SAMUEL E . PLOTNICK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION
THIS OPINIONIS DESIGNA TED "NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PR OCED URE PROMUL GA TED BY THE
SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28 (4) (c), THIS OPINION
IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOTBE
CITED OR USED AS A UTHORITY IN ANY OTHER
CASE INANY CO UR T OF THIS STATE.
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2
NOT TO BE PU
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Qlaud of '
2001-SC-1014-MR
APPELLANT
SAMUEL E . PLOTNICK
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D . WINCHESTER, JUDGE
2001-C R-0033
APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Samuel Plotnick, was convicted of First-Degree Sodomy in the
Whitley Circuit Court and sentenced to the minimum of twenty years imprisonment.
The charge stemmed from an allegation by the four-year old child of Appellant's
estranged girlfriend, that Appellant had "stuck a tent pole up [his] butt." Appellant
appeals his conviction to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b) .
Appellant alleges several errors on appeal, namely: (1) that defense counsel
was improperly denied a recross-examination of the victim after the Commonwealth had
insinuated on redirect that the victim's mother had manipulated the victim's testimony ;
(2) that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on the
lesser-included offense of Sexual Abuse I ; (3) that there was not sufficient evidence to
convict Appellant of Sodomy I, and therefore, Appellant's motion for directed verdict
should have been granted; and (4) that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he
gave unsworn testimony regarding his displeasure with the victim's mother in taking the
victim to see Appellant while in jail . For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
RECROSS-EXAM INATION OF VICTIM
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it refused to allow defense
counsel to recross-examine the victim . On direct examination of the victim, the
prosecution elicited testimony that Appellant had been the one who had sodomized the
victim . However, on cross-examination, the victim, for the first time, accused Rondel
Goins (a previous boyfriend of the victim's mother) of sodomizing him . On redirect, the
prosecution sought to establish that the victim had been to the jail to see Appellant the
night before he gave his testimony in court, presumably to allow the jury to infer that
Appellant or the victim's mother had manipulated the child's testimony . When defense
counsel asked to recross, the trial court denied the request by stating "that's enough"
and dismissed the witness.
Appellant states that this issue is preserved by defense counsel's request, and
the trial court's subsequent refusal of, the recross-examination of the victim . However,
we have repeatedly held that in circumstances such as this, the issue is not properly
preserved unless the disputed testimony is put into the record by avowal . Mills v .
Commonwealth , Ky., 95 S .W.3d 838, 843 (2003) . Since no avowal was taken in this
case, this issue is not preserved for our review, as we cannot speculate as to what the
actual testimony of the victim would have been .
Nevertheless, Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 611 vests the trial court with the
discretion and control over the scope of cross-examination of witnesses . Although
limitations on cross-examination should be cautiously applied because of due process
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implications, trial courts retain broad discretion in the regulation of cross-examination.
Commonwealth v. Maddox , Ky ., 955 S .W.2d 718, 721 (1997).
Here, the witness was a five-year old child who was becoming increasingly
confused throughout his testimony . Along with the revelation that Rondel Goins had
been the person who had hurt him, the victim also stated that the pole had gone
through his stomach and that pieces of his brain were coming out of his arms. Clearly
the child was veering off course . Any further attempt to elicit relevant testimony would
likely have been futile . Moreover, the victim's mother had already testified that she had
taken the victim to see Appellant while in jail because he wanted to make sure that
Appellant was still there so that he couldn't be hurt anymore . There was no new
material information adduced on redirect that would necessitate another cross by
defense counsel . Therefore, regardless of the lack of preservation, we cannot say that
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow recross-examination of the child
on this issue. The jury already possessed the relevant facts from which they could
draw their own inferences .
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE OF SEXUAL ABUSE I
Appellant contends that the jury should have been instructed on the lesserincluded offense of Sexual Abuse I because the prosecution could not establish that
actual penetration occurred as required by KRS 510 .070 and KRS 510.010 . The
Commonwealth argues that this issue is not preserved for appellate review. Indeed, the
record does not contain any tendered instructions by either party, nor does it contain a
transcript of the conference on jury instructions . Appellant refers us to a colloquy during
the argument for a directed verdict wherein defense counsel stated :
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[t]he child stated, even in the interview, that it occurred on
top of his clothes . So, that is not intercourse in anyway .
That might be criminal abuse or you could call it sexual
abuse, but there is no showing that there was . . . object to
skin contact. Said it, specifically, on top of his clothes, Your
honor. That does not support a charge of Sodomy in the
First Degree .
This, however, is not sufficient compliance with Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
9 .54(2) which mandates that:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give
an instruction unless the party's position has been fairly and
adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered
instruction or by motion, or unless the party makes objection
before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the
matter to which the party objects and the ground or grounds
of the objection .
See also Hopper v. Commonwealth , Ky., 516 S .W.2d 855 (1974) . Accordingly, we find
that Appellant has not properly preserved the issue of the trial court's failure to instruct
on the lesser-included offense of Sexual Abuse I .
