ALEX R . ROGERS, JR . V COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHEOPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED. " PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVI_L PROCED URE PROMULGATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITYIN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,$UyrrMr C~Vurf of ~i
2000-SC-0103-MR
ALEX R. ROGERS, JR .
10AT
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HAGERMAN, JUDGE
98-CR-00098-001 AND 98-CR-00136-001
V
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
-VACATING IN PART, AND REMANDING
Appellant, Alex Rogers was convicted of first-degree robbery, first-degree
assault, and attempted murder in the Boyd Circuit Court. He was sentenced to sixteen
and one half years, thirteen years, and twenty years, respectively. The sentence for
assault was to run consecutively with the robbery sentence and the combined terms
were to run concurrently with the attempted murder sentence for a total of twenty-nine
and one-half years imprisonment . This appeal is as a matter of right.
The facts are that Appellant and his accomplice, while off-roading,
decided to rob a tow truck operator . They left their vehicle parked in the mud and
walked to a house to call a tow truck.
When the tow truck arrived, Appellant and his
accomplice hitched a ride with the tow truck operators back to their truck. After the
' Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
truck was pulled out of the ditch, Appellant approached one of the operators,
demanded money, and then shot him in the head, causing serious physical injuries. As
the co-operator attempted to intervene, he too was shot at by both Appellant and his
accomplice before driving away and calling the police. Appellant's arguments on
appeal will be examined in turn .
I . HEARSAY AND PRESERVATION OF ERROR
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow Detective
Moore's testimony regarding a statement by Appellant's accomplice, Jeffrey Newsome .
The trial court excluded the testimony as hearsay pursuant to KRE 802. The testimony
dealt with Newsome's comments to Detective Moore concerning who was driving the
truck, Newsome or Appellant Rogers, as it was being pulled out of the ditch . Appellant
points out that both victims indicated in their statements to the police that the driver of
the truck as it was being pulled from the ditch was the person who shot and robbed the
victims . In Newsome's statement to Detective Moore at the time of his capture, he
stated that he was driving the truck. Thus, Appellant reasons that the excluded
testimony would have shown that Newsome and not Appellant was responsible for the
crimes.
Appellant argues that the testimony should have been allowed under KRE
804 as an exception to the hearsay rule because Newsome was an unavailable witness
whose statement was against penal interest. Under KRE 804, a statement is not
excluded under the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable as a witness and his
statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary
to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or
to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another,
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would
not have made the statement unless believing it to be true . 2
Newsome was allegedly unavailable as a witness because his own case was on appeal
at the time of Appellant's trial. Appellant requested that the testimony be preserved by
avowal, and the trial court granted the motion. Appellant failed, however, to actually
present the testimony of Detective Moore by avowal and thus it is unclear what
Detective Moore would have actually said .
Appellant contends that his failure to put on Detective Moore's testimony
by avowal does not defeat our consideration of this issue because Newsome's
statement is in the record by means of Detective Moore's official report made after
Newsome's arrest. Appellant contends that the desired information could have been
solicited by a question merely asking Detective Moore to read a highlighted portion of
his official report, an instrument which is before us.
It might be possible to assume that Detective Moore's testimony would
have been consistent with his report, but our rules relating to avowals are strict. In
Commonwealth v. Ferrell ,3 this Court disagreed with the idea that "trial counsel need
not offer avowal testimony in order to preserve an evidentiary exclusion issue for appeal
when the excluded testimony's relevancy is apparent from the questioning ." As
Detective Moore's testimony was not even apparent from the questioning, Appellant
failed to adequately preserve this issue and it is not before this Court . At best, we
regard this as flawed preservation that would require speculation on our part.
2 KRE 804(b)(3) .
3
Ky., 17 S .W .3d 520, 524 (2000).
Even if proper preservation were to be assumed, there is also the
absence of an unavailability determination by the trial court. Newsome was not called
as a witness. There is no evidence that a ruling was ever made, nor was the issue ever
considered as to whether Newsome met the requirements for being deemed
unavailable .
