CYPRUS MOUNTAIN COAL D/B/A STARFIRE MINES V MARLOUS NAPIER ; HON . JAMES L . KERR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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CYPRUS MOUNTAIN COAL D/B/A
STARFIRE MINES
V
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1
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-1815-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 98-81570
MARLOUS NAPIER; HON . JAMES L. KERR,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The claimant alleged that he was totally disabled by injuries to his head, neck,
back, legs, and arms and by depression, all of which resulted from a fall when he was
descending a drag line. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined, however that
the cervical condition was not work-related ; that there was no work-related
psychological condition ; and that although the claimant was totally disabled by workrelated lumbar injuries, 20% of his disability was pre-existing, active and, therefore,
noncompensable . The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) later reversed the denial
of medical benefits for the psychological condition; vacated the decisions concerning
the exclusion of pre-existing active disability and the denial of medical benefits for the
cervical injury; and remanded the claim for further consideration . The Court of Appeals
affirmed . Likewise, we affirm .
The claimant was born in 1950 and has a high school education with no
specialized or vocational training. He began working for the defendant-employer as a
heavy equipment operator in 1971 . He testified that he had injured his hip in a
nonwork-related motor vehicle accident in the early 1980's but was able to return to full
duty after an absence of several months. It was undisputed that, in 1985, the claimant
injured his back in a work-related fall from a tree, although the Department of Workers'
Claims had no record that the employer ever filed a First Report of Injury . After the
incident, the claimant underwent surgery to fuse L1-3, but he was able to return to work
after several months and did not file a claim. When deposed in July, 2001, the claimant
stated that he had limped for the past 6-7 years, but he also testified that he often
worked overtime, accumulating 801 hours of overtime in 1996, 610 hours in 1997, and
176 hours until his injury in 1998. His earnings statement for the period from April 19,
1998, through May 2, 1998, indicated that he worked 87 hours of overtime .
The injury that is the subject of this claim occurred on May 2, 1998, when the
claimant fell while descending from a drag line, hitting his head against a handrail and
twisting his back. He testified that he experienced immediate back pain and that he left
work after reporting the incident. He returned to work the following day but left after, a
few hours due to severe neck and low back pain . His family doctor and Dr. Mortara, the
neurosurgeon who had performed the 1985 surgery, treated him initially with pain
medication and physical therapy. When ongoing problems with degenerative disease in
his left hip interfered with physical therapy, Dr. Mortara suspended treatment until after
the claimant's recovery from hip replacement surgery that was performed in October
1998 . On May 13, 1999, Dr. Mortara performed lumbar surgery . The claimant testified
that although the surgery brought some relief from his right leg pain, he continued to
experience pain in his low back, left leg, and neck and, therefore, was referred to Dr.
Bosomworth for the treatment of chronic pain . He took various medications for his back
problems, including Oxycontin, and also took medication for depression .
At the hearing, employer's handwritten incident report, dated May 2, 1998, was
introduced into evidence. It indicated that the claimant fell when leaving the drag line at
shift change, hit his head on the right side, and complained of pain in his lower back and
neck . The claimant testified that he presently experienced constant pain in his neck, left
leg, and lower back; that he was unable to sit or stand for over thirty minutes ; and that
he had severe headaches and trouble sleeping . He stated that he received treatment
and counseling for depression at the pain clinic. He also stated that he had no physical
restrictions after the 1985 injury ; that until the 1998 injury he had routinely worked 11-40
hours of overtime per week; and that he worked as many as 84 hours per week in the
months preceding the 1998 incident .
