WAYNE WOODWARD V. PATRICIA M . SUMME, JUDGE, AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPOR-l'"ANTNOTICE
NOT TO- BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,SuFractr (fourf of ~i
2003-SC-0346-MR
APPELLANT
WAYNE WOODWARD
V.
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-0390
KENTON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 99-CR-0478
PATRICIA M . SUMME, JUDGE,
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
Reversing
On June 21, 1999, Appellant's wife reported an incident to the Kenton County
Police wherein she stated that on June 19, 1999, she confronted Appellant, Wayne
Woodward, in the bedroom of their eleven-year-old daughter . Ms. Woodward reported
that she observed the daughter partially clothed with her vagina exposed, and that when
Appellant noticed Ms . Woodward, he pushed her out of the room.
Following a search of the Woodward premises and the seizure of a computer and
a firearm, Appellant was arrested on June 24, 1999, and charged with distribution of
matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor, and fourth-degree assault (domestic
violence) . Appellant states in his brief that at the time of his arrest, he was also being
investigated for possible misconduct with his minor daughter arising out of the events of
June 19, 1999.
Appellant was subsequently indicted in the Kenton Circuit Court in September
1999, on one count of distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor
and one count of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon.
Pursuant to a written agreement by the Commonwealth, Appellant entered a plea
of guilty to both charges on November 22, 1999 . He was sentenced to five years
imprisonment, probated for five years . In addition to paying court costs, Appellant was
required to serve thirty days in jail, complete a sex-offender treatment program, consent
to random drug/alcohol testing as well as home searches, and agree to numerous other
conditions restricting contact with his children and his use of the internet. The written
plea agreement contained the following language: "This offer specifically DOES NOT
INCLUDE any acts of sexual abuse of children should evidence of such acts be
discovered ." It is reasonable to infer that the reservation of a sexual abuse charge
related to the ongoing investigation of allegations concerning Appellant's daughter .
On June 7, 2002, Appellant was indicted by a Kenton County Grand Jury for use
of a minor in a sexual performance on or about June 19, 1999. On June 18, 2002,
defense counsel filed a motion to prohibit prosecution on the grounds that it violated the
terms of Appellant's 1999 plea agreement . Following a hearing on January 16, 2003,
the trial court entered an order wherein it recognized that "a defendant is entitled to
specific performance of a plea agreement . The corollary conclusion is that the
Commonwealth is required to abide by its plea agreement irrespective of whether or not
it subsequently considers the agreement to have been unwise ." (citation omitted) .
However, the trial court further concluded :
The enforceability of plea agreements however is not at the heart of
this argument. The argument revolves around the interpretation of the
agreement . The defendant argues that the Commonwealth agreed not
to indict him on anything other than sex abuse . He bases this
argument on Section 4 (9) of the Commonwealth's recommendations,
which reads :
This offer specifically DOES NOT INCLUDE any acts
of sexual abuse of children should evidence of
such be discovered .
Attorney David Steele [former Assistant Kenton County
Commonwealth's attorney] testified that "acts of sexual abuse"
pursuant to KRS 510 and local standard of practice means a "touching"
or a "contact". He further testified that the local standard of practice
required the Commonwealth to reserve a cause of action, as it did in
Section 4 (9), or it was waived . In his view, the local standard is that
the Commonwealth, by entering a plea agreement in a multiple charge
case, merges the remaining criminal activity into the agreement and is
estopped from further prosecution . Former Commonwealth's Attorney
Robert Sanders Jr. also testified .
The Court finds the policies articulated by Mr. David Steele, are not
the policies of the current Commonwealth's Attorney . The Court
further finds the application of these policies, in the past, were fact and
case dependent .
The Court does not find that "acts of sex abuse" in the local
standard of practice always mean a "touching" or "contact" for the
reasons articulated in this order.