Under KRE 804 it is first necessary to determine if the witness is
unavailable . KRE 804(a)(1) states that a witness is unavailable if the declarant "[i]s
exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the
subject matter of the declarant's statement. ,4 Unavailability cannot be presumed . This
Court has stated, "Before a declarant may be excused as unavailable based on a claim
of privilege, the declarant must appear at trial, assert the privilege, and have that
assertion approved by the trial judge."5 Here, Appellant did not request and the trial
judge did not make the determination that the declarant would rely on the Fifth
Amendment privilege, and that the privilege was valid because his conviction was
pending on appeal .6 For these reasons, Appellant's claim with respect to the exclusion
of Newsome's hearsay statement is unpreserved for appellate review.
II . AMENDED INDICTMENT
On October 8, 1998, a Boyd County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Appellant with first-degree robbery by using physical force and causing
physical injury to the victim . Appellant was also indicted for first-degree assault on
December 22, 1998, and the indictment charged that "Alex Rogers assaulted Randy
KRE 804(a)(1) (emphasis added) .
' Marshall v. Commonwealth , Ky., 60 S .W .3d 513, 519 (2001) (citing United States v.
Udey, 748 F .2d 1231 (8th Cir. 1984) ; Crawley v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 568 S .W .2d 927
(1978)) .
6
See Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S .W .2d 72 (1990) (trial judge ruling on
unavailability).
4
Davidson by shooting him with a gun ." On November 4, 1999, the Commonwealth
moved to amend the first-degree robbery indictment by striking the language "and
causing physical injury to ." The trial court granted the motion to amend and on
November 10, 1999, defense counsel objected to the amended indictment.
Appellant argues that removing the "injury" language from the original
(October 8) indictment affected his substantial rights by subjecting him to double
jeopardy because he was then charged with two crimes, robbery and assault, arising
out of the same occurrence . It is his contention that under the original indictment
returned by the grand jury this would be impermissible as the "injury" language used in
the robbery indictment is also necessary for the separate assault indictment. Appellant
contends that he was prejudiced because the original indictment with the "injury"
language caused him to focus his defense on the indictment for robbery without fear of
an indictment for assault, and he was thereby prejudiced .
Under the test set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Burge ,' and
reflected in KRS 505.020, a person charged with two crimes arising from the same
course of conduct is not subject to double jeopardy as long as each crime requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Charges of assault and robbery
arising from the same occurrence do not necessarily violate double jeopardy .
Moreover, as Appellant concedes, the "injury" language used in the robbery indictment
is not necessary as robbery in the first degree may be committed in a manner that does
not involve injury to the victim. Accordingly, the indictment was properly amended as
permitted under RCr 6 .16, which allows the court to amend an indictment "any time
Ky., 947 S .W .2d 805, 809 (1996).
before verdict or finding if no additional offense is charged and if the substantial rights
of the defendant are not prejudiced .,,8
This case is distinguishable from O'Hara v. Commonwealth ,9 upon which
Appellant relies, because here Appellant was charged and convicted of robbery in the
first degree under KRS 515.020(1)(b) and assault in the first degree under KRS
508 .010(1)(a) . In O'Hara , 10 the appellant was convicted of assault and of first-degree
robbery, but the robbery indictment contained the same "injury" language as the assault
charge . The indictment was not amended, and the jury was not given the opportunity to
convict of robbery without relying on injury as an element." In the case at bar, the jury
was instructed in accordance with the language of KRS 515.020(1)(b) because
Appellant was armed with a deadly weapon .
Therefore, there was no double jeopardy
violation .
III. STRIKING JUROR FOR CAUSE
During voir dire, Appellant made a motion to strike a juror for cause after
extensive questioning revealed he had read about the crime in the newspaper and had
discussed it with his wife . Appellant maintains that it was apparent that the juror in
question "had discussed the crime in detail with his wife and was still very disturbed by
the event." The trial court refused to strike the juror for cause and Appellant exercised
one of his peremptory challenges to remove the juror.
RCr 6 .16 .
Ky., 781 S .W.2d 514 (1989).
'0 _Id.
11 Id. at 515.
8
9
The refusal of the trial court to strike a juror for cause was not in error. In
Sanders v. Commonwealth, 12 this Court recognized that upon appellate review of a trial
court's refusal to strike a juror for cause, the principal focus is on the trial court's
satisfaction that the prospective juror could be impartial and fair . The juror in question
admitted reading about the crime in the newspaper, but testified that he had not yet
formed an opinion as to the events nor did he remember names of those involved . The
trial court asked the juror if he could base his opinion solely on the evidence from the
witness stand and the juror answered affirmatively. Accordingly there was no error.
