JAMES EDWARD ELDRIDGE V. HUBB CORPORATION ; SPECIAL FUND ; AND HON . SHEILA LOWTHER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY COUR T OF THIS STA TE.
RENDERED : Mar
NOT TO BE P
JAMES EDWARD ELDRIDGE
V.
0, 2003
D1S0ED
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-1959-WC
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD NOS . 91-46605, 93-7283 & 93-42794
HUBB CORPORATION ; SPECIAL FUND ; AND
HON . SHEILA LOWTHER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
APPELLEES
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The Workers' Compensation Board (Board) and the Court of Appeals have
affirmed a finding that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving a change of
occupational disability at reopening . Nonetheless, he continues to maintain that the
finding was erroneous because it was not supported by substantial evidence. Having
concluded that the evidence did not compel a favorable decision, we affirm .
The claimant was born in 1956 and had an eighth-grade education with no
specialized or vocational training . He had worked for approximately 18 years in
underground coal mining when, on February 27, 1993, he was struck in the head, neck,
and upper back by a falling rock and sustained a compression fracture of one or more
thoracic vertebrae . Although he maintained that he was totally disabled and testified
that he had applied for social security disability, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
who considered his claim awarded only a 50% occupational disability. In doing so, the
ALJ noted that the claimant was relatively young and had the mental capacity to
perform a number of jobs despite his limited education . Furthermore, the ALJ was of
the opinion that the claimant substantially exaggerated his physical complaints, that the
psychological problems he alleged were not disabling, and that he was not
unemployable .
The claimant began to receive social security disability benefits shortly after the
hearing and did not attempt to return to work. On August 2, 1999, he moved to reopen
the claim, alleging a worsening of his physical condition and increased occupational
disability. He indicated that his symptoms had worsened and presently included back
pain, headaches, and pain that radiated into his leg. He admitted that he had never
sought employment since the injury, did not think that he could return to any type of
work, and indicated that he had received social security disability benefits continuously
since sometime in 1994 .
Dr. Chaney, the claimant's family physician, provided conservative treatment for
the effects of the injury from the outset and continued to treat him for low back pain and
depression at reopening. In January, 2001, he averred that the claimant's disability had
increased since the award and attributed the change to a small herniation at the C3-4
level that was revealed in a November, 1999, MRI. He also noted complaints of
increased neck and back pain that radiated into both arms and legs .
Treatment records from the Samaritan Pain Center were also introduced .
Dr. Cartia evaluated the claimant in November, 1998, with regard to continuing pain in
the area of the compression fracture .
He recommended Lortab for severe pain, Ultram
for baseline pain, and Restoril for sleep. In 1999, he discontinued the Ultram
prescription and substituted Oxycontin. Dr. Cartia's treatment notes from May 20,
2000, explain that most compression fractures heal and become stabilized in three to
six months although there might be some chronic pain in the area . They indicate that
the claimant's three compression fractures were stable and that although he was
occupationally disabled, he could return to at least light or sedentary work and,
possibly, to medium duty with some restrictions. The Oxycontin prescription was
continued .
Dr. Witt saw the claimant in October, 2000, and diagnosed possible thoracic
facet arthropathy for which he recommended a medial branch block . Dr. Holtman
performed the procedure, after which Dr. Witt changed his diagnosis to thoracic facet
syndrome . He recommended a thoracic radiofrequency medial branch rhizotomy at T811, but the procedure had not yet been approved by the insurance carrier.
Dr. Muckenhausen testified both in the initial proceeding and at reopening . In
1993, she assigned a 22-28% impairment and was of the opinion that the claimant
could not return to underground coal mining .
In 1999, she diagnosed chronic
progressive headaches, chronic progressive neck and mid-back pain with
radiculopathy, and sleep disturbance with elements of anxiety and depression .
Furthermore, she reported that the claimant's impairment was in the range of 47-55%,
that he could lift less than 10 pounds frequently, and that he could sit, stand, or walk for
less than 1-2 hours out of a period of 8 hours .
Dr. Sweasey, a neurosurgeon, evaluated the claimant in December, 1999, to
consider whether surgery was appropriate . He diagnosed lumbago, cervicalgia, strain,
and muscle spasm, and he ordered a myelogram . Although the claimant returned in
June, 2000, there is no indication that the test was ever performed .
An MRI of the thoracic spine that was performed in November, 1999, revealed
mild dextroscoliosis of the lower dorsal spine. Although it revealed old compression
fractures at D10, D11, and D12, and degenerative changes at D9 and D10, there was
no evidence of a herniation . An MRI of the cervical spine, also made in November,
1999, revealed a small herniation at C3-4 on the right.
