MEGAN BENTLEY, ET AL V. DAVID BENTLEY
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RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 22, 2005
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-1051-DG
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MEGAN BENTLEY ; AND AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL SOUTH INSURANCE
COMPANY
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APPELLANTS
ON REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-1455
GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT NO . 01-CI-586
DAVID BENTLEY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE COOPER
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
In Thompson v . Thompson , 264 S .W.2d 667 (Ky . 1954), our predecessor court
held that a parent could not maintain an action in tort against his or her unemancipated
minor child for injuries arising out of the child's negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
We now conclude that we should depart from this aspect of intra-family immunity, and
overrule Thompson .
Appellee, David Bentley, filed suit in the Greenup Circuit Court for damages
arising out of a two-vehicle accident that occurred on September 24, 2000 . Bentley was
a passenger in a vehicle owned and insured by his wife, Carol Bentley, and being
operated at the time by his daughter, Megan Bentley . He sued Megan in tort, and
also sued the insurer, American International South Insurance Company, asserting "bad
faith" refusal to settle his claim against Megan in violation of the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA) . KRS 304.12-230 . The insurer's refusal to settle
was specifically premised upon the holding in Thompson . The record of the Greenup
Circuit Court contains no proof, by way of interrogatory, admission, or stipulation, that
Megan Bentley was David Bentley's daughter, that she was a minor, or that she was
unemancipated . Nevertheless, the trial court dismissed the complaint, accurately noting
that Thompson had never been overruled . The Court of Appeals reversed, holding in a
"not to be published" opinion that "Thompson is no longer good law." Bentley v.
Bentley , No. 2002-CA-001455-MR, slip op. a t 9 (Ky. App . Nov. 26, 2003). Of course,
neither a circuit court nor the Court of Appeals has authority to overrule precedents of
this Court or our predecessor court . SCR 1 .040(5) ; SCR 1 .030(8)(a) ; Charash v.
Johnson , 43 S .W.3d 274, 277 nn.2 & 3 (Ky. App. 2000). Because both parties and both
lower courts have assumed that Megan Bentley is David Bentley's unemancipated
minor child, we choose to address the issue despite the inadequacy of the record .
In Rigdon v. Rigdon , 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971), our predecessor court
abrogated the concept of "parental immunity" that precluded a child from suing his or
her parent in tort, "except in the two following situations: (1) where the negligent act
relied on for a recovery involves the reasonable exercise of parental authority over the
child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves the exercise of ordinary parental
discretion with respect to provisions for the care and necessities of the child." Id. at
923 . Parental immunity first entered our jurisprudence in Harralson v. Thomas , 269
S .W .2d 276 (Ky. 1954), a case rendered four months after Th ompson was decided .
Ri don indicated that it was addressing the immunity created by Harralson , and did not
mention Thompson at all. Ri don, 465 S.W .2d at 922.
The principle that a parent may not prosecute a tort action against his or her
unemancipated minor child is a recognized corollary to parental immunity. Mauk v.
Mauk , 466 N.E .2d 166, 167 (Ohio 1984) . Such actions are far rarer than tort actions by
the child against the parent - perhaps because an adult is more likely to injure a child
than vice versa. However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G (1979)
recommends abolition of all parent-child immunities with some exceptions, viz :
(1)
A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely
by reason of that relationship .
(2)
Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for
an act or omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is
otherwise privileged or is not tortious .
(Emphasis added .) The Comment to subsection (2) cites commonplace incidents of
family life as an exception to the rule of liability:
A child thoughtlessly leaves his skates in a hallway and the parent trips
over them or slides on them and falls, or a parent delays fixing a slightly
broken step or calling in a carpenter to do it and the child falls as a result ;
these occurrences are normally regarded as commonplace incidents in
family life and usually treated as accidents rather than the basis for
imposing legal liability.
Rest. (2d) Torts § 895G cmt. k.'
The reporter's notes to Section 895G state that as of 1979, seventeen
jurisdictions had abolished parent-child immunity in its entirety (erroneously citing
Ri don as including Kentucky in that category), and that eight additional states have
abolished the immunity if the tort arises out of the operation of a motor vehicle. Rest.
' Harralson also cited the hypothetical scenario of a child suing a parent for injuries
sustained by falling down negligently repaired steps in the home as a reason for
adopting parental immunity . 269 S.W.2d at 278 .
-3-
(2d) Torts § 895G reporter's notes. At least six jurisdictions have specifically held that a
parent can sue his or her unemancipated minor child for damages arising out of the
child's negligent operation of a motor vehicle . Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co. , 257 So.2d
806, 808 (La. Ct. App. 1972) ; Ales v. Ales , 650 So.2d 482, 487 (Miss. 1995) ; Guterman
v . Guterman , 328 A.2d 233, 234 (N .J . 1974) ; Price v. Price, 483 N . E.2d 1222, 1223-24
(Ohio Ct. App . 1985) ; Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1017 (R .I . 1982) ; Erie Indem . Co . v.
