JOHN T. HILBERT V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2002-SC-0095-MR
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JOHN T . HILBERT
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY RAIKES, JUDGE
99-C R-0140
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE GRAVES
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, John T . Hilbert, stands convicted of two counts of murder for the
shooting deaths of Danny Wayne Elmore and Joe Eddie Stump . The jury fixed the
sentence for the murder of Elmore at twenty-seven (27) years . After finding aggravating
circumstances in the murder of Stump, the jury fixed Appellant's sentence for this
separate crime at life without the benefit of probation or parole for twenty-five (25)
years . The jury recommended that each sentence run consecutively, but following
Appellant's motion that such a sentencing arrangement would exceed the statutory
maximum, the trial judge entered an order for the sentences to run concurrently .
Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right .
The shootings occurred at the mobile home of Appellant's estranged girlfriend,
Karen Poole . Karen shared the trailer with her sister Tammy, and on the evening of the
shootings, Karen asked Appellant to be their "designated driver." While out, the sisters
met Elmore and Stump, and invited them home . Back at the trailer, Appellant and the
two victims danced with Karen and Tammy, and according to statements Appellant and
Karen later gave to police, tensions soon rose.
Appellant did not testify at trial, but following his arrest, Appellant claimed that the
victims grabbed him, threw him up against the wall, then pushed him out the doorway,
hitting his head against the door. Appellant advised police that he "flipped out," pulled a
gun from his jacket pocket and shot both men . According to Appellant, the victims kept
coming and he did not know what to do . After shooting Elmore, Appellant said that the
"big boy" was coming at him and that is when he killed Stump.
Neither Karen nor Tammy was present when the victims allegedly roughed up
Appellant and ejected him from the trailer. Karen testified that she left the room after
asking Appellant to retrieve something from her car. While in the bathroom, Karen
heard what sounded to her like firecrackers going off outside . Upon returning to the
living room, Karen observed Appellant enter the house, pull out a gun, and shoot Stump
as the victim walked out of the kitchen . Tammy provided similar testimony, stating that
after going to the bedroom to change her clothes, she saw Appellant come in through
the front door and fire at Stump. Neither witness observed the shooting of Elmore,
whose body was later found outside on the front porch, dead from a single gunshot fired
at close range .
I. Jury Instructions : Self-Defense
Appellant does not dispute that he killed Elmore and Stump. Instead, Appellant
hoped to justify the shootings as a matter of self-defense . In fact, during opening
statements, defense counsel asserted that Appellant was "not guilty because this was
self-defense ." The trial judge, however, found no basis from the evidence introduced at
trial to support a self-defense instruction, but did allow the jury to consider whether
Appellant acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance .
This issue arose shortly before the close of evidence, in the context of whether or
not Appellant's testimony was required in order to submit instructions on self-defense to
the jury. In denying the requested instructions, the trial judge reasoned that the selfdefense statute, KRS 503 .050 "is based on the subjective belief of the defendant and
the defendant is the only one who can testify ." In chambers, the trial judge further
explained :
[I]t says the defendant must believe. I'm not saying there is not evidence
from which he could believe that. But he's the only - the jury cannot
assume that he believes it because he's the - it's subjective and the case
law says that it is subjective . It is what he believes .
Appellant claims the trial judge has misinterpreted the relevant law regarding the
availability of self-defense instructions for defendants who choose not to testify .
The Kentucky Penal Code allows a defendant to justify the use of deadly physical
force upon another person when the defendant believes that such force is necessary as
protection against an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury . Specifically,
subsections (1) and (2) of KRS 503 .050 provide :
(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is
justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to
protect himself against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical
force by the other person .
(2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person
is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant believes
that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious
physical injury, kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled by force or
th reat.
(emphasis added) .
In evaluating this statute, the trial judge was correct insofar as "the focus of the
penal code is on the defendant's actual subjective belief in the need for self-protection
and not on the objective reasonableness of that belief ." Elliott v. Commonwealth , 976
S.W.2d 416, 419 (Ky. 1998) .
