CECIL PATE V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
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2002-SC-0037-MR
CECIL PATE
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RENDERED : APRIL 22, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
01-CR-00105
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING IN PART
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of First-Degree Rape and
two (2) counts of First-Degree Sexual Abuse . The jury recommended a life
sentence for the First-Degree Rape conviction and a five (5) year sentence for
each First-Degree Sexual Abuse conviction . The jury also found Appellant to be
a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO), and recommended an
enhanced sentence of life imprisonment in lieu of the previously-recommended
sentences . In accordance with the jury's recommendation, the trial court
Rather than authorizing the jury to enhance the punishment for each
offense, as it should have, see 1 WILLIAM S . COOPER, KENTUCKY INSTRUCTIONS TO
JURIES § 12 .35A, at 775 (4th ed . 1999) ; Wilhite v. Commonwealth , Ky., 574
S.W .2d 304, 307-08 (1978), the trial court's penalty phase jury instructions
authorized the jury to recommend one (1) enhanced sentence for all three (3)
convictions . Because this improper aggregate enhanced sentence was based, in
sentenced Appellant to "Life in Prison as a [F]irst-Degree Persistent Felony
Offender . ,2 Appellant appeals as a matter of right3 and argues that his conviction
for sexual abuse of EH must be reversed based on insufficiency of the evidence.
Additionally, Appellant argues that he was denied a fair trial by an impartial jury
when the trial court conducted EH's competency hearing in the presence of the
jury.4 We affirm Appellant's convictions for the First-Degree Rape and FirstDegree Sexual Abuse of JMK and the jury's PFO determination, but we reverse
his conviction for First-Degree Sexual Abuse of EH because Appellant was
entitled to a directed verdict of not guilty on that offense.
II. BACKGROUND
In April 2000, Appellant Cecil Pate lived with his girlfriend, Christy Jean
Kayse, and her three daughters, JMK, four (4) years old, EH, nine (9) years old,
and Amanda, thirteen (13) years old . Also living in the residence were Kayse's
aunt, Brenda Hall, and Kayse's nineteen (19) year old cousin, Jason . In March
2001, JMK's father and stepmother, who had limited visitation with the children,
overheard a conversation between JMK and another sibling alerting them to the
possibility of sexual abuse occurring at the children's full-time residence . They
part, upon a conviction that was unsupported by the evidence, the trial court's
instructional error will necessitate a remand for a new sentencing hearing to fix
PFO-enhanced sentences as to Appellant's convictions for the First-Degree
Rape and First-Degree Sexual Abuse of JMK.
2 A PFO determination authorizes an enhancement of the sentence for the
underlying offense - or, as in this case, the sentences for each of the underlying
offenses ; it is not, itself, a separate criminal offense . Thus it is inaccurate to
designate a sentence as being imposed for a PFO conviction . See Wellman v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 694 S .W.2d 696 (1985).
3 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b) .
4 It is not clear from Appellant's brief, but we assume that he seeks
reversal of all convictions because of this alleged error.
took JMK to the Jackson Purchase Medical Center where an examination of the
child's genitalia was conducted . They later took both JMK and EH to Child
Watch for interviews and further examinations by Dr. Wally Montgomery. Dr.
Montgomery stated at trial that the examination of JMK revealed that her vaginal
vault near her rectum had been disrupted, the child's hymen was not intact, and
there was evidence that tissue in the vaginal area had been torn . Dr.
Montgomery testified that these medical findings were consistent with the history
JMK reported, a portion of which was read at trial :
Dr. Montgomery: What has happened to you?
JMK: Cecil hurt me .
Dr. Montgomery: How?
JMK: He put his pee-pee in me.
Dr. Montgomery: Where?
JMK : In my bottom (Dr. Montgomery indicates the child pointed
toward the front part of her pelvic area).
Dr. Montgomery: Did he pee in you-in your bottom?
JMK: No.
Dr. Montgomery: Did he put his pee-pee in your mouth?
JMK : No .
Dr. Montgomery : Who is Cecil?
JMK: Cecil is my mother's boyfriend .
Dr. Montgomery: Did you bleed from your bottom after you were
hurt?
JMK: Yes.
Dr. Montgomery : How many times did he hurt you?
JMK: I don't know.
