PAUL WILLIAM LEWIS V JAMES L . BOWLING, JR ., JUDGE, HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY and PAUL WILLIAM LEWIS V JAMES L . BOWLING, JR ., SPECIAL JUDGE, HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED B Y THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED: MARCH 18, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2003-SC-0165-MR
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PAUL WILLIAM LEWIS
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ORIGINAL ACTION IN COURT OF APPEALS
2002-CA-2443
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 89-CR-96
JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., JUDGE,
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY I N INTEREST)
AND
2003-SC-0238-MR
PAUL WILLIAM LEWIS
V
APPELLEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ORIGINAL ACTION IN COURT OF APPEALS
2003-CA-169
HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 89-CR-73
JAMES L. BOWLING, JR., SPECIAL
JUDGE, HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLEE
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
(REAL PARTY IN INTEREST)
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING 2003-SC-0238-MR
AND
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING AND REMANDING IN PART
2003-SC-0165-MR
I . TRANSCRIPTS .
In 2003-SC-0238-MR, Appellant, Paul William Lewis, appeals from the Court of
Appeals' denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus requiring Appellee, Judge
Bowling, special judge of the Harlan Circuit Court, to furnish him with transcripts of a
1989 trial that resulted in his conviction of robbery in the first degree and sentence of
seventeen years in prison . Appellant filed the motion for transcripts on December 23,
2002 . The special judge had not yet ruled on the motion when the petition for a writ of
mandamus was filed on January 27, 2003. Although the Court of Appeals gave no
reason for denying the petition, we assume it was because the judge had not ruled on
the motion and insufficient time had expired to conclude that he was neglecting it or
refusing to act on it. Cf. Shelton v. Simpson , Ky., 441 S .W .2d 421, 423 (1969)
("Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel an inferior court to adjudicate on a subject
within its jurisdiction, where it neglects or refuses to do so , but will not lie to revise or
correct the decision or control discretion .") (emphasis added) . We agree with this
reasoning and affirm the Court of Appeals.
II. SPEEDY TRIAL.
In 2003-SC-0165-MR, Appellant appeals from the Court of Appeals' denial of his
petition for a writ to prohibit his trial on charges of attempted escape, possession of
dangerous contraband, and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO
1 st) . He was indicted for these offenses in November 1989 and filed a motion for a
speedy trial on these charges on July 27, 1990. He filed a motion to dismiss "for failure
to prosecute" on November 25, 1991, which has not yet been heard . The reason no
hearing was held on the motion is that Appellant was mistakenly released from custody
by the Department of Corrections on February 1, 1992, and remained free without bond
until July 28, 2002 . On August 21, 2002, he renewed his motion for a speedy trial on
both statutory, KRS 500 .110, and constitutional grounds . The petition for a writ was
filed on November 27, 2002. Again, the Court of Appeals did not state a reason for
denying the petition . According to the Commonwealth, the motion to dismiss on speedy
trial grounds was scheduled to be heard on December 12, 2002 . However, according to
Appellant, the case was scheduled for trial on that date . We cannot discern from the
record which assertion is correct . Regardless, the Court of Appeals should have issued
a writ requiring the special judge to rule on the motion to dismiss before allowing the
case to be tried . Cf. Schroerinq v. McKinney, Ky., 906 S.W .2d 349 (1995) (mandamus
may compel a lower court to act but not to direct what decision should be reached) ;
Spivey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 602 S .W .2d 158, 159 (1980) (circuit court does not have
jurisdiction to try defendant where speedy trial denied) . Because it does not appear that
a detainer was ever issued on the November 1989 indictment, the outcome of the
motion to dismiss for violation of Appellant's right to a speedy trial will depend upon
proper application of the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo , 407 U .S. 514, 530, 92
S .Ct. 2182, 2192, 33 L .Ed .2d 101 (1972) .
III . WAIVER OF SENTENCE .
Appellant also appeals in 2003-SC-0165-MR from the Court of Appeals' denial of
his petition for a writ prohibiting the special judge from enforcing the seventeen-year
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sentence imposed for the 1989 robbery conviction . However, that conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 7, 1992, and became final thirty-one days
thereafter . CR 76 .30(2)(a) . Again, the Court of Appeals did not state a reason for
denying the petition; but we assume it was because the special judge lacks jurisdiction
to alter or terminate Appellant's sentence. Ringo v. Pound , Ky., 436 S .W .2d 264 (1969).
