FORD MOTOR COMPANY V BETTY C . STEVENSON ; RICHARD H . CAMPBELL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED : May 20, 2004
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2003-SC-0382-WC
FORD MOTOR COMPANY
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-0023-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 00-0705
BETTY C . STEVENSON; RICHARD H .
CAMPBELL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant was totally
disabled by work-related impairment, that she gave timely notice of her gradual injury,
and that her claim was timely filed . The decision was later affirmed by the Workers'
Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals. Both determined that the
employer's failure to petition for reconsideration and request specific findings on the
question of limitations precluded an appeal of that aspect of the decision . Appealing,
the employer maintains that no additional findings were required and that the ALJ's
conclusions concerning work-relatedness, limitations, and total disability were not
supported by substantial evidence . Although our rationale is different with respect to
the question of limitations, we affirm .
The claimant was born in 1952 and had an eleventh-grade education with no
specialized or vocational training. Her employment history included production work in
a factory and restaurant work. She began working at the defendant-employer's
assembly plant in 1977 and continued to do so until September 29, 1998 . She has not
worked since that date .
In 1984, the claimant sustained a work-related fracture to her right hand . She
underwent surgery for the condition in 1985 and 1986, and the parties agreed at some
point to settle the claim for a 6% occupational disability . The claimant continued to work
and began to depend more on her left hand and arm . Eventually, she began to
experience numbness, loss of strength, and pain in both hands. This led to a third righthand surgery, in 1989, one of the goals of which was to help alleviate her increasing
dependence on her left hand.
The claimant testified that assembly work involved the repetitive use of her
hands, lifting and carrying, and walking back and forth . In the early 1990's, she
developed a trigger finger for which she received cortisone injections in the fingers of
her left hand . Over the years, the pain, numbness, and tingling continued to worsen.
Her employer restricted her from using vibratory tools in 1995. Then, in 1997, she was
assigned to a job that involved wiping dust off vehicles in preparation for painting. Like
her previous work, it required the repetitive use of her hands. She stated that she quit
working altogether on September 29, 1998, thinking that her condition would improve.
Nonetheless, her carpal and cubital tunnel symptoms persisted, and she sought
benefits under the employer's disability retirement plan . She was awarded disability
retirement benefits in the summer of 1999, after presenting evidence from Dr. Beilman,
her family physician, that she suffered from medical problems including : sinusitis,
depression, migraine headaches, hiatal hernia, tarsal tunnel syndrome, and arthritis in
her hands . At some point, she was also awarded social security disability benefits . On
June 12, 2000, the claimant filed an application for workers' compensation benefits. As
later amended, the application alleged disabling injuries to her arms and feet on
September 29, 1998, from the repetitive nature of her work.
Dr. Breidenbach, an orthopedic surgeon, began treating the claimant in 1989 . At
that time, he performed surgery to remove scar tissue and improve mobility in her right
hand . On April 12, 2000, she sought treatment for symptoms including pain, numbness,
and weakness in both hands. She indicated that the symptoms had been present for a
long time but had worsened in the past two years . Dr. Breidenbach found signs of
pinched nerves in both wrists and in the left elbow and diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome, which was more evident on the left side . He also diagnosed left cubital
tunnel syndrome . Although the results of subsequent nerve conduction studies were
normal, he later explained that a normal nerve conduction study together with the
claimant's symptoms were classical signs of carpal tunnel nerve compression . He
performed left wrist and elbow surgery in August, 2000 . A note dated October 18, 2000,
indicated that because the claimant had not worked since 1998, her carpal and cubital
tunnel problems were not related to her work. Yet, when deposed in February, 2001,
Dr. Breidenbach testified that the nature of the claimant's work was a known cause of
nerve compression problems and that her years of assembly line work were the
probable cause of the symptoms she experienced while working . In a note dated March
8, 2001, he explained that after learning from the claimant on November 22, 2000, that
her symptoms began more than two years earlier and progressively worsened, he had
concluded that the conditions resulted from her 22 years of doing repetitious work on
the employer's assembly line. He assigned a 13% AMA impairment, attributing a 2%
impairment to the left arm and an 11 % impairment to the right.
Dr. Auerbach, an orthopedic surgeon, examined the claimant on August 28 and
November 6, 2000 . In the latter report, he indicated that the August 2000, surgery had
been successful so far, although additional surgery was planned to correct a Dupuyten's
contracture in the left palm . In his opinion, the claimant had a 30% whole-body
impairment due to her arm problems and was unemployable . Although he thought that
she might be capable of some sedentary work, he found it inconceivable that she would
be able to work full time with her various medical problems.
