COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V CHRISTOPHER CHARLES MORRIS
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2002-SC-0845-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V
D
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-2595
PIKE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CR-114
APPELLEE
CHRISTOPHER CHARLES MORRIS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE COOPER
AFFIRMING
On March 15, 2001, Troy Thornsberry and his pregnant wife, Veronica Jane
Thornsberry, were en route to Pikeville Methodist Hospital for the anticipated birth of
their unborn child when their vehicle was struck by a pickup truck operated by Appellee,
Christopher Charles Morris . Mr. Thornsberry was injured in the collision ; his wife and
unborn child were killed. A post-mortem examination revealed that the child was a
viable fetus who would have been born a healthy baby girl had she not sustained a fatal
brain injury in the collision .'
A Pike County grand jury indicted Appellee for one count of assault in the first
degree, KRS 508.010(1)(b), for causing Mr. Thornsberry's injuries, and two counts of
' The parties stipulated for purposes of this appeal that "[i]t is anticipated that the infant
would have experienced a successful delivery given the medical information known to
the parties ."
wanton murder, KRS 507 .020(1)(b), for causing the deaths of Mrs . Thornsberry and her
unborn child . When the Pike Circuit Court refused to dismiss the charge pertaining to
the death of the unborn child, Appellee accepted a plea offer pursuant to which he
entered guilty pleas to reduced charges of assault in the second degree, KRS
508 .020(1)(c), and manslaughter in the second degree, KRS 507.040(1)(a), with
respect to the injury of Mr. Thornsberry and the death of Mrs. Thornsberry, and a
conditional guilty plea to manslaughter in the second degree with respect to the death of
the unborn child . RCr 6.16; RCr 8 .08; RCr. 8.09 . He was sentenced to concurrent
terms of ten years in prison for each conviction and appealed only the conviction arising
from the death of the unborn child .
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the common law "born alive" rule,
which Hollis v. Commonwealth , Ky., 652 S.W .2d 61 (1983), had applied to the homicide
offenses defined in KRS Chapter 507 of the Kentucky Penal Code, precluded a
homicide conviction for killing an unborn child . We granted discretionary review to
reconsider Hollis.
The Commonwealth presents two arguments : (1) that the "born alive" rule has
been superseded by the statutory definition of "human being" in the abortion statutes,
i .e . , KRS 311 .720(6), viz : "'Human being' shall mean any member of the species homo
sapiens from fertilization until death ;" or, in the alternative, (2) that the "born alive" rule
is an anachronism that should not be applied when the victim is a viable fetus. Because
the rationale for the "born alive" rule no longer exists, we agree that the rule should be
discarded . We hold that the felonious killing of a viable fetus can be prosecuted as a
homicide under Chapter 507 of our penal code . However, because Due Process
precludes retrospective application of that holding, we are required to affirm the result
reached by the Court of Appeals.
I. "BORN ALIVE ."
The earliest commentator on the common law of England suggested that the
killing of a fetus, or at least a "quickened" fetus, was a homicide .
If there be anyone who strikes a pregnant woman or gives her a
poison whereby he causes an abortion, if the foetus be already formed or
animated, especially if it be animated, he commits homicide .
III Henry de Bracton, The Laws and Customs of England , ii., 4 (circa 1274), as
translated from the original Latin into English by Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New
York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1660 -1968: A Case of
Cessation of Constitutionality , 14 N .Y.L .F. 411, 419 (1968). Bracton cited no authority
for his proposition 2 and it was not followed in two subsequent anonymous cases before
the King's Bench during the reign of Edward III . In the first case, reported in Year Book
Michaelmas (Y .B . Mich .), 1 Edw. 3, f. 23, pl . 18 (1327) and dubbed The Twinslayer's
Case by Professor Means, the accused supposedly had beaten a woman who was in
the advanced stages of pregnancy with twins. One of the twins died in the womb. The
other was born alive but died shortly thereafter, allegedly as a result of the beating . The
accused was acquitted of killing both twins. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional
2 The absence of any citation to authority was noted by Justice Mosk in Keeler v.
Superior Court , 470 P .2d 617, 626 n .4 (Cal . 1970), superseded by statute as stated in
People v . Carlson , 112 Cal . Rptr. 321, 324-25 (Cal . Ct. App. 1974) . Professor Means
later reported that "[t]he sagacity of this insight was confirmed for me by the leading
living authority on Bracton, Professor Samuel Thorne, of the Harvard Law School, who
remarked, when I drew Justice Mosk's statement to his attention, 'When Bracton had
cases to support his view, he cited them ."' Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of
Abortional Freedom : Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Riqht About to Arise from the
Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty? ,
17 N .Y.L .F. 335, 354-55 (1971).
Freedom , supra note 2, at 337 (providing English translation of original French text) .
The holding with respect to the twin who was born alive but later died was subsequently
rejected by Coke, infra , and by later English courts . Rex v. Senior, 1 Moody 346, 168
Eng . Rep. 1298 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1832); Regina v. West, 2 Cox's Cases in Crim . L. 500
(Nottingham Spring Assizes 1848) . See also Jones v. Commonwealth , Ky., 830 S.W.2d
877, 878-79 (1992) (conviction of manslaughter in the second degree affirmed where
victim was born alive but subsequently died of injuries inflicted in utero).
The second case rejecting sub silentio Bracton's proposition was reported by Sir
Anthony Fitzherbert in Graunde Abridgement , tit. Corone, f. 268, pl . 263 (1st ed . 1516),
f. 255, pl . 263 (3d ed. 1565) (Y.B . Mich ., 22 Edw. 3 (1348)), and dubbed The
Abortionist's Case by Professor Means . The accused was charged with killing a child in
its mother's womb but was acquitted partially because "it is difficult to know whether he
killed the child or not." Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom , supra note 2, at
339 . Thus, "'[i]f the child be destroied in the mothers belly, the destroier is no
manslayer, nor Felone."' Id. a t 342 (quoting William Lambarde, Eirenarcha, or of The
Office of the Justices of the Peace 217-18 (2d ed . 1582)) . The reason for the rule was
"non constat [it could not be established], whether the child were living at the time of the
batterie or not, or if the batterie was the cause of death ." Sims's Case, Gouldsborough
176, pl . 110, 75 Eng . Rep. 1075 (K.B . 1601) .