Dr. Mortara first saw the claimant on June 2, 1998, at which time he related a
history that included the recent accident . He complained of leg pain, a worsening of his
left hip pain and pain that extended from the base of his neck into his head . Dr. Mortara
noted evidence of L3 and 4 radiculopathy on the left. In July, 1998, Dr. Mortara noted
that the contemplated hip replacement surgery should be performed before the back
treatment could proceed. In August, 1998, he noted continuing complaints of neck pain
and weakness and numbness in the arms and recommended x-rays . When the
complaints of back and left leg pain continued in February, 1999, following the
claimant's recovery from the hip replacement surgery, Dr. Mortara recommended
diagnostic tests that revealed various abnormalities . The hospital discharge summary
indicated that on May 13, 1999, he performed a total laminectomy of L3 and partial
laminectomies of L2 and L4 with foraminotomies . As of June 10, 1999, Dr. Mortara
recommended that the claimant avoid lifting more than 35 pounds for a period of six
months and engage in limited pulling, tugging, twisting, and jerking . After six months,
he should avoid lifting more than 50 pounds . At one year after the surgery, the
restrictions would lapse. Dr. Mortara did not address the question of AMA impairment
or of pre-existing impairment or disability. A nerve conduction study that he ordered to
address the claimant's complaints of a burning sensation in his left foot was performed
on August 31, 1999, and was normal .
Dr. Travis examined the claimant on October 16, 2000. In his opinion, the
claimant magnified his symptoms, and the complaints of chronic headaches, neck pain,
and low back pain were not supported by objective findings. He thought that the
claimant had reached maximum medical improvement, required no further treatment,
and could return to work on November 1, 2000. Based upon the 1985 fusion and
subsequent spinal stenosis, Dr. Travis would impose permanent restrictions including
light work involving mostly sitting, occasional standing and walking, and lifting/carrying a
maximum of 20 pounds . He thought that the need for the 1999 surgery was unrelated
to the May, 1998, incident, explaining his opinion that the claimant developed significant
degenerative stenosis below the L1-2 and L2-3 levels of the 1985 fusion due to
"adjacent segment syndrome," a condition that is seen frequently in individuals who
have had a previous fusion . Dr. Travis assigned a 10% whole person impairment as a
result of the 1999 surgery.
Dr. Templin evaluated the claimant on March 23, 2001 . Among other things, he
diagnosed degenerative lumbar disc disease, lumbar spondylolysis, chronic cervical
pain syndrome, left leg radiculopathy, chronic left hip pain, depression, and post-
operative scar tissue/adhesions . He assigned a 16% AMA impairment but noted that
the rating was conditional because he did not think that the claimant had reached
maximum medical improvement and because further testing and evaluation of the
cervical condition were required . He thought that the claimant's condition was caused
by the May, 1998, incident and that he had no pre-existing active impairment .
Dr. Hieronymous evaluated the claimant on July 27, 2001, and diagnosed chronic
low back pain with radiculopathy and atrophy, chronic cervical pain with radiculopathy
and atrophy, chronic pain syndrome, degenerative disc disease, and status post lumbar
laminectomy L3-L4 with partial L2 and L4 bilateral medical facectomies . He assigned a
31 % impairment. In his opinion, the May, 1998, injury caused the claimant's present
complaints, and he had no active impairment before the injury.
Following an August 15, 2001, benefit review conference, the ALJ ordered a
university evaluation as provided by KRS 342.315, explaining that there was a
difference of opinion concerning the extent of the claimant's impairment due to the
injury . The order directed the physician to evaluate the claimant's neck, low back, and
left leg ; to determine the extent of impairment both before and after the May 2, 1998,
incident ; and to determine whether it was the May 2, 1998, incident or non-work-related
conditions that necessitated the subsequent surgery .
Dr. Goldman, an orthopedic surgeon, performed a university evaluation on
September 20, 2001, and submitted a Form 107 report . His diagnoses included : status
post lumbar decompressive laminectomy, mild degenerative joint disease of the cervical
and dorsal spine, and narrowing at L3-4 with retrolisthesis of L3 on L4 . He stated that
the 1998 injury was at least partially responsible for the claimant's present condition
because he had worked for the previous 12 years without any apparent back problems.