Dr. Harter was the plant physician through August, 1998, at which time she took
an executive position with the company. In 1995, the claimant complained of a loss of
strength and of the ability to grip with her right hand . Therefore, Dr. Harter decided to
place her on work restrictions and have her reassigned to work that did not require the
use of vibratory tools . She indicated that, after 1995, the claimant did not report any
problems with either arm. Dr . Harter testified that the work the claimant performed from
1995 to 1998 was not likely to irritate the carpal tunnel problem . She also testified that
the primary reason that the claimant sought disability retirement was extreme
depression . Company medical records were submitted at Dr. Harter's deposition. They
indicated that the claimant received injections in the fingers of her left hand in 1990 . In
1991, she had problems with grasping, squeezing, and carrying in both hands. She
also experienced some problems with a trigger finger on her left ring finger for which
she was placed on temporary restrictions . A March 1, 1996, a note from Dr. Gavin to
Dr. Beilman reported that the claimant was having problems with her right elbow. Also,
on August 13, 1999, the claimant saw Dr. Beilman, complaining of loss of grip strength
and an inability to grip or pull with both hands.
Dr. Corwin examined the claimant on October 31, 2000 . On November 6, 2000,
he reported that, in his opinion, there was never any evidence the claimant had carpal
tunnel or cubital tunnel syndrome . Furthermore, his examination revealed no objective
evidence of a neurologic deficit. He acknowledged that there might be underlying
arthritis that had not been evaluated and suggested radiographs of the hands and left
shoulder . In a March 6, 2001, report, he attributed any right hand impairment to the
1984 fracture . He found no left hand impairment due to carpal tunnel syndrome and
indicated that any loss of range of motion in the hand was more likely due to arthritis.
Ms. Bonn, the employer's workers' compensation administrator, testified that she
first became aware of an alleged injury to the claimant's left arm when she received a
copy of the June, 2000, application for benefits. Her understanding was that the
claimant's disability retirement application had been based primarily on depression .
Among other things, the employer asserted that any injury occurred more than
two years before the claim was filed and that the claimant failed to give timely notice .
With respect to the question of limitations, the ALJ stated as follows :
I find that the plaintiffs claim for a work related injury on
9/29/98 was made with the department within two (2) years
of the date of the accident . Accordingly, I find that the same
is not time barred .
Rejecting the testimonies of Ms. Bonn and Dr. Harter, the ALJ determined from the
claimant's testimony and the other medical evidence, including the company medical
records, that the claimant gave notice of her injury as soon as practicable . Relying
upon evidence from Drs . Breidenbach and Auerbach, the ALJ determined that the
claimant's cubital tunnel syndrome and bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome were workrelated ; that she was totally occupationally disabled ; that her prior, active disability was
6% ; and that she was entitled to benefits for 94% of a total disability.
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The sole issue raised in the employer's petition for reconsideration concerned the
failure of the AU to award an employer credit for the disability retirement benefits as per
the stipulation of the parties. Although noting that the award already included such a
provision and that the petition was moot, the ALJ amended the award in order to limit
the credit to the net amount of disability benefits after deductions for taxes and social
security benefits . Appealing to the Board, the employer contested the findings that the
carpal and cubital tunnel injuries were work-related ; that the claimant gave timely notice
of the conditions ; that she filed her claim within the applicable period of limitations ; and
that the carpal and cubital tunnel syndromes, by themselves, were totally disabling .
With respect to the limitations argument, the employer asserted : 1 .) that although
parties stipulated to an "alleged work-related injury(ies) on 9-29-98," it had argued from
the outset that the condition was not work-related ; 2.) that even if the condition was
work-related, it arose no later than March, 1997, and, therefore, was barred by
limitations ; and 3.) that the AU appeared to have relied upon the stipulation and made
a "cursory and unsubstantiated conclusion that [the claimant] did suffer a work-related
injury on September 29, 1998." It maintained, therefore, that the finding that the claim
was timely was not based upon substantial evidence and must be reversed .
Symptoms that occur at work or that an individual associates with work may or
may not be due to a work-related injury .
For the purpose of notice and limitations, a
gradual injury occurs when the worker learns that she has sustained such an injury and
is informed by a physician that the condition is work-related . Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp. ,
Ky., 65 S .W .3d 503, 507 (2001). The fact that a worker experiences symptoms and
thinks they are work-related does not trigger notice and limitations just as it will not
prove causation . Id . Special Fund v. Clark, Ky., 998 S.W.2d 487, 490 (1999), explains
that an individual who knows that she has sustained a work-related gradual injury also
knows that continuing to perform the same work is likely to cause additional injury. The
decision points out, however, that a gradual injury is dynamic and continues to occur for
so long as the individual performs the same work. Therefore, even where part of an
injury is barred by limitations, the portion that is attributable to work-related trauma
incurred in the two years before a claim is filed remains compensable . Id .
