CHRISTOPHER WELCH V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : NOVEMBER 18, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0645-MR
CHRISTOPHER WELCH
V
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN PECKLER, JUDGE
99-C R-00172
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Christopher Welch, was convicted of one count of sodomy in
the first degree and of one count of sexual abuse in the first degree . He was sentenced
to a twenty-year term of imprisonment . The charges arose from statements made by
Appellant during his treatment at a juvenile sex offender program . Appellant entered a
conditional guilty plea to the above charges and reserved the right to appeal the Boyle
Circuit Court's denial of his motion to suppress these statements . The issue here is
whether statements made by a juvenile to counselors without Miranda ' warnings during
treatment may be used to pursue a new criminal investigation and prosecution .
Appellant was adjudicated as a juvenile sex offender and committed to
the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ") . He was sent to Rivendell, a treatment
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U .S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed . 2d 694 (1966).
facility, to participate in the juvenile sex offender treatment program. While at Rivendell
and participating in the treatment program, Appellant disclosed to his counselor several
uncharged acts of sexual misconduct. The counselor notified social workers who then
notified the Boyle County Sheriffs Department . Deputy Sheriff Jim Wilcher investigated
the allegations and he, along with Kentucky State Police Detective Lisa Rudinski,
traveled to Rivendell to interview Appellant. The officers gave Appellant his Miranda
warnings and proceeded to interview him . Appellant gave the officers a full statement
in which he confessed to sodomizing a five-year-old child approximately twenty times.
Appellant's confession was consistent with the information previously gathered by
Deputy Wilcher from the young child.
Appellant presented evidence at the suppression hearing regarding the
juvenile sex offender treatment program and evidence regarding the lack of warnings
given to him. The evidence revealed that participation in the juvenile sex offender
program is not voluntary, but rather the participants are at these treatment programs by
court order and must follow the rules and procedures of the program. The program
uses group therapy and group dynamics as a means to further the goals of the
program . Participants are strongly encouraged, by counselors and other group
members, to admit and disclose all prior sexual misconduct . This fosters treatment and
reprogramming of the behavior of those involved . Testimony during the suppression
hearing described participation in this part of the program as essential to progress
toward completion of the program as ordered by the court. Progress in the program is
required to obtain and keep certain privileges during treatment.
Appellant received no warning or notice that his counseling disclosures
could result in criminal prosecution . When Appellant made the statements to
counselors at Rivendell, no Miranda warnings were given . The first time Appellant was
made aware of his right to remain silent occurred when he was interviewed at the
treatment facility by the police officers . The record does not contain any written
verification of waiver at that time . As a result of his statements, Appellant was charged
with the offenses herein . Following the denial of his suppression motion, Appellant
entered the conditional guilty plea from which this matter of right appeal2 is taken .
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to suppress his
statements made to the counselors at Rivendell . He presents three alternative reasons
as to why the statements should have been suppressed : (1) the statements were
obtained in violation of Miranda , (2) the statements were involuntary, and (3) the
statements were privileged . The Commonwealth argues that such statements made to
counselors are not privileged and are voluntary, and that the counselors are not agents
of the police .
Appellate review of a motion to suppress is governed by the standard
expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ornelas v. United States3 and
adopted by this Court in Adcock v. Commonwealth . The approach established by the
Supreme Court of the United States is a two-step process that first reviews the factual
findings of the trial court under a clearly erroneous standard .5 The second step reviews
de novo the applicability of the law to the facts found. The only evidence of record was
presented by Appellant during the suppression hearing. The Commonwealth did not
Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
517 U .S . 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996) .
Ky., 967 S .W .2d 6 (1998).
5 Ornelas, 517 U .S . at 699, 116 S. Ct . at 1663 .
6
Id
2
present any evidence . As summarized hereinabove, we discern no clear error
regarding the pertinent factual findings.
Upon review of the law, the initial inquiry must be whether the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution securing the privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to this
situation . The privilege has been held to protect a person from being forced to put forth
evidence against himself or herself and "the availability of the privilege does not turn
upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of
the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. '7 Moreover, the privilege
is not limited to criminal proceedings and protects in circumstances where the person's
freedom is curtailed .8 Here, the unwarned statements made by Appellant while he was
in state custody were used to initiate a new prosecution and this type of communication
is of a character to require an analysis under the Fifth Amendment and Section 11 of
the Kentucky Constitution . Kentucky decisions generally hold Section 11 to be
coextensive with the Fifth Amendment.9
A custodial interrogation is a prerequisite for invoking the necessity of
Miranda warnings-10 It has been held that "Miranda and its progeny in this Court [the
Supreme Court of the United States] govern the admissibility of statements made
during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts ."'
