WILLIAM A . HERNDON V. MARCELLA A . HERNDON (NOW VIERS)
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AS MODIFIED : AUGUST 26, 2004
RENDERED : APRIL 22, 2004
TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0452-DG
WILLIAM A. HERNDON
V.
[DATE
APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
1999-CA-2042
BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT NO. 95-CI-00506
MARCELLA A. HERNDON (NOW VIERS)
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY CHIEF JUSTICE LAMBERT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Following the dissolution of their marriage, Appellant, William Herndon,
and Appellee, Marcella Herndon (now Viers), entered into settlement negotiations . A
purported settlement agreement emerged, but Appellant refused to sign the settlement
document . The trial court adopted the agreement and incorporated it into the final
order of the court . Thereafter, Appellant filed a CR 60 .02 motion that was heard by the
Domestic Relations Commissioner . On the Commissioner's recommendation, the trial
court overruled the motion . Prior to trial court action on the Commissioner's CR 60 .02
report, neither party filed objections. The issue presented here is whether the Court of
Appeals properly dismissed Appellant's appeal based on Eiland v. Ferrell ' for
Appellant's failure to object to the Commissioner's recommendation .
' Ky., 937 S .W.2d 713 (1997).
In Bland v. Ferrell ,2 this Court held that claims of error with regard to
recommendations made by a domestic relations commissioner had to be brought to the
attention of the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal. We reasoned that unless
such claims of commissioner error were brought to the attention of the trial court, there
would be no opportunity for trial court correction, unnecessary appeals, needless
reversals, and all the mischief associated with review of unpreserved claims of error.
Here we must decide whether a failure of preservation under such circumstances
should result in appellate dismissal or whether the Court of Appeals should review such
unpreserved claims under a palpable error standard . We conclude that dismissal is
unauthorized and that such claims should be reviewed pursuant to CR 61 .02.
On November 14, 1995, a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage was entered
terminating the marriage of Appellant and Appellee . An amended decree was entered
on November 15, 1995 stating that only the marriage was dissolved and that the
remaining issues were reserved for resolution at a later time .a
On June 25, 1998, the Domestic Relations Commissioner held a hearing
following a trial court order of referral. Appellee and her counsel were present at the
hearing on June 25, but Appellant was not present because he was incarcerated in
Florida . He was represented by counsel at the hearing . During the course of the
hearing, the Domestic Relations Commissioner encouraged settlement negotiations
between the parties. Appellant and his counsel were in contact via telephone
2 Supra .
3 _Id . at 716.
4 This case well illustrates the problems that occur when trial courts bifurcate dissolution
of marriage from the other issues in the case. Unless a compelling need for dissolution
of the marriage is shown, better practice would be to resolve all issues in a single
judgment .
throughout the negotiations . Appellant's counsel dictated the terms of the parties'
settlement agreement and the terms were transcribed by Appellee's counsel .
When presented with the written settlement document, Appellant refused
to sign because he claimed that it contained provisions to which he had not agreed . On
July 28, 1998, Appellant's counsel notified Appellee's counsel of Appellant's refusal to
sign the agreement . The next day, July 29, 1998, Appellee moved the trial court to
adopt the settlement agreement as an order of the court.
On August 3, 1998, the trial court entered an order adopting the
settlement agreement as an order of the court . Appellant's counsel was not present
when the trial court entered the order. From the record, it appears that Appellant's
counsel believed the hearing to be at 1 :00 p.m. on August 3, 1998 but discovered at
8:30 a .m . on that morning that the hearing was scheduled for 9 :00 a.m . He notified the
trial court that he would be late but would be present . Counsel arrived at 9:15 a.m . and
then learned that the trial court had already entered the order adopting the settlement
agreement .
As a result of the foregoing, on August 17, 1998, Appellant filed a CR
60 .02 motion supported by counsel's affidavit . Appellee filed a response on August 20,
1998, and the motion was referred to the Domestic Relations Commissioner for a
hearing scheduled for December 4, 1998 . On June 15, 1999, the Domestic Relations
Commissioner recommended denial of Appellant's CR 60.02 motion. No objections
were filed, and on July 28, 1999, the trial court entered an order overruling Appellant's
CR 60 .02 motion whereby he had sought to set aside the August 3, 1998 order
adopting the settlement agreement .
