DARRYL A. DOWNING V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
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CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : JUNE 16, 2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2004-SC-0059-MR
7-7
DARRYL A. DOWNING
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS McDONALD, JUDGE
2002-CR-0189
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Darryl A. Downing, was convicted in the Jefferson Circuit Court of
attempted rape, kidnapping, and first-degree sexual abuse. He was sentenced to a
total of forty years' imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Finding
no error, we affirm.
The evidence at trial established that on the morning of Monday, January 14,
2002, eleven-year-old V.J. was walking to school after having missed the bus when a
man in a brown car stopped to talk to her. The man, later identified as Appellant, had a
little boy with him and asked V.J. where she was going . Appellant told V.J . that if she
walked to school the next day he would pick her up and take her to buy some candy.
The following morning, V.J . again missed the bus and was walking to school
when she observed Appellant's car. Appellant approached and asked
remembered him and whether she still wanted to go buy candy.
V.J .
V.J . if she
got into
Appellant's car and he drove to a Kroger grocery store . V.J. selected candy and drinks,
which Appellant paid for with a food stamp card . When V.J . told Appellant that she
would get into trouble if she took the items to school, he suggested that they drive to his
house to get a gym bag to put them in .
Upon arriving at Appellant's house, V.J. followed Appellant into the basement
where V.J . observed a bed, dresser, and television . Appellant told V.J . to sit on the bed
while he looked for the gym bag . Appellant then approached V.J. and said, "Since I
gave you something, you have to give me something back ." V.J . testified that
Appellant told her to take her pants off and that she complied because she was afraid
he would hurt her if she didn't . Appellant removed his pants and V.J . noticed that he
was not wearing underwear . V.J . stated that Appellant repeatedly tried to penetrate her
with his penis but that it would not go in . Appellant apparently became frustrated and
angry, and told V.J . to get dressed .
When Appellant dropped V.J . off at her school, she immediately reported the
incident to the school counselor. However, V.J. initially claimed that Appellant had
forced her into his car. She later admitted that she had lied because she did not want
others to think she was stupid for getting into a stranger's car.
The Kroger store's surveillance camera recorded Appellant and V.J .'s purchase
on the day in question . Police traced the food stamp card to Appellant's wife, who
positively identified him from the store video . Following Appellant's arrest, he was
interviewed by police during which he made numerous denials and gave various
versions of events. Finally, Appellant gave
a taped
statement and admitted penetrating
V.J . with his finger while the two were in the basement of his house . Although
Appellant stated that he became aroused, he denied ever taking his penis out of his
pants or trying to penetrate V.J. with it.
Appellant was subsequently indicted by a Jefferson County grand jury on
charges of rape, kidnapping, and sexual abuse. Following a trial in March 2003, the
jury found Appellant not guilty of rape, but guilty of attempted rape, kidnapping, and
sexual abuse . The jury recommended an aggregate sentence of forty years'
imprisonment and the trial court entered judgment accordingly . Additional facts are set
forth as necessary .
I.
Appellant's first allegation of error concerns the introduction of testimony
pertaining to V.J .'s financial status and to Appellant's sexual relationship with his wife.
Appellant claims that the evidence on both subjects was irrelevant and inflammatory.
We disagree .
During direct examination by the Commonwealth, Detective Carolyn Nunn of the
Louisville Crimes Against Children Unit was asked how she would describe V.J .'s
family's financial situation . Defense counsel objected to the relevancy of the testimony
and the Commonwealth responded that the evidence was relevant to show why V.J .
would get into the car of a stranger who offered her candy and also why she asked for
the candy back even after it was seized as evidence by the police. The trial court
overruled the objection . Detective Nunn thereafter responded, "poor, not a lot of
money."