Miranda is not just a
In re Gault , 387 U .S . 1, 49, 87 S . Ct . 1428, 1455, 18 L. Ed . 2d 527 (1967) .
8 Miranda , 384 U .S . at 467, 86 S . Ct. at 1624 .
9 See Hourigan v. Commonwealth , Ky., 962 S.W .2d 860, 864 (1998); Cooper v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 899 S .W.2d 75, 78 (1995) ; Newman v . Stinson , Ky ., 489 S .W.2d
826, 829 (1972) (holding that the Fifth Amendment and Section 11 of the Constitution
of Kentucky provide identical protection against self-incrimination) .
'° See Miranda, 384 U .S . 436, 86 S . Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
" Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S . 428, 431, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2329-30, 147 L. Ed.
2d 405 (2000) .
prophylactic rule but is rather a constitutionally-based rule of law.
12
Here, Appellant
was committed by the court to DJJ and placed in the juvenile sex offender program at
the treatment facility. For this reason, Appellant's participation in the juvenile sex
offender program was involuntary. Based upon the court ordered commitment,
Appellant was in state custody. During the treatment program, the counselors intensely
questioned Appellant, not only about the offense that resulted in the commitment, but
also about any other sexual misconduct. The questioning regarding other sexual
misconduct was a necessary part of the juvenile sexual offender program where the
participants were "strongly encouraged" to admit additional sexual misconduct. Such
questioning and encouraged disclosure amounted to coercion in the course of a
custodial interrogation .
Another Miranda requirement is state action . The counselors who
questioned Appellant were employees of the treatment facility, not law enforcement
officers . Generally, questioning by law enforcement is required to trigger the necessity
for Miranda warnings. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized the applicability of Miranda in situations not involving law enforcement . In
Estelle v. Smith,
13
the Court held that a psychiatrist, who performed an involuntary
evaluation of the defendant, could not testify regarding information that had been
gathered by questioning during the evaluation, because the defendant had not been
apprised of his Fifth Amendment rights . The examining physician was not a law
enforcement officer, but the Court held that the doctor went beyond a routine
,2 Id .
13
451 U.S. 454, 469, 101 S . Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L. Ed . 2d 359 (1981) .
examination and gathered information during the evaluation to testify concerning the
defendant's future dangerousness and to assist the prosecution in seeking the death
penalty. Here, the counselors gathered information regarding previously undisclosed
sexual misconduct and delivered that information to law enforcement officers .
The title and employer of the questioner are not the sole basis for
determining state action ; rather courts must determine whether the interrogation was
such as to likely result in disclosure of information which would lead to facts that would
form the basis for prosecution . In this case, the likelihood of such a disclosure was
virtually overwhelming . Accordingly, the counselors who interrogated Appellant were
state actors for the purpose of the Fifth Amendment, and Appellant should have been
informed of his Miranda rights regarding his privilege against self-incrimination .
Supporting this view is State v. Evans,15 where the Ohio Court of Appeals
held that statements disclosed to counselors by a juvenile, who was under involuntary
commitment for treatment, were not admissible against the juvenile . The facts in Evans
and the facts of this case are very similar, in that both cases dealt with juveniles who
had been committed by the court to receive treatment . Another similarity is that both
juveniles, upon the encouragement of the treatment program, admitted to prior
misconduct that resulted in subsequent prosecution . The Evans court held the
appellant's statements to be inadmissible in violation of the Fifth Amendment . The
court held that the appellant was in the "classic penalty" situation wherein the privilege
against self-incrimination is self-executing, and he "was unconstitutionally forced to
'4 United States v. D .F. ,
63 F .3d 671, 683-84 (1995), vacated and remanded, 517 U .S .
1231, 116 S. Ct. 1872, 135 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1996), remanded to, 115 F .3d 413 (1997)
holding that the Fifth Amendment analysis contained in D. F. , 63 F.3d 671 was correct) .
5 760 N.E .2d 909, 144 Ohio App. 3d 539 (2001), discretionary appeal not allowed , 757
N .E.2d 771, 93 Ohio St. 3d 1473 (2001) .
6
choose between a substantial penalty and self-incrimination ."' 6 The Evans court held
that the trial court had properly suppressed the appellant's written and oral confession
that he gave at the treatment center . Appellant's circumstance is not dissimilar and his
statements to counselors should have been suppressed .
