HON . TOM McDONALD, JUDGE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, RETIRED ; HON . McKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, DIVISION TWELVE ; AND JEWISH HOSPITAL HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC . V GLENDON PHELPS AND JOYCE PHELPS
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE BLISHED OPINION
PU
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO URT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
"Supr2mr Qlautf of
2004-SC-0252-MR
HON . TOM McDONALD, JUDGE
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT,
RETIRED ; HON. McKAY CHAUVIN,
JUDGE, JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT,
DIVISION TWELVE ; AND
JEWISH HOSPITAL HEALTHCARE
SERVICES, INC.
V
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
ORIGINAL ACTION FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2004-CA-000063-OA
JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 1996-CI-4861
GLENDON PHELPS AND
JOYCE PHELPS
APPELANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING
This appeal is from an order of the Court of Appeals granting the Phelpses CR
76.36 relief which directs the circuit judge to vacate his decision to bifurcate the trial in
the underlying tort action . The question presented to this Court is whether the decision
of the Court of Appeals was erroneous .
The Phelpses filed a personal injury action against Jewish Hospital and others
contending that Glendon Phelps was exposed to a fungus called aspergillus while a
patient at the hospital . It is alleged that the exposure was due to an unsanitary
environment caused by a renovation project at the hospital . The Phelpses claim that
Glendon contracted aspergillosis and now suffers from decreased lung capacity. The
complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages .
Jewish Hospital filed a motion to bifurcate the issues for trial, asserting the
beneficial effect of bifurcation of the medical evidence from the other issues, i.e.,
judicial economy, convenience to all parties and to avoid unnecessary prejudice . The
Phelpses objected on grounds that the liability and damages issues were so interrelated
that it would be difficult to separate the matter. Agreeing with the hospital on the
benefits of bifurcation, the circuit judge granted the motion pursuant to his discretionary
authority, citing CR 42.01, CR 42 .02 and two cases, Adams Real Estate Corp. v. Ward,
Ky., 458 S.W .2d 622 (1970) and Lexington Country Club v. Stevenson , Ky., 390
S .W .2d 137 (1965). His ruling limits the first issue tried to a determination by the jury of
whether Glendon had a medical condition known as aspergillosis, and
if
so, then to
proceed to litigate all other issues .
On a motion to reconsider, the Phelpses relied on KRS 411 .186(1), which
provides :
In any civil action where claims for punitive damages are
included, the jury or judge if jury trial has been waived, shall
determine concurrently with all other issues presented,
whether punitive damages may be assessed .
The circuit judge denied the motion to reconsider, stating that the statute "does
not prevent the medical evidence and causation issues to be bifurcated as the punitive
damage claims may still be tried concurrently with the issues presented separately at
trial."
The Phelpses sought a writ of prohibition/mandamus in the Court of Appeals .
That court determined that the circuit judge erred because KRS 411 .186(1) controlled.
Citing Bender v. Eaton, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 799 (1961), it also concluded that the
Phelpses had demonstrated their entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of a writ.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals decided that "irreparable injury may be presumed
from the deprivation of a right clearly bestowed by statute." Further, the panel stated
that bifurcation would cause additional delays, "thereby increasing the risk of loss of
discoverable information due to the passage of time, from which the Phelpses would
have no adequate remedy by appeal." Accordingly, the Court of Appeals directed the
circuit judge to enter an order vacating his previous decisions which bifurcated the trial
and grant "any other relief that may facilitate the normal progress of the action to a full
resolution of the issues ." This appeal followed .
Jewish Hospital argues that the decision by the Court of Appeals granting
extraordinary relief was erroneous; that the decision conflicts with KRS 447 .154, which
dictates that rules of court take precedence over statutory law; that KRS 411 .184(5)
may state that KRS 411 .184 supersedes judicial law, but is not applicable to KRS
411 .186 ; that the Kentucky rules of procedure govern all procedural issues in the courts
of
this state, and bifurcation is a procedural issue ; and that original actions seek
extraordinary remedies and the Court of Appeals erred when it granted such relief in
this action .
The Phelpses respond that the Court of Appeals should be affirmed because
Jewish Hospital has waived several issues by raising them for the first time on appeal;
that the decision should be affirmed because KRS 411 .186 supersedes KRS 447.154
and is not in conflict with the Kentucky rules of civil procedure; and that the Court of
Appeals issuance of a writ of mandamus should be affirmed because the circuit judge
ignored the statutory requirements of KRS 411 .186.
After consideration of all the arguments in this case, we conclude that the Court
of Appeals erred in granting the writ. A writ of prohibition/mandamus may be granted
upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of
its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court;
or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its
jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great
injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted . See Bender,
supra .
Here, because there is no claim that the circuit judge acted outside his
jurisdiction, only the second part of the test is applicable . Thus, a writ should issue only
if it is shown that there is (a) no adequate remedy by appeal and (b) great injustice and
irreparable harm would otherwise occur . The petitioner must pass test (a) before
reaching test (b) . Bender.
In this case, the Phelpses have not passed test (a) because they have not
demonstrated that they do not have an adequate remedy by appeal. If the first part of
the trial results in a finding in favor of the Phelpses, then they may proceed to the
second part of the trial without any harm . If, on the other hand, the first stage of the
trial results in a finding against them, then they certainly could appeal that decision,
including the decision of the circuit judge to bifurcate the trial . We find no merit in the
contention that the Phelpses have no adequate remedy by appeal because bifurcation
would cause additional delays, thereby increasing the risk of loss of discoverable
information due to the passage of time. Having determined that the Phelpses have an
adequate remedy by appeal, it is unnecessary for us to reach any of the other issues .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed .
All concur except Stumbo, J., who dissents without opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS :
Karen L. Keith
Shannon M. Gordon
Kirsten R. Daniel
WEBER& ROSE, P .S .C.
2400 Aegon Center
400 W . Market Street
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES :
Kenneth L. Sales
Jesse A. Mudd
SALES, TILLMAN, WALLBAUM,
CATLETT & SATTERLEY
1900 Waterfront Plaza
325 West Main Street
Louisville, KY 40202
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