Appellant argues that the sole purpose of the evidence was to create the
inference that V .J . was even more of a victim because of her poverty in order to elicit
sympathy from the jury. Further, Appellant claims that the introduction of V.J .'s financial
status allowed the Commonwealth during closing argument to further expound on V.J .'s
home life . The Commonwealth did, in fact, comment during closing that V.J.'s family
was poor, that mother would not take her to school when she missed the bus, and even
that her mother was not present at the trial.
The determination of relevance and admissibility under KRE 401 and KRE 403 is
within the sound discretion of the trial court, Rake v. Commonwealth , 450 S .W.2d 527
(Ky. 1970), and will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of that discretion.
Commonwealth v. English , 993 S .W .2d 941 (Ky. 1999) ; see also Love v.
Commonwealth, 55 S .W .3d 816 (Ky. 2001). We agree with the Commonwealth that
VJ's financial situation was relevant not only to provide a background and history of
the eleven-year-old, but also to explain why V.J . acted the way she did, especially with
respect to her initial claim that Appellant forced her into his car. V .J . testified that she
lied because she did want anyone to think she was stupid for voluntarily getting into the
car. But the fact of the matter is she did so simply because she was offered something
she could not buy on her own . Even after V.J . realized the gravity of the situation and
was driving around with the police, she asked the officers if she could still have the
candy and drinks that were seized as evidence .
Even assuming arguendo that VJ's poverty was not relevant, we do not agree
with Appellant that the singular statement by Detective Nunn was so prejudicial and
inflammatory as to deny him the right to a fair trial . RCr 9.24. The Commonwealth
would have still had the latitude to comment on VJ's background during closing
argument . See Tamme v . Commonwealth , 973 S .W .2d 13 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied ,
525 U .S . 1153, 119 S . Ct. 1056, 143 L . Ed . 2d 61 (1999). No error, harmless or
otherwise, occurred .
The second part of Appellant's argument concerns Detective Nunn's testimony
regarding comments Appellant made about his marital relationship during his interview.
Detective Nunn stated that Appellant initially told police that his wife did not sexually
arouse him anymore and that they slept in separate bedrooms. Later during the
interview, however, Appellant claimed he and his wife had engaged in sexual
intercourse the day before the incident in question . The Commonwealth argued that
the evidence was relevant to show Appellant's repeated inconsistencies in his
statement. The trial court agreed and overruled defense counsel's objection .
Credibility is always an issue and "the trial court may not exclude evidence that
impeaches credibility even though such testimony would be inadmissible to prove a
substantive issue in the case." Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S .W .2d 534, 545 (Ky .
1988). The Commonwealth was within the bounds of the law to point out that Appellant
initially stated he was no longer sexually interested in his wife, but changed his story
after being confronted with the allegations made by V .J . and claimed that he and his
wife had just previously had sex.
Further, we find Appellant's reliance on Chumbler v. Commonwealth , 905
S.W .2d 488 (Ky . 1995) misplaced. In Chumbler, this Court held that evidence of a
homosexual relationship between two defendants was relevant to the crimes charged,
but evidence pertaining to pedophilia and "sex toys" found at the men's residence was
highly prejudicial and irrelevant . Id . at 492-93 . Not only were Appellant's comments
relevant to the overall credibility of his statement, but they were in no manner similar in
extent or form of those found reversible in Chumbler.
The trial court acted well within its discretion in permitting Detective Nunn to
testify about the comments made during Appellant's statement. No error occurred .
II .
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict on the kidnapping charge . At trial, Appellant argued that the
Commonwealth had failed to prove that he intended to accomplish or advance a felony
at the time he restrained V.J . However, on appeal, Appellant now contends that the
kidnapping exemption statute, KRS 509 .050, precludes convictions for both kidnapping
and attempted rape . He concedes that application of KRS 509.050 was not raised in
the trial court .
KRS 509 .040(1)(b) provides that a person is guilty of kidnapping when he
unlawfully restrains another person with the intent to accomplish or advance the
commission of a felony . Here, the kidnapping was a Class B felony because V.J. was
released at a safe place, alive and without serious physical injury. KRS 509 .040(2).