Dr. Goodman first evaluated the claimant on the employer's behalf in May, 1994 .
He performed another evaluation in December, 1999, at which time the claimant
complained of headaches as well as back and neck pain. Dr. Goodman reported that
recent x-rays of the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine were virtually identical to those
from 1994 . He diagnosed the arousal of pre-existing degenerative disc disease of the
cervical spine and assigned a 6% impairment . He thought that the claimant could work
but recommended that lifting be limited to 50-60 pounds . Noting that both the objective
and subjective findings were essentially the same as in 1994, he concluded that the
claimant's condition had not worsened.
In April, 2000, Dr. Ensalada reviewed the medical records at the employer's
request. He indicated that the November, 1999, MRI showed improvement in the
compression fracture and no new findings . In his opinion, there was no objective
medical evidence of a worsening of condition and no basis for changing the initial
impairment rating or restrictions .
After reviewing the evidence and relying on the opinions of Drs . Cartia,
Goodman, and Ensalada, as well as the claimant's own testimony, the ALJ concluded
that the claimant had failed to meet his burden of showing an increase in occupational
disability as demonstrated by objective medical evidence . In support of the conclusion,
the ALJ pointed to the claimant's initial testimony that he was unable to work, to his
failure to seek employment, and to his continuous receipt of social disability benefits
since shortly after the hearing . Furthermore, the ALJ noted that other than a change
from one pain medication to another, there was little change in the conservative
treatment that he had received from the outset . Although acknowledging that the
claimant could not return to coal mining or other heavy work, the AU concluded that his
condition had not worsened since the initial award and that he remained capable of
some type of employment.
The claimant bears the burden of proof and risk of nonpersuasion before the
fact-finder with regard to every element of his claim . Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky.
App., 673 S .W .2d 735 (1984); Snawder v. Stice, Ky. App ., 576 S .W.2d 276 (1979);
Roark v . Alva Coal Corporation , Ky., 371 S .W.2d 856 (1963) . Although KRS 342.285
permits an appeal from an ALJ's decision to the Board, it provides that the decision is
"conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact" and that the Board "shall not
substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ] as to the weight of evidence on questions of
fact." KRS 342 .290 limits the scope of review by the Court of Appeals to that of the
Board and also to errors of law arising before the Board .
We have construed KRS 342.285 to mean that the fact-finder, rather than the
reviewing court, has the sole discretion to determine the quality, character, and
substance of evidence . Paramount Foods, Inc. v . Burkhardt , Ky., 695 S .W.2d 418
(1985) . Thus, an AU may reject any testimony and believe or disbelieve various parts
of the evidence, regardless of whether it comes from the same witness or the same
adversary party's total proof. Caudill v. Maloney's Discount Stores , Ky., 560 S.W.2d 15,
16 (1977). Contrary to the claimant's assertion, a finding that the party with the burden
of proof failed to meet that burden need not be supported by substantial evidence .
-5-
Butcher v. Island Creek Coal Co. , Ky., 465 S .W.2d 49 (1971) . Instead, that party's
burden on appeal is to establish that the evidence compelled a favorable decision . In
other words, the party must show that the favorable evidence was so overwhelming that
no reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded by it and, therefore, that the
ALJ's decision to the contrary was unreasonable. Special Fund v. Francis , supra at
643 ; Paramount Foods v. Burkhardt , supra ; REO Mechanical v. Barnes , Ky .App ., 691
S.W.2d 224, 226 (1985) ; Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, Ky.App ., 673 S.W.2d 735
(1984). Although the party may note evidence that would have supported a favorable
decision, such evidence is not an adequate basis for reversal on appeal. McCloud v .
Beth-Elkhorn Corp . , Ky., 514 S .W .2d 46 (1974) .
In a case, such as this, where the medical evidence was conflicting, the ALJ had
the sole authority to determine which witnesses to believe. Pruitt v. Bugg Brothers , Ky.,
547 S .W.2d 123 (1977) . Although there was evidence to support the claimant's
assertions, there was also evidence that his disability was no greater at reopening than
it had been at the time of the initial decision . Under those circumstances, the ALJ's
decision was not unreasonable .
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Edmond Collett
John Hunt Morgan
Monica J . Rice-Smith
Collett & Buckle, PSC
P.O. Box 1810
Hyden, KY 41749
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
HUBB CORPORATION :
W. Barry Lewis
Francesca L. Maggard
Lewis and Lewis Law Offices
151 E . Main Street, Suite 100
P .O . Box 800
Hazard, KY 41702-0800
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE,
SPECIAL FUND :
David W. Barr
Kentucky Labor Cabinet
Division of Special Fund
1047 U .S . Highway 27 South
Suite 4
Frankfort, KY 40601
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