RICKY CAMPBELL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
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SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : FEBRUARY 19, 2004
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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2002-SC-0013-MR
RICKY CAMPBELL
V.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA OVERSTREET, JUDGE
01-CR-00518
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
1. INTRODUCTION
A Fayette Circuit Court jury found Appellant guilty of one (1) count each of
First-Degree Rape and First-Degree Sodomy and also found him to be a
Second-Degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO). The trial court sentenced
Appellant in accordance with the jury's penalty-phase verdict to PFO-enhanced
sentences of thirty (30) years imprisonment for each conviction, and ordered the
sentences to run consecutively to each other for a total sentence of sixty (60)
years. Appellant appeals to this Court as a matter of right.' After a review of the
record, we affirm the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court .
11. BACKGROUND
On October 23, 2001, Appellant's case was tried before a Fayette Circuit
Court jury. Testimony at trial revealed that in March 2001, and for approximately
'KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b) .
three weeks before the sexual assault upon R.H, the victim in this case,
Appellant and R .H . had been living together in R.H .'s residence and had
engaged in consensual sexual relations on a regular basis during that time
period . On the day of the events in question, March 31, 2001, Appellant and
R .H . went to the store to purchase liquor. Later that day, R.H. testified that she
witnessed Appellant in two altercations, and during each he brandished a knife.
Based on this conduct, R. H. asked Appellant to leave her residence .
Appellant did not leave, but instead asked R.H . to go upstairs to the
bedroom with him . R.H . testified that once they were in the bedroom, Appellant
asked her whether she was "playing him ." She understood this question to
pertain to whether or not she was "cheating" on him. R.H . testified that she
denied that she was "cheating" on Appellant, however, he reacted by striking her
on the side of the face and knocking her to the bed. Appellant maintained that
the disagreement was the result of R.H . taunting him for listening in on her phone
call with the father of her daughter. Although Appellant did not contest the fact
that he struck R.H. in the face, he stated that this was the only physical force he
exerted against her.
R.H . testified that appellant asked her to perform oral sex on him and she
refused . When he again asked her to fellate him, she complied because she
feared that Appellant would harm her with his knife. R.H . testified that Appellant
then instructed her to remove her pants and although she protested, Appellant
told her to lie down on her stomach, attempted to have anal sex with her, and
then penetrated her vagina . R.H . testified that she repeatedly told Appellant that
she was in pain and that she did not want to have sex with him. Appellant
maintained that the sex was consensual.
Appellant and R .H. then went downstairs and he informed her that he was
going to kill himself. Appellant testified that he had been very distraught over the
deaths of his father and grandmother in the preceding months. R.H . then left the
residence and took her daughter next door to the house of Appellant's sister,
Michelle Campbell ("Campbell") . R.H. asked Campbell to remove Appellant from
her residence and Campbell was able to convince Appellant to depart R.H.'s
residence for Campbell's own residence . Campbell testified that when Appellant
arrived at her residence, she called the police because Appellant was angry and
upset and she was worried that he would hurt himself. When the police arrived,
they became concerned about Appellant's state of mind and decided to take him
into emergency protective custody so he would not be a threat to himself.
However, after interviewing R.H ., the police decided to place Appellant under
arrest. Sometime after Appellant's arrest, the police transported R.H. to the
hospital for a medical examination .
The sexual assault examiner testified that R. H. reported that she was hit
on the side of the head, was forced to perform oral sex on her assailant, and was
raped and sodomized . R.H. informed the examiner that by holding her mouth
and pulling her hair the assailant was able to force her to perform oral sex, he
penetrated her vagina from behind twice, penetrated her anus, and then
penetrated her vagina twice more . The examiner testified that she observed an
abrasion on the side of R.H .'s head, a small abrasion and a small laceration on
the outside of the vagina as well as some swelling and tenderness . At the
conclusion of her testimony, the examiner opined that the injuries she observed
on R .H . were consistent with R.H.'s account of what happened . She further
stated that although R.H .'s injuries would be consistent with the sort of injuries
that occur in a number of rape cases, the type of injuries sustained by R .H. could
also arise from consensual sex. The examiner was unable to testify as to when
the injuries were most likely sustained and stated that they could have occurred
as a result of other sexual encounters from one or two days prior. She furthered
testified that under circumstances of forced oral sex, one would generally see
injuries to the mouth, which were not present on R.H .
The jury found Appellant guilty of First-Degree Rape and First-Degree
Sodomy and, at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, found Appellant
to be a Second-Degree PFO . The jury fixed Appellant's sentences at twenty (20)
years for each count, and with a PFO enhancement the sentences increased to
thirty (30) years on each count . The jury recommended that the sentences run
consecutively .
