JASON W . McCREERY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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IMPORTANT NOTICE
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CI VIL PROCED URE PROMUL GATED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY INANY OTHER
CASE INANY COURT OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 18, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
6
*ixFxMr 490urf of
2002-SC-0497-MR
APPELLANT
JASON W. McCREERY
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE T. STEVEN BLAND, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 01-CR-00004
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
The sole question presented in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in
denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial . We affirm .
On January 19, 2001, Appellant, Jason W. McCreery, was indicted by the Hardin
County grand jury on two counts of Class A felony first-degree sodomy charges. Count
I alleged Appellant committed the offense of first-degree sodomy by engaging in deviate
sexual intercourse with C .H ., his minor stepson . Count II alleged that Appellant
committed the same against W .W., his minor stepdaughter .
Appellant's jury trial commenced approximately one year later on January 14,
2002 . On the second day of trial, Appellant's defense counsel discovered the existence
of records from the Cabinet for Families and Children ("CFC records") . Apparently, the
CFC records had been in the possession of the defense attorney who was representing
Appellant on a fourth-degree assault charge, which was pending before the Hardin
District Court.
In light of the CFC records, defense counsel moved the trial court for a
continuance of twenty-four hours in order to review them . The trial court granted the
motion . During the next day of trial, defense counsel informed the court that he was
essentially no longer prepared to continue with the case because he did not have an
adequate amount of time to properly review and investigate the CFC records . However,
instead of moving the trial court to grant another continuance, defense counsel moved
for a mistrial . This motion was denied by the trial court.
Subsequent to the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial, Appellant elected
to forego the remainder of the jury trial by accepting an offer from the Commonwealth .
The terms of the agreement provided that Count I of the indictment would be
amended from a Class A to a Class B felony. The Commonwealth recommended that
Appellant serve ten years on the amended Class B felony charge and twenty years on
the Class A felony, to run consecutively for thirty years . Additionally, the plea was
conditioned on Appellant's right to appeal the trial court's denial of the aforesaid motion .
Appellant then entered a conditional plea of guilty to two counts of first-degree
sodomy . The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the terms of the plea
agreement . This appeal followed .
Before we begin our discussion of the question presented, i .e . , whether the trial
court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial, we note Appellant's contention
that, even though defense counsel moved for a mistrial, defense counsel was effectively
asking the trial court to grant another continuance . We observe that the trial court, in an
order dated February 20, 2002, referred to Appellant's mistrial motion as a request for a
second continuance . However, it is quite manifest from the record that defense counsel
specifically moved the trial court for a mistrial, and not an additional continuance .
An abuse of discretion standard applies to a trial court's denial of a motion for a
mistrial . See Wiley v. Commonwealth , Ky. App., 575 S.W .2d 166, 169 (1978) .
Likewise, this Court will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for a continuance
unless the trial court has abused its discretion . See Abbott v. Commonwealth , Ky., 822
S .W.2d 417, 418 (1992) . Therefore, it is immaterial whether the motion on appeal
herein is treated as a motion for a mistrial or as a motion for a continuance, as a
reversal will not issue unless we determine the trial court abused its discretion in the
denial of such.
The single assignment of error presented by Appellant in this appeal concerns
the propriety of the trial court's denial of his motion for a mistrial. Appellant complains
that forcing his defense counsel to go to trial without having fully examined the
information contained in the CFC records would have prejudiced him, and requests that
this Court reverse his conviction and sentence, and remand the cause for a new trial .
Appellant directs this Court to our opinion in Anderson v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
63 S.W.3d 135 (2001), where we determined that the trial court committed reversible
error in denying the appellant's motion for a continuance after applying the seven
factors set forth in Eldred v. Commonwealth , Ky., 906 S .W.2d 694 (1994), cert. denied
516 U .S . 1154, 116 S. Ct . 1034, 134 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1996) . Anderson and the present
case are similar in that both involve requests from defense counsel for additional time to
examine newly discovered records . However, that is where the similarity ends.
In Anderson , the newly discovered records received by defense counsel revealed
that the victim had informed a nurse that she had sexual intercourse with a person other
than the defendant. Id . at 138. Here, Appellant cites to no information of this
magnitude, nor does he point to any information within the CFC records which tend to
exculpate him . The trial court in Anderson never granted a continuance . Id . Here
Appellant's defense counsel had already received one continuance . Furthermore, this
is not a matter that is of great complexity. In Anderson , we found that the case was
complex due to suspect discovery practices . Id. There is no evidence of misconduct
concerning the production of the CFC records on the part of the Commonwealth .
Appellant has conceded such . Consequently, any reliance Appellant extends to
Anderson in order to support a reversal of the trial court's decision is clearly misplaced .
Finally, we must consider the fact that the information was in the hands of
Appellant's counsel for other unrelated charges and that the discovery received by
defense counsel here repeatedly referred to CFC's ongoing investigation of various
complaints and allegations of sexual abuse made by Appellant's step-children . Yet no
effort to obtain the records was made during the eleven months that passed between
receipt of the first discovery material referring to the CFC investigation and the date of
trial .
Regardless of whether Appellant's motion is treated as a request for a mistrial or
a continuance, we are simply unable to conclude that the trial court's denial of such
motion was an abuse of discretion . Accordingly, under the circumstances, and from a
consideration of the entire record, we cannot say the trial judge committed reversible
error.
The judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed .
All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
John Palombi
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A. B . Chandler, 111
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Natalie L. Lewellen
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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