Coke's now-famous enunciation of the "born alive" rule is as follows :
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a Potion or otherwise killeth
it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a great misprision, and no
murder: but if the childe be born alive, and dieth of the Potion, battery, or
other cause, this is murder: for in law it is accounted a reasonable
creature, in rerum natura, when it is born alive .
Sir Edward Coke, Third Institute 50-51 (1644).3 The rule was repeated in later British
treatises . 1 William Hawkins, Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, ch. 31, § 16, at 80
(1716) ; Matthew Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 433 (1736); 1 William
Blackstone, Commentaries 129-30 (1765).
The "born alive" rule is reported to have first been applied in the United States in
Commonwealth v. McKee , 1 Add . 1 (Pa . 1791) . See Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of
the Unborn Child : The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms , 21 Val. U . L.
Rev. 563, 598 (1987). Prior to legislative reform, it was almost universally applied . See
Commonwealth v. Booth , 766 A.2d 843, 849 (Pa. 2001), and cases cited therein . The
rule continued to be one of necessity . As late as the nineteenth century, prior to
quickening, "it was virtually impossible for either the woman, a midwife, or a physician to
confidently know that the woman was pregnant, or, it follows, that the child in utero was
alive." Forsythe, supra , at 573 . Hence, there was no evidence of life until quickening .
Id . Even quickening did not constitute proof that the fetus was alive at any particular
moment thereafter . The health of a fetus could not be determined until after its birth. Id.
at 575 . "As a result, live birth was required to prove that the unborn child was alive and
that the material acts were the proximate cause of death, because it could not otherwise
be established if the child was alive in the womb at the time of the material acts." Id.
The "born alive" rule first entered Kentucky's jurisprudence in the pre-penal code
case of Jackson v. Commonwealth , 265 Ky. 295, 96 S .W.2d 1014 (1936).
"jlln order to establish the corpus delicti, in a case of infanticide, it must
also be established that the child was born alive . In the absence of proof
that the child had ever breathed or was alive at birth a conviction can not
be sustained . It is necessary for the Commonwealth to prove
3 Professor Means credits Coke's reference to a "great misprision" with breathing life
into Bracton's allegedly discredited dictum that an abortion after quickening was a
homicide. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom , supra note 2, at 346-49.
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affirmatively, not only that the child had breathed, because that might
occur during birth, but that it had had a complete and separate existence
of its own after birth . Being born means that the whole body is brought
into the world, and it is not sufficient that the child breathes in the progress
of the birth . But if a child is fully brought forth from the body of its mother,
and is killed while still connected by the umbilical cord, it is murder. When
the evidence that the child was born alive is susceptible of doubt, a
conviction can not be sustained ."
Id., 96 S.W.2d at 1014-15 (emphasis added) (quoting James M . Roberson, New
Kentucky Criminal Law and Procedure § 425 (2d ed . 1927)). Jackson , a murder case,
held that the Commonwealth had established the corpus delicti through "[t]he testimony
of the physicians, together with that of the accused . . . ." Id. at 1016 . Thus, as first
applied in Kentucky, the "born alive" rule pertained to the sufficiency of the evidence
needed to support a conviction of homicide, not the interpretation of a statute. See also
Forsythe, supra, at 586 (The "born alive" rule "is recognized to be an evidentiary
principle that was required by the state of medical science of the day.").
It. HOLLIS .
When Jackson was decided, murder was a common law offense and only the
penalty was prescribed by statute. KS § 1149 (repealed 1942 Ky. Acts, ch. 208, § 2).
Involuntary manslaughter (which now includes the offense of manslaughter in the
second degree) was also a common law offense4 but had no statutorily prescribed
penalty, so was thus a misdemeanor punishable only by fine and/or confinement in the
county jail . KS § 1127 (repealed 1942 Ky. Acts, ch. 208, § 2); Cottrell v.
Commonwealth , 271 Ky. 52, 111 S .W.2d 445, 448 (1937); Spriggs v. Commonwealth ,
113 Ky. 724, 68 S .W. 1087, 1088 (1902). Upon the adoption of the Kentucky Penal
4 Involuntary manslaughter did not become a statutory offense until 1962. KRS
435 .022 (enacted 1962 Ky. Acts, ch. 90, §§ 1, 2, repealed 1974 Ky. Acts, ch . 406, §
336, eff . Jan . 1, 1975) .
Code, effective January 1, 1975, common law offenses were abolished and all offenses,
including homicides, were thereafter to be defined by statute . KRS 500 .020(1) .
KRS 507 .040 provides, inter alia :
(1)
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when he
wantonly causes the death of another person including, but not
limited to, situations where the death results from the person's :
(a)
Operation of a motor vehicle . . . .
(Emphasis added .) Similarly, the murder statute, KRS 507.020, refers to causing the
death of "another person ." KRS 500 .080 has always provided that, "[a]s used in the
Kentucky Penal Code," "'person' means a human being . . . ." KRS 500.080(12) .
Likewise, KRS 507 .010, titled "Definitions," has always provided :
A person is guilty of criminal homicide when he causes the death of
another human being under circumstances which constitute murder,
manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, or
reckless homicide .
(Emphasis added .)
Hollis v. Commonwealth, supra , like Jackson, was a murder case that, like the
case sub judice, involved the killing of a proven viable fetus. Because the fetus was
killed before it was "born alive," Hollis held that a homicide had not been committed . Id .
at 64-65 . In interpreting KRS 507 .020,5 the plurality opinion in Hollis first inaccurately
reported that "[t]he statute makes no effort to define the word 'person . . . ."' Id . at 63 .