But, Dr. Montgomery's examination of EH revealed no evidence of injury
to the vaginal or perineum region . This finding was consistent with the history
she provided to Dr. Montgomery, a portion of which was read as follows :
Dr. Montgomery: What is wrong?
EH: My mother's boyfriend has been hurting my sister.
Dr. Montgomery: What is his name?
EH : Cecil .
Dr. Montgomery: Have you seen him hurting your sister?
EH : No, he makes me leave the room .
Dr. Montgomery: Has your mother been at home when this
happens?
EH: No, she is at work.
Dr. Montgomery : How many times has this happened?
EH : Almost every night .
Dr. Montgomery: Has anyone hurt you?
EH : No .
Dr. Montgomery : Has Cecil touched your bottom?
EH : No.
Dr. Montgomery: Has your older sister been hurt?
EH : I don't know.
Dr. Montgomery : How do you know [JMK] has been hurt?
EH : I saw blood in her panties and also in her jeans .
A critical factor in the Commonwealth's case against Appellant concerned
the application of a hydrocortisone cream or ointment to the vaginal regions of
both EH and JMK . Kayse, the children's mother, testified that JMK's father
provided the cream because of a rash or redness on the child's genitalia . Kayse
testified that she applied this medication to JMK after her bath in the evenings
and began to apply it to EH when she noticed some redness in her vaginal area .
EH testified that her mother was often at work in the evenings and on those
occasions, Appellant would apply the medication to her and JMK. EH stated that
Appellant made her leave the room when he applied the medicine to JMK and
that she once saw him place his hand down the front of his pants while applying
the medicine to JMK. E H testified that the only time Appellant touched her
"private" was when he applied the medicine to her and that he did not touch
himself while applying the medicine to her.
The grand jury indicted Appellant for First-Degree Rape, First-Degree
Sodomy, and First-Degree Sexual Abuse of JMK, for First-Degree Sexual Abuse
of EH, and for being a First-Degree PFO . The offenses were alleged to have
occurred between May 1, 2000 and March 1, 2001 . Upon motion of the
Commonwealth's Attorney, the trial court dismissed the sodomy charge prior to
commencement of Appellant's trial. The jury convicted Appellant of all charges
and recommended a life sentence for the rape conviction and a five (5) year
sentence for each sexual abuse conviction . The jury also found that Appellant
was a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender and then recommended an
enhanced sentence of life in lieu of the previous recommended sentences . The
trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury's recommendation .6
III. ANALYSIS
A. SUFFICENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AS TO SEXUAL ABUSE OF EH
Appellant's first claim of error is that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant his conviction for First-Degree Sexual Abuse of EH, and therefore, he
asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for a directed verdict on
that charge . In reviewing a claim that the trial court erred in denying a directed
verdict of acquittal of a criminal charge based on the sufficiency of the evidence,
this Court has steadfastly adhered to the rule that "[i]f the totality of the evidence
[was] such that the judge [could have] conclude[d] that reasonable minds might
fairly find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then the evidence [was] sufficient,
albeit circumstantial[,]"' and the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict
of acquittal . "If the evidence [did not] meet that test, it [was] insufficient[,] "8 and
the defendant would have been entitled to his requested directed verdict .
Appellant was charged with violating KRS 510 .110, which reads in
relevant part, as follows :
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree
when :
(a)
He subjects another person to sexual
contact by forcible compulsion ; or
5 See sutra note 1 .
6 See supra note 2.
Hodges v. Commonwealth , Ky., 473 S .W.2d 811, 813-14 (1971). See
also Norris v. Commonwealth , Ky., 89 S .W.3d 411 (2002); Commonwealth v.
Benham, Ky., 816 S.W .2d 186 (1991) ; Sawhill v. Commonwealth , Ky., 660
S.W .2d 3 (1983).
8 Hodges , 473 S.W .2d at 814.
(b)
He subjects another person to sexual
contact who is incapable of consent
because he:
1 . Is physically helpless ;
2 . Is less than twelve (12) years old ; or
3. Is mentally incapacitated .
As it is undisputed that EH was only nine (9) years old at the time of the
alleged offense, the Commonwealth was not required to prove forcible
compulsion, but rather the Commonwealth was only required to prove that
Appellant subjected EH to sexual contact . Sexual contact is defined in KRS
510 .010(7) as follows :
"Sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or
other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose
of gratifying the sexual desire of either party[ .)