Appellant further argues that his statements to police should be
suppressed as fruit of a poisonous tree." The Commonwealth argues that since the
police gave Appellant his Miranda warnings, his statements to them should be
admissible . On the contrary, Appellant's statements made to the police were indeed
fruit of a poisonous tree because those statements were obtained as a direct result of
information improperly gathered by the counselors at the treatment facility . Without
Appellant, the police would have had no source from which to gain information for the
new charges against Appellant . Moreover, the statements gathered by the police were
not attenuated from the statements made to the counselors.' $ Consequently,
Appellant's statements to the police should also have been suppressed .
Supporting this view is a recent United States Supreme Court decision, United
States v. Patane ,'9 which holds that an unwarned but voluntary statement is subject to
the exclusionary rule, but that evidence obtained as a result of such a statement is
not. 2° However, if the confession was coerced and the person to whom the statement
was made was a state actor, Patane states that "those subjected to coercive police
interrogations have an automatic protection from the use of their involuntary statements
'6
_Id . at 924 .
" Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U .S. 471, 488, 83 S . Ct . 407, 417, 9 L. Ed . 2d 441
1963) .
8 Id., citing Nardone v. United States , 308 U .S . 338, 341, 60 S. Ct. 266, 268, 84 L. Ed .
907 (1939) .
L. Ed. 2d
(2004) .
U .S.
, 124 S .Ct . 2620,
20
Id. at 2626
(or evidence derived from their statements) in any subsequent criminal trial." 21 As we
have held Appellant's confession to the counselors to have been involuntary because
coerced by a state actor, and to have led directly to the police investigation and
discovery of Appellant's criminal conduct, his post-Miranda confession to the police and
the evidence derived from either confession is inadmissible against him in any
subsequent criminal trial .
Since we have decided the case on constitutional grounds, we need not
address the parties' arguments pertaining to the applicability of KRS 197.440, KRS
635 .527, and KRS 620.030(1).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Boyle Circuit Court is
reversed and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
Opinion .
Cooper, Johnstone, and Stumbo, JJ., concur. Keller, J., dissents by
separate opinion in which Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ ., join .
2'
Patane , 124 S.Ct. at 2628 (uotin Chavez v. Martinez , 538 U.S. 760, 769, 123 S.Ct.
1994, 2002 (2003)) .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Timothy G. Arnold
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane'
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Elizabeth A . Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : NOVEMBER 18, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
,suprmtcr fauuxf of
onfurkV
2002-SC-0645-MR
CHRISTOPHER WELCH
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DARREN PECKLER, JUDGE
99-CR-00172
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
I respectfully dissent for three reasons : (1) Appellant's statements to the police
were made after Miranda ' warnings were given and, therefore, are admissible ; (2)
Wonq Sun's2 "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not require the exclusion of
Appellant's statements to police or the derivative evidence discovered as a result of his
statements, i .e., the identity of his other victims ; and (3) Appellant was not "in custody"
within the meaning of Miranda when he first confessed to counselors .
I . Statements to Police
The Supreme Court of the United States has previously addressed whether
Miranda warnings given by police officers after an unwarned confession are effective .
In Oregon v. Elstad ,3 the Court rejected the application of the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine to a subsequently warned confession after an initial unwarned statement
' Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U .S . 436, 86 S .Ct . 1602, 16 L .Ed.2d 694 (1966) .
2 Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U .S. 471, 83 S .Ct . 407, 9 L .Ed .2d 441 (1963).
3 470 U .S . 298, 105 S .Ct . 1285, 84 L .Ed .2d 222 (1985) .
was given and held that an officer's good-faith failure to give Miranda warnings did not
require suppression of a post- Miranda statement. 4 The Court recently clarified Elstad's
holding in Missouri v. Seibert,5 where it explained that if the police deliberately withhold
the Miranda warnings so as "to obscure both the practical and legal significance of the
admonition when finally given ,,6 then any subsequent post-warning statements resulting
from the violation are excluded . The Court reiterated that where the failure to give
Miranda warnings was in good faith, e .g., where the questioner may not realize that
Miranda warnings are required, any subsequent post-warning statements are not
excluded . Here, it is undisputed that Appellant's first statements were not the result of
any plan by the counselors to subvert Miranda . Clearly the counselors did not realize
that Miranda warnings might be required .7 Accordingly, Appellant's post-Miranda
statements to the police are admissible .
II . Identity of Other Victims
In United States v. Patane ,$ the Court held that the failure to give Miranda
warnings does not require suppression of the fruits of a defendant's unwarned
statement:
4 Missouri v. Seibert ,
U .S .
, 124 S .Ct . 2601, 2610 n.4, 159 L.Ed .2d 643
(2004) ("In Elstad , 'a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any
actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to
exercise his free will' did not 'so tain[t] the investigatory process that a subsequent
voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period .") .