But see KRS 500 .080(12) which, by its very language, applies to all penal code
offenses, and KRS 507.010 . The opinion then reasoned that in the absence of a
statutory definition, the General Assembly would be presumed to have intended to
retain the common law definition of "person," which the opinion then concluded was the
5 Although the Hollis plurality construed KRS 507.020, not KRS 507.040, the statute at
issue here, "person" cannot logically be construed one way under the statute
proscribing murder and another way under the statute proscribing manslaughter in the
second degree .
"born alive" rule adopted in Jackson . Hollis , supra, at 63. The concurring opinion in
Hollis rejected this flawed statutory construction but nevertheless concluded that the
holding in Jackson had survived the abolition of common law homicide offenses .
Jackson , supra, had not been overruled when the act was committed by
Hollis. I believe he was entitled to rely upon the decisions of this court
which had not been repudiated .
Id . at 65 (Vance, J ., concurring) .
We do not know why the Hollis plurality chose to ignore the existence of KRS
500 .080(12) and KRS 507.010, both of which define "person" as "a human being," and
instead employed a common law evidentiary requirement as the definition of "person ."
Remember, Jackson , supra, had not applied the "born alive" rule as a definition but as
the proof required to establish the corpus delicti of the common law offense of murder.
Id., 96 S .W .2d at 1014. Perhaps the Hollis plurality had its eye on the definition of
"human being" in the abortion statutes, supra . Although the effective date of KRS
311 .720(6) was April 7, 1982 (1982 Ky. Acts, ch. 342, § 2), and Hollis was rendered on
March 30, 1983, the offense in Hollis occurred prior to the enactment of the abortion
statutes, thus precluding the application of KRS 311 .720(6) to that case. See the
discussion of the Ex Post Facto Clause in Part V, infra. However, the Hollis plurality
may have concluded that by construing "person" instead of "human being," it could
avoid a potential future argument, such as the one advanced here by the
Commonwealth, that KRS 311 .720(6) abrogated the common law interpretation applied
in Hollis .
By construing "person" instead of "human being," the Hollis plurality also may
have intended to deflect attention away from the fact that the drafters of the Kentucky
Penal Code did not adopt the definition of "human being" espoused in the Model Penal
Code (MPC) i .e. , "a person who has been born and is alive." MPC § 210.0(1) . As
noted by the Hollis plurality, 652 S .W .2d at 63, the MPC influenced the drafters of the
homicide provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code. See KRS 507.020-.040 (1974
Commentary). See generally Robert G . Lawson, Criminal Law Revision in Kentucky:
Part I - Homicide and Assault , 58 Ky. L.J . 242 (1969-70) . Nevertheless, the drafters did
not adopt the MPC's definition of "human being" which, as suggested by the dissent in
Hollis , provides some evidence of a legislative intent not to incorporate the "born alive"
rule into our penal code . Id. at 67 (Wintersheimer, J ., dissenting) . Remarkably, the
Hollis plurality cited the Comment to the MPC's definition of "human being" for the
proposition that the drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code did intend to retain the "born
alive" rule . Id . at 63 (quoting MPC § 210.1 cmt. 4(c)).
111 . VIABLE FETUS.
Medical science has now advanced to the stage that the viability, health, and
cause of a fetus's death can be determined . See Mary Lynn Kime, Hughes v. State:
The "Born Alive" Rule Dies a Timely Death , 30 Tulsa L.J. 539, 543 (1995); Stephanie R.
McCavitt, Note, The "Born Alive" Rule: A Proposed Change to the New York Law
Based on Modern Medical Technology , 36 N.Y.L . Sch . L. Rev. 609, 636-37 (1991).
Thus, the rationale for the "born alive" rule no longer exists. Hughes v. State , 868 P.2d
730, 732 (Okla . Crim . App. 1994) . Specifically, there is no need for it in the case sub
'ut dice because the post-mortem examination clearly proved that the unborn victim was
a viable fetus who would have been born alive and completely normal except for the
6 The Commentaries cite a tentative draft of the MPC from 1959 that is numbered
differently from the final draft completed in 1962 . The sections from the tentative draft
cited in the Commentaries accompanying KRS 507 .020-040 are numbered from
201 .2- .3 . However, the corresponding sections in the final draft are sections 210.1-.4.
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fatal brain injury sustained in the vehicular collision caused by Appellee . To quote
Justice Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1896-97).
The more enlightened cases have departed from the "born alive" rule in favor of
recognizing that a viable fetus can be the victim of a homicide . See, e.g. ,
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N .E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Mass . 1984) (viable fetus is a
"person" under a vehicular homicide statute criminalizing causing the death of "another
person") ; Hughes v. State , supra , at 731 (viable fetus is a "human being" under statute
defining homicide as the killing of a "human being") ; State v. Horne, 319 S .E.2d 703,
704 (S.C . 1984) (viable fetus is a "person" within statute defining murder as the killing of
"any person") . Viability was recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S . 113,93 S.Ct . 705, 35
L.Ed .2d 147 (1973), as the "compelling" point at which "the fetus then presumably has
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb," and the earliest time at
which a state may proscribe consensual abortions . Id . at 163-64, 93 S .Ct. at 732 . It is
also the point at which the killing of an unborn child gives rise to a civil cause of action
for wrongful death on behalf of the unborn child's estate . KRS 411 .130 .
The most cogent reason, we believe, for holding that a viable
unborn child is an entity within the meaning of the general word "person"
is because, biologically speaking, such a child is, in fact, a presently
existing person, a living human being . It should be pointed out that there
is a definite medical distinction between the term "embryo" and the phrase
"viable fetus ." The embryo is the fetus in its earliest stages of
development, but the expression "viable fetus" means the child has
reached such a state of development that it can presently live outside the
female body as well as within it. A fetus generally becomes a viable child
between the sixth and seventh month of its existence, although there are
instances of younger infants being born and surviving .