The 1974 Commentary to KRS 510.110 states:
The three degrees of sexual abuse contained in KRS
510.110, 510.120, and 510.130 roughly parallel the
structure for rape and sodomy . The offenses apply to
both adults and children . Formerly the proscribed
behavior when committed upon an adult was
generally prosecuted under an assault provision.
However, under the Code an actual physical injury
must be inflicted to constitute an assault. Since the
conduct dealt with in the offense of sexual abuse
seldom results in physical injury a gap would exist if
this conduct were not proscribed . Thus, these three
sections constitute a special prohibition against
sexual assault.9
As recognized in the Commentary, the conduct dealt with in this type of offense
rarely results in physical injury . So, the fact that Dr. Montgomery's examination
of EH did not reveal injuries consistent with sexual abuse is not dispositive as to
the charge .
s
KRS 510.110 cmt. (Banks/Baldwin 1974) (emphasis added) .
-7-
The dispositive issue, however, is whether the evidence supported a
finding by the jury that Appellant's undisputed touching of EH's vaginal area was
for the purpose of sexual gratification . In deciding this issue, Appellant's intent
11
may be ascertained from the surrounding facts and the jury is allowed a
reasonably wide range in which to infer intent from the circumstances ."' °
Here, the facts relied upon by the Commonwealth in support of its claim
that Appellant touched EH's vaginal area for his sexual gratification are straight
forward but limited . EH testified that when Appellant applied medicine to her
vaginal area, he required that she lay naked on the bed in his bedroom . EH also
testified that Appellant often requested that she massage his legs with either
baby oil or lotion, and when asked how far up the leg Appellant would ask her to
massage, she stood and indicated her upper thigh/lower hip region . In addition,
EH stated that Appellant asked her to watch with him a movie depicting "naked
people," and she testified that she once saw Appellant place his hand down the
front of his pants while he was applying medicine to JIVIK's vaginal area . She did
not testify that he did so when applying medicine to her. Although this evidence
may give rise to a suspicion, even a strong suspicion that Appellant touched EH's
vaginal area for his sexual gratification, "[s]uspicion alone is not enough."" We
realize that "[i]t is, of course, often difficult to draw the line between a reasonable
inference and speculation . But evidence that will support a reasonable inference
10 Rayburn v. Commonwealth , Ky., 476 S .W.2d 187,189 (1972). Accord
Tungate v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 901 S .W. 2d 41 (1995); Anastasi v.
Commonwealth , Ky ., 754 S .W .2d 860, 862 (1988).
1
1
Hodges, 473 S.W .2d at 814.
must indicate the probable, as distinguished from a possible cause . "12 Even
taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it was not
sufficient to create a reasonable inference that Appellant touched EH's vaginal
area for his sexual gratification. Thus, the trial court erred when it failed to direct
a verdict of acquittal on the charge that Appellant sexually abused EH.
B. CONDUCTING EH'S COMPETENCY HEARING IN JURY'S PRESENCE
Appellant next claims that he was denied due process and a fair trial by an
impartial jury because the trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether
EH was competent to testify in the presence of the jury. Appellant also claims
that in addition to the error of conducting the hearing in front of the jury, the judge
also improperly bolstered the witness's credibility at the close of the hearing . At
the outset we note that this issue is not properly preserved for review; however,
Appellant urges this Court to consider this claim as palpable error. Under RCr
10 .26, "[a] palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised
or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error."
Near the close of its case, the Commonwealth called ten (10) year old EH
to the stand, and the trial court conducted a hearing in the jury's presence in
order to determine her competency to testify as a witness. 13 The trial judge
12
13
Briner v. General Motors Corp . , Ky., 461 S .W .2d 99, 101 (1970).
KRE 601 relates to competency of witnesses and it provides :
(a) General. Every person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules or
by statute.
asked EH several questions regarding her ability to discern between telling the
truth and telling a lie ; he emphasized the importance of telling the truth,
particularly when she was on the witness stand . At the close of the hearing he
stated, "All right, do you have any further qualifiers, either counsel? I think she's
capable and qualifies under the statute, so you may proceed ." Appellant
maintains that the trial judge's statement was improper bolstering of the child
witness. We disagree .
Appellant relies upon language from this Court's opinion in Humphrey v.
