MERRICK PRINTING COMPANY V MICHAEL W . VERTREES ; SHEILA C . LOWTHER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PROCED URE PROMULGA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : August 26, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0648-WC
MERRICK PRINTING COMPANY
V
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0472-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO . 98-72170
MICHAEL W. VERTREES; SHEILA C . LOWTHER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Denying an employer's motion to reopen, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
determined that KRS 342.125(1) did not permit the reopening of a settled workers'
compensation claim as a means of apportioning the injured worker's proceeds from a
civil action in which the employer failed to intervene . The Workers' Compensation
Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals have affirmed . Likewise, we affirm .
The claimant sustained a work-related shoulder injury on July 9, 1998 . He
underwent surgery by Dr. Catalano several weeks later. Sometime thereafter, he
developed osteomyelitis, a bone infection . Dr. Malkani then performed a second
surgery, debrided the infected area, and administered antibiotics . On November 10,
1999, the claimant brought a civil action against Dr. Catalano .
On February 9, 2000, while the civil action was pending, the claimant and his
employer agreed to settle the workers' compensation claim . They agreed to a lump
sum of $47,491 .55, which was based on an 18% impairment and a return to work
earning a lower average weekly wage than at the time of injury . They also agreed that
the employer had previously paid $38,624.88 in temporary total disability benefits and
$53,821 .72 in medical expenses, which included both of the surgeries and treatment .
The agreement was approved on February 15, 2000.
On July 5, 2002, the claimant and Dr. Catalano agreed to settle the allegations in
the civil suit for a total of $292,854.06 . The agreement did not allocate the settlement
proceeds among items of damages . On July 8, 2002, the employer filed a motion to
intervene in the civil suit which the trial court later denied .'
Also on July 8, 2002, the employer filed a motion to reopen the workers' compensation
claim . Although no action had yet been taken on the motion to intervene in the civil action,
the employer's motion to reopen alleged that it had intervened. It also alleged that the parties
to the civil action had settled the matter and that the claimant and employer had been unable
to agree how to divide the proceeds . Noting that KRS 342 .125(1) specifies the grounds for
reopening and that the employer had failed to allege one of the listed grounds, the ALJ
denied the motion. In a petition for reconsideration, the employer noted that the claimant
settled the civil action after settling the workers' compensation claim . It asserted, therefore,
that the settlement in the civil action amounted to newly discovered evidence with respect to
the workers' compensation claim, evidence that could not have been discovered with due
diligence before the workers' compensation claim was settled . The petition was denied .
Following unsuccessful appeals to the Board and the Court of Appeals, the
employer asserts that KRS 342.700(1) prohibits the claimant from receiving a double
The claimant has maintained from the outset that the civil action was settled on July 5, 2000; that the
employer moved to intervene on July 8, 2000 ; and that the motion was denied . Although there is nothing
in the record to document the assertions, the employer has not disputed them or offered evidence to the
contrary .
2
recovery for his injury and that an AU has the authority to apportion settlement
proceeds under Whittaker v. Hardin , Ky., 32 S .W.3d 497 (2000). The employer argues
that the Court has, on occasion, permitted reopening for reasons that are not specified
in KRS 342.125(1). For example, although the "mistake" provision had previously been
interpreted as permitting a reopening only to correct mistakes of fact, in Wheatley v.
Bryant Auto Services , Ky., 860 S .W .2d 767 (1993), the court determined that an ALJ
was permitted to reopen a final award, sua sponte, in order to correct a mistake of law.
Likewise, in Westvaco Corp . v. Fondaw , Ky., 698 S .W .2d 837 (1985), the court
indicated that although KRS 342 .125(1) did not include post-award medical fee disputes
as a ground for reopening, reopening was the proper method for resolving such
disputes . Finally, the employer asserts that to construe KRS 411 .188(2) as prohibiting
apportionment on these facts would produce an absurd and inequitable result. It
concludes, therefore, that it should be permitted to reopen the workers' compensation
award and obtain an apportionment of the claimant's proceeds from the civil settlement .
On the date of injury, KRS 342 .700(1) provided as follows :
(1) Whenever an injury for which compensation is payable under
this chapter has been sustained under circumstances creating in
some other person than the employer a legal liability to pay
damages, the injured employee may either claim compensation or
proceed at law by civil action against the other person to recover
damages, or proceed both against the employer for compensation
and the other person to recover damages, but he shall not collect
from both . If the injured employee elects to proceed at law by civil
action against the other person to recover damages, he shall give
due and timely notice to the employer and the special fund of the
filing of the action . If compensation is awarded under this chapter,
the employer, his insurance carrier, the special fund, and the
uninsured employer's fund, or any of them, having paid the
compensation or having become liable therefor, may recover in his
or its own name or that of the injured employee from the other
person in whom legal liability for damages exists, not to exceed the
indemnity paid and payable to the injured employee, less the
employee's legal fees and expense. The notice of civil action shall
conform in all respects to the requirements of KRS 411 .188(2).
