JASON A. VANHOOK V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
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RENDERED : APRIL 22, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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JASON A. VANHOOK
APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DANIEL J. VENTERS, JUDGE
2001-CR-0084
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Jason A . Vanhook, was found guilty of arson in the first degree
following a jury trial before the Lincoln Circuit Court. He was sentenced to a term of
twenty-five years' imprisonment . Appellant now brings this direct appeal, claiming that
his conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights . For the reasons set
forth below, we affirm the judgment of the Lincoln Circuit Court .
I.
Facts
At some time between 11 p.m. and midnight on October 2, 2001, Natalie Tincher
observed a male wearing a camouflage jacket standing on the front porch of the home
of her neighbor, Levon White . Minutes later, Ms . Tincher observed the man running
from the White residence as the home burst into flames. Coincidentally, Stanford
Police Officer Mike Correll was patrolling the area and observed a male wearing a
camouflage jacket jump into a waiting car, which then sped off. Officer Correll
attempted to perform a traffic stop, but the driver of the vehicle would not stop and a
high-speed chase followed . The vehicle was eventually stopped, and Appellant was
taken into custody . At the police station, Appellant was questioned . The interrogation
was neither tape recorded nor video taped, and none of the officers present took notes.
Detective Rick Edwards conducted this meeting, and testified that Appellant orally
confessed . Appellant was formally charged with arson in the first degree . After
pleading not guilty, Appellant was ultimately tried before a Lincoln County jury and was
found guilty.
Appellant now enters this appeal, raising seven issues for review .
II.
Suppression of Appellant's Incriminating Statements
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a
self-incriminating statement made to Detective Edwards after his arrest. Specifically,
Appellant argues that the statements should have been suppressed because he was
not advised of his Miranda rights and because he previously had requested an attorney.
Pursuant to RCr 9 .87, a hearing was held and oral findings of fact and conclusions of
law were issued . The trial court denied the motion, determining that there was
sufficient evidence that Appellant had been informed of his Miranda rights and that he
had not requested an attorney .
The standard for appellate review of a trial court's decision on a suppression
motion following a hearing is twofold . First, we must determine whether the factual
findings of the trial court are supported by substantial evidence . If so, we must then
determine if the trial court violated the rule of law in applying it to the established facts.
Adcock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (1998). Where the defense objects to
the introduction of a defendant's confession at trial, the prosecution must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily made. Tabor v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 613 S.W .2d 133,135 (1981).
Turning to the present matter, Appellant was stopped by police after a car chase,
taken to the station, and questioned by Detective Edwards, Trooper Collins, and Officer
Correll . During the interview, Appellant stated that he had gone to the White residence
with the intention of starting a fire but, upon reaching the front door, he had changed his
mind . Appellant further stated that he had accidentally dropped his cigarette and that
inadvertent action apparently started the fire . Appellant moved the trial court to
suppress these statements on two grounds: that he was not apprised of his Miranda
rights at any point during the interrogation and that, prior to making these statements,
he had made a request for an attorney which was denied.
At the suppression hearing, only two persons testified . Appellant reiterated his
version of events to the court . The Commonwealth called Detective Edwards, who
testified that Appellant was informed of his Miranda rights at the start of the
interrogation . Detective Edwards further testified that Appellant never made a request
for an attorney . The interrogation was not recorded, nor was Appellant asked to sign a
waiver of his Miranda rights . Trooper Collins and Officer Correll were not called to
testify. Noting that the issue was essentially a contest between the credibility of
Appellant and Detective Edwards, the trial court concluded that Appellant was apprised
of his Miranda rights and did not request an attorney .
We find that the factual findings of the trial court are supported by substantial
evidence . Detective Edwards testified unequivocally that Appellant did not request an
attorney and was informed of his Miranda rights . The trial court was persuaded more
by this testimony than the self-serving recollections of Appellant, and we decline to
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disturb the trial court's findings of fact. Therefore, the issue becomes whether the trial
court violated the rule of law in applying the established facts. Having concluded that
Appellant did not request an attorney and did receive a Miranda warning, it was
established by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements were voluntarily
made . Tabor, 613 S.W .2d at 135. Thus, the trial court properly denied Appellant's
motion to suppress the incriminating statements .
