ISMAEL GUTIERREZ V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-130-MR
ISMAEL GUTIERREZ
APPEAL FROM TRIMBLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
98-CR-0019
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
AFFIRMING
I . INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Ismael Gutierrez, was convicted of Murder, Unauthorized Use of a
Motor Vehicle, First-Degree Burglary, Tampering with Physical Evidence, and Violation
of a Domestic Violence Order (DVO), and he was sentenced to sixty years in prison.
He claims that the trial court erred in its decision to allow the Commonwealth to use the
violation of the DVO as a substantive charge and as an aggravating circumstance in the
Murder charge. Because the validity of the DVO was not subject to challenge in this
case, the trial court did not commit error in admitting this evidence, and we affirm
Appellant's convictions .
II. BACKGROUND
On April 5, 1998, Appellant choked and threatened to kill Alma Roque, his wife.
Police responded to a call for help, and Appellant was charged with Fourth-Degree
Assault . As a condition of bail, Appellant consented to a "no contact" order, which
required Appellant not to have any contact with Roque while awaiting a hearing on the
assault charge .
The following day, April 6, 1998, the Trimble District Court issued an emergency
protective order (EPO). A hearing on the EPO was held on April 7, 1998, at which time
the district judge reviewed the officer's report and heard testimony from the victim, Alma
Roque, concerning the assault on April 5, 1998 . The district judge granted a
continuance on the assault charge, but left the "no contact" order in effect. Appellant
agreed to a continuation of the "no contact" order. Also, at that time, the district judge
issued a domestic violence order (DVO), and Appellant confirmed that he understood
both the order itself and the consequences of violating the order.
On May 26, 1998, Appellant pled guilty to the assault charge. The court
accepted Appellant's plea, which required him to pay a $100 fine and to pay for damage
to Roque's apartment. Also, Appellant agreed, pursuant to the DVO, not to have any
contact with Roque .
On June 3, 1998, less than two months after the issuance of the EPO, Appellant
entered Roque's home and stabbed her to death . He was subsequently indicted for
Murder, Theft by Unlawful Taking (Class D felony), First-Degree Burglary, Tampering
with Physical Evidence, and Violation of a DVO . Appellant filed a motion to exclude
violation of the DVO as the aggravating circumstance on the Murder charge . Based on
the Commonwealth's argument that the DVO was a civil order, not a criminal judgment,
the trial court overruled Appellant's motion to exclude evidence of the DVO.
The jury did not find Appellant guilty of Theft by Unlawful Taking, but instead it
found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle .
The jury, however, convicted Appellant on all of the other charges . The jury
recommended fifty years for Murder, one year for Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle,
ten years for First-Degree Burglary, three years for Tampering with Physical Evidence,
and one year for Violation of a DVO.' The jury recommended that the sentences for
Murder and First-Degree Burglary run consecutively and that the sentences for the
other charges run concurrently, for a total sentence of sixty years imprisonment . The
trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury's recommendation .
Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right.
III. ANALYSIS
Appellant claims that because the DVO was not valid, the trial court committed
reversible error in admitting evidence of the DVO, both as an aggravating circumstance
and as a separate substantive offense . We disagree .
The validity of a DVO must be challenged, if at all, prior to its violation or to its
use as an aggravating circumstance . Although there is no Kentucky case law dealing
directly with the issue before us, we can analogize the validity of a DVO, as a civil order,
to an injunction . In Goodman v. Kentucky Board of Dentistry,3 the Court of Appeals, in
upholding the trial court finding the appellant in contempt for violation of an injunction
and sentencing him to sixty days in jail, held-and we believe rightfully so-that
"[w]hether an injunction order is right or wrong, it is the duty of the party bound by the
The trial court properly instructed the jury that the punishment for the two
misdemeanor charges, Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and Violation of a DVO,
was not to exceed twelve months in jail ; however, the jury-obviously not understanding
the difference between a twelve-month sentence and a one-year sentencerecommended sentences of "1 year" for each of these charges . The trial court properly
sentenced the defendant to twelve months on these charges.
2 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).
3 823 S .W .2d 944 (Ky .App . 1991) .
,4
injunction to obey it so long as the injunction remains in effect . Furthermore, "[i]t is
almost unanimously agreed that if the defendant desires to attack the order or the
decree as erroneous, he must do so, not by disregarding or violating it and then setting
the error up as a defense to a charge of contempt, but by a direct attack thereon by
appeal or a motion to set it aside . He cannot attack it collaterally . . .
