TERRELL LITTLE V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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2003-SC-0276-MR
APPELLANT
TERRELL LITTLE
V
APPEAL FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDY COLEMAN, JUDGE
2002-CR-0043
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
This appeal is from a jury verdict convicting Little of murder and first degree
assault and sentencing him to twenty years in prison.
The questions presented are : (1) whether an inadequate foundation was laid by
the Commonwealth before positing expert testimony under KRE 702 ; and, (2) whether
KRS 507.020(1)(b) is constitutional without proving a single act that manifests a
conscious disregard of extreme indifference to human life by the defendant.
At about noon on March 3, 2002, Little drove his Ford Ranger truck onto a
dangerous curve, crossed the centerline of the road, proceeded 99 feet in the opposing
traffic lane, and collided with an on-coming full-size Ford F-150 truck killing the driver
and seriously injuring the passenger of that truck . Little suffered injuries, including a
bleeding brain and lung injuries requiring surgery and 16 days of hospitalization .
Rescuers had to cut his vehicle open in order to get him out . Even his foot had been
pinned underneath the brake pedal requiring further extraction efforts . The response
personnel described him as unresponsive to questions or their requests for assistance
from him during the extraction process and said he sat in the vehicle staring straight
ahead . They recalled no complaints of pain from him, either.
The relative vehicle positions were used to reconstruct the accident . The victim's
truck had been pushed over 13 feet backwards by the impact. The victim's vehicle was
determined to have been traveling with the right tire outside of the fog line . Little's truck
was determined to have been at least two feet across the centerline at impact.
The cause of the accident was ascertained to be something other than
mechanical defects or conditions . It was a clear day and the road was dry. Police had
the trucks inspected after the accident and no mechanical failure capable of causing
the accident could be found . Testimony at trial included observations that in order for
Little's lighter truck to push the heavier F-150 backwards on impact, Little must have
been traveling a greater speed than the victim's vehicle.
About an hour after the accident, hospital blood tests were drawn from Little that
revealed blood levels of 0.047mg% Diazepan; 0.009 mg% Nordiazepan ; and
0 .011 mg% Cocaine . Diazepan and Nordiazepan are the chemicals comprising the drug
known as Valium . During later investigation at the hospital, Little denied having taken
any prescription medicines or having prescriptions for any medicines that would contain
these chemicals, but admitted ingesting cocaine a few days prior to the accident .
At trial, the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Rolf, testified that these drugs might
have had a "synergistic" effect to heighten effects, but abandoned that theory without
modifying her opinion . Her opinion was that despite the minute levels, as a matter of
science, the drugs impaired Little . The defense rebutted with their expert, Dr. Reasor,
who instead stated that no significant medical studies have been conducted as to
whether the presence of both of these chemicals could have intoxicating synergistic
effects. His testimony included that cocaine levels could have been twice as much at
the time of the accident, and that cocaine causes a "euphoric" state . Both experts
agreed that no studies have been performed on the exact effects of these drugs when
taken together. Although discussion was made that the relative effects may "cancel"
each other out, it was explained that each drug works on different types of neurological
transmitters, rather than affecting the same places in the brain.
Little told police that he did not have prescriptions for the drugs found in his
system on March 3, 2002. The amounts were consistent with therapeutic levels, that is,
levels consistent with those levels created when the drugs are taken for treatment
purposes . The Commonwealth showed that therapeutic levels of Valium can have
impairing effects, including slower reaction times, impeded muscle coordination, and
impaired eyesight . The impairing effects of the drug can be greater if the drug is taken
irregularly, at differing amounts, and without medical supervision .
The jury convicted Little on both counts . He was sentenced to twenty years for
the murder and ten years for assault to run concurrently . This appeal followed .
I . The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Little attacks the qualifications and sufficiency of facts underlying the testimony
of the Commonwealth's expert, Dr. Rolf. He argues that because Dr. Rolf has taken no
toxicology classes and had performed only one other evaluation of drug levels for
driving impairment purposes, she was unqualified to be an expert in this case .