III.
Denial of Appellant's Motion for Mistrial
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial .
Specifically, Appellant claims that Detective Edwards' testimony at trial included
statements allegedly made by Appellant that were not included in discovery . Because
these statements were not revealed prior to trial, Appellant was denied a fair
opportunity to prepare a defense or to effectively cross-examine Detective Edwards .
The Commonwealth concedes that Detective Edwards' testimony at trial included some
details not included in prior testimony, but argues that these details did not change the
substance of his testimony and therefore, in no way prejudiced Appellant so as to
warrant reversal .
Detective Edwards testified in four proceedings concerning this matter: a
preliminary hearing, a grand jury proceeding, a hearing on the motion to suppress, and
Appellant's trial . At trial, Detective Edwards testified that Appellant had revealed to him
that, on the afternoon before the crime, someone from the White residence had pulled
a weapon on him and that an altercation had ensued in front of the home . Defense
counsel objected, stating that this fact was not included in any of Detective Edwards'
three prior testimonies ; the Commonwealth acknowledged the same . Determining that
RCr 7.24(1) prohibited the introduction of these statements because they had not been
disclosed in discovery, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard that portion of
Detective Edwards' testimony. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, arguing that
the substance of Detective Edwards' testimony regarding the prior altercation
essentially established a motive and that an admonishment to the jury was insufficient
to cure that prejudice . After hearing arguments in chambers, the trial court concluded
that a mistrial was not warranted .
A mistrial is an extreme remedy to be utilized only when the record reveals a
"manifest necessity" for such action . Kirkland v. Commonwealth , Ky., 53 S .W.3d 71, 76
(2001). The decision of the trial court concerning a motion for mistrial should only be
disturbed where there is an abuse of discretion . Clay v. Commonwealth , Ky. App., 867
S.W .2d 200, 204 (1993). Here, Appellant's own statements were the basis of the trial
court's decision to deny the motion for mistrial . Appellant admitted that he had
approached the house with the intent to start a fire, but changed his mind at the last
minute, and that the resulting fire was started by accident . Where Appellant himself
admits his intent mere minutes before the crime, the trial court reasoned, further
evidence of that intent earlier in the day could not be considered prejudicial . Although
declining to find that the statements were prejudicial, the trial court nonetheless
recognized that they should have been disclosed during discovery as required by RCr
7 .24(1). RCr 7 .24(9) provides that a permissible remedy to a discovery violation is to
"prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed ." Here,
having concluded that the statements were not prejudicial, the trial court determined
that the violation could be cured by an admonition to the jury to disregard the
inadmissible testimony of Detective Edwards.
We find no abuse of discretion here . The trial court thoroughly reviewed the
matter and entertained arguments in chambers . The decision to deny the motion for
mistrial was based on sound logic and we agree that, even if slight prejudice occurred,
it was certainly cured by the admonition to the jury.
IV.
Evidence of Prior Bad Acts
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in admitting testimony indicating that
Levon White had sworn out a warrant for Appellant's arrest prior to the fire, thus
establishing a motive. Appellant argues that he was unaware of the warrant on October
2, and therefore the evidence was insufficient to establish a motive pursuant to KRE
404(b)(1) and should have been excluded .
KRE 404(b) renders inadmissible evidence of prior crimes or bad acts; however,
KRE 404(b)(1) allows such evidence to be entered if used to establish proof of motive.
In admitting such evidence, the trial court must balance the probative value of the
evidence against the danger of undue prejudice . English v. Commonwealth , Ky., 993
S .W .2d 941, 945 (1999). On appellate review, the decision will be upheld absent an
abuse of discretion. Partin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 918 S .W .2d 219, 222 (1996).