KRS 411 .188(2) provided :
At the commencement of an action seeking to recover damages, it
shall be the duty of the plaintiff or his attorney to notify, by certified
mail, those parties believed by him to hold subrogation rights to any
award received by the plaintiff as a result of the action . The
notification shall state that a failure to assert subrogation rights by
intervention, pursuant to Kentucky Civil Rule 24, will result in a loss
of those rights with respect to any final award received by the
plaintiff as a result of the action .
KRS 342 .700(1) gives subrogation rights to employers who have paid workers'
compensation benefits and prevents the worker from receiving a double recovery . It
entitles employers to timely notice of a civil action that the injured worker files against a
third-party tortfeasor and permits them to intervene to protect their subrogation rights .
Although KRS 411 .188 has been found to be an unconstitutional encroachment on this
Court's power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure, the decision concerned only
KRS 411 .188(3)'s requirement that evidence of collateral source payments be admitted at
trial . See O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth , Ky., 892 S.W.2d 571 (1995), in which this Court held
that the requirement violated the constitutional separation of powers . Under KRS
411 .188(2), an employer who has paid workers' compensation benefits and who has been
notified of the worker's civil action must intervene in the action to preserve its claim for
reimbursement from the recovery, but it need not actively pursue the subrogation claim .
Zurich American Insurance Co . v. Haile , Ky., 882 S.W.2d 681 (1994). In summary, just as
KRS 342 .700(1) requires an injured worker to give timely notice of a civil action against a
third-party tortfeasor, KRS 411 .188(2) requires the employer to file a timely motion to
intervene in the civil action in order to preserve its subrogation rights .
Although the record does not establish affirmatively that the employer was served
with timely notice of the claimant's civil action, the employer has never asserted that he
failed to comply with KRS 342 .700(1) by providing notice that conformed to KRS 411 .188(2) .
In fact, the employer asserts that it was "engaged in the settlement process with the parties
during the civil claim." Nonetheless, after settling the workers' compensation claim, it failed
to move to intervene in the civil action until approximately two and one-half years after it was
filed, at which point the parties to the action had settled . Consistent with the employer's
failure to assert its right to a portion of the claimant's recovery by filing a motion to intervene
during the pendency of the action, the trial court denied its post-settlement motion to do so .
Under KRS 411 .188(2), the employer's failure to intervene before the settlement resulted in
a loss of its subrogation rights and entitled the claimant to receive all of the settlement
proceeds.
Attempting to reopen the workers' compensation award, the employer asserted
that the settlement in the civil action constituted newly discovered evidence that
warranted reopening . The argument was unsuccessful because although KRS
342 .125(1) permits reopening upon prima facie evidence of newly discovered evidence,
such evidence must have existed at the time the claim was resolved but not have been
discoverable through the exercise of due diligence. See Walker v. Farmer, Ky., 428
S .W .2d 26, 29 (1968). Therefore, the claimant's settlement of the civil action could not
properly be viewed as being "newly discovered" evidence with regard to the workers'
compensation claim because the action was pending when the workers' compensation
settlement occurred, and it was not settled until roughly two and one-half years later.
Workers' compensation is a statutory creation, and the employer has failed to
convince us that the present facts warrant a judicial exception to the grounds for reopening
that are set forth in KRS 342 .125(1). This case does not involve circumstances that are akin
to those addressed in Wheatley v. Bra, supra , or Westvaco v. Fondaw, supra . KRS
342 .700(1) gives an employer who has paid workers' compensation benefits a right to
intervene in the worker's civil action to protect its subrogation rights and entitles the
employer to notice of the action that conforms to KRS 411 .188(2). The latter provision is
explicit concerning the penalty for failing to intervene in a proceeding of which proper notice
is given . Furthermore, the employer has failed to show that applying KRS 411 .188(2) to the
present facts would produce an absurd result that warrants the creation of a judicial ground
for reopening . Contrary to what the employer would have us believe, the claimant may or
may not have received a double recovery . The agreement in the civil action did not allocate
the proceeds among items of damages . It was reached before trial and before the employer
moved to intervene . Under the circumstances, the employer's failure to intervene might well
have been a factor in the sum for which the parties agreed to settle .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Walter Charles Jobson
Lance O . Yeager
Ferreri & Fogle
203 Speed Building
333 Guthrie Green
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Matthew Lee White
Gray & Weiss
1200 PNC Plaza
500 W . Jefferson Street
Louisville, KY 40202
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