WILLIAM G . RAYE V. GOLF COMMISSION OF PADUCAH ; ROBERT L . WHITTAKER, DIR . OF SPECIAL FUND ; HON . DONALD G . SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PROMUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : MAY 22, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WILLIAM G. RAYE
V
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2000-CA-2266-SC & 2000-CA-2287-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NO. 96-85431
GOLF COMMISSION OF PADUCAH ;
ROBERT L. WHITTAKER, DIR . OF SPECIAL FUND;
HON. DONALD G. SMITH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
The Court of Appeals determined that it was reversible error for an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to fail to give presumptive weight to a university
evaluator's testimony without stating a reason for doing so . Thus, it reversed a decision
of the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and remanded the claim for the findings
that are required by KRS 342 .315(2). Appealing, the claimant maintains that the Board
was correct in determining that any error was harmless . Although we reverse with
regard to the findings of causation and total disability, we affirm with regard to the entry
of an award of permanent income benefits.
In July, 1996, the claimant injured his lower back when he fell at work . He
underwent surgery to repair a herniated disc at L5-S1 and settled his workers'
compensation claim for a 21 % permanent, partial disability . Although he attempted to
return to work, he was unable to maintain either of two subsequent employments due to
back pain . In January, 1998, he returned to his treating physician with complaints of
increasingly severe back pain which he did not associate with any recent trauma or
activity. MRI revealed a probable recurrent herniation at L5-S1 and a small herniation
at L4-5. Another severe increase in symptoms occurred in May, 1998 . The symptoms
continued to progress thereafter and, in April, 1999, surgery was performed at L4-5 and
L5-S1 .
Dr . Raque conducted a medical records review on the employer's behalf and
reported that the claimant's current condition was the result of a new herniation that
was unrelated to the 1996 injury . On that basis, the employer refused payment for the
1999 surgery and moved to reopen the claim for a finding concerning its liability .
Alleging a change of occupational disability, the claimant also moved to reopen . At
issue in the subsequent proceeding were : causation with respect to any increased
disability, the compensability of unpaid medical expenses, and whether presumptive
weight must be given to the university evaluator in this pre-December 12, 1996, claim .
The claimant testified that he continued to have back pain that radiated to his
right groin and leg and that it was more severe than in the past. He required pain
medication and had difficulty sleeping, standing, sitting, and lifting. Furthermore, he did
not think that he was able to perform any of his past employment and had not looked
for other work .
Dr. Meriwether, the claimant's treating neurosurgeon, testified that the workrelated injury and the weakness that it caused in the claimant's back were substantial
factors in causing the recurrent complaints of pain and the conditions found at L4-5 and
L5-S1 . Furthermore, the additional disc herniation and resulting surgery lessened the
claimant's ability to perform a number of physical activities and increased his
impairment rating .
Dr . Prince performed a university evaluation as authorized by KRS 342 .315(1)
and reported his findings . He indicated that within a reasonable medical probability, the
claimant's 1996 injury was the cause of his complaints, noting the persistent symptoms
following the injury . He indicated that the claimant's condition was partially due to the
arousal of pre-existing degenerative disc disease and attributed 30% of his impairment
to the 1996 injury, 40% to the 1998 herniation, and 30% to the underlying degenerative
changes. Furthermore, he stated :
In terms of causation, his worsening back pain in late 1997 and
1998 was associated with a recurrent disc herniation at the L5S1 and a
new herniation at L4L5 . While the majority of his worsened symptoms
were due to the L4L5 right-sided lesion, there were increasing symptoms
prior to this which were at least present at the time of the MRI showing the
recurrence at L5S1 .
Although I do not feel the L4L5 herniation was directly caused by
the 1996 injury, I do feel the 1996 injury and subsequent surgery played
some role in contributing its development through altered spine
mechanics and reduced support.
Convinced that the claimant had not yet reached maximum medical improvement
(MMI), he would not rate any permanent impairment .
Addressing causation, the ALJ noted that Dr. Meriwether clearly related the
claimant's present condition to the July, 1996, injury and, furthermore, that Dr. Prince
attributed at least part of the condition to the injury . Whereas, Dr. Raque's testimony
was not persuasive . Based upon the evidence from Drs . Meriwether and Prince, the
ALJ determined that the cause of any increased disability related back to the workrelated injury . Turning to the applicability of the "presumptive weight" provision, the ALJ
noted that the claimant's injury occurred before December 12, 1996, and concluded
that because the legislature did not designate KRS 342 .315(2) as being retroactive, it
was inapplicable to this pre-1996-Act claim . Finally, the AU determined that the
contested medical expenses were compensable, that the claimant's actual disability at
settlement was 21 %, and that his present disability was total . Awarding income
benefits for permanent, total disability, the AU relied upon the claimant's testimony
concerning his pain and restrictions, Dr. Meriwether's testimony, and Dr. Prince's
testimony concerning the claimant's present restrictions.