The kidnapping exemption statute, KRS 509.050, provides as follows :
A person may not be convicted of unlawful imprisonment in
the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree,
or kidnapping when his criminal purpose is the commission of
an offense defined outside this chapter and his interference
with the victim's liberty occurs immediately with and incidental
to the commission of that offense, unless the interference
exceeds that which is ordinarily incident to commission of the
offense which is the objective of his criminal purpose. The
exemption provided by this section is not applicable to a
charge of kidnapping that arises from an interference with
another's liberty that occurs incidental to the commission of a
criminal escape .
This Court has held that application of the exemption statute is determined on a
case-by-case basis. Wilson v. Commonwealth , 836 S.W.2d 872 (Ky. 1992), cert.
denied , 507 U .S . 1034, 113 S . Ct. 1857, 123 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1993), overruled on other
-grounds in St. Clair v. Roark, 10 S .W .3d 482 (1999) . If the restraint goes beyond that
which occurs immediately with or incidental to the commission of the underlying
offense, the exemption statute is not available . Gilbert v. Commonwealth , 637 S.W .2d
632 (Ky. 1982), cent . denied , 459 U .S . 1149, 103 S . Ct. 794, 74 L. Ed . 2d 998 (1983) .
Furthermore, "if the victim of a crime is going to be restrained of his liberty in order to
facilitate its commission, the restraint will have to be close in distance and brief in time
for the exemption to apply." Murphy v. Commonwealth , 50 S .W.3d 173, 180 (Ky. 2001)
(quoting Timmons v. Commonwealth , 555 S.W.2d 234 (Ky. 1977)) .
Appellant initially concedes that because of VJ's age, she was "restrained" at
the point she got into his vehicle . See KRS 509 .010(2) . Nonetheless, he argues that
VJ's own testimony established that she did not believe she was restrained until
Appellant told her that she had to give him something in return for the candy. As such,
Appellant contends that the restraint did not actually occur until they were in his
basement and thus, was immediate and incidental to the commission of the underlying
offenses . Furthermore, he points out that V.J. was never tied up or held down, and any
restraint did not exceed that which ordinarily accompanies an attempted rape or sexual
abuse.
Regardless of what V.J . believed, she was restrained at the moment she was
induced into Appellant's car by the promise of candy. More than one and a half hours
passed from the time V.J. got into Appellant's vehicle until the time he finally dropped
her off at school . Furthermore, V.J . was picked up en route to the school, taken to the
Kroger store, to Appellant's house, and then back to school . Thus, it cannot reasonably
KRS 509.010(2) defines "restrain" for the purposes of the kidnapping statute as
follows, in relevant part :
A person is moved or confined "without consent" when the movement or
confinement is accomplished by physical force, intimidation, or deception,
or by any means, including acquiescence of a victim, if he is under the
age of sixteen (16) years, or is substantially incapable of appraising or
controlling his own behavior . (Emphasis added).
be argued that the restraint was immediate and incidental to the commission of the
sexual offenses . Accordingly, Appellant's argument that he is entitled to application of
the exemption statute is not only unpreserved, but unpersuasive on the merits .
Notwithstanding the exemption statute, there was more than sufficient evidence
for the jury to find that Appellant restrained V.J . with the intent to commit a felony. The
jury heard evidence that Appellant approached V .J . the previous day and told her he
would take her to buy candy if she walked to school the next day. A reasonable juror
could have concluded that Appellant planned the encounter and used the promise of
candy to lure V.J. into his car. He thereafter demanded something in return for the
candy. "[T]he intentions of an accused may be ascertained from the surrounding facts
and the jury is allowed a reasonably wide range in which to infer intent from the
circumstances ." Rayburn v. Commonwealth , 476 S.W.2d 187,189 (Ky. 1972) ; see also
Beaty v Commonwealth , 125 S .W .3d 196 (Ky. 2003). Without question, the
Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to withstand a directed verdict on the
kidnapping charge. Commonwealth v. Benham , 816 S .W .2d 186,(Ky. 1991) .