DIRECTED VERDICT
Appellant next alleges that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a
directed verdict based on : (1) the lack of evidence of penetration ; (2) the lack of
evidence of sexual gratification ; and (3) the general sufficiency of the evidence .
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Commonwealth v . Benham , Ky., 816 S .W.2d
186, 187 (1991) . Further, the trial court is to evaluate the evidence in a light most
favorable to the Commonwealth when ruling upon the defendant's motion for directed
verdict. Id. The evidence in this case clearly indicates that the trial court did not err
-4-
when it found that it would not be clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Appellant
guilty of Sodomy I . Although the element of penetration was clearly in dispute, there
was medical testimony to the effect that penetration would have been possible given
the victim's injuries . This was clearly a question for the jury, as the prosecution
produced "more than a scintilla of evidence" on this issue. Id . at 188.
Appellant also argues that there was no evidence adduced that would show he
acted for the purpose of "sexual gratification" as required by the definition of "deviate
sexual intercourse" in KRS 510.010 . However, as we read the statute, sexual
gratification is only a requirement for the first part of the definition stating that deviate
sexual intercourse "means any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another." The next phrase is separated by a
semicolon and begins "or penetration of the anus of one person by a foreign object
manipulated by another person ." KRS 510.010(1) (emphasis ours) .
KRS 446 .080(4) states that "[a]II words and phrases shall be construed
according to the common and approved usage of language . . . ." Therefore, in so
construing KRS 510.010(1), we conclude that sexual gratification is not a necessary
element of "deviate sexual intercourse" if the evidence establishes that the anus was
penetrated by a foreign object, thus satisfying the second part of the definition .
Accordingly, the Commonwealth was not required to prove that Appellant derived any
sexual gratification from the act.
Appellant also argues general insufficiency of the evidence in support of his
argument that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his directed verdict. As stated
previously, we believe that the trial court correctly denied Appellant's motions for
-5-
directed verdict as the prosecution produced more than a scintilla of evidence from
which a reasonable jury could determine that the appellant was guilty of the offense
charged . See Benham, supra .
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Lastly, Appellant asserts that the prosecutor made improper comments during
his direct examination of the victim's mother when he sought to establish that he (the
prosecutor) and the victim's mother had argued over the fact that the mother had taken
the victim to see Appellant on several different occasions. Appellant insists that these
comments insinuated to the jury that the prosecutor personally believed Appellant to be
guilty and was going forward with the prosecution despite the mother's belief that
Appellant was innocent . Appellant concedes that this issue is not preserved but seeks
review for manifest injustice pursuant to RCr 10 .26.
It was not error for the prosecutor to establish that the victim's mother may have
been biased due to her belief of Appellant's innocence . The defense itself introduced
numerous letters from the victim's mother to Appellant proclaiming her belief in his
innocence . The prosecutor's comments regarding his displeasure with the victim's
mother for exposing the victim to Appellant prior to trial do not even remotely reach the
level of palpable error as required for reversal . At the most, it was harmless error .
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Whitley Circuit Court is affirmed .
Lambert, C.J . ; Graves, Johnstone, Keller and Wintersheimer, JJ ., concur .
Cooper, J ., concurs in result only by separate opinion . Stumbo, J ., dissents by
separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Richard Hoffman
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, #302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A . B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
George G . Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive, Suite 200
Frankfort, KY 40601
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,*ixVrPmr ~vurf of ~rnfurhV
2001-SC-1014-MR
SAMUEL E . PLOTNICK
V
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
2001-C R-0033
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
Effective July 14, 2000, KRS 510.010(1) was amended, 2000 Ky. Acts, ch . 401, §
4, so that it now reads (new language in bold):
"Deviate sexual intercourse" means any act of sexual gratification
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another ;
or penetration of the anus of one person by a foreign object
manipulated by another person . "Deviate sexual intercourse" does
not include penetration of the anus by a foreign object in the course
of the performance of generally recognized health-care practices ;
The premise of the majority opinion is that the 2000 General Assembly's failure to
delete the first semicolon indicates a legislative intent to eliminate the "sexual
gratification" requirement from the offense when it is committed by penetration with a
foreign object . Perhaps, but the failure to delete the preexisting semicolon could also
have been mere oversight .
Punctuation marks are no part of an act. To determine the intent of the
law, the court, in construing a statute, will disregard the punctuation, or will
repunctuate, if that be necessary, in order to arrive at the natural meaning
of the words employed .
