that no reasonable jury could find the
defendant guilty of the crimes with which he had been charged . Even if true,
Appellant's attorney had the obligation, under CR 50 .01, to direct the court's
attention to specific elements of the crime that the prosecution had not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Just last year, in Pate v. Commonwealth , a case
involving prosecution for the manufacture of methamphetamine, we held that a
general motion for directed verdict was insufficient, stating, "CR 50.01 requires that a
directed verdict motion 'state the specific grounds therefor[,]' and Kentucky appellate
courts have steadfastly held that failure to do so will foreclose appellate review of the
trial court's denial of the directed verdict motion ."6 In this case, instead of citing
specific elements of the charges, Appellant's attorney relied on the vague assertion
that no reasonable jury could find Appellant guilty, thus depriving the trial court of the
opportunity to rule on specific elements of the charges. Therefore, we hold that
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict was not preserved for appellate review.
Nevertheless, despite Appellant's failure to preserve this issue for review, we
have reviewed the record and conclude that the trial judge properly denied
Appellant's motion for directed verdict. "On appellate review, the test of a directed
4 CR 50 .01 ("A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the
evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that the motion is
not granted, without having reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if
the motion had not been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted
is not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts . A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds
therefore . The order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is effective
without any assent of the jury.").
5 134 S .W.3d 593 (Ky. 2004).
6 Id . at 597-98 .
verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a
jury to find guilt, only then is the defendant entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal."'
Additionally, the Court of Appeals has fleshed out this rule: "[I]n ruling on a directed
verdict motion, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence
in favor of the Commonwealth and assume that the Commonwealth's evidence is
true, leaving questions of weight and credibility to the jury. ,8 In this case, Appellant
was charged with numerous counts of rape and sodomy. The prosecution called
two doctors, Dr. Dhillon and Dr. Dew, to testify about their examination of the victim .
Both doctors testified that there was evidence of sexual activity, e.g . perforated
hymen, chlamydia, and bacterial vaginosis. In fact, although the defense attacked
the use of the perforated hymen as incontrovertible evidence of sexual activity, no
one disputed Dr. Dhillon's statement that chlamydia is a sexually transmitted
disease. Of course, evidence of sexual activity does not prove that the victim was
raped by Appellant . It is, however, evidence of sexual activity, which, depending on
the credibility of the witnesses, could be used to prove the defendant's guilt.
Appellant has gone to great lengths to impeach the credibility of the victim,
arguing that her testimony was replete with contradictions, inconsistent statements,
and implausible scenarios, specifically citing four factors that, allegedly, render the
victim's claims wholly improbable . First, Appellant mentions the fact that no person
saw or heard anything unusual in the Hatfield home when these events allegedly
occurred, despite the fact that there were four people in a relatively small house.
Although Appellant is correct that the prosecution did not call any witnesses to the
Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W .2d 186,187 (Ky. 1991).
8 Slaughter v. Commonwealth , 45 S.W.3d 873,875 (Ky.App . 2000); see also
Nichols v. Commonwealth , 657 S .W .2d 932, 934 (Ky. 1983).
alleged offenses, the jury could still choose to believe the testimony of the victim
even in the absence of corroborating testimony from other witnesses. Indeed, the
jury must determine whether, and to what extent, a witness's testimony is to be
believed . 9
Second, Appellant argues that the victim's decision not to tell anyone about
these incidents for more than two years strains credulity . Specifically, Appellant
contends that the prosecution had a responsibility to offer evidence of a
psychological syndrome that would explain the victim's reticence on this sensitive
subject . We acknowledge the fact that the prosecution did not offer any substantive
evidence that the victim was afflicted with a psychological disorder, but we do not
agree with Appellant's assertion that this was necessary or that the absence of such
evidence rendered the victim's claims implausible . As a technical matter, nowhere
in the statute is there any requirement that the prosecution in a rape case offer
evidence of a psychological disorder . Such evidence, if offered, would go to the
credibility of the witness, which, as we have said, must be left to the jury. Moreover,
in this case, Appellant's argument that no substantive evidence of a psychological
disorder was offered, though technically true, is misleading . In fact, the victim,
during direct examination, explained her reluctance to tell her mother about these
acts, saying that she knew that her mother was fond of Appellant and, consequently,
would probably accuse the victim of fabricating the claims (as she did at trial .
Third, Appellant points out the fact that no evidence was offered to
corroborate the victim's claim that she was a virgin at the time of the first rape .