IV. VIOLENT OFFENDER DESIGNATION
Appellant contends that he was denied due process of law because the
trial court treated the attempted murder conviction as a violent offense. He makes a
similar claim with respect to his first-degree robbery conviction . By virtue of the violent
offense designations, Appellant will not be eligible for parole until he has served eightyfive percent of his attempted murder and first-degree robbery sentences .
Appellant asserts that the crime of attempted murder is an inchoate
offense and thus, is not included as a felony for which violent offender status is
permissible . KRS 439.3401(1) provides :
"Miolent offender' means any person who has been
convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of a capital
offense, Class A felony, or Class B felony involving the
death of the victim or serious physical injury to a victim, or
rape in the first degree or sodomy in the first degree of the
victim. . . . or robbery in the first degree . "' 3
'2
13
Ky., 801 S .W .2d 665, 670 (1990).
KRS 439.3401(1) (as amended in 2002).
The statute offers no exemption for attempted murder or for any other inchoate offense,
although section five of the statute prohibits application of violent offender status in
cases where the offenders were victims of domestic abuse. Here, "[a]s with any case
involving statutory interpretation, our duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the General Assembly. We are not at liberty to add or subtract from the legislative
enactment nor discover meaning not reasonably ascertainable from the language
used ."'s Had the legislature intended to include inchoate offenses in the list of
exemptions in KRS 439.3401(5) it could have done so, ,6 and we will not discover a
legislative intent unsupported by statutory language.
With respect to the violent offense designation of Appellant's first-degree
robbery conviction, we note that when Appellant's offenses were committed, KRS
439 .3401 provided :
"Miolent offender' means any person who has been
convicted of or pled guilty to the commission of a capital
offense, Class A felony, or Class B felony involving the
death of the victim or serious physical injury to a victim, or
rape in the first degree or sodomy in the first degree of the
victim.
At that time there was no provision in the statute making first-degree robbery a violent
offense unless it was accompanied by death or serious physical injury . Not until July
15, 2002, did the amended version of the statute become effective permitting violent
KRS 439.3401(5) .
Beckham v. Bd . of Educ. Of Jefferson County , Ky., 873 S.W .2d 575, 577 (1994)
(citing Gateway Construction Co . v. Wallbaum , Ky., 356 S .W.2d 247 (1962)) .
'6
See Commonwealth v. Harris, Ky., 59 S .W.3d 896, 900 (2001) (enumeration of
particular items excludes other items that are not specifically mentioned); see also
Smith v. Wedding , Ky., 303 S .W .2d 322 (1957); Louisville Water Co . v. Wells , Ky.App.,
664 S.W.2d 525 (1984).
14
'S
offender status to apply to the stand-alone crime of robbery in the first degree ." As
earlier explained, Appellant was originally charged with inflicting serious physical injury
in the course of committing first-degree robbery and attempted murder. That indictment
was amended to eliminate the serious physical injury element, and Appellant was
indicted again and charged with infliction of serious physical injury in the course of
committing first-degree assault. In this posture the case went to trial and the
instructions on criminal attempt to commit murder and first-degree robbery were without
any serious physical injury element. The only instruction that permitted a finding of
serious physical injury was the first-degree assault instruction. Appellant was
determined to be guilty of all three crimes with the court entering judgment on attempt
to commit murder and first-degree robbery, and a separate judgment on first-degree
assault.
Despite the amended indictment that omitted serious physical injury from
the first-degree robbery charge and the failure to include serious physical injury as an
element in either the first-degree robbery or the attempted murder instructions, the trial
court designated all three offenses as violent offenses, yet in only one of those offenses
was there a finding of serious physical injury . Under the prevailing statute, there must
be a death or a serious physical injury related to the commission of a Class B felony
(first-degree robbery and attempted murder) if it is to be treated as a violent offense .
Here the jury found that Appellant caused serious physical injury to the victim only while
committing assault in the first degree . As to the other convictions, a violent offense
17
See KRS 439.3401(8) .
designation was not available. Accordingly, it was error to designate the attempted
murder conviction and the first-degree robbery conviction as violent offenses .