If Appellant believes he is being unlawfully incarcerated, his remedy is a petition for a
writ directed to the person by whom he claims to be unlawfully detained, i .e. , the prison
warden . See, e .g . , Kassulke v. Briscoe-Wade , Ky., 105 S.W .3d 403 (2003). Because
Appellant undoubtedly will refile his petition against the proper party, we will briefly
review the facts and law pertinent to this issue .
Appellant was arrested for robbery on August 8, 1989. At that time, he was on
parole of a twenty-six-year sentence for seven previous convictions in Jefferson and
Hardin counties which occurred in 1975 and 1980, respectively. On August 24, 1989,
the Department of Corrections revoked Appellant's parole and ordered him to serve the
remainder of the twenty-six-year sentence . He remained in the Harlan County
Detention Center awaiting trial on the 1989 robbery charge. While there, he was
charged with attempted escape, possession of dangerous contraband, and PFO 1 st, the
offenses that are the subject of his speedy trial claim, discussed supra .
Following his October 11, 1989, robbery conviction, Appellant remained
incarcerated in the Harlan County Detention Center awaiting trial on the escape,
contraband, and PFO charges . Trial was ultimately scheduled for August 16, 1990 . On
July 27, 1990, Appellant moved for a competency evaluation, claiming he was insane
when he committed those offenses . According to Appellant, the trial court ordered a
competency evaluation and continued the trial date indefinitely . Of course, a new trial
date could not be set until the competency evaluation was completed . Appellant claims
the competency evaluation was never scheduled .
In late 1990, Appellant was transferred from the Harlan County Detention Center
to the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex to serve the remainder of the twenty-sixyear sentence imposed for the 1975 and 1980 convictions . However, the Harlan Circuit
Court failed to forward to Luckett a certified copy of the judgment imposing the
seventeen-year sentence for the 1989 robbery conviction .' Significantly (with respect to
his statutory speedy trial claim under KRS 500.110), Appellant also asserts that no
detainers were lodged against him with respect to the 1989 indictment for attempted
escape and contraband . He is no doubt correct considering the following chain of
events .
On February 1, 1992, Appellant completed service of his twenty-six-year
sentence for the 1975 and 1980 convictions and was released . Of course, he had not
completed his seventeen-year sentence for the 1989 robbery conviction . In fact, he
probably had not served any of that sentence, as it could not be served concurrently
with the 1975 and 1980 sentences . KRS 533.060(2). Additionally, Luckett officials
were unaware of the robbery conviction . After his release, Appellant moved to
Huntsville, Tennessee, where on March 16, 1992, he was arrested on a fugitive warrant
pertaining to the pending 1989 indictment for escape, contraband, and PFO 1 st .
Obviously, Kentucky officials were aware of their mistake within a month of Appellant's
release . Although the Tennessee court granted two continuances, Kentucky authorities
' Under KRS 431 .215(1), two certified copies of the judgment imposing sentencing must
be furnished to the sheriff for delivery to the penitentiary or institute of confinement .
2 The penitentiary records attached to Appellant's brief do not show the 1989 conviction .
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never appeared to establish probable cause for extradition . As a result, the Tennessee
court dismissed the fugitive charges.
On July 28, 2002, more than ten years later, Appellant was again arrested in
Huntsville, Tennessee, on a fugitive warrant . He was extradited to Kentucky on August
1, 2002, and has been imprisoned in the Green River Correctional Complex since that
time . It is unclear whether he is imprisoned on the robbery conviction, or the pending
indictment for escape, contraband, and PFO 1 st. Regardless, the Commonwealth
intends to enforce the entire seventeen-year sentence imposed for the 1989 robbery
conviction .
While the common law required a person to serve his/her sentence in its entirety,
regardless of whether the sentence was served continuously or in installments, the
current trend has moved toward examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the delay in executing the sentence . United States v . Martinez , 837 F.2d 861, 864 (9th
Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) . Absent extraordinary circumstances, a defendant can be
required to serve the remainder of the sentence . "There is no doubt of the power of the
government to recommit a prisoner who is released or discharged by mistake, where his
sentence would not have expired if he had remained in confinement ." White v.
Pearlman , 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) . The
two circumstances in which the defendant will not be required to serve any portion of
the remainder of the sentence are waiver and estoppel . Green v. Christiansen , 732
F .2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir. 1984) .
A. Estoppel .
Estoppel requires a showing of four elements:
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts ;
(2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the
party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended ;
(3) the latter must be ignorant of the facts; and
(4) he must rely on the former's conduct to his injury .