Commonwealth 14 to support his contention that it was error for the trial court to
conduct the competency hearing in the presence of the jury. In Humphrey ,
Appellant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not
object when the trial court held the competency hearing of a child witness in the
presence of the jury, 15 and this Court stated:
While it would have been better practice to have
conducted the competency hearing in chambers,
outside the presence and hearing of the jury,
in asmuch as our law was not then settled on this
point, counsel's failure to object did not amount to
ineffective assistance. Moreover, the trial court said
nothing which amounted to bolstering the credibility of
14
15
(b) Minimal qualifications . A person is disqualified to
testify as a witness if the trial court determines that
he :
(1) Lacked the capacity to perceive accurately the
matters about which he proposes to testify;
(2) Lacks the capacity to recollect facts ;
(3) Lacks the capacity to express himself so as to be
understood, either directly or through an interpreter;
or
(4) Lacks the capacity to understand the obligation of
a witness to tell the truth.
Ky., 962 S.W.2d 870 (1998) .
-1 0-
K .H . and although appellant asserts that there was
some type of error and that his trial counsel should
have objected, at that time there was no authority that
such a hearing was improper. 16
Citing the Humphrey Court's language, Appellant states that it appears "there is
now direct authority in Kentucky which provides that conducting a competency
hearing of a child witness in the presence and hearing of the jury is prohibited ."
Appellant candidly admits, however, that he cannot find any such authority. We
assume that the Humphrey Court was simply referring to its statement that the
better practice is to conduct such hearings outside the presence and hearing of
the jury. Regardless, the Kentucky Rules of Evidence now provide that
"[p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness
. . . shall be determined by the court,"" and shall be conducted out of the hearing
of the jury "when the interests of justice require ."~s KRE 104 grants the trial court
discretion in whether to conduct a preliminary hearing on admissibility of
evidence with or without the presence of the jury . 19 Here, the trial court held the
hearing in the jury's presence, and although we reaffirm that the better practice is
to hold the hearing without the jury being present, we find no abuse of discretion
by the trial court in so doing . Undoubtedly, the questions asked by the trial court
16
Id . at 874 (emphasis added) .
" KRE 104(a) .
18
19
KRE 104(c) .
ROBERT G . LAWSON, THE KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK
1 .12[7][a], at 65 (4th ed . 2003) ("It is clear that KRE 104(c) is designed
to give
the trial judge considerable discretion over the question of whether to conduct
hearings on preliminary questions with or without the presence of the jury . . . ... ).
Accord Commentary to KRE 104, Evidence Rules Study Commission, Final Draft
(1989) ("This provision assumes that in most instances the trial judge is in a
superior position to determine the need for shielding the jury from hearing on
preliminary matters pertinent to the admissibility of evidence .") .
would have been asked by the Commonwealth's Attorney if the trial judge had
not conducted the hearing in the jury's presence . Additionally, the trial judge's
statements did not bolster EH's testimony . He merely stated that she was
competent to testify, not that he believed EH to be truthful, as suggested by
Appellant, or that she would be truthful in her testimony . The jury was free to
determine EH's credibility. Accordingly, we find no error by the trial court in
holding the hearing in the jury's presence or in his statement. In any event, no
manifest injustice has resulted from this claim of error.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm Appellant's convictions for the FirstDegree Rape and First-Degree Sexual Abuse of JMK and the jury's First-Degree
PFO determination but reverse Appellant's conviction for First-Degree Sexual
Abuse of EH and remand the case to the trial court for the jury to fix enhanced
sentences for Appellant's First-Degree Rape and First-Degree Sexual Abuse
convictions .
Lambert, C .J . ; Graves, Johnstone, Keller and Stumbo, JJ ., concur.
Cooper, J ., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which
Wintersheimer, J ., joins .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shelly R. Fears
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-1133
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Elizabeth A. Heilman
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
RENDERED : APRIL 22, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,,Sixyrtmr 011,laurf of ~rufurhV
2002-SC-0037-MR
CECIL PATE
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE R. JEFFREY HINES, JUDGE
01-CR-00105
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
The majority opinion vacates one of Appellant's convictions of sexual abuse in
the first degree because of insufficient evidence that the "sexual contact" that occurred
between Appellant and EH was "for the purpose of satisfying the sexual desire of either
party ." KRS 510 .010(7); 510 .110(1)(b) . The opinion also reverses and remands for a
new penalty phase of the trial because of improper jury instructions . Finally, the opinion
holds that it is not an abuse of discretion to hold a child competency hearing in open
court in the presence of the jury. I believe the evidence was sufficient to support
Appellant's conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree ; that error in the penalty phase
instructions was not preserved and does not amount to palpable error; and that, while it
was error for the trial court to hold the competency hearing in open court and to declare
EH competent within the hearing of the jury, that error was also unpreserved, and, thus,
not reversible .
I . SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE FIRST DEGREE .
"A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when . . . [h]e subjects
another person to sexual contact who is incapable of consent because he . . . [i]s less
than twelve (12) years old . . . ." KRS 510 .110(1)(b). "'Sexual contact' means any
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of
gratifying the sexual desire of either party." KRS 510.010(7).
EH was nine years old when the relevant events occurred . Appellant was her
mother's boyfriend . The three lived in a mobile home with EH's sister, Amanda, age 14,
her half-sister, JMK, age 4, her mother's adult sister, and, occasionally, a male cousin,
age 19 . However, they were not all at home at the same time. Appellant's mother and
aunt were employed as dispatchers for the same company and worked opposite hours,
alternating between day and night shifts. Pursuant to an agreement between EH's
mother and JMK's father, JMK stayed with a babysitter while her mother worked, which
meant that EH was often at home alone with Appellant .
Upon returning JMK from a scheduled visitation in January 2001, her father
reported that he had taken JMK to a doctor for treatment of a vaginal rash. At the
doctor's suggestion, he had purchased a tube of hydrocortisone cream and told JMK's
mother that she should apply it to the rash on a daily basis. Because EH was also
exhibiting redness in her vaginal area, the mother also treated her with the cream on at
least two occasions. The mother testified that she then gave the tube of hydrocortisone
to JMK's babysitter. According to EH, Appellant then assumed the task of rubbing the
cream onto her vagina. But since the hydrocortisone had been delivered to JMK's
babysitter, the jury could have believed that Appellant was rubbing something else on
EH's vagina as a pretext to obtain EH's consent to sexual contact .
EH testified that Appellant would wash her "privates" while giving her a bath though EH's great-aunt testified that EH was capable of bathing herself and caring for
her own hygiene . Appellant would then take EH into his bedroom and lay her naked on
the bed with her legs spread apart while he applied the "cream" to her "privates ." When
defense counsel suggested on cross-examination that this was "no big deal," EH
responded that she "didn't think it felt right." EH also claimed that she saw Appellant do
the same thing to JMK while sticking his hand inside the front of his pants, and that
when Appellant realized EH was present, he told her to leave the room . EH testified to
other occasions when Appellant would strip to his shorts and have EH massage his
calves and thighs up to his hips with lotion or baby oil even though "[t]here was nothing
wrong with his legs."
In support of the decision to vacate Appellant's conviction of sexual abuse of EH,
the majority opinion cites Hodges v. Commonwealth , Ky., 473 S .W .2d 811 (1971), for
the proposition that "'suspicion alone is not enough,"' ante , at
(slip op . at 8). In
Hodges , the defendant was found hiding under a log with a person who had been seen
emerging from a burglarized building several hours before . Our predecessor court held
this to be insufficient evidence to convict Hodges of participating in the break-in .
There is nothing in the competent evidence which indicates that Hodges
was at the crime scene, nor is there anything other than his being found
with Moore five hours after the latter's flight from the store, tending to
prove his complicity in the crime.
Id . at 814. The issue in Hodges was whether the evidence sufficed to prove the
defendant's commission of the alleged criminal act, not his mens rea.
The majority opinion then cites Briner v. General Motors Corp. , Ky., 461 S .W.2d
99 (1970), for the proposition that "evidence that will support a reasonable inference
must indicate the probable, as distinguished from a possible cause," ante , at
(slip
op . at 8-9) . Briner was a personal injury action asserting strict manufacturer's liability
and negligent repair. Our predecessor court noted that "[thhere was no direct proof of
the existence of a defective mechanical condition existing at the time of the accident
which could have caused it," id . at 101, and concluded that there was insufficient
evidence of a mechanical defect attributable to either defendant to warrant submission
of the case to a jury. Id. at 102-03 . Again, the issue was the civil version of corpus
delicti, not mens rea .