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Mitchell v. Couch , Ky., 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (1955) (citing William J . Cason, May
Parents Maintain an Action for the Wrongful Death of an Unborn Child in Missouri? The
Case for the Right of Action , 15 Mo . L . Rev. 211, 218 (June 1950)) . See also Rice v.
Rizk , Ky., 453 S.W.2d 732, 735 (1970). Whether a fetus was viable when killed is just
as provable by competent evidence as whether a child was born alive or stillborn . See
Jackson , 96 S .W .2d at 1016 ("The testimony of the physicians together with that of the
accused, establishes beyond cavil, doubt, or question" that the child was born alive .).
It is inherently illogical to recognize a viable fetus as a human being whose
estate can sue for wrongful death and who cannot be consensually aborted except to
preserve the life or health of the mother, but not as a human being whose life can be
nonconsensually terminated without criminal consequences . Thus, we overrule Hollis
and hold that a viable fetus is a "human being" for purposes of KRS 500.080(12) and
the KRS Chapter 507 homicide statutes.
IV. THE ABORTION STATUTES.
The Commonwealth argues that the penal code's definition of "person" as "a
human being" ipso facto requires application of the definition of "human being" in KRS
311 .720(6) to the penal code . As noted supra, that statute defines "human being" as
"any member of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until death ." However,
while the introductory sentence in KRS 311 .720 purports to apply the definitions
enumerated therein to "KRS 311 .710 to 311 .820, and laws of the Commonwealth
unless the context otherwise requires " (emphasis added), the definition of "human
being" was added to KRS 311 .720 by an Act entitled, "AN ACT relating to abortion ."
1982 Ky. Acts, ch . 342, § 2 . Section 51 of our Constitution provides that "[n]o law
enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall
be expressed in the title . . . ." (Emphasis added .) Thus, the definition of "human being"
set forth in KRS 311 .720(6) cannot constitutionally be applied to the homicide provisions
of the penal code . Edwards v. Land , Ky. App., 851 S .W.2d 484, 487 (1992) (if a portion
of the Act falls within the scope of the title and another portion falls outside the scope of
the title, the portion falling outside may be omitted), overruled on other grounds by
O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth , Ky., 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (1995) .'
V. THE FETAL HOMICIDE STATUTE .
House Bill 108, 2004 Gen . Assem., Reg . Sess. (Ky. 2004), effective February 20,
2004 (nine days after the oral argument in this case), which became KRS Chapter
507A, created the new offense of "fetal homicide ." The bill defines "unborn child" as "a
member of the species homo sapiens in utero from conception onward, without regard
to age, health, or condition of dependency." H .B . 108 § 1(c). The Ex Post Facto
Clauses of both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions preclude retrospective
application of this statute to Appellee's conduct with respect to the unborn child in this
case. U .S . Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ; Ky. Const. § 19(2). However, we are invited to use
this case as a vehicle to prospectively adopt that definition via common law. (See
Wintersheimer, J ., concurring, post.) Of course, KRS 507 .040, the statute we now
construe, refers not to an "unborn child," but to a "person," further defined as "a human
being ." Since the human being that is the subject of this appeal was a viable fetus, it is
unnecessary to address in this opinion whether killing a nonviable fetus would violate
KRS 311 .720(6) has also been declared unconstitutional as applied to abortions
because it violates the directive in Roe v. Wade , supra , at 162, 93 S.Ct . at 731, that a
state may not adopt a particular theory of life for the purpose of overriding the rights of
the pregnant woman. Eubanks v. Brown , 604 F .Supp . 141, 144 (W .D. Ky. 1984) .
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KRS 507.040. Presumably, future homicides of nonviable fetuses will be prosecuted
under KRS Chapter 507A.
Furthermore, to prematurely approve the definition in H .B. 108 would preempt a
potential "void for vagueness" challenge to the statute, essentially declaring it
constitutional without benefit of either briefs or arguments . $ It might also tempt an
overly zealous prosecutor to cite such a holding in an attempt to apply the KRS Chapter
507 homicide statutes to a consensual abortion of a nonviable fetus, or to seek the
death penalty for the double murder of a pregnant woman and her nonviable fetus,
applications expressly precluded in the new fetal homicide law . H .B . 108, supra , at §§
1(2), (3); 6 .
VI. THE "REENACTMENT DOCTRINE."
Justice Keller correctly notes the validity of the "reenactment doctrine" in his
concurring opinion, post. "'It is a generally recognized rule of statutory construction that
when a statute has been construed by a court of last resort and the statute is
subsequently reenacted, the Legislature may be regarded as adopting such
construction ."' Hughes v. Commonwealth , Ky., 87 S .W .3d 850, 855-56 (2002) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Trousdale , 297 Ky. 724, 181 S.W .2d 254, 256 (1944)). However, the
so-called "reenactment doctrine" does not require continued application of the "born
alive" rule to our homicide statutes .
First, the lead opinion in Hollis was a plurality opinion joined by only three
members of the Court . Two members concurred in result only and the remaining two
8 Roe v. Wade, supra , contains the statement that "[s]ubstantial problems for precise
definition of this view [that life begins at conception] are posed, however, by new
embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a 'process' over time,
rather than an event . . . ." _Id . at 161, 93 S.Ct. at 730-31 (citing various medical texts
and articles) .
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members dissented . The two concurring members based their concurrence on the
premise that Jackson v. Commonwealth , supra , "had not been overruled when the act
was committed [and the defendant] was entitled to rely upon the decisions of this court
which had not been repudiated ." Hollis , 652 S.W.2d at 65 (Vance, J ., concurring) .
Obviously, the two separately concurring members concluded that the adoption of the
penal code had not abrogated the common law holding in Jackson that proof of the
corpus delicti of a homicide required proof that the victim was "born alive ." They did not
join the plurality opinion's analysis of legislative intent with respect to the definition of
"person" in KRS 507.020 . Id . ("I do not believe it is necessary or proper to extend the
opinion of this court to the other issues discussed in the [plurality] opinion, and for that
reason I concur in the result only."). Thus, the Hollis plurality's construction of the word
"person" in KRS 507 .020 was not a holding of the Court to which the legislature would
be deemed to have implicitly acquiesced when it subsequently amended and/or
reenacted KRS 507.020 and KRS 507.040 without redefining the word "person."
