JEANIE L . LONGWELL V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VI_L PROCED URE PR OMUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : JUNE 17, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
4
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2003-SC-0623-TG
JEANIE L. LONGWELL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET P. COLEMAN, JUDGE
02-CR-00222
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Affirminq
Appellant, Jeanie L. Longwell, was convicted in the Hardin Circuit Court of
complicity to commit first-degree robbery, first-degree fleeing and evading police, and
for being a first-degree persistent felony offender. She was sentenced to a total of
twenty years imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Finding no
error, we affirm .
On December 5, 2001, Appellant and her boyfriend, Ray Shively, drove from
Louisville to Proffitt's Department Store in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. While Shively
waited in the car, Appellant entered the store and proceeded to hide numerous articles
of clothing in her pants. Jonathon Goldsburg, the store's Loss Prevention Manager,
observed Appellant shoplifting items from several areas of the store . Goldsburg called
another Loss Prevention Manager, Chad Harrod, and both men confronted Appellant
after she exited the store . While Appellant was arguing with Goldsburg and Harrod,
Shively approached, armed with two knives . Shively ordered both men back into the
store as Appellant ran to the car. Shively thereafter got into the passenger side of the
car and Appellant sped away. After a lengthy car chase during which Appellant ran
numerous traffic lights and ignored police sirens, six police cruisers blocked the car and
she and Shively were apprehended . When police approached the vehicle, Shively was
in the passenger seat holding the stolen clothing .
Appellant and Shively were indicted in the Hardin Circuit Court for first-degree
robbery (Appellant as an accomplice) and first-degree fleeing or evading police.
Following a trial, Appellant was found guilty on both charges, while Shively was
convicted of terroristic threatening and fleeing or evading police . Based upon the
additional first-degree persistent felony offender conviction, Appellant received an
enhanced sentence of twenty years imprisonment . Additional facts are set forth as
necessary.
Appellant first argues that the complicity to commit first-degree robbery
instruction did not require the jury to find that she, as an accomplice, intended that
Shively (the principal) commit robbery. Instruction No . 2, under which Appellant was
convicted, provided :
You will find the Defendant guilty of Complicity to Commit FirstDegree Robbery under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the Defendant, alone or complicity
with another, committed all of the following :
A. That in this county on or about December 5, 2001, and before
the finding of the Indictment herein, she stole items of clothing from
Proffitt's at Towne Mall, Elizabethtown, Kentucky;
B . That in the course of doing so and with the intent to accomplish
the theft, she by herself or with the aid of Ray Shively used or
threatened the immediate use of physical force upon Chad Harrod
and Jonathon Goldsburg and that she acquiesced in his actions ;
AND
C . That when she did so, Ray Shively was armed with two knives .
I n Harper v. Commonwealth , Ky., 43 S .W.3d 261, 263-64 (2001), we stated,
The language of KRS 502.020(1) and the accompanying
commentary make clear that intent is an essential element to a
conviction under subsection (1) of the statute. "To be guilty under
subsection (1) for a crime committed by another, a defendant must
have specifically intended to promote or facilitate the commission of
that offense . This means that the statute is not applicable to a
person acting with a culpable mental state other than
`intentionally ."' KRS 502 .020, Official Commentary (emphasis
added) . Thus, the "[i]ntention to promote or facilitate the charged
offense is what must be proved for conviction under KRS
502 .020(1) . . . ." Robert G . Lawson and William H. Fortune,
Kentucky Criminal Law § 3-3(b)(3) (Lexis 1998) (emphasis in
original) .
Since robbery requires both the intent to accomplish a theft and the use or threat of
immediate use of physical force upon the victim, KRS 515.020(1), the complicity
instruction erroneously failed to include the element of intent . See Carpenter v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 771 SW.2d 822 (1989) ; Watkins v . Commonwealth , Ky., 298
S .W.2d 306 (1957) .
