TAMICA BEARD V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE~VUBLI-SHED-OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PR OMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
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RENDERED : JUNE 16,2005
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0915-MR
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TAMICA BEARD
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A . CONRAD, JUDGE
2002-C R-00028
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a judgment based on a jury verdict that convicted Beard of
murder and being a second-degree persistent felony offender . She was sentenced to
forty years in prison .
The questions presented are whether prior bad acts were improperly admitted
into evidence ; whether the failure to designate the defendant as eligible for the
domestic violence exemption and the presentation of both parole eligibility guidelines to
the jury was reversible error; and whether reversible error occurred when a witness
testified to an incident despite a lack of personal knowledge .
Beard admitted that she shot and killed the victim, who was her former boyfriend
and the father of her third child . She claimed that she acted in self defense. To
support that justification, Beard offered evidence that the victim had committed acts of
domestic violence against her in the past. The Commonwealth's theory was that Beard,
who shot the victim multiple times, killed him intentionally. In support of that position, it
offered evidence that the defendant had previously threatened and attacked the victim .
The jury convicted Beard of murder and being a second-degree persistent felony
offender. She was sentenced to forty years in prison . This appeal followed .
I . Bad Act Evidence
Beard argues that the admission of prior bad acts is reversible error. She lists
the following alleged occurrences in her brief:
1) January 1999, an argument ensued between Beard and
the victim, which apparently culminated in Beard firing a gun
and hitting the victim's vehicle. The victim did not press
charges. The evidence of this incident consists of an out-ofcourt affidavit.
2) July 21, 1999, following an argument between the couple,
Beard pulled out a gun and pointed it at the victim . The
victim was able to disarm her. Beard damaged his
motorcycle and spat on him . A DVO was entered against
the victim from facts stemming from this incident and Beard
plead guilty to second-degree wanton endangerment .
3) July 14, 2000, Beard threatened to kill the victim if he took
her back to court over child custody. This alleged threat was
based on an affidavit for an EPO/DVO filed by the victim .
The case was dismissed .
4) September 30, 2000, Beard allegedly cut the victim's tires
after an argument . This evidence was also based on the
affidavit for an EPO/DVO .
5) October 9, 2000, Beard was convicted of two counts of
third-degree assault for fighting with two deputies following
an incident in Family Court. She also spat on the victim
during that incident .
6) November 27, 2000, Beard was caught in the victim's
truck and cut his ear. Those charges were still pending at
the time of this trial.
Contrary to CR 76.12(4)(c)(v), Beard fails to indicate in the record where much of
this bad act evidence was introduced . Our review of the record demonstrates that she
significantly overstates the amount of evidence that was admitted .
There was no evidence admitted regarding the January 1999 incident. It
appears that this event was only referenced in the pre-trial motions .
The Commonwealth did introduce evidence that the victim filed a criminal
complaint charging Beard with second-degree wanton endangerment relating to the
July 21, 1999 episode, and that she pled guilty to the charge. The affidavit of the victim
supporting that charge was not introduced into evidence .
The Commonwealth notes a tire slashing incident that occurred on September
28, 2000, but it does not appear to be the same incident alleged to have occurred on
September 30, 2000 . In any event, the Commonwealth did introduce evidence through
a witness suggesting that Beard slashed the victim's tires . There was no affidavit
admitted .
There was no evidence introduced during the guilt phase regarding the
conviction for two counts of third-degree assault on October 9, 2000. The
Commonwealth did introduce evidence through a family court support worker that
Beard spat on the victim during that same incident.
Finally, the Commonwealth did introduce evidence through a detective about an
act of domestic violence on November 7, 2000, wherein Beard cut the victim's ear with
a knife . A taped statement Beard gave to the detective after that incident was played
for the jury and several photographs of that injury were introduced .
Evidence of prior threats and animosity of the defendant against the victim are
generally admissible to prove motive, intent or identity. Davis v. Commonwealth , 147
S .W.3d 709 (Ky. 2004). See also KRE 404(b)(1) . Additionally, evidence of collateral
criminal conduct is admissible for purposes of rebutting a defendant's material
contention . Moore v. Commonwealth , 771 S .W .2d 34 (Ky. 1988).
Here, Beard claimed that she killed the victim in self defense . The bad act
evidence that was introduced was admissible to rebut that defense and to prove that
she had the motive and intent to kill the victim . The prior crimes and bad acts were
relevant, probative and the potential for prejudice did not outweigh their probative value.