In the matter before us, the trial court permitted Ms . White to testify that an
altercation occurring in August of 2001 between her son and Appellant prompted her to
swear out a warrant against Appellant . The warrant itself was not admitted, nor was
Ms. White permitted to testify as to any details concerning the facts underlying the
warrant. In other words, instead of testifying as to the specifics of prior conflicts
between her children and Appellant, Ms. White testified only to her own actions in
executing the warrant .
This Court considered a similar argument in Matthews v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
709 S.W.2d 414, 419 (1985) . In Matthews, the appellant was found guilty of the
murders of his estranged wife and her mother. The Commonwealth was permitted to
admit evidence that a warrant had been issued charging the appellant with the burglary
of his wife's house three nights prior to the double homicide . The appellant in Matthews
argued that the warrant was irrelevant as there was no evidence that he was aware of
its existence . This Court concluded that evidence of the warrant was admissible,
determining that:
although there was no direct evidence that appellant was aware that this
burglary warrant was outstanding, the circumstances that led to the
warrant, and the warrant itself, reflected on a relevant pattern of conduct.
It was part of the circumstances which evidenced the existing domestic
difficulties between the appellant and his wife. . . . The general rule
foreclosing evidence of other, unrelated crimes, does not apply .
Id . at 418, 419 .
Returning to the particular facts of the present matter, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony regarding a warrant against
Appellant . The evidence admitted was far more limited than that allowed in Matthews .
Ms. White's testimony was restricted to her own actions in executing the warrant ; no
details regarding the underlying altercation were permitted, nor was the actual warrant
introduced . The crux of Ms . White's testimony - that a warrant against Appellant did
exist - is relevant to establish a possible motive for Appellant to commit the crimes
charged . Furthermore, as in Matthews, Ms . White's testimony was relevant to establish
the ongoing conflict that existed between her family and Appellant . That Appellant
might not have been aware of the warrant does not necessarily urge its exclusion,
especially where, as here, the only evidence that Appellant was not aware of the
warrant was his own self-serving statement to that effect. We conclude that Ms.
White's testimony was relevant to establish Appellant's possible motive and the
contentious nature of the relationship between the White family and Appellant . The trial
court did not err.
V.
Denial of Appellant's Motion for Dismissal of the Indictment and Motion for
Directed Verdict
Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment prior to trial, and renewed this motion
at the close of defense counsel's evidence . At the close of the Commonwealth's
evidence, Appellant moved for a directed verdict. Both motions were denied .
Appellant's arguments concerning the validity of the indictment are without merit .
Appellant contends that the indictment is insufficient because, although plainly charging
Appellant with first-degree arson, it failed to specify that Appellant was aware that
people inhabited or occupied the dwelling at the time of commission. While the
requirements of either KRS 513 .020(1)(a) or KRS 513.020(1)(b) must be proven to
sustain a conviction for arson in the first degree, it is not necessary that such details be
specifically enumerated in the indictment. RCr 6.10(2) requires only that the indictment
contain a "plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts" in order to be
sufficient . Furthermore, this Court has found that RCr 6 .10(2) does not require that the
indictment specifically state every technical element of a crime ; the indictment is
sufficient so long as the language and the applicable statute can be reasonably
calculated to put the defendant on notice of the crime charged . Thomas v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 931 S .W.2d 446, 449 (1996) . Here, the indictment plainly stated
that Appellant was being charged with arson in the first degree . The trial court did not
err in denying defense counsel's motion to dismiss the indictment .
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict was properly denied as well . Appellant
argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that Appellant was aware that the White
home was inhabited or occupied, as required by KRS 513.020(1)(a) . Moreover,
Appellant asserts, he could not have reasonably inferred that the White home was
occupied or inhabited because, at the time of the crime, the house was dark and no
cars were in the driveway .