The Fayette Circuit Court reviewed a pre-sentence investigation report
and conducted a formal sentencing hearing on November 29, 2001 . The court
declined to impose a sentence of probation or conditional discharge and,
following the jury's recommendation, sentenced Appellant to PFO-enhanced
sentences of thirty (30) years for First-Degree Rape and thirty (30) years for
First-Degree sodomy, to run consecutively for a total of sixty (60) years . As
Appellant was convicted of a sexual offense, the court also required Appellant to
register with Probation & Parole for his lifetime, advised him of his duty to
execute a "Sex Offender Duty to Register Notification Form," and imposed an
additional three (3) year period of conditional discharge, pursuant to KRS
532.043. This appeal followed .
III. ANALYSIS
A. OFFICER BROSIK'S TESTIMONY
Appellant first claims that it was error for the trial court to allow the
introduction of testimony concerning an exchange that occurred between
Appellant and his sister, Campbell, in Officer Brosik's presence . Officer Brosick
testified that while at Campbell's home, Appellant stated, "I'm not going back to
prison ." Officer Brosick testified that Campbell then stated, "[y]ou're going to
prison for raping that girl," and Appellant did not respond . Appellant argues three
(3) distinct grounds upon which he asserts that this testimony was improperly
admitted : first, admitting the evidence was a violation of Appellant's Fifth
Amendment rights, second, the statement was investigative hearsay, and third,
the statement did not satisfy the requirements for adoptive admission under KRE
801A(b)(2). Our review of the record, however, reflects that the only basis upon
which defense counsel objected to the admission of Officer Brosick's testimony
was an alleged violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent, and the trial court overruled the objection on that basis, ruling that the
evidence did not present any "Fifth Amendment problems." Because Appellant's
second and third grounds were not presented to the trial court, and appellants
are "not permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the
appellate court[, ],2 those allegations of error were not properly preserved for our
review, and we will address only the objection that was made in the trial court.
In support of his contention that Officer Brosick's testimony infringed upon
his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, Appellant primarily relies on Combs v.
Coyle, 3 a Sixth Circuit case decided pursuant to a petition for federal habeas
relief. In Combs, the Sixth Circuit held that the introduction of the defendant's
statement, "talk to my lawyer," made in response to a police officer's question,
was a violation of the Fifth Amendment, even though the defendant had not been
formally arrested or given Miranda warnings at the time he said it.4 The court
ruled that "the use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence as substantive evidence of
guilt violates the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination" and "the
application of the privilege is not limited to persons in custody or charged with a
crime ; it may also be asserted by a suspect who is questioned during the
2 Kennedy v. Commonwealth , Ky., 544 S .W.2d 219, 222 (1976).
3 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000) .
4 Id .
investigation of a crime ."5 Appellant argues that the court's decision in Combs
does not permit the use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence as substantive
evidence of guilt as this would, "greatly undermine the policies behind the
privilege against self-incrimination while adding virtually nothing to the reliability
of the criminal process ,,6 and the use of such evidence in the prosecution's case
in chief "is not a legitimate government practice."'
We find three significant (3) differences in this case, however, that
distinguish it from Combs .
First, the Sixth Circuit determined that Combs was in
police custody when he directed the police to consult with his attorney and that
his reference to an attorney was a specific invocation of his privilege against selfincrimination .8 In contrast, Appellant was not in police custody or under arrest at
the time of Campbell's statement, nor was Officer Brosick aware at that time that
a crime had even occurred . Based on testimony at trial, Campbell called for
police assistance because she feared her brother would harm himself. Thus, the
police did not arrive on the scene in order to investigate a crime ; they arrived in
order to calm Appellant and perhaps place him in emergency custody . These
circumstances were quite different from those present in Combs , in which the
questioning officer arrived in response to a shooting .
Second, in Combs the exchange at issue occurred between an
investigating officer and the suspect, who later became the defendant. It
occurred fifteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes after the officer first arrived at the
scene and took the gun from the suspect, and was the second time the officer
5 -. at 283 (quoting Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1565 (1 St Cir.
Id
1989)) .
6 Id . a t 285-86 .
Id .
8 Id .
asked the suspect the same question .9 The Combs court determined that under
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed him or herself to be
in custody.1° In the instant case, the alleged exchange occurred between
Appellant and his sister ; Officer Brosick was merely present, he was not
interrogating Appellant or asking him routine investigative questions . In addition,
Officer Brosick's presence was for the identified purpose of calming Appellant
and ensuring that he did not harm himself. Thus, Appellant could not reasonably
have assumed that he was in custody or the subject of a custodial interrogation .
Finally, in contrast to the defendant in Combs , who did not testify on his
own behalf, Appellant elected to testify at trial. Although Officer Brosick's
testimony was elicited during the prosecution's case in chief, the Appellant's act
of testifying would have allowed the prosecution to introduce the testimony, not
as substantive evidence of guilt but for impeachment purposes ." Further, while
on the stand Appellant did not attempt to explain his silence or lack of response
to his sister's statement. In fact, Officer Brosick's testimony likely provided
necessary context for other testimony regarding Appellant's subsequent
statement that he "did not rape that girl," which was made immediately after his
arrest but before he was informed of the charges upon which he was arrested .
The Sixth Circuit in Combs found that Combs's pre-arrest silence was used as
substantive evidence of guilt and based this conclusion on Combs's refusal to
testify. 12 In Seymour v . Walker, 13 the Sixth Circuit distinguished Combs, 14 stating
9 Id . at 284 .
10 Id .
11
See Seymour v. Walker , 224 F.3d 542 (2000).