The AU determined that the claim for a September 29, 1998, injury was filed
within two years after the date of accident and, therefore, was timely . Yet, the decision
failed to provide a factual basis for concluding that September 29, 1998, was the
appropriate date for triggering the period of limitations under Special Fund v. Clark,
supra . Therefore, it was patent on the face of the award that the AU reached a
conclusion of law concerning the question of limitations but failed to state the facts that
supported it. See Harry Stevens Company v. Workmen's Compensation Board , Ky.,
553 S .W .2d 852 (1977). Furthermore, although its reasoning was different, the
employer acknowledged that the AU had reached an "unsubstantiated conclusion" in its
brief to the Board .
KRS 342.285(1) provides that unless a petition for reconsideration is filed, an
ALJ's decision is "conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact." As amended
effective December 12, 1996, KRS 342 .281 permits an AU to correct "errors patently
appearing on the face of the award" when such errors are raised in a petition for
reconsideration . The 1996 amendment deleted a sentence that was enacted effective
April 4, 1994, which provided that a failure to file such a petition did not preclude an
appeal on any issue and required only that issues must be raised at the administrative
level to be preserved for judicial review. 1994 Ky. Acts ch . 181, § 75 ; See , Smith v.
Dixie Fuel Co., Ky., 900 S .W .2d 609 (1995). Thus, by deleting the sentence, the 1996
amendment restored the statute to essentially the same form that it had when enacted
in 1964. See 1964 Ky. Acts ch. 192, § 21 .
In Eaton Axle v. Nally , Ky., 688 S .W .2d 334, 337-38 (1985), the court construed
KRS 342 .285 as requiring findings of fact on all contested issues and pointed out that
the decision being appealed contained no finding with respect to notice even though the
issue had been hotly contested. After complaining of the number of cases that had to
be remanded for additional findings of fact, the court applied the 1964 version of KRS
342.281, explaining that it was the statutory counterpart of CR 52.04 and that the
principles of judicial economy required a petition for reconsideration to be filed in order
to preserve a patent error or omission of fact for judicial review. Id . At the time of the
decision, workers' compensation claims were decided by the Board and were appealed
to circuit court . Since 1987, however, claims have been decided by ALJs and are
subject to an administrative appeal to the Board before a judicial appeal is permitted .
Applying Eaton Axle to the changed procedures, the court determined in Osborne v.
Pepsi Cola, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 643 (1991), that a timely petition for reconsideration must
be filed before the AU in order to preserve a patent error or omission of fact for review
by the Board. Since the 1996 amendment restored KRS 342 .281 to essentially the
same form that the Osborne decision addressed, we conclude that the principles set
forth in the decision apply to this claim. See also , Hall's Hardwood Floor Co. v.
Stapleton , Ky.App., 16 S .W.3d 327 (2000).
Although KRS 342 .281 refers to "errors patently appearing on the face of the
award," it does not limit an AU to correcting clerical errors. Commonwealth v.
Robertson , Ky., 447 S.W.2d 857 (1969). It permits the correction of all patent errors,
both legal and factual . Wells v. Beth-Elkhorn Coal Corp . , Ky.App., 708 S .W .2d 104
(1986). Although an ALJ may not reconsider the merits or change the factual findings
on reconsideration, correcting an award to conform to the law is not a change of the
decision on the merits . Reliance Diecasting v. Freeman , Ky., 471 S .W.2d 311 (1971);
Beth-Elkhorn Corp . v. Nash, Ky., 470 S .W.2d 329 (1971) .
As interpreted by the court in 0sborne v. Pepsi Cola , su ra, KRS 342.281 and
KRS 342.285(1) place upon a party who wishes to appeal an ALJ's decision the burden
to request any necessary findings of fact before the appellate process begins. Although
an ALJ is not required to provide a detailed legal analysis of a contested issue, an ALJ
is required to make sufficient findings of fact to apprise the parties of the basis for the
decision and to permit a meaningful appellate review. Big Sandy Community Action
Program v. Chaffins , Ky., 502 S .W.2d 526 (1973); Shields v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal
Mining Co. , Ky. App., 634 S.W.2d 440 (1982) . We conclude, therefore, that the ALJ's
failure to state a factual basis for concluding that the date of "accident" was September
29, 1998, and that the claim was filed within the applicable period of limitations
constituted an error that was patent on the face of the award. Furthermore, it was a
type of error that a petition for reconsideration was designed to correct. We conclude,
therefore, that the employer's failure to bring the error to the ALJ's attention and to
request specific findings precluded a reversal on the ground that the ALJ failed to make
the necessary findings of fact or that the ALJ failed to consider all aspects of its
argument concerning the limitations issue. That conclusion does not entirely dispose of
the limitations issue, however, because nothing in KRS 342 .281 negates the
requirement of KRS 342 .285(2) that a decision must be based upon substantial
evidence . Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S .W .2d 641, 643 (1986) .