Furthermore, he charges error to the trial court in failing to find specific facts upon
which it admitted her as an expert . The question is therefore whether Dr. Rolf could be
admitted as an expert witness and whether the quality of her testimony could be
admitted as expert opinion .
There is no support for an argument that the trial judge abused his discretion
because the video record of Little's Daubert hearing was not made part of the certified
record on appeal . The designation of the record to be considered on appeal is
appellant's responsibility . CR 75.01 . It is his responsibility to ensure that a complete
designated record is prepared and certified by the clerk of the trial court within the time
prescribed by CR 73 .08. CR 75.07(5).
The evidence at trial supported admitting Dr. Rolfs expert testimony. Expert
opinion evidence is admissible so long as: (1) the witness is qualified to render an
opinion on the subject matter; (2) the subject matter satisfies the requirements of
Daubert; (3) the subject matter satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in KRE 401,
subject to the balancing of probativeness against prejudice required by KRE 403; and,
(4) the opinion will assist the trier of fact per KRE 702. Stringer v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
956 S .W .2d 883 (1997), cert . denied 523 U .S . 1052, 118 S.Ct. 1374, 140 L.Ed .2d 522
(1998) (internal citation omitted) . Little argues that under Mitchell v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 908 S .W .2d 100 (1995) and Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson , Ky., 11
S .W .3d 575 (2000), each of which clarified the incorporation of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals , 509 U.S . 579, 113 S .Ct. 2786, 125 L .Ed .2d 469 (1993) into Kentucky
law, that Dr. Rolf's testimony failed . Furthermore, Little contends that her testimony
was not "scientific knowledge" . We disagree and analyze the issue under the Stringer
standards here .
A. Dr. Rolf
s Qualifications
Dr. Rolf was qualified to render an opinion on the subject matter. Little
challenges the training and experience of Dr. Rolf in an attempt to disqualify her expert
testimony as to drug impairment . In evaluating whether the expert is qualified,
"Kentucky's case law clearly indicates that the decision required of the trial judge is to
determine if an expert has 'adequate' rather than 'outstanding' qualifications ." Lawson,
The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook , § 6 .15 (3d ed .) . With respect to medical
experts, "a general practitioner usually may testify as to medical problems that a
specialist might treat in a clinical setting ." Wright and Gold, Federal Practice and
Procedure; Evidence, § 6265 (citing cases). The decision as to the qualifications of an
expert rests within the discretion of the trial judge . Ford v. Commonwealth , Ky., 665
S .W .2d 304, 309 (1983), cert . denied , 469 U.S . 984,105 S .Ct. 392, 83 L .Ed .2d 325
(1984).
At trial, Dr. Rolf testified that she has a degree in biology, pre-medicine from
Penn State, she graduated from Medical College of Ohio in 1991, completed a three
year residency at Case Western Reserve University in Ohio, and received specialty
training during a one year forensic medicine fellowship at a county coroner's office in
Cleveland, Ohio . Since 1997, when she began working for the Kentucky State Medical
Examiner's Office, she has been determining whether drugs caused the death of the
individuals whose blood, fluids, and tissues she tests for the presence of drugs . She
regularly researches pharmacological and toxicological literature and consults other
experts in the field to perform her duties . She has testified in another trial regarding the
effect of a drug on driving skills .
In short, she was qualified to give expert testimony in this case on the presence
and potential effects of the drugs found in Little's blood . Little's argument revolves
around comparing Rolf's testimony to his own expert, Dr. Reasor, who is a professor
with experience in pharmacological and toxicological effects of drugs . Such
comparisons are to be made by the jury, whereas the trial judge's job was to determine
whether Dr. Rolf was minimally qualified to meet the standards of KRE 702 . See, e . .,
..
Cree v. Hatcher , 969 F .2d 34, 38-39 fn. 5 (3d Cir.1992), cert. dismissed , 506 U.S . 1017,
113 S.Ct. 1147, 121 L .Ed .2d 577 (1992) ("The fact that a doctor is not a specialist in a
particular field goes not to the admissibility of the opinion but rather to the weight that
the jury may wish to place upon it."). Therefore, Little's argument was made to the jury,
and they were able to determine whether Dr. Rolf's opinion compared to Dr. Reasor's
opinion . The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by permitting Dr. Rolf to testify as
an expert witness .