Dr . Goldman noted, however, that the 1998 incident probably would not have resulted in
persistent symptoms had there been no previous fusion of L1-3 . He stated that the
changes in the cervical and dorsal spine were due to the natural aging process and,
noting that the cervical changes were not unusual given the claimant's age, he also
stated that the claimant's work did not aggravate or accelerate the effects of the natural
aging process . He attributed half of the claimant's impairment to the arousal of the
previous L1-3 fusion, which he characterized as a pre-existing dormant non-disabling
condition . Furthermore, although he acknowledged that the claimant would have had
an impairment rating based upon the L1-3 fusion, he found nothing to indicate that the
impairment was active before the 1998 injury . Dr. Goldman did not think that the
claimant retained the physical capacity to return to the type of work that he performed in
May,1998. He restricted the claimant from bending forward with the knees straight,
lifting more than 10 pounds, climbing on machinery, and operating heavy equipment . In
his opinion, the claimant had reached MMI . He assigned a 13% impairment to the 1998
injury, a 20% impairment to the 1985 injury, and a 30% impairment for the combined
effects of the injuries. He stated that the 1985 injury accounted for two-thirds of the
combined impairment .
When deposed, Dr. Goldman testified that he would have restricted a similar
patient from bending forward with the knees straight and from lifting more than 25-35
pounds after the 1985 injury and resulting fusion. He stated that the AMA Guides to the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (Guides ) distinguish between impairment and
disability . Under the Fifth Edition, the term "impairment" refers to "the loss of function to
do activities of daily living, exclusive of work."
Also on September 20, 2001, Dr. Harpring, a neurosurgeon, conducted a
university evaluation . He received a history that included the 1985 injury and
subsequent fusion surgery; the claimant's statement that he returned to work thereafter
at approximately 90% of his previous capacity ; and his statement that he worked with
no problem except some left hip pain until the 1998 incident. Dr. Harpring diagnosed
lumbar stenosis and neck pain, both of which he attributed to the 1998 injury. In his
opinion, the claimant did not have a pre-existing active impairment . Dr. Harpring did not
assign an impairment rating but did indicate that the claimant had no active impairment
before the 1998 injury . He noted that the lumbar stenosis and previous lumbar fracture
obviously were present before the 1998 incident . Nonetheless, noting that the claimant
was asymptomatic at the time of the 1998 accident and that the low back and leg pain
followed the accident, his opinion was that the surgery performed after the 1998 injury
was required by the effects of the injury . When deposed, Dr. Harpring noted that some
individuals have impairments but overcome them.
Phillip Pack, a certified clinical psychologist, evaluated the claimant on June 15,
2001, and concluded that he suffered from major depression that was mild and without
psychotic symptoms . He assigned a Class 2 impairment, stating that it corresponded
with a 10% impairment under the latest edition of the AMA Guides in which numerical
impairments were used . He found no evidence of malingering and thought that the
claimant would benefit from treatment .
Dr. David Shraberg, a psychiatrist, evaluated the claimant on August 30, 2001, at
the request of the employer. In his opinion, the claimant exhibited a high degree of
symptom magnification, and any physical problems were due to natural aging and
arthritis. He was depressed and distraught, with anger and anxiety over his present
circumstances and emotional instability. Furthermore, his personality predisposed him
to developing physical symptoms under stress . Dr. Shraberg diagnosed a
psychophysiological adjustment disorder associated with multiple surgeries and a
passive/dependent personality but indicated that the condition had resolved . He found
no active psychiatric impairment related to the May 1998 injury. He thought that the
claimant's primary psychological problem was an addiction to Oxycontin and that the
depression was situational . He suggested that detoxification from the drug would
relieve the depression and allow the claimant to return to work.
Resisting the claim, the employer asserted that the claimant's current
impairments were solely the result of pre-existing conditions and not attributable to the
1998 incident . The employer also asserted that because 1996 Act awards are based
upon impairment, pre-existing impairment rather than pre-existing disability must be
excluded . Other arguments were that the cervical condition was not related to the 1998
injury, that the psychological condition was not work-related, and that the claimant was
not totally occupationally disabled .