However, the instructions furthered defined Complicity as :
Complicity - Means that a person is guilty of an offense committed
by another person when, with the intention of promoting or
facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits, commands, or
engages in a conspiracy with such other person to commit the
offense, or aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in
planning or committing the offense .
Thus, while the complicity to commit first-degree robbery instruction should have
required that Appellant, as an accomplice, intended that the principal use or threaten
the immediate use of physical force upon Goldsburg and Harrod, Har er, supra, the
element of intent was satisfied by the separate instruction defining complicity . Compare
Crawley v . Commonwealth , Ky., 107 S .W.3d 197, 200 (2003). No reversible error
occurred .
Next, Appellant argues that she was entitled to a directed verdict on the robbery
charge because the Commonwealth failed to prove that she intended that Ray Shively
use force to assist her in committing the theft. Appellant relies on the fact that she
testified at trial she did not tell Shively she was going into the store to shoplift, and that
Shively testified he only brandished the knives because he believed Appellant was
being accosted . And, in fact, the jury did not find Shively guilty of first-degree robbery,
but rather only of terroristic threatening . Accordingly, Appellant contends that the jury
could not have reasonably concluded that she intended Shively to use force to further
the commission of the theft. We disagree .
The jury's finding that Shively was not guilty of robbery has no bearing on
Appellant's criminal liability . KRS 502 .030(1) provides, in pertinent part:
In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the
accused is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to
KRS 502 .010 and 502 .020, it is no defense that:
(1) Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of
any offense based on the conduct in question, or has previously
been acquitted thereof, or has been convicted of a different
offense, or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction for
such conduct[ .]
Therefore, the fact that Shively was only convicted of terroristic threatening did not
preclude the jury from finding that Appellant was, in fact, guilty of complicity to commit
first-degree robbery.
However, in addition to proving that it was the defendant's intention to promote or
facilitate the charged offense by another person, the Commonwealth has the burden of
proving that the defendant participated in that offense . Lawson and Fortune, supra , at
§3-3(d)(2) . It is an oft-cited principle that a person is presumed to intend the logical and
probable consequences of his actions and, thus, "a person's state of mind may be
inferred from actions preceding and following the charged offense ." Parker v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 952 S .W.2d 209, 212 (1997), cert. denied , 522 U .S. 1122 (1998) ;
see also Harper, supra, at 265 .
The Commonwealth introduced evidence that: (1) Appellant and Shively drove
from Louisville to Proffitt's in Elizabethtown ; (2) Appellant entered the store with the
intention of shoplifting items to sell for money to support her drug habit; (2) Shively
waited in the driver's seat of the car with the door open; (4) Shively, armed with two
knives, approached Goldsburg and Harrod when they attempted to confront Appellant ;
(5) Appellant immediately thereafter ran to the car with the stolen items ; (6) Appellant
and Shively fled from the scene and were only apprehended after a lengthy police
chase ; and (7) police found Shively sitting in the car holding the stolen merchandise .
From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant and
Shively had planned to commit the robbery before Appellant ever entered the store.
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Certainly, Appellant's acquiescence in Shively's use of force and their subsequent flight
from the store was indicia of her intent that the robbery be committed . As this Court
held in Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 5 S .W.3d 126,129 (1999):
Generally, all who are present at the commission of a robbery,
rendering it countenance and encouragement, and ready to assist if
needed, are liable as principal actors . To be liable, the accused
need not to have taken any money from the victim with his own
hands, or actually participated in any other act of force or violence ;
it is sufficient that he came and went with the robbers, was present
when the robbery was committed, and acquiesced therein.
(Emphasis in original) (Citing 67 Am .Jur.2d, Robbery § 9 p.62)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant Appellant's motion for a
directed verdict. Commonwealth v . Benham, Ky., 816 S .W.2d 186 (1991) .
The judgment and sentence of the Hardin Circuit Court are affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
John Palombi
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Ste . 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Courtney J . Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Christopher G. Shaw
26 Public Square
Elizabethtown, KY 42701
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