Moreover, the statute states that the trial judge "shall designate in its judgment
if the victim suffered death or serious physical injury." While the trial court did not make
such finding in the final judgment of conviction for assault in the first degree, there was
an implicit finding that serious physical injury occurred based on the jury verdict and the
trial court's conclusion that it was a violent offense . In the final judgment, the trial court
stated, "the defendant is guilty of the crime(s) First Degree Assault, which the Court
finds to be a violent offense ." Despite this finding, the statute plainly requires the court
to designate in its judgment if the victim suffered death or serious physical injury, and
the court did not so state. As such, this cause will be remanded to the trial court for
modification of the judgment of conviction for first-degree assault in accordance with
KRS 439.3401 .
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's convictions for the crimes of firstdegree robbery and attempted murder are affirmed, provided, however, that the
designation of such crimes as violent offenses is vacated . Appellant's conviction of
first-degree assault is affirmed and remanded to the trial court with directions to modify
its judgment by complying with KRS 439.3401(1) .
Lambert, C.J., and Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, and Stumbo, JJ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J ., concurs in result only . Keller, J., files a separate opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Richard Hoffman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane'
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A . B . Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
Anitria M. Alo
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : DECEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixprt Courf of ~rztfurkv
2000-SC-0103-MR
ALEX R. ROGERS, JR .
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. HAGERMAN, JUDGE
98-CR-00098-001 AND 98-CR-00136-001
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
1 write separately because I disagree with the majority opinion's Part IV analysis
of the KRS 439.3401 "violent offender" issues presented in this appeal. I concur in the
majority opinion to the extent that it: (1) affirms Appellant's convictions and sentences
for Attempted Murder, First-Degree Robbery, and First-Degree Assault ; and (2) vacates
the language in the trial court's final judgment in Boyd Circuit Court Indictment No. 98CR-00098 that purports to designate Appellant's Attempted Murder and First-Degree
Robbery crimes as "violent offenses ." I dissent from the majority opinion, however, to
the extent that it remands Appellant's First-Degree Assault conviction under Boyd
Circuit Court Indictment No. 98-CR-000136-001 for the trial court to modify its final
judgment to include express (but redundant) language to the effect that "serious
physical injury" resulted from Appellant's crime.
Initially, I would note that the "relief' granted by the majority has absolutely no
effect upon Appellant's parole eligibility date . Simply put, the judgments entered four
(4) years ago by the trial court have the exact same legal effect as the judgments that
will exist after remand in this case, i .e . , after the trial court's "violent offender' findings
as to Appellant's Attempted Murder and First-Degree Robbery convictions are vacated
and the trial court makes express findings upon remand with respect to Appellant's
First-Degree Assault conviction . Under the applicable law, the final judgments that are
currently on appeal to this Court require Appellant to serve 85% of his sixteen and onehalf (16'/2) year First-Degree Assault sentence before he will reach his "ultimate date,"
i .e . , the date "before which the inmate may not be released by either parole or sentence
reduction credits[.]"' The "vacating in part, remanding in part" of today's majority
opinion will also result in "new" final judgments that will also require Appellant to serve
85% of his sixteen and one-half (16 1/2 ) year First-Degree Assault sentence before he
reaches his ultimate date. In other words, the majority opinion does not change
Appellant's parole eligibility status by even a single day.
In fact, I would wager that these issues would not have been raised on appeal at
all if anyone had examined Appellant's Kentucky Department of Corrections Resident
Record Card . The plain truth is that the KRS 439.3401 issues constitute "much ado
about nothing" because the "violent offender' language in the trial court's judgments
("which the [trial] Court finds to be [violent offenses/a violent offense]") has no legal
effect whatsoever and no bearing at all on Appellant's parole eligibility date .
It is true
that, in "determin[ing] exactly what sentence the Court imposed and apply[ing] it
according to existing Kentucky law . . . the Department of Corrections . . . rel[ies]
' Brenn O . Combs, Understanding Sentence Calculation and Application, 25 (No.