After reviewing all of the medical testimony, the ALJ determined that Dr.
Goldman's was the most credible . Noting his statement that the claimant would have
retained a 20% impairment following the 1985 injury and subsequent surgery but was
able to return to work until May 2, 1998, albeit with some low back pain, the ALJ
determined that the claimant's pre-existing disability equaled his pre-existing
impairment . Relying on testimony by the claimant, Dr. Goldman, and Mr. Pack, the ALJ
determined that the claimant was totally disabled following the 1998 injury and awarded
income benefits for 80% of a permanent total disability. Based upon Dr. Goldman's
opinion that any cervical changes were age-related rather than due to the injury, the
ALJ determined that the cervical condition was not compensable .
In a petition for reconsideration, the claimant asserted that the exclusion of a 20%
disability was clearly erroneous since he was working substantial amounts of overtime
and had no restrictions until after the injury . He requested additional findings
concerning the basis for the 20% exclusion, the psychological injury, and the denial of
medical as well as income benefits for his cervical problems. He also requested
findings concerning the compensability of the psychological component of the claim .
The ALJ's order reaffirmed the decision, explaining that the finding of a 20% preexisting active disability was based not only on the 20% impairment but also on the
physical restrictions that Dr. Goldman would have imposed after the 1985 injury. The
ALJ viewed the impairment and restrictions as indicating that the claimant had an active
disability at that time despite his full-time employment . Noting, erroneously, that the
claimant's cervical problems did not arise for several months after the 1998 incident and
also noting that Dr. Goldman had attributed them to the natural aging process, the ALJ
was not persuaded that the condition was caused by the incident. Finally, the ALJ
found Dr. Shraberg to be more persuasive than Mr. Pack and determined that the
claimant's psychological condition was not work-related .
The employer's first argument on appeal is that the Board erred by vacating the
ALJ's decision concerning pre-existing active disability after acknowledging that there
was substantial evidence to support it. Noting that it is unclear precisely what Drs.
Goldman and Harpring meant by stating that the claimant's pre-existing impairment was
not active, the employer maintains that it would not be inconsistent to state that the
1985 injury resulted in an impairment but that it was not disabling. It maintains,
however, that since awards are "based solely on the impairment caused by a workrelated injury, it only makes sense to exclude from compensability pre-existing
conditions that produce an impairment without regard to actual disability ."
Both lay and medical evidence may be considered when determining whether the
disability that results from work-related impairment is total . See Ira A . Watson
Department Stores v. Hamilton , Ky., 34 S.W.3d 48 (2000) . Even under the 1996 Act,
the Osborne v. Johnson, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 800 (1968), factors remain central to the
determination . Id . Having decided that work-related impairment has caused an
individual to be totally disabled, the AU must then determine the extent of any preexisting disability . See Wells v. Bunch , Ky., 692 S.W.2d 806 (1985); Griffin v. Booth
Memorial Hospital , Ky., 467 S .W.2d 789 (1971). Although the degree of impairment
that results from an injury affects the extent of the injured worker's disability, the words
"impairment" and "disability" are not synonymous. The 1996 Act bases an exclusion
from a partial disability award upon pre-existing impairment, but an exclusion from a
total disability award continues to be based upon pre-existing occupational disability .
Roberts Brothers Coal v. Robinson , Ky., 113 S.W.3d 181 (2003) .