Johnson v. Williford , 682 F .2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted) . In Johnson ,
the defendant was released on parole even though he was convicted under a statute
that the government knew did not provide for it; the government was estopped from
revoking parole as it released him after reviewing his parole eligibility eight times . Id . at
872-73 . The estoppel issue cannot be decided without an evidentiary hearing .
B. Waiver .
If the government's behavior in reincarcerating the defendant after erroneously
releasing him/her rises to the level of a due process violation, the government is
deemed to have waived its right to enforce the remainder of the sentence . This occurs
when "its agents' actions are so affirmatively improper or grossly negligent that it would
be unequivocally inconsistent with 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice' to
require a legal sentence to be served in its aftermath ." Green , supra , at 1399 (citations
omitted) . Courts have found waiver when the government allowed an extended period
of time to expire before attempting to reincarcerate the defendant. Such was the case
in Derrer v. Anthony , 463 S.E .2d 690 (Ga. 1995), where the defendant was mistakenly
released on parole after serving only twelve days of his sentence, never violated the
terms of his parole, and the government did not seek to reacquire custody of him for
seven years. Id . at 693-94 . Waiver was also found in Lanier v. Williams , 361 F.Supp .
944 (E .D .N .C . 1973), where the defendant was erroneously released without serving his
full sentence and the government waited five years before seeking to enforce the
remainder of his sentence . Id . at 947-48. Due process is also denied when the
government repeatedly represents to the defendant that it will not seek enforcement of
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the sentence, but later does so .
United States v. Merritt , 478 F .Supp . 804, 807-09
(D.D.C. 1979) (detainer cannot be enforced when government informed defendant
several times that it would not seek its imposition) .
In Appellant's case, more than ten
years expired between his erroneous release and the Commonwealth's attempt to
reincarcerate him .
The issue then becomes whether the government's behavior amounts to simple
negligence or gross negligence . If only simple negligence, a complete waiver of the
sentence is inappropriate . Under the "installment" theory, the prisoner is entitled to
credit against his sentence for the time he was erroneously at liberty . Martinez , supra,
at 865 (citations omitted) . This theory is based on the notion that, "A prisoner has some
rights . A sentence . . . means a continuous sentence, unless interrupted by escape,
violation of parole, or some fault of the prisoner, and he cannot be required to serve it in
installments ." White , supra, at 789 . The key test in the "installment" theory is that the
defendant must have been released due to government negligence and not due to any
fault of the defendant . Id. The "installment" theory also requires that the defendant
must have served at least part of the sentence, even if only one day . Martinez , supra ,
at 865 . The majority of states that have considered this issue have adopted the
"installment" theory and granted credit to defendants who the government erroneously
released . See Giles v. State , 462 So .2d 1063, 1064 (Ala. Crim . App . 1985) ; McKellar v.
Ariz . State Dep't of Corr. , 566 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ariz. 1977) ; Carson v. State, 489 So .2d
1236, 1238 (Fla . Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ; People v. Cavelli , 409 N .E.2d 924, 925 (N.Y.
1980) ; Ex parte Esquivel , 531 S.W .2d 339, 342 (Tex. Crim . App. 1976), overruled on
other grounds by Ex parte Hale, 117 S .W.3d 866, 872 n .26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (a
person who is free on conditional release and then reincarcerated for violating the
conditions of that release is not being forced to serve sentence in installments) ; In re
Roach , 74 P.3d 134,136-39 (Wash. 2003).
In Commonwealth v. Blair, 699 A .2d 738 (Pa . Super. Ct. 1997), the Pennsylvania
Superior Court refused to follow the "installment" theory and denied the defendant good
time credit for the period of time when he was improperly free on bond . (Appellant was
not free on bond but had been unconditionally released .)
We will not allow the court system's inadvertent error to cancel any part of
Blair's punishment for the crimes for which he was justly convicted and
sentenced . Society has an interest in knowing that its criminals are
serving the punishment to which they have been sentenced, regardless of
an unintended delay or negligent error attributable to the government .
The fact remains that, regardless of the delay, Blair has not served the
time he was so ordered to serve.
Id . at 743.3
The Kentucky Court of Appeals commented favorably on Blair when deciding that
a defendant who experienced a seven-year delay between the time his sentence was
imposed and the time the government sought to incarcerate him was not entitled to
credit for those seven years . Richardson v. Commonwealth , Ky. App ., 56 S .W.3d 460,
463 (2001) . However, unlike in Blair, the Court of Appeals in Richardson did not
indicate an unwillingness to adopt the "installment" theory at all; rather, it indicated that
it was not unjust in that particular case to require the defendant to serve his sentence.