Of course, our subsequent decision in Jones v. Commonwealth , supra , was a
majority opinion . However, the holding in Jones was that a child who was born alive
and subsequently died from injuries inflicted in utero was a "person" within the meaning
of KRS 507 .040. 830 S .W .2d at 878-79. That holding is not inconsistent with our
holding in this case.
Furthermore, since the General Assembly had already twice defined "person" as
"a human being" for purposes of the penal code and the homicide statutes in KRS
500 .080(12) and KRS 507 .010, and the Hollis plurality did not attempt to construe either
of those statutes, the Hollis plurality opinion arguably did not affect the statutory
definition of "person" in any respect. Compare Blauner's Inc. v. City of Phila . , 198 A.
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889, 893 (Pa . 1938) (common law definitions irrelevant where statute contains its own
definition) ; Kohn v. City of Phila . , 30 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa . Super. Ct. 1943) ("None of
these cases [reciting common law definitions of 'sale'] has any relevancy here where
'sale' is defined by the ordinance .") . Thus, the "reenactment doctrine" does not affect
our decision to overrule Hollis.
VII . "FAIR WARNING."
Just as the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes retrospective application of new
legislation, e .g ., H .B . 108, to conduct that was not illegal when committed, the
retrospective application by a court of an unforeseeable change in the common law or in
the interpretation of a statute to the detriment of a criminal defendant violates the "fair
warning" requirement of the Due Process Clause. U.S . Const . amends . V, XIV § 1 .
A "fair warning" violation occurs "[w]hen a[n] . . . unforeseeable state-court
[sic] construction of a criminal statute is applied retroactively to subject a
person to criminal liability for past conduct, the effect [being] to deprive
him of due process of law in the sense of fair warning that his
contemplated conduct constitutes a crime." Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S . 347, 354-55, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1703, 12 L.Ed .2d 894 (1964). . . .
See also Gall v. Parker, 231 F .3d 265, 305-06 (6th Cir. 2000) (detrimental
application of new judicial interpretation of extreme emotional disturbance
defense to conduct occurring when more favorable interpretation was in
effect violated "fair warning" requirement) . The "fair warning" requirement
also applies to changes in common law principles that are "'unexpected
and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior
to the conduct in issue ."' Rogers v. Tennessee , 532 U.S . 451, 460-62,
121 S .Ct. 1693, 1699-1700, 149 L .Ed.2d 697 (2001) (state court's
abolishment of common law "year and a day" rule did not violate "fair
warning" requirement) (quoting Bouie , supra , at 354, 84 S .Ct . at 1697).
Walker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 127 S.W.3d 596, 603 (2004).
Thus, our decision to overrule Hollis and criminalize the killing of a viable fetus
cannot be applied retrospectively to Appellee's conduct .9 Accordingly, we affirm the
result reached by the Court of Appeals, but for a different reason than expressed in its
opinion .
Lambert, C .J. ; Graves, and Johnstone, JJ ., concur. Keller, J., concurs by
separate opinion, with Stumbo, J., joining that concurring opinion. Wintersheimer, J .,
concurs by separate opinion .
9 In light of the enactment of HB 108, some might regard this entire exercise as a vain
endeavor, since all future fetal homicides presumably will be prosecuted under new
KRS Chapter 507A . However, should HB 108 not survive constitutional challenge, the
decision in this case will attain future significance .
- 1 6-
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Room 118
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Matthew D . Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen W . Owens
P .O. Box 1426
Pikeville, KY 41502
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE :
Francis J . Manion
American Center for Law and Justice-Midwest
6375 New Hope Road
New Hope, KY 40052
Geoffrey R. Surtees
Center for Law and Justice for Catholics United for Life
6375 New Hope Road
New Hope, KY 40052
COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE NORTHERN KENTUCKY RIGHT TO LIFE; AND
KENTUCKY COALITION FOR LIFE:
Robert C. Cetrulo
Northern Kentucky Right to Life
620 Washington Street
Covington, KY 41011-2314
RENDERED : JUNE 17, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
,*uptt Courf of Arttfurkg
2002-SC-0845-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-2595-MR
PIKE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CR-114
CHRISTOPHER CHARLES MORRIS
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
I vote to affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals because I agree with the
majority opinion's ultimate holding that the Pike Circuit Court erred when it denied
Appellee's motion to dismiss Count II of the indictment.
I write separately, however,
because I recognize that this case is solely about statutory interpretation, i .e. , whether a
defendant can be liable for criminal homicide under KRS Chapter 507 for the killing of
an unborn child . It is black-letter law that "[i]n the construction of statutes, the primary
rule is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature ."' And, when
interpreting a statute, we must assign it a stable meaning because "intent is what the
legislative body that passed the act intended when it passed the act at that point in
time .,,2 Accordingly, I disagree with the majority's prospective broadening of KRS
Chapter 507 criminal homicide liability through its conclusion (a/k/a "judicial fiat") that
' Moore v. Alsmiller, 289 Ky. 682, 160 S.W .2d 10, 12 (1942).
2 RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION :
THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT, § 2 .4, at 14 (NITA 2002) (emphasis added and
footnote omitted) [hereinafter BROWN & BROWN] .
medical advancements have changed the meaning of the word "person" in KRS
Chapter 507 from what this Court previously found that the General Assembly intended
it to mean when it enacted the Kentucky Penal Code three decades ago . In my view,
the rules of statutory construction continue to compel the conclusion that a person who
kills an unborn child has no criminal liability under KRS Chapter 507.