Although the claimant had a pre-existing non-work-related hip condition, there is
no dispute that work-related lumbar impairment, by itself, caused the claimant to be
totally disabled . KRS 342 .730(1)(a) ; Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp. , Ky., 65 S .W.3d 503,
508-09 (2001). Since the finding of total disability was based solely on the claimant's
lumbar condition, only pre-existing disability that is due to the lumbar condition must be
excluded . The Board acknowledged that there was substantial evidence to support the
ALJ's decision with respect to pre-existing active disability but noted that the bulk of the
evidence was to the contrary . It also pointed to contradictions in the two university
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evaluations and to internal inconsistencies in Dr. Goldman's report. Noting that the ALJ
failed to address either the contradictions or inconsistencies and failed to state a
reasonable basis for choosing to rely upon Dr. Goldman rather than Dr. Harpring, the
Board concluded that the AU did not comply with KRS 342.315(2). Therefore, it
vacated the decision to exclude 20% of the award and remanded the matter for further
consideration.
Dr. Harpring acknowledged that the lumbar stenosis and fracture were preexisting conditions but stated that the claimant did not have an active impairment before
his injury because he was able to perform his usual work without a problem . He later
testified that some individuals who have an impairment are able to overcome it. Dr.
Goldman characterized the 1985 L1-3 fusion as a pre-existing dormant non-disabling
condition . He attributed 50% of the claimant's impairment to the arousal of the fusion
and stated that although the fusion warranted an impairment rating, there was no
indication that the impairment was active until after the 1998 injury . Later in the report,
he assigned a 20% impairment to the fusion, a 13% impairment to the 1998 injury, and
attributed two-thirds of the combined 30% impairment to the fusion . He testified
subsequently that he would have imposed some restrictions after the fusion .
As the Board acknowledged, there was substantial evidence from which the AU
could have reasonably concluded that the 1985 injury resulted in a 20% permanent
occupational disability despite the claimant's return to work. On the other hand, the
claimant's physician released him to return to work without restrictions; he continued to
perform his pre-injury job and to work extensive amounts of overtime until the May 2,
1998, accident ; and he did not appear to have any significant problems performing his
work before the 1998 accident . Therefore, it is equally clear that there was substantial
evidence from which the AU could have determined that the 1985 injury caused little or
no permanent occupational disability . The evidence did not compel a particular
conclusion as a matter of law. Roberts Brothers Coal v. Robinson, supra .
KRS 342.285 vests the AU with the sole authority to make findings of fact. An
AU is required to make sufficient findings to support the conclusion of law that is
reached but is not required to provide a detailed interpretation of the evidence or a
detailed legal analysis . Although a finding for which there is substantial evidence may
not normally be disturbed on appeal, the parties are entitled to be certain that the
decision was the product of a correct understanding of the evidence . See Cook v.
Paducah Recapping Service , Ky., 694 S .W.2d 684 (1985).
Dr. Goldman stated that the L1-3 fusion warranted a 20% impairment and
accounted for two-thirds of the claimant's ultimate impairment, but he also testified that
the claimant's pre-existing condition was dormant and non-disabling ; that it was aroused
by the 1998 injury ; that half of the claimant's impairment was due to the arousal of the
pre-existing condition by the injury ; and that the claimant had no active impairment until
the 1998 injury . The ALJ "particularly [found] Dr. Goldman's testimony to be credible"
and chose to rely upon his statements that the pre-existing impairment was 20% and
that a similar patient would have had some restrictions after the L1-3 fusion as the basis
for excluding a 20% lumbar disability . Yet, the decision failed to address Dr. Goldman's
other statements, including his characterization of the pre-existing condition as being
dormant and non-disabling and the pre-existing impairment as not being active. Thus, it
was unclear from the decision that the AU understood the testimony . For that reason,
it was appropriate for the Board to vacate the award and require a further explanation in
order to clarify that the AU based the decision on a correct understanding of Dr.
Goldman's testimony .