The official commentary to KRS 513.020 undermines this argument: "in any
case involving the burning of a dwelling, absent some special circumstances, the
presence of another person would be a reasonable possibility." It is completely
unreasonable for Appellant to argue that special circumstances were created because
the house was dark and no cars were in the driveway . At midnight, when this crime
occurred, most homes are occupied by sleeping residents and are dark . Furthermore, in
light of the history of conflict between Appellant and Ms . White's children, it was
completely reasonable for the jury to infer that Appellant was aware the building was
being used as a dwelling . Finally, any rational person looking at the building itself would
immediately assume it is an occupied home .
On appellate review of a denial of a motion for a directed verdict, we must look at
the evidence as a whole and determine if it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to
find guilt. Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S .W .2d 186, 187 (1991). Here,
Appellant's only argument that a directed verdict was warranted is based on an alleged
lack of evidence that Appellant knew the White home to be occupied or inhabited .
For the reasons stated above, we find no merit to this argument, and the ruling of the
trial court is affirmed .
VI.
Competency Hearing
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in camera
review regarding Appellant's competency to stand trial . Appellant concedes that
defense counsel never raised this issue . Rather, at a pretrial hearing, Appellant himself
asked the trial court if he could be transferred to KCPC. At that point, the trial court
stated that nothing had been presented to reasonably call into question Appellant's
competency. Appellant now argues that his request triggered a duty by the trial court to
review Appellant's mental health records in camera in order to determine if there was
reasonable belief to question his competency . We disagree .
KRS 504.1 00(l) requires the trial court to order a mental health examination or
report when the trial court has "reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial ." Upon Appellant's request that he be transferred to KCPC,
the trial court specifically stated that it had no reason to question Appellant's
competency. At that point in time, the trial court had observed Appellant at two pre-trial
hearings and had heard Appellant testify at a suppression hearing . The trial court
further stated that it would entertain the issue if some evidence of Appellant's
incompetency was presented. Having found no reasonable grounds on which to
question Appellant's competency to stand trial, the trial court was under no obligation or
duty to order a mental health evaluation . Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing
to hold a competency hearing .
VII.
Failure to Strike Juror for Cause
Appellant next cites error where the trial court refused to remove Juror X for
cause. Juror X's husband and son work for the Stanford Fire Department, which
responded to the fire at the White residence . Furthermore, Juror X stated that she
knew Tim Lawson, an arson investigator with the Stanford Fire Department who
testified on behalf of the Commonwealth . Defense counsel twice moved the court to
strike Juror X for cause ; both motions were denied . Defense counsel ultimately
removed the potential juror using a preemptory strike .
It lies within the sound discretion of the trial court to remove a potential juror for
cause, and such a determination will be reversed only where the trial court's exercise of
discretion was clearly erroneous. Simmons v. Commonwealth , Ky., 746 S.W .2d 393,
396 (1988). Here, no objective evidence of Juror X's potential bias was presented ;
rather, Appellant contends that Juror X's relationship with two Stanford firefighters
creates a bias per se. We disagree . After her relationship to two firefighters was
established, Juror X was asked twice whether that relationship would impair her ability
to decide the case fairly and impartially. On both occasions, Juror X unequivocally
stated that it would not. In response to defense counsel's renewed motion to strike, the
trial court concluded that Juror X's demeanor did not indicate any prejudice, and that
she had answered questions about her potential bias with sincerity . The trial court also
noted that there was no evidence that either her son or her husband had even
responded to the fire at the White residence . We find that the trial court acted well
within its discretion in refusing to strike Juror X for cause, and we thus affirm its ruling .
VII.
Cumulative Error
In his final argument, Appellant asks this Court to review his conviction under the
palpable error standard of RCr 10.26, noting the cumulative effect of the proceeding
errors. Having found no error in the proceeding arguments, there is no resulting
cumulative error.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lincoln Circuit Court is affirmed .
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Stumbo, and Wintersheimer, JJ.,
concur. Keller, J ., concurs in result only .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Misty Dugger
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael Harned
William Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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