As stipulated, the defendants
were held equally liable for the award .
Each defendant filed a petition for reconsideration pursuant to which the AU
gave them credit for overlapping benefits under the settlement . However, the AU
rejected the employer's request for a finding "that the medical evidence in this case
does not establish a legal proximate cause between Plaintiffs current medical problems
and his work-related injury." The order did not address an assertion by the Special
Fund that the failure to apply KRS 342 .315(2) was erroneous .
Appealing, the defendants maintained that the AU was required to give
presumptive weight to Dr. Prince's clinical findings and opinions . The employer also
maintained that in the absence of evidence that the claimant's degenerative disc
disease resulted from the 1996 injury, neither Dr. Prince's report nor Dr . Meriwether's
constituted an adequate basis for a finding that all of the increased disability and
medical expenses were compensable .
Noting that Magic Coal Co. v . Fox , Ky., 19 S.W.3d 88 (2000), was rendered
shortly after the ALJ's decision, the Board determined that the AU did err by failing to
give Dr. Prince's testimony presumptive weight . Concluding, however, that the error
was harmless, the Board determined that Dr. Meriwether's and Dr. Prince's testimonies
both supported a finding of proximate causation . Noting that a proximate cause did not
have to be the exclusive cause but rather that it must be a substantial factor in bringing
about a particular result, the Board concluded that the chain of events between the
1996 injury and the claimant's present condition appeared to be unbroken . Thus, the
arguments that part of the claim was not compensable were rejected . Convinced that
the essence of Dr. Prince's testimony supported the finding of causation and that the
ALJ had granted the testimony the appropriate weight despite finding that KRS
342 .315(2) did not apply, the Board affirmed .
As the Board pointed out, if the evidence establishes that a compensable injury
is a substantial factor in causing a medical condition, the condition is viewed as being a
result of the injury and, therefore, is compensable . See Newberg v . Reynolds, Ky., 831
S.W .2d 170 (1992) ; Wemyss v. Coleman , Ky., 729 S .W.2d 174 (1987) . In Magic Coal
Co . v. Fox, supra , we determined that KRS 342.315(2) applied to all claims pending
before an ALJ on or after December 12, 1996 . Furthermore, we construed the
provision as shifting the burden of going forward with proof to the party that opposes
the evaluator's testimony but as having no effect on the burden of persuasion . We
explained that the clinical findings and opinions of a university evaluator constituted
substantial evidence of a worker's medical condition that could not be disregarded
unless it was rebutted . We also explained that the fact-finder retained the authority to
weigh conflicting medical evidence and that KRS 342.315(2) permitted an ALJ to reject
a university evaluator's testimony if a reasonable basis for doing so were stated . Until
our decision, the prevailing view was that KRS 342 .315(2) did not apply retroactively
because it could serve to shift the burden of proof.
When considering this reopening, the ALJ was not persuaded that KRS
342 .315(2) governed a pre-December 12, 1996, claim . The fact remains, however, that
he did not reject Dr. Prince's clinical findings and opinions when determining that the
claimant met his burden of proving causation and total disability. Instead, the decision
expresses a reliance on both Dr. Prince and Dr. Meriwether, and the ultimate findings
on those issues are consistent with both testimonies . Therefore, to the extent that the
Court of Appeals' decision might be read to imply that further consideration of those
particular issues is required, we reverse .
Permanent income benefits are not authorized until a worker's condition is
sufficiently stable for the extent of any permanent impairment and disability to be
determined . W. L. Harper Construction Co. v. Baker, Ky.App ., 858 S.W.2d 202 (1993).
In other words, they are not authorized until the worker reaches MMI . Dr. Prince was of
the opinion that the claimant had not reached MMI when he was evaluated; therefore,
the ALJ erred by failing to state a reasonable basis for disregarding the opinion and
awarding permanent income benefits . To that extent, we affirm the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with regard to the question of
permanent disability and reversed with regard to causation and the extent of disability .
The claim must be remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings that are consistent with
KRS 342 .315(2) .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Craig Housman
109 South Fourth Street
P.O . Box 1196
Paducah, KY 42002-1196
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
GOLF COMMISSION OF PADUCAH :
W. Kenneth Nevitt
Nevitt Law Office
804 Stone Creek Pkwy., Suite 4
Louisville, KY 40223
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION FUNDS:
David Barr
Labor Cabinet - Special Fund
1047 U.S. Hwy. 127 South
Suite 4
Frankfort, KY 40601
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