5
U .S.
6 Seibert ,
concurring) .
, 124 S .Ct. 2601, 159 L .Ed .2d 643 (2004).
U .S . at
, 124 S .Ct. at 2615, 159 L.Ed .2d at
(Kennedy, J .,
In State v. Evans, 760 N.E .2d 909 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001), the Court of Appeals
of Ohio determined that staff members of a juvenile treatment facility were not required
to give Miranda warnings even though the juveniles were encouraged to confess past
offenses because the staff members were not law enforcement officials or their agents .
U.S .
1
124 S .Ct. 2620, 159 L .Ed.2d 667 (2004) .
In this case we must decide whether a failure to give a
suspect the warnings prescribed by [Miranda], requires
suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned
but voluntary statements . The Court has previously
addressed this question but has not reached a definitive
conclusion . . . . Because the Miranda rule protects against
violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, which, in turn, is
not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence
resulting from voluntary statements we answer the question
presented in the negative .
The Self-Incrimination Clause does exactly what its name implies : It creates a right
against self-incrimination . It does not create a right against incrimination by others .
Thus, the Self-Incrimination Clause is not implicated by the introduction at trial of the
testimony of others, e .g., the victim. The Appellant can assert his Fifth Amendment
rights only to bar the introduction of statements that he has made, not statements made
by others . Thus, even if we assume that Appellant's statements should be suppressed,
the fruits of his otherwise voluntary statements, i .e ., the identity of his other victims, are
not subject to suppression, and the newly identified victims may testify against him.
III. Custodial Interrogation
At first blush, it seems illogical to maintain that a person adjudicated a juvenile
sexual offender and remanded to a treatment facility is not in custody when he is
questioned . Of course Appellant was in custody, but that does not mean that Appellant
was "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda when he first confessed to the counselors.
And in Appellant's situation, I do not believe that he was "in custody" within the meaning
of Miranda .
Although Kentucky's appellate courts have not previously addressed whether
one who is imprisoned is per se "in custody" for purposes of Miranda , the Second,
U.S . at
emphasis added) .
, 124 S .Ct. at 2624, 159 L.Ed .2d at
(citations omitted ;
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals have
addressed this issue and have held that merely because the defendant is in prison on
an unrelated charge does not mean the defendant is "in custody" under Miranda .' °
They uniformly hold that the totality of the circumstances determines the custody
issue."
Factors the courts considered in determining whether the
prisoner was "in custody" include : the defendant's freedom to
leave the scene and the purpose, place and length of the
questioning ; a change in the surroundings of the prisoner
which results in an added imposition on his freedom of
movement; and whether circumstances suggest any
measure of compulsion above and beyond the
12
confinement.
In U .S . v. Chamberlain , the Court stated that "[i]n determining whether [the
investigators'] conversations with Chamberlain amounted to custodial interrogation, we
1°
See United States v. Willoughby , 860 F .2d 15, 23 (2 nd Cir. 1988) ("[W]e believe
that the mere fact of imprisonment does not mean that all of a prisoner's conversations
are official interrogations that must be preceded by Miranda warnings ."), cert . denied ,
488 U .S . 1033, 109 S.Ct . 846, 102 L .Ed .2d 978 (1989); United States v . Conley, 779
F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1985) ("declin[ing] to read Mathis as compelling the use of
Miranda warnings prior to all prisoner interrogations and [holding] that a prison inmate is
not automatically always in 'custody' within the meaning of Miranda"), cert. denied , 479
U .S . 830, 107 S .Ct. 114, 93 L.Ed .2d 61 (1986); U.S . v . Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1232 (7th
Cir. 1994) (where no "added imposition on his freedom of movement" nor "any measure
of compulsion above and beyond [imprisonment]," defendant held not "in custody" for
the purposes of Miranda ), Leviston v. Black, 843 F .2d 302, 304 (8 th Cir. 1988) ("While
Miranda may apply to one who is in custody for an offense unrelated to the
interrogation, Mathis, 391 U .S . at 4-5, 88 S .Ct. at 1504-55], incarceration does not ipso
facto render an interrogation custodial . . . ."), cert. denied , 488 U .S . 865, 109 S .Ct. 168,
102 L.Ed .2d 138 (1988); Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F .2d 424 (9th Cir.1978) (questioning
of inmate by deputy sheriff about contents of matchbox containing a substance
resembling marijuana during a routine search of an inmate's belongings held
noncustodial) .