Id . The Court of Appeals may have reached this conclusion because in Richardson , as
in Blair, the defendant had not been exposed to the rehabilitative aspects of prison then
mistakenly released, but merely experienced a delay between the time of sentencing
and incarceration . Lending support to this interpretation is the court's statement that
3 The Tennessee Court of Appeals also declined to grant credit for time at liberty based
on a Tennessee sentencing statute that only allows good time credit under a specific list
of circumstances . State v. Chapman , 977 S.W .2d 122, 127 (Tenn . Crim. App. 1997) .
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credit for time served is generally only awarded when the defendant has served part of
the sentence before being erroneously released . Id . at 462 (citing Martinez , supra , at
865). It is unclear from the record whether Appellant served any part of his seventeenyear sentence before his release but, unlike in Richardson , this was a mistaken release
from incarceration as opposed to a mistaken failure to incarcerate .
The act of negligence in this case was the failure of Harlan County officials to
mail a certified copy of the 1989 judgment to officials at Luckett . The government's loss
of a judgment or failure to mail it to the correctional facility has been deemed mere
negligence . Jackson v. Stalder , 772 So.2d 380, 384 (La . Ct. App. 2000). However, an
additional factor present here is that although the actual release may constitute simple
negligence, the failure to reacquire custody until ten years after learning of the mistake
could be found to have been gross negligence .
In determining whether credit should be granted or denied, some courts consider
the defendant's behavior during the period of freedom . See Crater v. Furlong , 884 P.2d
1127, 1129 (Colo . 1994) (en banc) (citing Brown v. Brittain, 773 P.2d 570, 570 (Colo.
1989)) ; Roach , supra, at 138. See also Martinez , supra , at 865 (defendant should be
given credit as he had not attempted to flee and had lived at same address since
release) ; In re Messerschmidt , 163 Cal . Rptr. 580, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (declining to
adopt a "blanket rule" granting credit for time spent at liberty and instead considering
the equity of granting credit in each circumstance based on prisoner's behavior while
free); State v. Roberts , 568 So.2d 1017, 1019 (La . 1990) (extending the concept to
consider defendant's conduct while free, as well as other factors such as the nature of
the offense, the sentence imposed, and the lapse of time without imposition of the
sentence). But see Green , supra , in which the court found that the defendant's behavior
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while free was irrelevant to the decision of whether he should receive good time credit .
Id . at 1400 . Green distinguished between defendants who were released on parole and
those who were unconditionally released from custody . Those who are on parole know
they are subject to behavioral limitations and conditions but those who are released
unconditionally have no such notice .
Under those circumstances, neither regulations nor simple fairness justify
the imposition of a penalty to which Green never knew he was subject .
He remains, of course, subject to any independent criminal penalties that
may attach to his behavior while at liberty, and that is enough .
Id . Here, Appellant asserts that he was on good behavior during his ten years of
freedom .
While we have set forth factors relevant to this inquiry for the purpose of
guidance, we are unable to address the issue head on because (1) Appellant brought
his petition for a writ against the wrong party and in the wrong court, and (2) there has
been no evidentiary hearing at which the facts necessary for proper application of those
factors could be developed . If Appellant brings this petition against the Department of
Corrections, he will do so in a circuit court, an appropriate forum for an evidentiary
hearing . Our only recourse under the present state of the record is to affirm the
dismissal of this aspect of the petition .
Accordingly, in 2003-SC-0238-MR, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for a
writ of mandamus ; and in 2003-SC-0165-MR, we affirm the dismissal of the portion of
the petition that seeks to prohibit the imposition of the seventeen-year sentence for
Appellant's 1989 robbery conviction . However, we reverse the dismissal of the portion
of his petition that pertains to his claim of a speedy trial violation and remand this case
to the Court of Appeals with direction to issue a writ requiring the special judge of the
Harlan Circuit Court to rule on the speedy trial claim before proceeding to trial on the
1989 indictment for attempted escape, possession of contraband, and PFO 1 st.
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Paul William Lewis, pro se
Green River Correctional Complex
#161107
1200 River Road
P .O . Box 9300
Central City, KY 42330
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE JAMES L . BOWLING, JR ., SPECIAL JUDGE, HARLAN
CIRCUIT COURT :
James L. Bowling, Jr., pro se
P .O. Box 751
Pineville, KY 40977
COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST APPELLEE COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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