While the current indictment is under KRS 531 .310 and not for
"sexual abuse" as defined in KRS Chapter 510, the facts as stated in
the indictment and bill of particulars clearly show sexual exploitation
under the charging statute of such a nature as to meet as common
sense understanding of sexual abuse. Alcorn v. Commonwealth , Ky.
App., 910 S.W.2d 716 (1995) . The primary purpose of the Kentucky
statute relating to sexual exploitation of minors is clearly to protect
children from the conduct of being used in a sexual performance. The
word "use" is the cornerstone of KRS 531 .310.
In addition KRS 531 .310 is included along with the child abuse
statutes from KRS Chapter 510 in KRS 532 .045, which outlines
exceptions to probation eligibility. It is clear that the legislature
intended use of a minor in a sexual performance to be classified with
other statutes protecting minors from being used for sexual purposes,
despite its placement in the pornography chapter of the statutes.
The court concludes that the plea offer uses the phrase "sexual
abuse of children" without reference to any specific statute and so
should be read with its common meaning and not limited to the
definition under KRS 510.110 or the other "sexual abuse" statutes .
On April 7, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied Appellant's petition for a writ of
prohibition, on the grounds he has an adequate remedy by appeal . Appellant appealed
to this Court as a matter of right. The Commonwealth did not respond to either
Appellant's petition for a writ or this appeal until ordered to do so by this Court.
As to the procedural worthiness of Appellant's claim, he argues that he does not
have an adequate remedy by appeal . He contends that the current prosecution violates
the terms of the plea agreement with which he has fully complied ; and if prosecution is
permitted to proceed, he has lost the benefit of what he bargained for, namely, the
freedom from having to defend himself in such proceedings . Appellant argues that
although he would certainly have the right of appeal in the event he is convicted, it
cannot remedy the fact of prosecution and its consequences .
Concerning the merits of this case, Appellant asserts that the language of the
plea agreement clearly only reserved the Commonwealth's right to prosecute him for
sexual abuse (arising from the same June 1999 events) . Appellant relies heavily on this
Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Reyes, Ky., 764 S .W.2d 62, 64 (1989), wherein
we recognized that plea agreements are "constitutional contracts" which are binding and
enforceable once an accused enters his plea or takes action to his detriment in reliance
upon the offer. Quoting Ricketts v . Adamson , 483 U .S . 1, 107 S.Ct . 2680, 97 L.Ed .2d 1
(1987) (Brennan, J ., dissenting) . Had the Commonwealth intended to reserve other
causes of action, Appellant contends that it should have either delineated such or
should have omitted the language in Section 4(9) .
The Commonwealth responds that a writ is not appropriate in this case since
Appellant has a remedy by appeal in the event he is convicted on the instant charge .
Furthermore, although conceding that a written plea agreement is binding and
enforceable once a defendant enters a plea and relies upon it to his detriment, the
Commonwealth claims, as did the trial court, that such did not occur in this case .
Essentially, it is the Commonwealth's position that the provision in Section 4(9) only
applied to the children depicted in the images seized from Appellant's home computer,
which formed the basis of the 1999 indictment for distribution of matter portraying a
sexual performance by a minor. In other words, the instant charge of using a minor in a
sexual performance relates to Appellant's daughter, who was not one of the children
depicted in the images . Thus, the Commonwealth claims it was not prohibited by the
plea agreement from charging Appellant with any offenses relating to his daughter.
Further, the Commonwealth asserts that the ordinary meaning of "sexual abuse"
as defined by BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY is "illegal acts performed against a minor by
a parent, guardian, relative, or acquaintance." Id . at 1375 (6 t" ed. 1993) . As such, the
Commonwealth agrees with the trial court's rationale that use of a minor in a sexual
performance falls within the common sense definition of sexual abuse.
We are of the opinion that the Commonwealth and the trial court clearly erred in
finding that a "common sense understanding of sexual abuse" would include a charge of
use of a minor in a sexual performance. The offense of sexual abuse is contained in
Chapter 510, Sexual Offenses . The Commentary to KRS 510 .110, sexual abuse in the
first degree, provides : "Sexual abuse is based on `sexual contact' as that term is defined
in KRS 510 .010(7). An actual touching must occur." See also Bills v . Commonwealth ,
Ky ., 851 S.W.2d 466 (1993) .