B. Daubert Requirements
Although the record is unclear in this case, it appears that Little moved to
exclude Dr. Rolf's testimony prior to trial and a Daubert hearing was held . Little objects
to trial admission of Dr. Rolf's opinions that Cocaine and Valium at the levels found in
Little's blood would mean he had been intoxicated . He disputes this expert opinion
under the Daubert standard because Dr. Reasor testified that no adequate studies have
been performed on the potential "synergistic" effects of Cocaine and Valium, nor
measurements of either drug's intoxicating effects at this level. He therefore states that
Dr. Rolf's opinion that Cocaine and Valium have intoxicating effects is mere speculation
thereby violating Goodyear and Mitchell, supra . We disagree .
Both experts agreed that these two drugs were found in Little's blood . Blood
tests for blood detection have been used as evidence in numerous cases, and we
decline to invalidate such evidence in this case absent a convincing argument. Little's
expert agreed that drug levels were higher earlier in the day of the collision . Each
expert based their opinions on the blood results and the methodology of measuring the
presence of Valium or Cocaine in the blood is well accepted. Therefore we find no
abuse of discretion .
C . Probativeness versus Prejudice
This part of the Stringer test requires us to balance the probativeness of Dr.
Rolf's testimony against the prejudice . We have addressed the probative value of such
testimony in Bush v. Commonwealth , Ky., 839 S .W .2d 550 (1992) and Estep v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 957 S .W.2d 191 (1997). Both cases dealt with the admission of
drug presence in the defendant pursuant to a trial for wanton murder due to automobile
crashes .
Here, Little's argument seems to have a focus on the fact that Dr. Rolf stated
with reasonable medical certainty that the Valium levels had impairing affects on Little's
ability to operate a vehicle. He attacks her ability to state this, and did so with his own
expert at trial . The jury was therefore able to give proper weight to this evidence, but
the probative value of determining the impairing effects of Valium was necessary to
sustain a conviction for wanton murder. In this case, because the balance between
KRE 401 and KRE 403 was not exceeded, the trial judge properly admitted Dr. Rolfs
testimony.
D. KRE 702
The last hurdle of the Stringer test is whether, as required by KRE 702, the
testimony will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue . Dr. Rolf was used as a Commonwealth expert to explain the nature of the drugs
found in the blood of Little . The Commonwealth had a burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt the elements of the wanton murder charge . In order for the trier of
fact to understand how the drugs were influencing Little and to understand the nature of
the drugs, Dr. Rolf's testimony explained these things to the court.
Dr . Rolf testified to the effects of Valium and the effects of Cocaine. She stated
that each "can" impair driving skills . She commented that using each drug together
does not cancel the effects out, and explained why: because each drug works on
different transmitters in the brain, and therefore, it was not that the use of one drug
blocked the other drug's ability to work on parts of the brain because they each affected
different types of parts of the brain . Finally, and perhaps the most contentious
statement in the eyes of Little, Dr. Rolf concluded that Little was impaired at the time of
the accident . Little attacks this conclusion on the grounds that inadequate literature is
available discussing the synergistic effects of these drugs and the effects of these
drugs at the level measured in Little's blood . The tools available to a doctor to make
conclusions regarding the medical condition of an individual are not confined to mere
literature . They also use symptoms of the patient, and the actual condition of the
patient together with their experience and that of their peers . Given the presence of the
drugs and the behavior of Little, she made her conclusion with reasonable medical
certainty, "based on science" . The weight and value of her statement was to be
measured by the jury, and in reference to Dr . Reasor's testimony . The trial judge
properly admitted the evidence by this test.