12
Id. at 285-86 .
13
Sevmour, 224 F.3d at 560 (2000).
14
Combs, 205 F .3d at 269 (2000).
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that Combs did not control because "Seymour chose to testify in her own
defense and to propound a theory of self-defense . "15 The court found that the
prosecutor in Seymour had "a legitimate interest in impeaching her testimony and
in not allowing Seymour to use the Fifth Amendment as a sword rather than a
shield . "16 In the instant case, Appellant also testified on his own behalf, providing
the Commonwealth with a legitimate interest in impeaching his testimony.
This Court's decision is consistent with the Combs court's statement that,
[T]he use of a defendant's prearrest silence as
substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination . Like
[other] circuits, we believe "that application of the
privilege is not limited to persons in custody or
charged with a crime; it may also be asserted by a
suspect who is questioned during the investigation of
a crime . ,17
We decline to extend Combs to encompass the circumstances in the instant case
and find that the admission of Officer Brosick's testimony was not a violation of
appellant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination .
B . FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
Appellant's second claim of error concerns the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury on Sexual Misconduct as a lesser-included offense of FirstDegree Rape and First-Degree Sodomy. In order to find merit in Appellant's
claim, however, this Court would not only have to rely upon questionable dicta
from previous opinions, but would also have to ignore the fact that the evidence
upon which Appellant bases his claim was never introduced at trial. A person is
guilty of Sexual Misconduct when "he engages in sexual intercourse or deviate
15
Seymour, 224 F.3d at 560 (2000) .
16
Id .
17
Combs, 205 F .3d at 283 (2000) (citations omitted) .
-8-
sexual intercourse with another person without the latter's consent . 08 Although
the commentary to KRS 510 .140 indicates that the ages of the victim and
defendant are not always material, "our longstanding rule" is that this statute
"was intended to apply only in cases where the victim is fourteen or fifteen and
the defendant less than twenty-one, or where the victim is twelve-to-fifteen and
the defendant is less than eighteen years of age." 19 Here, the victim was over
twenty-one years of age, rendering the offense of Sexual Misconduct
inapplicable . Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Appellant's request for
lesser-included offense instructions on Sexual Misconduct .
C. AGGREGATE SENTENCE
Appellant's final claim of error is that the trial court erred in ordering his
sentences to run consecutively for a total aggregate sentence of sixty (60) years
because, he maintains, the maximum aggregate sentence authorized by statute
for the relevant convictions is fifty (50) years . We find no merit to Appellant's
claim. KRS 532.110(1)(c), which governs concurrent and consecutive terms of
imprisonment, reads :
The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms
shall not exceed in maximum length the longest
extended term that would be authorized by KRS
532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any of
the sentences is imposed . In no event shall the
aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms exceed
seventy (70) years .
18
19
KRS 510 .140(1) .
Johnson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 864 S.W .2d 266, 277 (1993)
(emphasis added). See also Cooper v. Commonwealth , Ky., 550 S.W.2d 478
(1977) .
The above statute relies upon KRS 532.080 to determine the maximum term of
years to which an individual may be sentenced . Appellant was deemed a
Second Degree PFO, thus KRS 532 .080(5) is the relevant section to determine
his enhanced sentences . KRS 532.080(5) states : "[a] person who is found to be
a persistent felony offender in the second degree shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate term of imprisonment pursuant to the sentencing provisions of
KRS 532.060(2) for the next highest degree than the offense for which convicted .
Appellant was convicted of two Class B felonies, however, because he
was found to be a PFO Second-Degree, his sentences were enhanced to the
next highest degree, Class A felonies, as set forth under KRS 532 .060(2), which
reads: "[t]he authorized maximum terms of imprisonment for felonies are:
(a) For a Class A felony, not less than twenty (20) years nor more than fifty (50)
years, or life imprisonment[.]"
Thus, Appellant was sentenced under the guidelines for a Class A felony,
which is subject to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Appellant received
two sentences of thirty (30) years each, to run consecutively. He contends that
because fifty (50) years is the longest "term of years" possible under KRS
532.080 and KRS 532.060, a longer consecutive sentence is not permitted .
However, as stated by this Court in Bedell v. Commonwealth ,2° KRS
532.110(1)(c) refers to the longest "extended term" authorized by KRS 532 .080 ;
it does not refer to the longest "term of years ." For a Class A felony, life
imprisonment is the longest "extended term" authorized and KRS 532 .110(1)(c)
2°
Bedell v. Commonwealth , Ky., 870 S .W . 2d 779, 783 (1993).
-10-
thus places the ceiling for consecutive Class A felony sentences at seventy (70)
years . As Appellant's sentence is less than the upper limit of seventy (70) years,
the trial court did not exceed the statutory cap when it ordered Appellant's PFOenhanced thirty (30) year sentences to run consecutively to each other.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Fayette Circuit
Court.
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Karen Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D . Stumbo
Attorney General
Ian G . Sonego
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
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