However, the question here is not whether the defense of
self-protection is based upon a defendant's subjective state of mind, but whether a
defendant must testify in order to establish such a personally held belief .
Kentucky courts have long held that a defendant need not testify in order to
receive an instruction on self-defense. See Hasty v. Commonwealth , 272 S.W.2d 325,
326 (Ky. 1954) ; Benson v. Commonwealth , 290 Ky. 713, 162 S .W.2d 538 (1942) ;
Rutherford v . Commonwealth , 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 608 (1878) . In Hasty , supra , the
predecessor to this Court opined
Concerning the question of whether or not the appellant was entitled to an
instruction on self-defense, we find that in cases of this character the court is
required to give such an instruction where the evidence is wholly circumstantial,
there is evidence of a struggle, and the accused fails to testify, or, although he
does become a witness, he does not testify as to any facts indicating the manner
in which the deceased met death .
Among the evidence we find : Appellant's statement to police indicating an
altercation between the victims and himself; Appellant's statement that the victims kept
coming and he didn't know what to do; a welt on Appellant's head, attributable either to
the altercation or to an automobile wreck later that evening ; and finally, evidence that in
an unrelated incident several years earlier, Appellant had been severely beaten during a
mugging, after which he bought a gun and became more reserved .
Admittedly, the evidence supporting Appellant's belief in the need for the use of
force was not strong, nor free from contradiction . However, such evidence need only
raise the issue, for an instruction on self-defense is necessary once sufficient evidence
has been introduced at trial which could justify a reasonable doubt concerning the
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defendant's guilt. Estep v. Commonwealth , 64 S.W.3d 805, 811 (Ky. 2002) ;
Commonwealth v. Day, 983 S .W.2d 505, 508 (Ky. 1999) ; Jewell v. Commonwealth , 549
S .W.2d 807, 812 (Ky. 1977), overruled on other -grounds, Payne v. Commonwealth , 623
S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1981), cert . denied , 456 U .S . 909, 102 S.Ct. 1758, 72 L.Ed.2d 167
(1982) .
In addition, we hardly need to repeat that a criminal defendant is entitled to jury
instructions on any defense supported by the evidence. Sanborn v. Commonwealth ,
754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1988) ; Curtis v. Commonwealth , 169 Ky. 727, 184 S.W. 1105,
1107 (1916). In this regard, we note that the evidence which tended to show
Appellant's belief in the need for self-defense may also be interpreted as evidence of a
mistaken belief in that need. Therefore, the full range of self-defense instructions,
including the wanton and reckless belief qualifications, as provided by KRS 503.120(1),
are appropriate in this matter . See generally Commonwealth v. Hager, 41 S .W.3d 828
(Ky. 2001).
Intertwined with Appellant's argument that he was improperly denied instructions
on self-defense, Appellant asserts that the trial judge's ruling deprived him of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination . Caught in the proverbial "Catch-22,"
Appellant claims he was forced to choose between taking the witness stand or forgoing
a valid defense .
In general, where circumstantial or indirect evidence fails to raise the issue of
self-protection, the fact that a defendant must testify or forgo this defense does not
implicate the Fifth Amendment . The defendant's "choice between complete silence and
presenting a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination ." United States v. Rylander , 460 U .S . 752, 759, 103 S.Ct.
1548, 75 L.Ed .2d 521 (1983), quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U .S . 78, 84, 90 S .Ct.
1893, 1897-98, 26 L .Ed .2d 446 (1970) .
Although we are not prepared to say that the trial court's actions infringed on
Appellant's privilege against self-incrimination, particularly since Appellant chose not to
testify, we note that at least one jurisdiction has ruled otherwise . In People v. Mills, 267
N .W.2d 417, 419 (Mich . 1978), the Michigan Supreme Court stated : "A defendant need
not take the stand and testify in order to merit an instruction on self-defense . . . . A ruling
to the contrary compromises a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination ."