11 See U .S . v . Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1232 (7th Cir. 1994).
12 _Id . (citations, internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted ;
emphasis added).
13
163 F . 3d 499 (8th Cir. 1998).
are 'concerned with the suspect's subjective belief that "his freedom of action is
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest" and whether that belief is objectively
reasonable under the circumstances . -14 The Court then utilized a six-factor analysis set
out in United States v. Griffin 15 to determine how a reasonable person would have felt in
the situation :
A determination of how a reasonable person would have felt
in this situation-whether a reasonable person would have
thought he was in custody-requires close consideration both
of how Chamberlain got to the interview room and of the
atmosphere of the interviews once Chamberlain arrived for,
and during, questioning .
The six factor analysis set out in United States v. Griffin
provides guidance in making this determination:
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of
questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the
suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or
that the suspect was not considered under arrest;
(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of
movement during questioning ;
(3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or
voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to
questions ;
(4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were
employed during questioning ;
(5) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was police
dominated ; or,
(6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the
termination of the questioning .
All six of these factors need not be present for a finding of
custody requiring a Miranda warning . Nor is this list
exhaustive. The custody issue ultimately "focuses upon the
totality of the circumstances. "16
Here, Appellant voluntarily participated in the Sex Offender Treatment Program
at the juvenile facility . It was his choice to attend the sessions, and a decision not to
14
15
Id . at 503 .
922 F .2d 1343 (8t' Cir. 1990) .
16 Chamberlain , 163 F .3d at 503 (citations omitted) .
-5-
attend or participate would not increase his sentence . 17 During the sessions, he was
free to discuss his previous sex offenses, or not . And the counselors, to whom he made
his first statements, although employed by a state facility, questioned Appellant only for
the purpose of treatment . The counselors were not law enforcement officers and did
not create a police-dominated atmosphere during their sessions with him . Furthermore,
the counselors did not require that Appellant confess to law enforcement officers when
they came to interview him .
The counselors encouraged Appellant to discuss his previous offenses in an
effort to provide treatment and not as a "strong arm tactic" or a "deceptive stratagem ." It
is undisputed that the counselors were not seeking to elicit information from Appellant
for the purpose of his prosecution . Unlike the situation in Estelle v. Smith 18 where the
psychiatrist performed an involuntary exam and testified at the prosecutor's behest, the
counselors in the present case worked with the Appellant for treatment purposes only.
Notwithstanding the assertion by the majority, Appellant was not actually coerced by the
counselors to disclose the information about his prior sexual offenses-encouragement
does not equal coercion . Thus, I join in the trial court's disagreement with Appellant that
Appellant's statements, first to the counselors, and then later to the sheriff's deputy and
state trooper, were coerced .
I believe that the majority's reliance on State v . Evans is misplaced given that the
case precedes the Supreme Court's decisions in Patane and Seibert, and other than
sharing with the present case the general subject matter of a juvenile who confesses in
17
See Martin v. Chandler, 122 S .W .3d 540 (Ky. 2003) (holding requirement that
prisoner complete Sex Offender Treatment Program to be eligible to earn discretionary
good time credits towards his sentence did not result in increase in punishment ).
18
451 U.S . 454; 101 S .Ct. 1866, 68 L .Ed .2d 359 (1981) .
a treatment program, Evans is factually different. In Evans, although the Court found
that the counselors were not law enforcement officials or their agents, and thus no
Miranda warnings were required, the Court suppressed two of the three statements
made by the juvenile because the "grinding duration and inevitability" of the counselor's
questioning (where he was questioned until he gave an incriminating statement)'9 and
the threats for failure to confess to offenses of which he was suspected effectively
created a situation in which the juvenile would be punished for exercising his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination . In Appellant's case, there is no evidence
that Appellant was threatened with punishment for failure to admit committing the
offense or that he was exhaustively questioned . There is also no evidence that the
counselors suspected Appellant committed additional crimes and were seeking to
obtain his confession .
Thus, i believe that although Appellant was imprisoned at the time he attended
the sessions, he was not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda when he made his
admissions to the counselors .
For the above three reasons, or any one separately, I dissent and would affirm
Appellant's conviction .
Graves and Wintersheimer, JJ ., join this dissenting opinion .
19
State v. Evans, 760 N.E .2d 909, 915 (Ohio Ct. App . 2001) ("Hillcrest
authorities deemed Evan's first attempt to complete the 'commitment offense paper'
unacceptable because 'incomplete.' The staff required that he try again. To assist him in
being more thorough, a counselor provided Evans with a list of fourteen charges that at
one time had been brought against him, and he was specifically told to write separately
about each of them.") .
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