United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co . , 287 U .S. 77, 82-83, 53 S .Ct. 42, 44,
77 L .Ed . 175 (1932) (citations omitted) . My view is that if the offending act was not
committed for sexual gratification, it is not a sexual offense but an assault that should
more properly be prosecuted under KRS Chapter 508 . Nevertheless, until 2000, the
same act of penetration of the anus of another with a foreign object was formerly
included in the definition of "sexual intercourse ." KRS 510 .010(8) . When the 2000
General Assembly amended subsection (1) of KRS 510 .010, it also amended
subsection (8) as follows :
"Sexual intercourse" means sexual intercourse in its ordinary sense
and includes penetration of the sex organs [9F aRUS] of one person by a
foreign object manipulated by another person . Sexual intercourse occurs
upon any penetration, however slight ; emission is not required . "Sexual
intercourse" does not include penetration of the sex organ [OF-anus] by a
foreign object in the course of the performance of generally recognized
health-care practices ;
Thus, the only apparent purpose of the 2000 amendment was to move the act of
penetration of the anus of another with a foreign object from the definition of "sexual
intercourse" to the definition of "deviate sexual intercourse ." If the legislature did not
intend to require that penetration of the anus of another with a foreign object to have
been for "sexual gratification" when it was in subsection (8), it is not illogical to assume
that it had the same non-intent when it moved it to subsection (1) . Nor would there be
any logic in requiring that penetration of the anus of another with a foreign object to be
for sexual gratification under subsection (1) when subsection (8) does not contain the
same requirement for penetration of the vagina of another with a foreign object.
Although I continue to believe that such an attack for a purpose other than sexual
gratification should more properly be categorized as an assault, I must conclude that it
is within the General Assembly's prerogative to categorize it as a sexual offense.
Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority .
I would note in passing that this issue arose in the context of a motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal for failure to prove the act was done for sexual gratification,
not in the context of an objection to the instructions which, in fact, did (unnecessarily, as
it turns out) include the requirement of sexual gratification . Further, if sexual
gratification were an element of the offense, it could be inferred from the nature of the
act, cf. Anastasi v. Commonwealth , Ky., 754 S .W.2d 860, 862 (1988); thus, Appellant
would not have been entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal in any event.
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
,Supx7emt (gaurf of ~mfurkg
2001-SC-1014-MR
SAMUEL E. PLOTNICK
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JERRY D. WINCHESTER, JUDGE
2001-CR-0033
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE STUMBO
Respectfully, I must dissent from the majority opinion because I feel that the
failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of Sexual
Abuse I was so prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant that manifest injustice
occurred . RCr 10.26 .
Under the palpable error rule, we must determine if, after considering the case as
a whole, there exists a substantial possibility that the result would have been different
had the error not occurred . Partin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 918 S.W.2d 219, 224 (1996) .
Appellant argues that the evidence could not conclusively establish that penetration
occurred, thereby warranting a charge of First-Degree Sodomy.
KRS 510.070(1)(b) states that a person is guilty of First-Degree Sodomy if he
"engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is incapable of consent
because he . . . [i]s less than twelve (12) years old ." KRS 510 .010 defines "deviate
sexual intercourse" as "any act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one
person and the mouth or anus of another; or penetration of the anus of one person by a
foreign object manipulated by another person ." Here, there was medical testimony that
established the victim had bruising around the rectal area that was consistent with a
pole being stuck in his anus. However, the physician's assistant who first examined the
victim testified that some of the bruises were yellowing, indicating healing, and that
there were no tears or fissures of the rectum . She also testified that while it was hard to
tell from the victim's injuries, it would be possible to have penetration without having a
tear or fissure, depending on the width of the pole. Most importantly though, at all
times, the victim has maintained that he was clothed during the incident. While it is true
that we have held that the element of penetration can be established by circumstantial
evidence, Gregory v. Commonwealth , Ky., 610 S.W.2d 598 (1980), I think the jury could
have reasonably concluded that no penetration occurred and opted for a conviction on
the lesser-included offense of Sexual Abuse I .
"An instruction on a lesser-included offense is appropriate if and only if on the
given evidence a reasonable juror could entertain reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt on the greater charge, but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty of the lesser offense ." Skinner v. Commonwealth , Ky., 864 S .W.2d 290, 298
(1993) . "In a criminal case, it is the duty of the trial judge to prepare and give
instructions on the whole law of the case, and this rule requires instructions applicable
to every state of the case deducible or supported to any extent by the testimony ."
Taylor v. Commonwealth , Ky., 995 S .W.2d 355, 360 (1999).
"Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the
defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor
of conviction." Keeble v. United States , 412 U.S . 205, 212-213, 93 S . Ct. 1993, 1998,
36 L . Ed . 2d 844, 850 (1973) .
Since the jury was only presented with the options of a conviction for Sodomy I or
a complete acquittal, I do not believe that this Court can say that the result of the case
would not have been different if the jury was presented with the opportunity to convict
Appellant on the lesser charge of Sexual Abuse l . Id . Accordingly, l would find that
given the evidence presented, a reasonable juror could have entertained reasonable
doubt that penetration occurred, as required for a conviction of Sodomy I, while
believing beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of the lesser-included
offense of Sexual Abuse I, which does not contain an element of penetration .
Therefore, I find this to be palpable error and grounds for reversal .
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