Use of a minor in a sexual performance, KRS 531 .310, is contained in Chapter
531, Pornography, and provides : "(1) a person is guilty of the use of a minor in a sexual
performance if he employs, consents to, authorizes or induces a minor to engage in a
sexual performance ." No physical contact with the minor is required for violation of the
statute . Indeed, the Alcorn , supra , case cited by the trial court notes that Chapter 531
indicates the legislature's intent to "prohibit the sexual exploitation of minors including
such deviate behavior as Alcorn engaged in in the presence of a child . This would be
especially true where the actor used the child in any manner whatsoever whether he
physically touched him or not. . . . The fact that the child had no physical contact with
appellant does not absolve him of guilt. Gilbert v . Commonwealth , Ky., 838 S.W.2d 376
(1992) ." Alcorn , supra, at 717 .
Regardless of whether the "local standard of practice" in Kenton County
requires a "touching" or "contact" for sexual abuse, the offense as defined in KRS
Chapter 510 unquestionably requires such element. The Commonwealth obviously did
not find sufficient evidence that Appellant had engaged in physical contact with his
daughter in June 1999, for it chose to indict him in 2002 for use of a minor in a sexual
performance rather than sexual abuse. To construe the Commonwealth's language in
the plea agreement as reserving a right to prosecute Appellant for any additional acts of
child exploitation concerning his daughter arising from the same date as the 1999
charges, would effectively eviscerate the purpose of the clause since the initial charge
he pled guilty to was distribution of matter portraying a sexual performance by a minor,
which, under the trial court's analysis, was sexual abuse. Further, contrary to the trial
court's order, logic dictates that the practices and policies of the Commonwealth's
attorney that was in office at the time of Appellant's plea agreement is what is relevant,
not those of the current office .
Next, we must determine whether Appellant is entitled to the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of prohibition . To obtain such relief, a petitioner must show that: (1)
the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its jurisdiction and there is
no adequate remedy by appeal, or (2) the lower court is about to act incorrectly,
although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or
otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury would result. Southeastern United
Medigroup v. Hughes ., Ky., 952 S.W .2d 195, 199 (1997) . While the decision whether to
grant or deny a petition for a writ is within the appellate court's discretion, unless the
petition alleges a double jeopardy bar, a court may grant extraordinary relief only when
the party seeking the writ has satisfied the threshold requirements .
See
Commonwealth v . Stephenson , Ky., 82 S .W.3d 876 (2002) ; Graham v. Mills , Ky., 694
S .W.2d 698 (1985) . And such an extraordinary remedy is unavailable unless a
petitioner can demonstrate that traditional post hoc appellate procedures do not provide
him or her with an adequate remedy. Ignatow v. Ryan , Ky., 40 S .W.3d 861 (2001) ;
Cavender v. Miller , Ky., 984 S.W.2d 848 (1998), cert. denied , 528 U .S. 833 (1999) .
We are cognizant of the fact that we recently held in Flynt v. Commonwealth , Ky .,
105 S .W .2d 415 (2003), that having to endure a prosecution and the ramifications
associated therewith does not change the fact that a defendant has the right to appeal
any conviction .
To accept Appellant Flynt's argument that the disqualifications
associated with a felony conviction render his direct appeal right an
inadequate remedy, however, we would have to hold that any ruling in
a felony case can be reviewed via mandamus or prohibition prior to
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final judgment. And, because we have consistently found that
traditional appellate review of allegations of error in felony cases
constitute[s] an adequate remedy, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that Appellant Flynt's right of direct appeal from any future judgment of
conviction would afford him an adequate forum in which to raise his
allegations of error .