Two decades ago, the lead opinion in Hollis v. Commonwealth 3 properly
observed that "[t]his Court cannot presume that the legislature intended to license us to
expand the class of persons who could be treated as victims of criminal homicide in our
own discretion .,,4 Accordingly, it turned to rules of statutory construction to determine
what meaning the General Assembly intended for the word "person" in KRS Chapter
507, and it concluded that "persons" included all human beings who were born alive,
but excluded the unborn, including viable fetuses . Nine years later, in Jones v.
Commonwealth ,6 a majority of this Court applied this same interpretation of "person" to
a different factual situation, i .e., one where a child born alive after the defendant's
criminal conduct dies as a result of that conduct, and concluded that the defendant was
liable for Second-Degree Manslaughter.' Until today, therefore, this Court has held
that, for purposes of KRS Chapter 507, a "person" must be born alive. But today,
despite the widely-held view that "[a] statutory construction, once made and followed,
3 Ky., 652 S .W .2d 61 (1983).
a
Id. at 63.
5 Id . at 62 .
6 Ky., 830 S .W .2d 877 (1992).
Id . at 880.
should never be altered upon the changed view of new personnel of the court[,] "8 a
majority of the Court consisting in part of new faces who were not on the Court when
Hollis and Jones were decided, holds that medical advancements have made the
Court's earlier interpretation obsolete and assigns a new meaning to the word "person"
without even attempting to suggest that its interpretation corresponds to the enacting
Legislature's intent.
In my view, the majority's evolutionary notion of statutory meaning runs afoul of
the canons of statutory interpretation . In particular, I submit that subsequent General
Assemblies have ratified the holdings of Hollis and Jones .
When a legislature reenacts an earlier statute, the
normative view is that the legislature should have known
how that statute had been interpreted and applied since its
original enactment . If the legislature had disagreed with
those interpretations, it should have expressed that
disagreement by changing the statute to prevent courts and
agencies from continuing to apply the statute incorrectly .
Consequently, if the legislature reenacts the statute without
rejecting the interpretations of the earlier act, it probably
means to approve those interpretations .9
Significantly, in the twenty-one years that have elapsed since Hollis was rendered, the
General Assembly has substantially reenacted both KRS 507 .020,' ° the crime for which
Appellee was indicted, and (twice) KRS 507 .040," the crime to which Appellee entered
8 73 AM . JUR . 2D Statutes § 63 (2001) .
9 Id . at § 9 .3 .1, 149-50 (footnote omitted) . See also Commonwealth v. Vincent ,
Ky., 70 S .W .3d 422, 425 (2002) ; Falender v. Hankins, 296 Ky. 396, 177 S .W.2d 382,
383 (1944) (observing that it is a "well-settled rule of statutory construction, that when a
statute or clause, or provision thereof, has been construed by the court of last resort of
a state, and the statute has been substantially re-enacted, the Legislature will be
deemed to have adopted such construction .") .
'° See 1984 Ky. Acts . ch . 165, § 26 .
11
See 2000 Ky. Acts . ch . 521, § 8 ; 1984 Ky. Acts . ch . 165, § 27.
-3-
his conditional guilty plea, but has failed to make any changes to KRS Chapter 507 that
would have changed the meaning of "person" that Hollis - and later, but prior to the
most recent reenactment of KRS 507 .040, Jones - found applicable to Kentucky's
criminal homicide provisions.
To interpret the statutes at issue here, however, we do not have to rely upon
rules of construction that merely assume the legislature "should have known" or "must
have known" about this Court's previous interpretation of "person ." The 2004 General
Assembly's "ACT relating to the protection of unborn children and declaring an
emergency," which created separate fetal homicide offenses for causing the death of an
unborn child and became law when it was signed by the Governor on February 20,
2004, expressly states that the General Assembly interprets the existing provisions of
the Kentucky Penal Code not to provide criminal liability for the killing of an unborn
child : "Whereas current criminal law leaves unborn children outside of its covers e, and
unborn children are in dire need of that coverage , an emergency is declared to exist
and this Act shall take effect upon signature of the Governor or upon its otherwise
becoming law. 02 Although Justice Wintersheimer, in his concurring opinion, believes
the 2004 General Assembly's fetal homicide legislation supports his conclusion that the
killing of an unborn child is actionable under KRS Chapter 507, I believe the exact
opposite to be true . Possible constitutional challenges to House Bill 108
notwithstanding, it is the fact that the fetal homicide legislation was enacted at all that
cements my conclusion that KRS Chapter 507 criminal homicide liability is unavailable
for the killing of an unborn child . This was expressly recognized by the 2004 General
12
2004 Regular Session, House Bill 108, § 6 (emphasis added) .
Assembly in enacting fetal homicide legislation . What better expression of the General
Assembly's intent is there than their own words.
Just last year, in Kotila v. Commonwealth , , this Court held that its interpretation
of Manufacturing Methamphetamine under KRS 218A .1432(1)(b) was "supported by
the General Assembly's own subsequent enactments with respect to the possession of
chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine." 14 In doing so, the Court
recognized that the presumption against redundant enactments allows a reviewing
court to interpret the General Assembly's decision to prohibit certain conduct through its
criminal laws as an indication that the conduct was not already prohibited by another,
previously-enacted criminal statute. 15 It defies all logic, and creates serious potential
double jeopardy quandaries, for this Court to interpret "causing the death of an unborn
child" as criminal homicide under KRS Chapter 507 after the most-recent General
Assembly has both made a legislative declaration that the existing provisions of the
Penal Code (presumably including KRS Chapter 507) do not provide criminal liability for
that conduct and has defined the conduct as a different criminal offense under a
different chapter of the Penal Code.
Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority because I believe
Appellee was not subject to liability for criminal homicide under KRS Chapter 507 for
causing the death of an unborn child . Unlike the majority, however, I maintain that no
KRS Chapter 507 liability exists for any such conduct unless and until the General
Assembly enacts legislation that would provide for such liability.
13
Ky ., 114 S.W.3d 226 (2003).
14
Id . at 238.
15
Id . at 238-39.