.,'5
In this case,
Appellant did not challenge the DVO by direct attack in the proceedings in which it was
issued, but rather he violated the order and then raised the issue of the validity of the
DVO in his trial on criminal charges .
In effect, Appellant is asking this Court to rule that a collateral attack on the
validity of a civil order in a subsequent prosecution for violation of that order is
permissible . Such an approach to the validity of the DVO is contrary to our prior cases
involving the validity of other civil orders and, consequently, must be rejected as a
proper method of challenging the DVO .6 In fact, the only situation in which a collateral
attack upon the validity of a court order during the prosecution for violation of that order
is appropriate is when the issuing court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction .'
Here, however, the Trimble District Court had jurisdiction to issue the DVO. Therefore,
any attempt to attack the validity of the DVO during the prosecution in circuit court for
the murder charge or for violation of the order is barred .
4 Id . at 945.
5 P . H. Vartanian, Annotation, Right to Punish for Contempt for Failure to Obey
Court Order or Decree Either Beyond Power or Jurisdiction of Court or Merely
Erroneous, 12 A .L .R .2d 1059, at § 41 [a] (1950, updated as April 28, 2005) .
6 See Leibson v. Taylor, 721 S .W .2d 690, 692 (Ky. 1986), overruled on other
grounds by Shaffer v. Morgan , 815 S.W .2d 402 (Ky. 1991) .
See P . H. Vartanian, Annotation, Right to Punish for Contempt for Failure to
Obey Court Order or Decree Either Beyond Power or Jurisdiction of Court or Merely
Erroneous, 12 A.L .R .2d 1059, at § 41 [b] (1950, updated as April 28, 2005).
Whether the validity of a DVO may be challenged when it is offered to prove an
aggravating circumstance in a capital murder prosecution or to prove the criminal
charge of violation of a protective order is also analogous to an issue that has been
previously addressed by this Court in the context of a criminal proceeding, i.e ., whether
an underlying conviction offered to prove persistent felony offender (PFO) status may
be collaterally challenged . In McGuire v. Commonwealth , $ this Court held that "[t]he
PFO enhancement statute is similarly lacking in `any indication' the General Assembly
`intended to permit collateral attacks on prior convictions used for sentence
enhancement purposes."'9 We stated that "[t]he U .S. Supreme Court decision in Custis
[v . United States , 511 U.S . 485, 114 S .Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed .2d 517 (1994),] applies to
proof of PFO status in the present case. KRS 532.080(2) and (3) require proof of the
fact of 'previous felony convictions' and not their underlying validity." 10 Thus we held that
"Kentucky trial courts are no longer required to conduct a preliminary hearing into the
constitutional underpinnings of a judgment of conviction offered to prove PFO status
unless the defendant claims `a complete denial of counsel in the prior proceeding .""' Of
course, the right to counsel is not afforded in a civil case such as a DVO hearing . 12
8 885 S .W .2d 931 (Ky. 1994) .
9 _Id . at 937 (quoting Custis v. United States , 511 U .S. 485, 493 114 S.Ct. 1732,
1737, 128 L. Ed .2d 517 (1994)) .
10
11
12
Id . (quoting Custis , 511 U.S . at 493, 114 S .Ct. at 1737) .
See May v. Coleman , 945 S.W .2d 426, 427 (Ky. 1997) ("It is now elementary
that an indigent criminal defendant is entitled to appointment of counsel in any
proceeding in which he could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment . We have
extended that right to civil contempt proceedings where imprisonment is a potential
punishment . If a prisoner fails to defend a civil action brought against him, a guardian ad
litem must be appointed for him before judgment may be entered . . . . Except in these
limited circumstances, there is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case .").
We hold that proof of the underlying validity of a DVO is not required when the
DVO is offered as evidence in other proceedings and thus it is not subject to collateral
attack in those proceedings . Therefore, the validity of a DVO is not a proper subject of
inquiry when it is offered as proof of an aggravating circumstance in a capital murder
prosecution or to prove the criminal violation of the DVO. Accordingly, we hold that the
trial court did not commit error in admitting evidence of the DVO.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because proof of the validity of the DVO was not required, the trial court properly
admitted evidence of the DVO to prove an aggravating circumstance of murder and to
prove the charge of Violation of DVO . Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's convictions .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Karen Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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