Here, however, there was direct, not inferential, testimony that Appellant
committed the act of touching a "sexual or other intimate part" of EH's body. There was
also direct evidence that he induced EH to touch an "intimate part" of his own body.
The leg is an "intimate" part of the body, and a common sense
interpretation of the language of the statute indicates that "intimate" is not
a rephrasing of "sexual." By including the word "other," the statute
provides a broader category of "intimate" parts.
Certainly a proper test to determine if the part of the body is
"intimate" should revolve around an examination of three factors : 1) What
area of the body is touched; 2) What is the manner of the touching, [sic]
and 3) Under what circumstances did the touching occur.
Bills v. Commonwealth , Ky., 851 S .W.2d 466, 472 (1993) (internal quotes omitted) .
The only remaining issue was whether the touching was "done for the purpose of
gratifying the sexual desire of [Appellant] ." KRS 510.010 (7). "Purpose" is a synonym
of "intent ." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language
Unabridged 1847 (1993). We have consistently held that "intent may be inferred from
the act itself or from the circumstances surrounding it." Talbott v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
968 S .W.2d 76, 86 (1998). See also Davis v. Commonwealth , Ky., 967 S .W .2d 574, 581
(1998) ; Tungate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 901 S.W.2d 41, 42 (1995); Anastasi v.
Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S .W.2d 860, 862 (1988). I have no difficulty concluding that
the evidence was sufficient to create an inference that Appellant's repeated touching of
EH's vagina and his acts of inducing EH to massage his legs with lotion and baby oil
were "for the purpose of gratifying [Appellant's] sexual desire ."
11 . PENALTY PHASE INSTRUCTIONS.
The penalty phase instructions were erroneous in permitting the jury to enhance
the penalties for three separation convictions, i.e. , life imprisonment for first-degree rape
and five years each for two counts of first-degree sexual abuse to one life term for first
degree persistent felony offender . Of course, PFO is not an offense, but is a status that
permits the enhancement of penalties for convictions of offenses such as rape and
sexual abuse . Hardin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 573 S.W.2d 657, 661-62 (1978).
However, the Commonwealth's Attorney tendered these jury instructions without
objection from defense counsel . The error was actually favorable to Appellant, as he
received only one sentence instead of three even though the result is the same as the
two lesser sentences merge into the life sentence . Bedell v. Commonwealth , Ky., 870
S .W.2d 779, 783 (1993). Because the error was unpreserved, RCr 9.54(2), and
resulted in no injustice to Appellant, RCr 10 .26, I would affirm on this issue.
III. COMPETENCY HEARING .
.
Appellant correctly asserts that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
bolster the credibility of EH by establishing her competency in the presence of the jury
and then declaring her "capable and qualified under the statute." The majority opinion
suggests that, "Undoubtedly, the questions asked by the trial court would have been
asked by the Commonwealth's Attorney if the trial judge had not conducted the hearing
in the jury's presence ." Ante, at - (slip op. at 11-12). Perhaps, but it is one thing for
the proponent of the witness to bolster her credibility and quite another for the trial judge
to do it and then declare her competency to the jury. We have held that a trial court
should not inform the jury that a particular witness has been determined to be an expert
because such information bolsters the credibility of the witness . Luttrell v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 952 S .W.2d 216, 218 (1997). In Humphrey v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 962 S .W.2d 870 (1998), we said that it would be "better practice" to conduct a child
competency hearing outside the presence of the jury. Id . at 874. Apparently, that
"softball" was not enough . I would specifically hold that hearings to determine the
competency of a child witness should be held out of the hearing of the jury and that the
jury should not be informed that the trial court has determined that the witness is
competent to testify .
Again, however, there was no objection to the trial court's procedure in this case.
Nor, after hearing EH's testimony, could there be any question of her competency . On
several occasions, she asked counsel to explain or repeat a question and, on one
occasion, corrected a misstatement made by counsel during cross-examination . Thus,
no palpable error occurred .
Accordingly, I concur in the affirmance of Appellant's convictions of rape in the
first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree perpetrated against JIVIK but dissent
from the reversal of the sentence imposed therefore. I further dissent from the vacating
of Appellant's conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree of EH, and would affirm the
judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the McCracken Circuit Court in its
entirety.
Wintersheimer, J., joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
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