Stumbo, J., joins this concurring opinion .
RENDERED : JUNE 17, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Suprornr d1ourf of ~rttfurkV
2002-SC-0845-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-2595-MR
PIKE CIRCUIT COURT NO . 01-CR-114
CHRISTOPHER CHARLES MORRIS
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
I most certainly concur with the opinion of this Court in its decision to overrule
Hollis . In that case, a plurality of this Court in 1983 determined that a viable unborn
child is not a person under KRS Chapter 507, and that an unborn child must be "born
alive" to constitute a person thereunder . Hollis reasoned that an individual who kills a
viable unborn child cannot be charged with criminal homicide . Clearly, it was long past
due to remove that holding from the jurisprudence of Kentucky .
I write separately in concurrence to state my views regarding the necessity of
recognizing the ultimate legal logic and medical fact that necessarily arises from the
adoption of a viability standard . "Viability" is a term of art, nonspecific, constantly
changing, and medically and factually of some concern . "Viability" measures not the
humanity of the unborn child, but of the life support capacity of our culture and society.
For almost a half a century, the law with respect to the rights of unborn children
has been progressive and enlightened by the clear evidence developed in the sciences
of medicine and biology. Except for certain superficial differences, there is no
meaningful distinction between the unborn child with functioning but younger organs
and another unborn child, a few days or weeks older with functioning slightly more
advanced. There is no difference sufficient to justify granting greater consideration to
the child in the later stages of development than the child in the earlier stages. There is
no good reason why we should discriminate against unborn children and treat their
cases any differently than those of any other human being .
Medical authority has long recognized that an unborn child is in existence from
the moment of conception . Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §55 "Prenatal Injuries" at 368
(5th Ed . 1984); 42 Am.Jur.2d "Infants" §3 . Many jurisdictions have extended the
standards in both civil and criminal cases to a definition which involves conception
and/or fertilization .
A number of cases decided prior to Roe v. Wade, 410 U .S. 113, 93 Sup.Ct . 705,
35 L.Ed .2d 147 (1973), shed light on the difficulty of using viability to identify the
beginning of a person's life . In O'Neill v. Morse , 188 N .W.2d 785 (Mich . 1971), the
court asked, "if the mother can die and the fetus live, or the fetus die and the mother
live, how can it be said that there is only one life? . . . . The phenomenon of birth is not
the beginning of life ; it is merely a change in form of life." Id ., at 787 . In Porter v.
Lassiter, 87 S .E.2d 100 (Ga . Ct. App . 1955), the court rejected viability and determined
that the child's life begins when it is "quick", that is it moves in the mother's womb.
Another court, in Smith v. Brennan , 157 A.2d 497 (N .J . 1960) gave a lengthy review of
the medical and legal history up to that point, and rejected viability as "impossible of
practical application ." They said, "[w]e see no reason for denying recovery for a
prenatal injury because it occurred before the infant was capable of separate existence .
In the first place, age is not the sole measure of viability, and there is no real way of
determining in a borderline case whether or not a fetus was viable at the time of the
injury . . ." Id . a t 504 ; accord Bennett v. Homers, 147 A.2d 108 (N .H . 1958) .
Justice O'Connor, in Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health, Inc. , 462 U .S .
416 at 457 (1983), noted that although viability was generally thought, in 1973, to be 28
weeks, ten years later, infants delivered at 22 weeks could survive. "[D]ifferent
technological improvements will move backward the point of viability . . ." Id ., 462 U .S . at
456 . "It is certainly reasonable to believe that fetal viability in the first trimester of
pregnancy may be possible in the not too distant future ." Id ., at 457. "The Roe
framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself." Id., at 458. It may be easily
said then that logic is in favor of ignoring the time in the pregnancy at which an injury
occurs lest we place our criminal system on the same collision course .
In other pre-Roe civil cases, the U .S . District Court for the northern district of
Ohio in Steinberq v. Brown, 321 F .Supp. 741 (D .C . Ohio 1970), observed that
"biologically, when the spermatozoon penetrates and fertilizes the ovum, the result is
the creation of a new organism which conforms to the definition of life . . . ." Id . at 746 . It
is true that there have been dramatic advances in medical science, and legislative
enactments now require acknowledgement that the 'born alive' doctrine no longer
serves any evidentiary purpose . However, it can easily be argued that viability is
difficult to apply . As noted by the Steinberq panel, "Once human life has commenced,
the constitutional protections found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose
upon the state the duty of safeguarding it." Id . at 746-747 .
It is of interest to note that the pattern of legislative intent by the Kentucky
General Assembly can be seen in the adoption of KRS 311 .720(6) wherein the
legislature specified that the definition of human being as "any member of the species
homo sapiens from fertilization until death" is applicable to the laws of the
Commonwealth unless the context otherwise requires . The General Assembly has
clearly indicated its intent that the term "human being" should have the broadest
possible meaning so as to include an unborn child .
In effect, the legislature has abrogated the common law by adopting a definition
that considers the unborn child as a human being from the moment of conception . See
KRS Chapter 507A Section 1(c), which was enacted by the legislature and signed into
law by the governor as emergency legislation on February 20, 2004 . It could provide
uniformity and stability by recognizing that the unborn child is, from conception onward,
in medicine and biology, in logic and law, a person, and that the death of the unborn
child by the wrongful act of a third person is actionable both civilly and criminally.
Prosecution of such behavior should be measured in the same way as all other
questions of fact : 1) by introducing competent causation evidence established by a
preponderance of the evidence in civil cases and beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal
cases and, 2) having the case submitted to a jury just as any other factual dispute in
our legal system . Unborn children should be treated in the same manner as other
human beings .
Obviously, this Court cannot pass on the availability of the newly enacted
criminal fetal homicide act. Such matters could be addressed only in a proper case
under the new law.
A brief review of the scholarly writings and some of the pertinent cases may be
helpful in understanding the history of the born alive doctrine in general, as well as the
viability standard in particular. I would be remiss if I ignored the considerable
jurisprudence in the area of fetal homicide that I discovered in researching the
questions raised .