III .
Appellant next argues that he was entitled to an instruction on unlawful
imprisonment as a lesser-included offense of kidnapping . While defense counsel did
request that the jury be instructed on unlawful imprisonment, he did not specify which
degree . Nevertheless, the trial court denied any instruction on the grounds that there
had to be some evidence to support the instruction and that it found none in this case .
We agree.
The essential difference between kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment is that
kidnapping requires that the restraint of the individual be accompanied by the intent to:
(1) hold the victim for ransom, or (2) accomplish or advance the commission of a felony,
or (3) inflict bodily injury on the victim or terrorize the victim, or (4) interfere with the
performance of a governmental or political function, or (5) use the victim as a shield or
hostage . KRS 509.040(1)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) . Cannon v. Commonwealth , 777
S.W .2d 591 (Ky. 1989) . Under KRS 509 .020, a person is guilty of unlawful
imprisonment in the first degree when he or she knowingly restrains another person
under circumstances which expose that person to a risk of serious physical injury .
Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree requires only the element of restraint .
KRS 509 .030.
It is axiomatic that a trial court must instruct the jury on all lesser-included
offenses which are justified by the evidence . McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d
464 (Ky . 1986), cert . denied , 479 U .S. 1057, 107 S. Ct. 935, 93 L . Ed . 2d 986 (1987) ;
Martin v. Commonwealth . 571 S .W .2d 613 (Ky. 1978) . However, there must be some
evidence that pertains to the lesser-included offense . "A defendant is not entitled to an
instruction on a lesser-included offense unless the evidence is 'such as to create a
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty of the higher or lower degree ."'
Rowe v. Commonwealth , 50 S.W .3d 216, 218-19 (Ky. App. 2001) .
Here, there was no evidence presented which would justify an instruction on
either degree of unlawful imprisonment . Appellant's actions on the day before the
incident and on the day in question clearly indicated his intent to commit a sexual felony
when he picked up V.J . Appellant presented no evidence at trial, and merely
maintained the defense that he only penetrated V.J . with his finger, not his penis.
Based on the evidence and testimony, the jury could not have reasonably
maintained doubt concerning the kidnapping offense, but found guilt beyond a
-9-
reasonable doubt of unlawful imprisonment . Parker v. Commonwealth , 952 S .W.2d
209 (Ky. 1997) ; see also Bills v. Commonwealth , 851 S .W .2d 466 (Ky. 1993). Thus,
the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on unlawful imprisonment in
either degree .
IV.
Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a
directed verdict on the attempted rape charge on the grounds that there was insufficient
evidence that he attempted to penetrate V.J . with his penis. He also argues that he
could not have been found guilty under the facts presented of both attempted rape and
sexual abuse . This second argument was never presented to the trial court and is
wholly unpreserved for review .
Notwithstanding, we conclude there was more than sufficient evidence of
Appellant's guilt on both charges . V.J . clearly and specifically testified, "He tried to stick
his thing in me. . . . He kept trying, but it wouldn't go in ." V.J . testified that she saw
Appellant's penis, felt it touching her, and that "it felt scary." She further stated that
"nothing came out of it ." After several attempts, Appellant told V.J . it was not going to
work, and V.J. said she could tell from his expression that Appellant was mad . VJ's
testimony alone, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient
to submit the attempted rape charge to the jury. Benham, supra .
Moreover, Appellant himself admitted to fondling VJ's breasts and penetrating
her with his finger. Although V.J.'s testimony differs from Appellant's version of events,
the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction for sexual abuse.
The judgment and sentence of the Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed .
Lambert, C.J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ .,
sitting . All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Emily Holt Rhorer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kenneth Wayne Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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