Appellant timely appealed to the Court of Appeals from the July 28, 1999
Order of the trial court . The Court of Appeals dismissed Appellant's appeal and stated
in part:
We are bound by Bland v. Ferrell , Ky., 937 S.W .2d 713 (1997),
which holds that the filing of objections to a Commissioner's report
pursuant to CR 53.06(2) is necessary for preservation of the issue for
appellate review. No objections were filed in the case sub judice ; thus, we
dismiss this appeal .
Appellant sought discretionary review and this Court granted the motion to determine if
the Court of Appeals properly dismissed Appellant's appeal or whether the court should
have considered the merits of the appeal under CR 61 .02.
Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals should have considered his
appeal under CR 61 .02 even though he did not file objections under CR 53 .06 to the
Domestic Relations Commissioner's report. Appellant contends that the Court of
Appeals incorrectly interpreted Bland v. Ferrell5 and that SCR 1 .030(8)(a) does not
bind the Court of Appeals to reach its result. Appellant believes that Bland does not
answer the question presented here, and for that reason the Court of Appeals
erroneously dismissed the appeal .
Appellee contends that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
Appellant's appeal. She relies on Swatzell v. Commonwealth s an administrative law
case, wherein this Court held that "failure to file exceptions to the report of the hearing
officer constitute[d] a failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, thereby precluding
review by the circuit court . ,7 In Swatzell , we held that the failure to file exceptions was a
Supra .
.,
'Ky 962 S .W.2d 866 (1998),
overruled by Rapier v. Philpot , Ky.,
S.W.3d
(2004) (overruling the Swatzell holding that the failure to file exceptions is a
jurisdictional defect).
Swatzell , 962 S .W.2d at 870 .
jurisdictional defect, but more recently we have abandoned jurisdiction as the decisional
basis and adopted the view that in administrative cases, a party who fails to file
exceptions may only obtain review of those matters in the agency head's final order that
differ from those contained in the hearing officer's recommended order. $ In other
words, in administrative law cases, a party who disagrees with the hearing officer's
recommended order must bring that disagreement to the attention of the agency head
or be precluded from raising the issue in court.
Our decision in Rapier v. Philpot9 was predicated upon our analysis of
various provisions of KRS 13B and to that extent it is inapplicable where the rules of
civil procedure are controlling. Another difference between KRS 13B cases and cases
governed by the civil rules is the breadth of discretion possessed respectively by the
agency head or the trial judge . In Rapier, we took pains to point out that "[i]f the agency
head deviates from the recommended order, it must make separate findings of fact and
conclusions of law for any deviation from the recommended order."' ° By contrast, a
trial judge acting on a Commissioner's report pursuant to CR 53 .06 has the broadest
possible discretion with respect to the action that may be taken ."
The final distinction and the one we believe to be most fundamental
between administrative law cases and cases originating in the Court of Justice is the
source of the tribunal's authority . An administrative case arises from a legislative
delegation of authority to an administrative agency wherein power is granted to make
regulations for the exercise of the authority granted, and the duty imposed to resolve
8 Rapier v. Philpot,
S .W.3d at
, Slip op . at 3 .
'Supra .
~° Rapier,
S .W .3d at
, Slip op. at 3. See KRS 13B .120(3) .
Eiland v. Ferrell, 937 S .W.2d at 716. See also , Basham v. Wilkins, Ky. App ., 851
S .W .2d 491 (1993); Haley v. Haley, Ky. App ., 573 S .W.2d 354 (1978).
5
disputes in a manner that requires findings of fact and application of law. 12 Typically,
the statute will delegate the fact-finding role to a hearing officer with the final authority
being reserved to the agency head . Executive Branch agencies or administrative
agencies have no inherent authority and may exercise only such authority as may be
legislatively conferred . 14 Moreover, the legislative grant of authority may define the
basis for judicial review. 15 By contrast, the Court of Justice is vested exclusively with
the judicial power of the Commonwealth 16 and the Supreme Court is authorized to
prescribe "rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice."" CR 53.06(2) and
CR 61 .02 are such rules. The authoritative interpretation of these rules is a matter
exclusively within the province of this Court .