Again, the statute under which Appellant was convicted says nothing about proof of
9 Slaughter, 45 S .W .3d at 875.
virginity . Furthermore, even if the victim was not a virgin, such a fact would have no
effect on the jury's decision in this case . The victim was alleging rape, i .e . nonconsensual sex, and not violation of her chastity. Finally, Appellant cites to the
witnesses who testified to the victim's lack of truthfulness . While we recognize the
value in impeaching the credibility of witnesses, we also believe that the jury must be
the final arbiter of witness credibility .
Ultimately, contradictions in the victim's testimony go to her credibility, which
must be weighed by the jury and not the judge . Thus, a motion for directed verdict,
unless accompanied by proof that the prosecution has failed to offer any credible
evidence, must be rejected, and the jury must be allowed to determine what weight,
if any, to ascribe to the testimony of the victim. The motion for directed verdict,
therefore, was properly denied by the trial judge .
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Appellant asserts that the prosecutor's conduct in this case was sufficiently
egregious to amount to prosecutorial misconduct . We disagree .
Appellant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is based upon the
Commonwealth's decision to call Brenda Hatfield as a witness . During direct
examination, the prosecutor asked Hatfield if she had ever referred to the victim as a
"whore," to which she responded with an unequivocal denial . Then, based upon Ms .
Hatfield's denial, the Commonwealth called two witnesses, Libby Calk and Elizabeth
Shelton, who testified that they had heard Hatfield say that the victim was a "whore ."
The Commonwealth did nothing improper, either in asking Hatfield this question on
direct examination or in impeaching her credibility by calling witnesses to testify to a
prior inconsistent statement. The Commonwealth asked Hatfield whether she had
ever called her daughter a "whore" to show bias, which, as Professor Lawson has
correctly noted,' ° is admissible. Indeed, during direct examination, Hatfield admitted
that she and Appellant were romantically involved at the time of the alleged acts and
remained so at the time of trial . Further, Hatfield testified that, in her opinion, the
victim was untruthful and that the claims that had been made against Appellant
could not be trusted . Thus, based upon this testimony, which, we believe, reveals
evidence of bias in favor of the Appellant, the Commonwealth's question about
Hatfield referring to the victim as a "whore" was proper. When Hatfield denied
making this statement, the Commonwealth called other witnesses to impeach her
credibility. According to KRE 607, "the credibility of a witness may be attacked by
any party, including the party calling the witness ." The Commonwealth gave Hatfield
the opportunity to address her prior statement as required by the Rules of
Evidence .' 1 Thus, the Commonwealth's impeachment of Brenda Hatfield's
credibility was proper.
But even assuming, arguendo, that the prosecution had engaged in
impermissible trial practices, the error was not properly preserved for review. In fact,
Appellant concedes this point in his brief, claiming that the error, though
10 Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, §4.15[l], at 183 (3d
ed . 1993) ( "No doubt exists about the admissibility of evidence bearing on what is
commonly referred to as the `bias' of witnesses . . . .There is no explicit treatment of
impeachment by bias in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence . . . .Admissibility of such
evidence, said the [United States Supreme] Court, is governed by provisions on
relevancy (Rules 401 and 402) . . . . ).
11
See KRE 613 ("Examining witness concerning prior statement . Before
other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at another time a different
statement, he must be inquired of concerning it, with the circumstances of time,
place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining party can present them .") .
unpreserved, should be reviewed by this Court as palpable error. 12 But RCr 10.26 is
only applicable when the error is so egregious that the defendant was deprived of
the right to a fair trial . At the most, any prosecutorial misconduct in this case would
fall within the category of harmless error, and therefore, Appellant's argument that
there was evidence of prosecutorial misconduct must be rejected .
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant contends that his attorney's performance during trial was deficient,
thus depriving him of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel .
"As a general rule, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will not be
reviewed on direct appeal from the trial court's judgment, because there is usually
no record or trial court ruling on which such a claim can properly be considered . »13
We have held that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised in a
post-conviction Rule 11 .42 motion rather than on direct appeal, thus we decline to
review the issue on direct appeal..
IV. CONCLUSION
Appellant did not properly preserve his directed verdict claim or his claim of
prosecutorial misconduct, and Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
can only be raised as a post-conviction Rule 11 .42 motion . Thus, the trial court did
not commit error in this case, and we affirm Appellant's convictions .
12
RCr 10.26 ("A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on
appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate
relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from
the error .").
13
14
Humphrey v. Commonwealth , 962 S.W .2d 870, 872 (Ky. 1998) .
Id . a t 872.
-10-
Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur. Lambert,
C.J., concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Aubrey Williams
Suite 421, Starks Building
455 Fourth Avenue
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
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