Finally, Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his requested
instruction on the duty to retreat, or more specifically, that Appellant had no duty to
retreat . Appellant claims the prosecution raised this issue by repeatedly telling the jury
that Appellant could have simply fled instead of shooting the victims . An instruction on
retreat, according to Appellant, was necessary to counter the inference that Appellant
was under a duty to avoid, if at all possible, the altercation with the victims .
In Gibson v. Commonwealth , 237 Ky. 33, 34 S .W .2d 936 (1936), the High Court
stated : "[I]t is the tradition that a Kentuckian never runs. He does not have to ." As
professors Lawson and Fortune note, "[a] proposal by the drafters of the Kentucky
Penal Code to change this rule was rejected by the General Assembly and the right of a
defender to stand his ground against aggression was left intact ." Robert G . Lawson &
William H . Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 4-2(d)(2) (1998) (footnotes omitted) .
Despite the defiant attitude toward retreat exhibited by the Gibson opinion,
Kentucky decisions have generally not adhered to such an absolute interpretation of the
"no duty to retreat rule," nor did our predecessor court require jury instructions
describing the same . For example, in Bush v . Commonwealth , 335 S .W.2d 324 (Ky.
1960), the Court of Appeals found no error in the failure to give an instruction on retreat,
particularly since the jury was otherwise fully instructed on self-defense . "[A]n
instruction on self-defense should be in the usual form, leaving the question to be
determined by the jury in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, rather
than in the light of certain particular facts." Id . at 326 . Accord , Crawford v.
Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 557, 136 S.W.2d 754 (1940); Greer v. Commonwealth , 164
Ky. 396, 175 S.W. 665 (1915) ; Connor v. Commonwealth , 118 Ky. 497, 81 S .W. 259
(1904). See also James M. Roberson, New Kentucky Criminal Law and Procedure §
313 (2d ed. 1927) (stating that "the rule now is that whether the assailed should stand
his ground or give back is a question for the jury, and that he may properly follow that
course which is apparently necessary to save himself from death or great bodily harm") .
Appellant argues that when the jury is correctly instructed on the law of selfdefense, it should be clear from the instructions that the defendant has no duty to
retreat . Furthermore, although some jurisdictions require specific jury instructions
detailing a defendant's right to stand his or her ground when the facts of the case
instead suggest a duty to withdraw, see Cassels v. State, 92 P .3d 951 (Colo. 2004) ;
McDonald v. State , 717 So.2d 715 (Miss . 1998) ; People v. Redmond , 150 Wash .2d
489, 78 P .3d 1001 (2003), other jurisdictions, like Kentucky, follow the principle "that
when the trial court adequately instructs on self-defense, it need not also give a no duty
to retreat instruction ." State v. Ottman , 144 Ariz . 560, 562, 698 P.2d 1279, 1281 (1985) .
Accord , State v . Brown , 414 So.2d 726 (La. 1982) .
II. Victim Background Evidence
During the guilt phase of trial, the mothers of each victim briefly described their
sons to the jury. The jury learned such information as the victims' dates of birth, the
number and sex of their siblings, and the fact that one victim had a nine-year-old son .
One mother softly cried and sniffled as she spoke. Each mother concluded by
displaying a single photograph of her son for the jury. Altogether, the combined
testimony of both mothers, including the exhibition of photographs, took slightly more
than three minutes to complete.
Appellant argues that the mothers' testimony had no purpose other than to
arouse the jurors' emotions or to evoke sympathy for the victims . Recognizing that our
holding in McQueen v. Commonwealth , 669 S .W.2d 519 (Ky. 1984), cert . denied , 469
U .S . 893, 105 S.Ct . 269, 83 L.Ed .2d 205 (1984), permits at least a measure of such
testimony during the guilt phase of trial, Appellant asks this Court to overrule that oftcited decision and relegate all victim background evidence to the sentencing phase of
the trial. We decline.