As the foregoing discussion reveals, Swatzell v. Commonwealth '8 and
Rapier v. Philpot' 9 were administrative law cases and Eiland v. Ferrell2° was a case
within the original jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. As our analysis further reveals,
court authority with respect to review of administrative law cases and review of cases
originating in the Court of Justice is different . In the first instance we must interpret
procedural statutes and give effect to legislative intent ,2' while in the other we interpret
our own rules . As such, even where the facts appear similar, the standard of appellate
12 Young v. Willis , 305 Ky. 201, 203 S .W .2d 5 (1947) ; Vanhoose v. Commonwealth , Ky.
App ., 995 S .W .2d 389 (1999) .
13 KRS 1313 .030; KRS 1313 .120.
14
Linkous v. Darch , Ky., 323 S .W.2d 850 (1959); Robertson v. Schein, 305 Ky. 528,
204 S .W .2d 954 (1947) .
15 See KRS 1313 .140 . Cf. American Beauty Homes Corp . v. Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Comm'n , Ky., 379 S .W .2d 450 (1964).
16
17
KY. CONST. § 109 .
KY. CONST. § 116 .
Supra .
Supra.
2°
Supra .
21 Gateway Construction Co. v. Wallbaum , Ky., 356 S .W .2d 247 (1962) .
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1s
1s
review in an administrative law case may differ from the process of review where the
Rules of Civil Procedure control.
The Constitution of Kentucky grants "as a matter of right at least one
appeal to another court . . . ."22 Where unpreserved issues are presented, this Court
has adopted a rule of practice and procedure, CR 61 .02, whereby the constitutional
right of appeal may be harmonized with our rules relating to preservation of error. 23 CR
61 .02 recognizes that a party's appellate rights may be circumscribed but maintains an
avenue of relief by an appellate court even when the error may have been insufficiently
raised or preserved for review.
The question that remains is whether Appellant was entitled to appellate
review of his unpreserved claim pursuant to CR 61 .02. The rule provides that :
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court
on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and
appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest
injustice has resulted from the error .
The language of the rule plainly states that a claim of palpable error may be considered
by an appellate court even though the issue was not presented to the court below.
Relief under CR 61 .02 requires a determination of manifest injustice resulting from an
error that affected the substantial rights of the party. Illustrative is Deemer v. Finger ,2s
where this Court reversed the Court of Appeals for refusing to address an issue of juror
misconduct that was not presented to the trial court but was raised on appeal . This
Court held that "a palpable error affecting the substantial rights of a party, even if
§ 115.
CR 59 .06; Payne v. Hall , Ky., 423 S .W .2d 530 (1968).
24
Collins v. Sparks , Ky., 310 S .W.2d 45 (1958).
25
CR 61 .02 .
26 Ky .,
817 S .W .2d 435 (1991).
22
23
KY. CONST.
insufficiently raised or preserved, is reviewable, and, upon a determination that it has
resulted in manifest injustice, reversible."2'
This Court need not address the merits of the palpable error arguments
presented by the parties because remand to the Court of Appeals for that purpose is
appropriate . For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Appellant's
appeal is vacated and this cause remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
consistent proceedings .
Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller, Stumbo, and Wintersheimer, JJ .,
concur.
Id . at 437. See, e.g. , Collins v. Sparks , Ky., 310 S .W.2d 45 (1958) ; Cobb v. Hoskins ,
Ky. App ., 554 S .W .2d 886 (1977) .
8
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Harry Bernard O'Donnell IV
The Nolan Building
2100 Gardiner Lane, Suite 321
Louisville, KY 40205-2949
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Lyn Taylor Long
Mike Moulton
MOULTON AND LONG, PLLC
58 Public Square
Elizabethtown KY 42701
~5uyrrmr Courf of ~rnfurhV
2002-SC-0452-DG
WILLIAM A. HERNDON
APPELLANT
ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
1999-CA-2042
BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT NO. 95-CI-506
V
MARCELLA A. HERNDON (NOW VIERS)
APPELLEE
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
The Petition for Modification of this Court's opinion rendered April 22, 2004, filed
by William A. Herndon, is granted.
The sixth sentence on page one of the opinion is modified by substituting a new
page one, attached hereto, which reads, "Prior to trial court action on the
Commissioner's CR 60.02 report, neither party filed objections," in lieu of page one of
the opinion as originally rendered . Said modification does not affect the holding of the
opinion as originally rendered .
All concur.
ENTERED : August 26, 2004.
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