Kerns , 367 S . E.2d 774, 776 (W . Va . 1988) . Such holdings are consistent with the public
policy behind our Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA), KRS 304 .39-010, et seg. , and
our holdings in Bishop v. Allstate Insurance Co. , 623 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ky. 1981), and
Lewis v. West American Insurance Co. , 927 S .W .2d 829, 835 (Ky. 1996), that
household exclusion clauses in policies of automobile liability insurance are contrary to
that public policy.
The concept of parental immunity did not exist in the English common law and
appears to have been fashioned out of whole cloth in Hewlett v. George , 9 So. 885
(Miss . 1891). Rest. (2d) Torts § 895G cmt. b. The justifications usually advanced for
parent-child immunity are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Public interest in maintaining family harmony and tranquility .
Maintenance of parental authority and discipline.
Prevention of fraud and collusion .
Preservation of equal distribution of the family exchequer .
Avoidance of useless litigation in that the parent may, in the
event of the death of the child, inherit any money which the
child may have recovered from the parent [and vice versa] .
Prevention of assertion of stale claims of minors on their
reaching majority.
Thurman v. Etherton , 459 S .W.2d 402, 403 (Ky. 1970) (citation and internal quotations
omitted) . However :
[None] of these reasons would appear to outweigh the more urgent
desirability of compensating the injured person, and particularly a child, for
genuine harm that may cripple him for life and ruin his entire future. The
development of liability insurance, especially in the area of automobile
accidents, has removed to a considerable extent whatever theoretical
justification this reasoning may once have afforded .
Rest. (2d) Torts § 895G cmt. c.
We now adopt the rule stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G
(1979), subject to Comment k's exception for "commonplace incidents in family life ."
We will not attempt to anticipate in this opinion the nature of all possible "commonplace
incidents in family life," except to say that such incidents do not include acts that are as
likely to cause harm to the general public as to family members, such as the negligent
operation of a motor vehicle . Nor need we address here the other exceptions described
in Comments d through i of Section 895G, none of which have any application to the
facts of this case .
However, with respect to David Bentley's claim against American Indemnity
South Insurance Company, an insurer cannot be held to have acted in "bad faith" by
failing to settle a claim unless it is shown "that the insurer either knew there was no
reasonable basis for denying the claim or acted in reckless disregard for whether such a
basis existed. . . . [A]n insurer is . . . entitled to challenge a claim and litigate it if the
claim is debatable on the law or the facts." Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky.
1993) (quoting Fed . Kemper Ins . Co. v. Homback, 711 S.W .2d 844, 846-47 (Ky. 1986)
(Leibson J., dissenting)) . Since the insurance company in this case denied the claim in
reliance on existing precedent which had not been overruled, i .e. , Thompson , a fortiori ,
there was a reasonable basis for denying the claim and the trial court properly
dismissed the UCSPA claim against the insurer. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Glass, 996
S.W.2d 437, 454 (Ky. 1997) ("In view of . . . existing law . . . that defense was not only
fairly debatable, it had substantial merit .") .
Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion insofar as it reverses the
Greenup Circuit Court's dismissal of David Bentley's cause of action against Megan
Bentley ; we reverse the Court of Appeals' opinion insofar as it reverses the Greenup
Circuit Court's dismissal of David Bentley's cause of action against American
International South Insurance Company; and we remand this case to the Greenup
Circuit Court with directions to conduct such further proceedings as are consistent with
this opinion.
Lambert, C .J.; Graves, Johnstone, Roach, Scott, and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur.
Roach, J., concurs by separate opinion, with Graves, J ., joining that concurring opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS :
Robert L. Steinmetz
Diane Rose Conley
Frost, Brown, Todd, LLC
32nd Floor
400 West Market Street
Louisville, KY 40202
Edward H . Stopher
Darryl S . Lavery
Boehl, Stopher & Graves, LLP
2300 Providian Center
400 West Market Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Bruce W. MacDonald
McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland
P.O. Box 280
Greenup, KY 41144
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2003-SC-1051-DG
MEGAN BENTLEY ; AND AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL SOUTH INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-1455
GREENUP CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CI-586
V.
DAVID BENTLEY
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE ROACH
Generally, the declaration of public policy is the prerogative of the General
Assembly. See Fann v. McGuffey , 534 S .W.2d 770, 779 (Ky. 1976) ("It is elementary
that the legislative branch of government has the prerogative of declaring public policy
and that the mere wisdom of its choice in that respect is not subject to the judgment of a
court .") . However, the General Assembly has not addressed the issue of parent-child
immunity since our predecessor court abrogated the concept of parental immunity in
Riqdon v. Riqdon , 465 S .W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971) . Therefore, because there is no
principled distinction between abandoning parental immunity and retaining immunity for
children against tort actions by their parents, I concur.
Graves, J ., joins this concurring opinion .
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