As Appellant notes, McQueen was decided during a time when bifurcated trials
were the exception rather than the norm . Appellant contends that trial courts then were
not accustomed to "discretely segregat[ing] sentencing information out of the guilt phase
of the trial ." Notwithstanding the changes rendered by the now-common bifurcation of
trials into separate guilt and innocence phases, the lessons of McQueen are still
applicable today . As stated in Bowling v. Commonwealth , 942 S W.2d 293 (Ky. 1997) :
A murder victim can be identified as more than a naked statistic, and
statements identifying the victims as individual human beings with
personalities and activities does not unduly prejudice the defendant or
inflame the jury. Just as the jury visually observes the appellant in the
courtroom, the jury may receive an adequate word description of the
victim as long as the victim is not glorified or enlarged .
Id . at 302-03 (citing McQueen ) .
As an alternative, Appellant argues that victim impact evidence should be
excluded as irrelevant under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence . KRE 402 provides that
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"[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible." Appellant overlooks that this Court has
recognized "that a certain amount of background evidence regarding the victim is
relevant to understanding the nature of the crime ." Campbell v. Commonwealth , 788
S .W.2d 260, 264 (Ky. 1990), citing Sanborn v. Commonwealth , 754 S .W.2d 534, 542
(Ky. 1988) (emphasis added) .
Of course, victim impact evidence does carry the potential to "inflame the jury,"
and a trial court must carefully balance the probative value of such evidence against
prejudicial concerns. KRE 403 ; Clark v . Commonwealth , 833 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Ky.
1991) . Here, however, we find Appellant's allegations wholly without merit. The brief
display of the victims' life portraits, and the reserved testimony by each of their mothers,
was neither excessive nor overly emotional . We therefore find no error in the
introduction of this evidence .
III. Challenge for Cause
During individual voir dire, Juror 40 revealed prior traumatic events in her life that
she believed would likely shape her views on the appropriate penalty for Appellant's
alleged crimes. Specifically, Juror 40 informed the trial court of her experiences as a
victim of domestic violence, and of the loss of a loved one through an accident . When
asked if these events would affect her decision in this case, Juror 40 stated : "I honestly
can't answer that, as to whether it has any bearing as to how I feel about another
person." Defense counsel then asked if this meant the juror would now want to give the
death penalty if someone killed another person. Juror 40 replied: "I feel like it might
create some prejudice . I'm not saying it would cause me to give him the death penalty .
But it does create prejudice, though."
The trial court denied Appellant's motion to strike Juror 40 for cause. Appellant
not only claims this ruling was in error, but citing Thomas v Commonwealth , 864 S.W.2d
252 (Ky . 1993), Appellant asserts that because he was forced to strike her with one of
his own challenges, the trial court's ruling denied him his full complement of preemptory
challenges .
The decision of whether or not to remove a juror for cause rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court . Mills v . Commonwealth , 996 S.W.2d 473 (Ky. 1999), Foley v.
Commonwealth , 953 S .W .2d 924 (Ky . 1997) . In exercising this discretion, the trial court
must keep in mind that a defendant is entitled to an impartial jury that can fairly consider
the full range of penalties. Woodall v. Commonwealth , 63 S .W .3d 104 (Ky. 2001) . A
defendant, however, is not guaranteed that a jury be comprised of individuals devoid of
life experiences-life experiences which may shape that juror's views regarding
sentencing . See generally , Grooms v. Commonwealth , 756 S .W.2d 131 (Ky. 1988) .
Simply because Juror 40 used the word "prejudice" in her replies does not
necessarily mean she could not fully and fairly consider the evidence at trial. Instead of
connoting an inflexible stance, the phrase "it might create some prejudice," as used by
Juror 40, may have simply meant her views toward criminal punishment had changed
following her personal experiences . The trial judge asked Juror 40 whether she could
consider the full range of penalties, to which she affirmatively replied. Since the trial
judge was in the best position to evaluate Juror 40's responses, and because her
responses during voir dire can reasonably be considered innocuous, we find no error in
this matter .