5) THE ADVOCATE 30, 33 (Sept . 2003).
primarily upon the final judgment entered by the court. ,2 But, in order for a Class B
felony conviction to trigger KRS 439 .3401's parole eligibility restrictions, the trial court's
final judgment must designate that "the victim suffered death or serious physical
injury . ,3 Accordingly, the Justice Cabinet's parole eligibility regulations calculate parole
eligibility for a Class B felony conviction in accordance with KRS 439.3401 only "where
the elements of the offense or the judgment of the court demonstrate that the offense
involved death or serious physical injury to the victim . ,,4 A final judgment that labels an
offense a "violent offense" is meaningless unless the final judgment otherwise
designates that the victim suffered death or serious physical injury - i .e . , where the
elements of the offense in question conclusively establish that a victim suffered death
or serious physical injury or where the trial court makes the additional finding authorized
by KRS 439.3401(1) . Thus, although I concur in the majority's decision to vacate the
"violent offense" label attached to Appellant's Attempted Murder and First-Degree
Robbery convictions, I do so only because I recognize that language is without legal
effect and that this Court can easily eliminate the surplusage .
I break ranks with the majority and dissent from its decision to remand the FirstDegree Assault conviction so that the trial court can make the proper KRS 439.3401(1)
"serious physical injury" finding in its judgment because : (1) neither party requests such
relief; and (2) remanding this case for the trial court to amend its final judgment when
the amendment will not change the legal effect of the prior judgment seems to be a
waste of judicial resources. The Department of Corrections will already have treated
2 Id. At 30.
3 KRS 439 .3401(1) ("The court shall designate in its judgment if the victim
suffered death or serious physical injury.") .
4 501 KAR 1 :030 § 3(1)(b).
Appellant's First-Degree Assault conviction as a violent offense under the applicable
regulation because, given the elements of the offense in question (First-Degree
Assault), 5 the trial court's judgment, which states that Appellant was convicted of FirstDegree Assault, necessarily designates that the victim suffered serious physical injury .
I also take issue with the majority opinion's suggestion that Appellant was not
subject to KRS 439.3401's parole eligibility restrictions as to his First-Degree Robbery
conviction because the jury's verdict on that charge did not include a finding of serious
physical injury. KRS 439.3401(1), of course, requires only that the Class B felony
offense involve serious physical injury to a victim, and no Kentucky appellate court has
ever held that violent offender status is dependent upon the jury's findings . In fact, the
ink is barely dry on Brooks v. Commonwealth , in which this Court held that a trial court
properly "determined for the purposes of the violent offender parole ineligibility
provisions of KRS 439 .3401 that the injuries inflicted by Brooks on the victim were
serious physical injuries ,,7 and that Brooks "was properly a subject for the violent
offender parole limitation provided in KRS 439.3401 "8 although the offense for which
5 KRS 508 .010(1) provides :
A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when :
(a)
He intentionally causes serious physical injury to
another person by means of a deadly weapon or a
dangerous instrument ; or
(b)
Under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life he wantonly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of
death to another and thereby causes serious physical
injury to another person . (Emphasis added) .
s Ky., 114 S .W.3d 818 (2003) .
7 Id . at 823 .
8 Id. at 824 .
Brooks was convicted, Attempted Murder, did not require a jury finding of serious
physical injury .9 In light of the uncontested evidence demonstrating that the physical
force that Appellant and his accomplice used to accomplish their robbery of the towtruck operator consisted of shooting the man in the head, I feel confident that the trial
court could have made the appropriate KRS 439.3401(1) finding in this case. Appellant
cites no authority for the proposition that constitutional or statutory double jeopardy
protections prohibit the Commonwealth from restricting his parole eligibility on more
than one offense as a result of the serious physical injuries he caused to a single victim
during the commission of those offenses . However, because the trial court did not
make the required KRS 439.3401(1), "serious physical injury"finding as to Appellant's
First-Degree Robbery conviction in its final judgment, and the Commonwealth has
brought no cross-appeal from the judgment,' ° which contained only an ineffective
"violent offender' label, I agree with the majority's conclusion that Appellant is subject to
KRS 439.3401's parole eligibility restrictions only for his First-Degree Assault
conviction.
9 _Id. ("[T]he jury correctly found from the evidence that Brooks attempted to kill
the victim but that does not mean that the jury thereby rejected a finding of serious
physical injury .")
'o I express no opinion, however, as to whether the Commonwealth could ask
the trial court to amend the final judgment under CR 60 .02.
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