The employer has asserted from the outset that all or at least part of the claim
was untimely . Nonetheless, it has pointed to no evidence that indicates a physician
informed the claimant that she had sustained a work-related gradual injury before she
quit working . The fact that a worker experiences symptoms and thinks they are workrelated does not, by itself, trigger notice and limitations . See Hill v. Sextet Mining Co . ,
supra. Likewise, a company physician's imposition of work restrictions or reassignment
of the worker to other duties does not trigger the period of limitations unless the
physician also communicates to the worker the fact that she has sustained a workrelated injury .
The surgeries to the claimant's right hand during the 1980's and the claim that
was later settled arose from a fracture to that hand, not a gradual injury . Regardless of
when symptoms of the gradual injury began, we are aware of no evidence that a
physician informed the claimant that she had sustained a work-related gradual injury to
her hands and arms until Dr. Breidenbach did, after she quit working . Furthermore,
despite the employer's assertions to the contrary, the claimant's description of her
duties together with Dr. Breidenbach's testimony permitted a reasonable conclusion that
the claimant's entire tenure on the assembly line contributed to her injury . At this point,
it is impossible to determine if the basis upon which the AL determined that the claim
was timely was correct, and we have already determined that the employer's failure to
request specific findings on the matter precludes a remand for that purpose.
Nonetheless, because there was substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the
claim was filed within two years after any trauma that contributed to the gradual injury,
the decision was properly affirmed . Special Fund v. Francis , supra .
We are persuaded that the findings of fact with respect to notice, workrelatedness, and extent and duration of disability were adequate to apprise the parties
of the basis for the ALJ's decision and to permit a meaningful appellate review.
Big,
Sandy Community Action Program v. Chaffins , supra ; Shields v. Pittsburg & Midway
Coal Mining Co. , supra . Concluding that the employer received timely notice, the ALJ
found the claimant's testimony and the other medical evidence, including that in the
company medical records, to be more persuasive than that of Ms . Bonn and Dr. Harter .
As the Board and the Court of Appeals pointed out, the claimant may not have given
formal written notice, but this was not a case where the employer was unaware of her
condition until she filed a claim. Not only were the employer and company physician
aware of her condition, they provided accommodations . Although the claimant
suspected that her symptoms were work-related, Dr. Breidenbach did not diagnose the
carpal and cubital tunnel conditions or determine that they were work-related until after
she quit working . Under the circumstances, the employer has failed to show that the
finding of timely notice was unreasonable .
As was his prerogative, the ALJ relied upon the testimonies of Drs . Breidenbach
and Auerbach as medical evidence that the claimant's carpal and cubital tunnel
syndromes were work-related . Furthermore, the claimant's and Dr. Breidenbach's
testimony constituted substantial evidence from which the ALJ could reasonably
determine that the claimant's entire tenure on the assembly line contributed to causing
the injury . Under the circumstances, the finding of causation was reasonable .
The employer points to the claimant's numerous medical problems and asserts
that the carpal and cubital tunnel syndromes, alone, were not totally disabling . KRS
342 .730(1)(a) requires a finding of total disability to be based solely upon work-related
impairment. Nonetheless, even under the 1996 Act, many of the factors in Osborne v.
Johnson , Ky., 432 S .W.2d 800 (1968), remain relevant to the determination . Ira A.
Watson Department Stores v. Hamilton , Ky., 34 S .W.3d 48 (2000) . Furthermore, the
testimony of the injured worker remains relevant . Id. In concluding that the effects of
the claimant's 1984 and 1998 work-related injuries, by themselves, were totally
disabling, the ALJ chose to rely upon the testimonies of the claimant, Dr. Breidenbach
and Dr. Auerbach. In view of the claimant's age, education, and previous work
experience, we conclude that it was reasonable for the ALJ to determine that the workrelated conditions, by themselves, would have prevented the claimant from being able
to work for another for remuneration on a regular and sustained basis in a competitive
economy .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Wesley G . Gatlin
Earl Lipscomb Martin, III
Boehl Stopher & Graves
Capital Holding Center, Ste . 2300
400 West Market
Louisville, KY 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Charles Ched Jennings
Haydon Dockter & Jennings
412 Kentucky Home Life Building
239 S. Fifth Street
Louisville, KY 40202
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