Little's last argument is that certain hypothetical questions presented to Dr. Rolf
violated his right against self-incrimination . Essentially, Little complains about the
hypotheticals positing a time of Little's Cocaine ingestion . Dr. Rolf was asked to
assume that Cocaine ingestion had been in the last few days. Little states that these
questions are improper hypotheticals and it appears that he invokes the right against
self-incrimination because he could not rebut this evidence without admitting himself
when he ingested Cocaine. The experts each agreed that the Cocaine amount present
in Little's blood had a half-life of about an hour. This fact meant that each hour the
dose dropped in half, or, looking backwards, the Cocaine level would be double for
each hour prior. That evidence alone was enough to support a hypothetical question
limiting the time of ingestion to be within a few days. Little would not need to
incriminate himself to rebut that assumption, but rather provide an alternative theory for
the presence of Cocaine measured in his blood . The jury could determine the
believability of the Commonwealth's theory against his, but in neither case was it an
improper hypothetical . In short, the limitations of Dr. Rolfs testimony go to the weight
and not the admissibility of the evidence. We cannot say the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting Dr. Rolfs testimony as an expert .
II. Constitutionality of KRS 507.020(1)(b)
Little argues that KRS 507.020(1)(b) is void for vagueness because the phrase
"extreme indifference to human life" is a "nebulous concept" incapable of certain grasp
by the average man . In the alternative, he claims that even if this phrase could be held
in the minds of reasonable and average men with certainty, there is no specific act of
Little's that on its own could fulfill the requirement of that mens rea. He asserts that the
phrases "Valium" and "Cocaine" merely prejudiced the jury against him . This premises
his argument that no single act of wantonness, that is, with a "depraved heart", or, with
"purposeful or knowing" indifference to a known risk, can be named in his actions . We
disagree with both arguments .
A statute is vague if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S . 601, 93 S .Ct . 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830
(1973) . Likewise, if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the
meaning of a statute and differ as to its application, the statute is vague. United States
v. Lanier , 520 U .S . 259, 117 S .Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed .2d 432 (1997). We have stated the
test of vagueness to be "whether a person disposed to obey the law could determine
with reasonable certainty whether contemplated conduct would amount to a violation ."
Commonwealth v. Foley, Ky ., 798 S.W.2d 947 (1990) overruled on other grounds by
Martin v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 96 S.W .3d 38 (2003) . We examined KRS 507.020(1)(b)
in Brown v. Commonwealth , Ky., 975 S .W .2d 922 (1998), and found it to Constitutional
and therefore not vague. There is no reason to revisit that meticulous examination
here, other than to reiterate that the phrase "extreme indifference to human life" has a
succinct meaning capable of being grasped in the mind of the common man . The
question of whether Little's actions manifested such indifference was an assessment for
the trier of fact .
The jury was faced with a defendant who had Cocaine and Valium in his system,
drove his vehicle across the median of the road at a high rate of speed, and despite
being conscious, was unresponsive to emergency response personnel who attempted
to cut him out of his own crushed vehicle. The jury was free to make all reasonable
inferences from these points of evidence . Dillingham v. Commonwealth , Ky., 995
S .W .2d 377 (1999). They were able to determine whether Little was unresponsive at
the accident scene because of shock or because of intoxication . They were also able
to determine whether operating his vehicle involved a risk of death . They were able to
put these things together and determine from that evidence whether they believed Little
10
had conducted himself with the required mens rea of "extreme indifference to human
life". Stopher v. Commonwealth , Ky, 57 S .W .2d 787 (2001). The jury could determine
whether Little took the Valium without a prescription in order to attempt to "cancel out"
his cocaine intoxication . Although Little argued this point about the effect of Valium to
try and disprove intoxication, the jury was free to reasonably infer that the effects were
not cancelled out because Little showed signs of being intoxicated at the crash scene.
Therefore, the jury may have inferred that Little was knowingly intoxicated and
attempted a self-remedy prior to driving . Little argues that there had to be one specific
act. Given the totality of the circumstances, including, as Little informs us, the notoriety
of the extremely dangerous nature of this particular curve in the road, we can see no
unreasonable prejudice for the jury to reach this verdict . See Commonwealth v.
Benham , Ky., 816 S .W.2d 186 (1991) .
The judgment of conviction is affirmed .
All concur except Stumbo, J ., who concurs in result only.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Lawrence R. Webster
P.O. Drawer 712
Pikeville, KY 41502
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew D . Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
John R . Tarter
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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