It is undisputed that both Dr. Goldman and Dr. Harpring testified as university
evaluators under KRS 342.315 . As construed in Magic Coal Co . v. Fox, Ky., 19
S .W .3d 88 (2000), KRS 342.315 (2) provides that the clinical findings and opinions of a
university evaluator constitute substantial evidence of the worker's condition and may
not be disregarded unless they are rebutted by other medical evidence . In instances
where they are rebutted, the ALJ remains free to weigh the conflicting medical evidence
and to choose the expert upon whom to rely. Nonetheless, an AU who chooses to
disregard the clinical findings and opinions of a university evaluator must state a
reasonable basis for doing so . Therefore, in instances where multiple evaluators testify
and express different opinions, the AU must state a reasonable basis for choosing to
rely upon one evaluator and disregard the other. Likewise, although an ALJ may
ordinarily pick and choose among an expert's opinions, a reasonable basis must be
stated for choosing to rely upon some of a university evaluator's opinions but to
disregard others .
The AU failed to state a reasonable basis for choosing to rely upon some of Dr.
Goldman's opinions concerning the claimant's lumbar condition but to disregard others .
Likewise, the AU failed to state a reasonable basis for disregarding Dr. Harpring's
opinions . For that reason, KRS 342 .315(2) required that the claim be remanded for
further findings .
In vacating the decision concerning the cervical injury and remanding the claim
for further consideration, the Board pointed to several matters that will need to be
addressed by the AU on remand. First, the AU stated that the cervical complaints first
13
occurred several months after the injury, but the record clearly indicates that they began
immediately . Therefore, the decision appears to have been based on an incorrect
understanding of the facts . Furthermore, as with the lumbar injury, the AU failed to
address differences in the university evaluators' opinions with respect to causation or to
state a reasonable basis for choosing to rely upon one rather than the other.
Dr. Harpring thought that the cervical complaints were due to the 1998 injury
based on the lack of previous complaints of cervical pain, weakness, or numbness, or of
pain involving the upper extremities . Although Dr. Goldman thought that the claimant's
work did not aggravate or accelerate the natural aging process because the claimant's
cervical spine was not unusual for a 50-year-old male, he did not address whether the
1998 accident aroused the age-related changes and caused them to become
symptomatic . Yet, when non-work-related degenerative changes become symptomatic
due to work-related trauma, that harmful change is an injury even if it is transient . KRS
342.0011(1) ; See Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., supra ; Robertson v . United Parcel Service ,
Ky., 64 S.W .3d 284, 286 (2001); McNutt Construction/First General Services v. Scott,
Ky., 40 S.W .3d 854, 859 (2001). Therefore, if the claimant's cervical complaints are
found to be work-related, some of the medical treatment may be compensable even if
there was no permanent harm. Robertson v. United Parcel Service , supra ; Cavin v.
Lake Construction Co. , Ky., 451 S .W .2d 159 (1970).
The Board reversed the finding that the claimant had no work-related
psychological condition, noting that Dr. Shraberg's report compelled an award for the
treatment of psychological conditions . It is undisputed that Oxycontin was prescribed to
treat the claimant's back pain . Contrary to the employer's present argument that the
use of Oxycontin was unreasonable or unnecessary, the compensability of the
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Oxycontin is not what is presently at issue . Furthermore, that issue was never raised
before the ALJ. In Dr. Shraberg's opinion, the claimant's primary psychological problem
was an addiction to Oxycontin, and detoxification would not only relieve his depression
but release energy and motivation so that he could return to work. Therefore, the
evidence compelled a finding that the depression and addiction were work-related
psychological conditions, and any reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the
conditions was compensable without regard to whether they caused a permanent
impairment or disability. Robertson v. United Parcel Service , supra ; Cavin v. Lake
Construction Co . , supra . Consistent with Dr. Shraberg's recommendations, reasonable
treatment would include both a psychopharmacological evaluation and therapy to help
the claimant reduce his somatic preoccupation and to control his anxiety, anger, and
self-defeating negative thoughts .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Bonnie Jo Hoskins
Carl Martin Brashear
Hoskins Law Offices, PLLC
P .O . Box 24564
Lexington, KY 40524-4564
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas W . Moak
Stumbo, Moak & Nunnery
P.O. Box 511
Prestonsburg, KY 41653
15
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