For a valuable review and analysis for discarding both the requirements of
viability and the born alive rule, see Michael Holzapfel, Comments, The Right to Live,
The Right to Choose, and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J . Contemp . Health L.
& Pol'y 431 (2002) . But commentaries as far back as 1968 have shown that viability is
"impractical of application" . Norman, Torts: Prenatal Injuries - Liability and Live Birth ,
21 Okla. L . Rev. 114 (1968).
Since the decision of Bonbrest v. Kotz , 65 F. Supp. 138 (D .D .C . 1946), our legal
system has been steadily distancing itself from the reasoning of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes who declared that a pregnant mother and her unborn child were a "single
entity" in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton ,138 Mass. 14 (1884) . The "born alive"
rule is disappearing from the face of American criminal jurisprudence . As the
legislature has defined, the life within the mother begins at fertilization . See KRS
311 .720(6) . It is good to see that we have moved the common law underlying the
legislation towards our goal of ensuring the protection of life for all Kentuckians .
"Viability" is a term of art that sets the legal recognition of a separate person's
interests and rights to be distinct from the mother's as the time at which medical
science can sustain the child's life apart from the womb. Bonbrest , supra, originally
used this concept as a means of determining whether the unborn child had a wrongful
death claim . The controversial decision of Roe v. Wade, supra, deeply rooted viability
into abortion decisions because it used this point in the development of the unborn child
to balance the interests of the mother with those of her unborn child . Viability depends
on the medical establishment to tell the courts what they are able to do . But interest in
cloning and the creation of an artificial womb can mean a possibility that someday
viability may coincide with fertilization.
As a standard in the world of abortion, viability was adopted as the last point at
which a mother could opt to abort the unborn child in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 505 U.S . 833, 112 S.Ct . 2791, 120 LEd .2d 674
(1992). But Roe and Casey, supra , inserted the clause "except where it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
Casey, 505 U.S . at 879 (quoting Roe , 410 U .S . at 164-165) . This "health of the mother"
exception is used to justify abortions that are commenced beyond viability. An ordinary
person might understand the words to mean that the unborn child may be killed
because it poses a threat to the life of the mother. Justice Thomas argues the same in
his dissenting opinion in Stenberg v. Carhart , 530 U .S . 914, 120 S .Ct. 2597, 147
L.Ed .2d 743 (2000) and the majority said, "He is wrong." See Stenberg , 530 U .S . at
931 . Therefore, "Health" has been vastly enlarged . So, despite the so-called health
exception, the concept of viability is the line dug in the sand for those people who
discuss abortion . The Roe line of cases, however, deals with a mother and an unborn
child . In this case, we are determining the rights of the unborn child and mother vis-avis criminal acts of others . Viability has nothing to do with whether the unborn child, or
other nomenclature referring to the being created and set into independent motion at
fertilization or conception, is recognized as a person with rights and privileges under the
law.
In Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms , 543 N .W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996), the South
Dakota Supreme Court wisely distinguished between using viability as an abortion
standard or as a criminal standard . Their purpose was to determine whether there are
two separate lives existing in relation to third parties. It stated, "Nothing in Roe prohibits
the Legislature from including a nonviable fetus in its definition of a person under our
State's wrongful death act". Wiersma , 543 N.W.2d at 790, note 2. They distinguished
fetal assault and homicide cases away from acts committed during abortion . Maple
Leaf had argued that an inconsistency would be created by allowing a cause of action
for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus and at the same time allowing an abortion up
to the 24th week of pregnancy . That court stated that if it accepted such an argument,
"someone could fatally injure an unborn child by a nonconsensual, wrongful act and still
avoid civil liability because the child was not yet viable . This would, ironically, give the
tortfeasor the same civil rights as the mother to terminate a pregnancy ." Id ., at 791 .
This analysis is clear and consistent with Roe, which allowed the mother to choose to
abort the unborn child, but not anyone else, not even the father. Therefore, simple
equity instructs that others who have less tenable rights than the father are estopped
from using Roe as a shield from civil and criminal liability here because those interests
sprung from the mother's unique position and the next closest to the mother, the father,
does not qualify . Therefore, a third party cannot claim the same interests granted only
to the mother . At least one other court has rejected Maple Leaf's type of argument and
upheld the distinction on purpose . See People v. Ford , 581 N .E.2d 1189 (III .App .Ct.
1991). ("A woman has a privacy interest in terminating her pregnancy ; however,
defendant has no such interest.") .
For any purpose other than abortion, many jurisdictions have abandoned viability
because it has no magic sense in identifying the beginning of a person's life. California,
which has defined murder as the "unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with
malice aforethought", declined to use viability as an element of murder . There, the
charge of murder will stand as long as the state can show that the unborn child was
beyond the embryonic stage, that is, seven to eight weeks. See People v. Davis , 872
P.2d 591 (Cal . 1994) . Other standards are fertilization and quickening . Quickening is a
point prior to viability, somewhere between 16 and 18 weeks, when the mother feels the
first movements of the child in her womb. Several states have used quickening as the
point after which criminal actions for harm to the fetus may attach . But quickening is
also only a waypoint from the true beginning of individual human life which is
conception . Viability is a tool that can be used to expand the proper approach to
ascertaining the legal and natural beginning of human life in the unborn child. The
advances of medical science are limitless and can be easily applied to enlarge the
viability concept to currently unknown dimensions, including fertilization and conception .
These movements away from born alive rules tend to place the beginning of life
at its source, as proved by medical science, fertilization or conception . Louisiana, North
Dakota, Missouri, and several others have had statutes defining a separate human life
from fertilization or conception . The Federal Government has recently enacted the
Unborn Victims of Violence Act (HR 1997) . Our legislature passed KRS 311 .720(6)
with the definition of life beginning at fertilization . We should put the force of the
common law on similar footing .
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