IV. Unpreserved Errors
Appellant raises two unpreserved claims of error in his appeal . First, Appellant
complains the trial court failed to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt as to the degree
of the offense, when extreme emotional disturbance is claimed as a mitigating factor . In
Carwile v. Commonwealth , 586 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Ky. 1983), we noted that RCr 9.56 no
longer mandates such an instruction . However, our decisions have not been uniform on
this issue. See Edmonds v. Commonwealth , 586 S .W.2d 24, 27 (Ky. 1979), overruled
on other grounds , Wellman v . Commonwealth , 694 S .W .2d 696 (Ky. 1985) (requiring
the instruction) ; Holbrook v . Commonwealth , 813 S .W.2d 811 (Ky. 1991), overruled on
other g rounds , Elliott v. Commonwealth , 976 S .W.2d 416 (Ky. 1998) . See also 1
Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries § 2 .03 (1999).
More recently, in Hager, supra , we included such an instruction among our
"Specimen Recommended Instructions ." 41 S .W.3d at 847. Although we do not believe
omission of this instruction, when not requested, rises to the level of palpable error, we
do adhere to this recent case, and if requested on retrial, this instruction should be
submitted to the jury.
As a final matter, Appellant alleges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct
during closing arguments . More precisely, Appellant complains that the prosecutor
extolled the jury not to convict Appellant of manslaughter, because such a crime is
equivalent to burglary or assault. Although we decline to further address this issue
because it was not properly preserved, we note that "sentencing issues must not be
raised prior to the penalty phase of trial as a means to impermissibly influence the jury
to convict based on the desired penalty rather than on the elements of each given
offense ." Norton v. Commonwealth , 37 S .W .3d 750, 753 (Ky. 2001) .
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of conviction and sentence
imposed upon Appellant are reversed . This case is remanded to the Nelson Circuit
Court for a new trial at which, if the evidence be the same, Appellant shall be entitled to
an instruction on the defense of self-protection .
Lambert, C.J ., Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, and Scott, J .J ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J ., dissents in a separate opinion in which Keller, J., joins.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Thomas M . Ransdell
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Susan Roncarti Lenz
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : MAY 19, 2005
TO BE PUBLISHED
Urf of ~rufurhv
2002-SC-0095-MR
JOHN T. HILBERT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LARRY RAIKES, JUDGE
99-CR-0140
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the trial judge did
not err when he declined to instruct on self-defense because there was no evidence to
show that the use of deadly physical force against two unarmed individuals was
justifiable .
Hilbert argues that the trial judge committed error when he refused to instruct the
jury on self-defense because he did not take the stand to testify. He conveniently
ignores the fact that there was no evidence presented to the jury to justify the use of
deadly physical force under the facts of this case .
The trial judge noted that in this case all that happened was that Hilbert had
been thrown out of the house trailer. Thus, because there was no evidence to
demonstrate what Hilbert believed, it was necessary for him to testify and tell the jury
what he did believe .
Hilbert complains that the fact that he had been mugged seven years previously
in an unrelated incident was sufficient to demonstrate that he could have believed that
he was in danger of death or serious physical injury . Such evidence only indicated that
Hilbert may have been cautious and concerned about being mugged and that he began
to carry a gun.
In this case, one of the female witnesses asked Hilbert if it was alright if she and
her girlfriend brought two men home with them . She testified that Hilbert exhibited no
fear and that he did not seem to care . It is clear that Hilbert only began to care when
he believed that he would be excluded from the party in the mobile home and that the
two victims would be alone with the two women . If Hilbert had been pushed outside the
trailer, he still could have left the scene or called police . Instead, he chose to shoot and
kill the first victim at point blank range, and then enter the trailer and shoot the second
victim twice and kill him . Hilbert's intention was to get back into the trailer and not to
defend himself.
The facts here do not support a jury instruction in order to justify the use of
deadly physical force . There was no evidence of an altercation and the evidence
indicated that both of the victims were unarmed . There was no evidence that would
permit even a subjective belief that he was facing death or serious physical injury. The
defendant was not forced to choose between testifying and foregoing a valid defense of
self-protection . A defendant may not have to testify in order to be entitled to a selfdefense instruction, but he still has to introduce some evidence which allows a
reasonable inference that he had a subjective belief that deadly physical force was
justified . Such is not the case here .
I would affirm the conviction in all respects .
Keller, J ., joins this dissenting opinion .
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