See Parker v. Commonwealth , 952 S .W .2d 209 (Ky. 1997) . The trial judge did not err
in permitting the evidence to be introduced .
II . Domestic Violence Exemption/Parole Guidelines
Beard contends that the failure to designate her as eligible for the domestic
violence exemption and the presentation to the jury of both parole eligibility guidelines is
reversible error. We disagree .
At a bench conference just prior to the start of the penalty phase, defense
counsel raised the issue of whether the jury would be informed that Beard was eligible
for parole after serving twenty percent of her sentence, KRS 439.3402, or eighty-five
percent, KRS 439 .3401 . In order to be eligible under the former, the trial judge was
required to make a finding that Beard was a victim of domestic violence and abuse.
Defense counsel, however, had not yet filed a motion as required by KRS 439 .3402 .
The trial judge determined that without a proper motion, she could not make the
determination if Beard was a victim of domestic violence and abuse and thus exempt
from KRS 439 .3401 . Consequently, she permitted the probation and parole officer to
testify to both sentencing guidelines--twenty percent and eighty-five percent . The jury
was told that a decision would be made after the trial as to which applied .
Defense counsel filed a motion a month after the penalty phase seeking to
designate Beard as eligible for the domestic violence exemption to KRS 439 .3401 . The
Commonwealth opposed that motion . Following a hearing, the trial judge entered an
order finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Beard was not a victim of
domestic violence or abuse with regard to the offenses involving the death of the victim .
The trial judge did not err in allowing the jury to be informed of both sentencing
guidelines . Defense counsel had not complied with the procedural requirements of the
statute and it was not certain at that time which percentage applied . The trial judge
allowed the jury to be informed about both and instructed them that a decision would be
made later. Under these circumstances, that decision was proper.
Beard has failed to show that the trial judge's determination that she was not a
victim of domestic violence was clearly erroneous. The trial judge recognized that the
family court had entered a domestic violence order against the victim on August 2,
1999 . She also noted that Beard pled guilty to second-degree wanton endangerment in
district court based on the same incident. Although the victim may have been a victim
of domestic violence in the past, the trial judge correctly observed that the real issue
was whether there was a connection between the murder and the domestic violence .
See Springer v. Commonwealth , 998 S .W .2d 439 (Ky. 1999) .
The trial judge, who is not required to accept the defendant's version of the
events surrounding the offense, found no connection between the murder and the
domestic violence . She noted the multiple, impulsive and violent acts that Beard
perpetrated against the victim . These included slashing his tires, slicing his ear with a
knife and spitting on him during a hearing in family court. The trial judge also
recognized that Beard never stated during questioning that the victim was violent the
night of the shooting and that there was evidence that the murder was planned. Having
carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial judge's finding on this issue
was not clearly erroneous.
Ill . Witness without Personal Knowledge
Beard asserts that reversible error occurred when a family court support worker
testified to the spitting incident in family court even though she had not been present .
We disagree .
The Commonwealth made a pre-trial motion to introduce a videotape of a
hearing in Jefferson Family Court on October 9, 2000, during which Beard spat on the
victim. The trial judge ruled that the videotape was inadmissible because of other
improper conduct exhibited by Beard on that occasion .
Precluded from playing the videotape, the Commonwealth asked one of its
witnesses, a family court support worker, to testify about the spitting episode . She had
not been present during the incident, but had reviewed the videotape on which it was
recorded . Defense counsel objected because the witness had no personal knowledge
of the event. The Commonwealth responded that the videotape was an official court
record which this witness was qualified to testify about and alternatively, it sought
permission to show the relevant portion of the videotape .
The trial judge overruled the objection by Beard, stating that the witness was an
employee of the court system who was involved with these parties even after this
incident. She recognized the witness was not personally present when the event
occurred .
The witness lacked personal knowledge of the matter. KRE 602. This was not a
situation where a witness testified about a certified copy of a court record--because
none was presented here . The witness should not have been permitted to testify about
the spitting episode.
However, as was previously decided in this opinion, the spitting incident was
properly admissible as a prior bad act. The Commonwealth should have been entitled
to show that portion of the videotape containing the same . Nevertheless, the means it
chose to get in the evidence was still improper . Considering the fact that the evidence
was admissible, but the means of introducing it was improper, we can conclude that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. RCr 9 .24.
Beard received a fundamentally fair trial . She was not denied any due process
under either the state or federal constitutions .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
Lambert, C.J., Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Scott and Wintersheimer, JJ .,
sitting . All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Karen Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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