Id . at 422-23 . But see Peterson v . Shake, Ky., 120 S.W.3d 707 (2003) ("If a writ were
not issued, Appellant would experience great injustice in that he would have to endure a
trial and possibly face conviction of a Class D felony, when the maximum charge he
should face is a Class A misdemeanor.")
We perceive a significant distinction between the instant case and the facts of
Flynt, supra . Following Flynt's indictment for a felony drug offense (the procedural
validity of which was not at issue), he filed an application for entry of a pretrial diversion
order. The trial court denied the application and Flynt petitioned the. Court of Appeals
for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court "to exercise discretion and to rule upon
the Defendant's motion for Felony Diversion under KRS 533 .250 ." Flynt, supra, at 421 .
Flynt argued that extraordinary relief was proper because if he sought appellate review
of the trial court's pretrial ruling in an appeal from a final judgment of conviction, he
would first have to suffer the collateral consequences associated with a felony
conviction. Id. at 422 .
Here, while Woodward is certainly claiming he will suffer irreparable harm if
required to face trial on the current charge, what he actually seeks is enforcement of the
terms of the plea agreement, which only excluded acts of sexual abuse. Should
Woodward be convicted on the instant charge, an appellate court can surely reverse the
conviction if it finds the Commonwealth violated the plea agreement . Yet, at that point,
enforcement of the plea agreement is moot. In other words, if Woodward's only remedy
for a violation of the plea agreement is to appeal any subsequent conviction, the plea
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agreement becomes a nullity. And, for all practical purposes, the Commonwealth is free
to renege on its end of the bargain . Unlike Flynt, who challenged a pretrial ruling
associated with his felony indictment, Woodward challenges the validity of the
indictment itself, including the Commonwealth's authority to indict him for a charge that
was not reserved in the agreement,
In Shaffer v. Morgan, Ky., 815 S.W.2d 402 (1991), the defendant sought a writ
prohibiting the Commonwealth from prosecuting him on a charge that had been
dismissed with prejudice, on the grounds that the dismissal of the indictment with
prejudice was a final adjudication of the merits and thus barred further prosecution .
This Court held that the defendant relied to his detriment on the prosecution's motion to
dismiss the indictment and that the Commonwealth reneged on the agreement upon
which the defendant had relied . "The Commonwealth must honor its agreement to
dismiss the case with prejudice . The prosecution, therefore, is further estopped from
any further prosecution of the appellant ." Id . at 404. See also Workman v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 580 S .W.2d 206 (1979), overruled on other grounds in Morton v .
Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S .W.2d 218 (1991) . Similarly, in Reyes, supra, the
Commonwealth appealed an order of the Christian Circuit Court sustaining the
defendant's motion to compel the Commonwealth to carry out its written plea
agreement . This Court ultimately upheld the finding of the special circuit judge that
"Except as he has been prevented from performing by the Commonwealth, Reyes has
fully performed . Perforce, it is now the obligation of the Commonwealth to perform."
Reyes , supra, at 69 .
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that traditional post
hoc appellate procedures provide Woodward with an adequate remedy. Enforcement of
the plea agreement is the essential issue in this case, not whether Woodward can
appeal any subsequent conviction . To allow the prosecution in this case to continue
would not only result in an irreparable injury to Woodward, who relied on the plea
agreement and complied with all of its terms, but would relieve the Commonwealth
from the performance of its end of the bargain . "If the government breaks its word, it
breeds contempt for integrity and good faith. It destroys the confidence of citizens in the
operations of their government and invites them to disregard their obligations ."
Workman, supra, at 207.
For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the order of the Court of Appeals and
remand with directions to issue a writ directing the Kenton Circuit Court to dismiss the
current charge against Appellant for use of a minor in a sexual performance .
Lambert, C .J ., Cooper, Graves, Keller, and Stumbo, J .J ., concur .
Johnstone, J., concurs in result only.
Wintersheimer, J ., dissents without opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
W. Robert Lotz, Jr.
120 West Fifth Street
Covington, KY 41011
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Brian T. Judy
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
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