JASON D . SHAVERS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: AUGUST 21, 2003
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2001-SC-0232-MR AND 2001-SC- 0923-
JASON D . SHAVERS
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APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DONALD ARMSTRONG, JUDGE
ACTION NO . 99-CR-000666
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
Appellant, Jason Shavers, was tried as a youthful offender and convicted in the
Jefferson. Circuit Court of murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, and
tampering with physical evidence. He was sentenced to terms of fifty (50), ten (10), ten
(10), and five (5) years respectively, with the robbery and burglary counts to run
concurrently with one another and consecutively with all other counts for a total of sixtyfive (65) years imprisonment .
Appellant went to the home of David Chavous to purchase marijuana. Appellant
entered the house after being told that a friend would be returning with some marijuana
shortly . Once inside, Appellant held a gun to Mr. Chavous' throat and ordered him to
"give me all you've got ." Mr. Chavous was shot while attempting to empty his pockets .
Appellant raises ten issues on appeal, specifically: (1) that he was denied a fair
trial when he was tried by a jury that was "death-qualified" under the mistaken belief that
Appellant was sixteen when the crimes were committed ; (2) that the trial court erred
when it refused to give a reckless homicide instruction to the jury; (3) that he was
entitled to a directed verdict on the burglary charge, as there was no evidence that he
entered the premises unlawfully ; (4) that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the
charge of tampering with physical evidence because he did not know that police were
conducting an investigation ; (5) that the trial court erroneously applied the sentencing
statutes, resulting in an impermissible maximum sentence ; (6) that reversible error
occurred when the trial court allowed the introduction of a prior misdemeanor during the
penalty phase of the trial; (7) that the photo identification technique used by police was
unduly suggestive to one witness ; (8) that the prosecutor failed to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury; (9) that the prosecutor's behavior regarding the applicability
of the death penalty and her comments during closing argument amounted to
prosecutorial misconduct ; and, (10) that the cumulative effect of errors committed during
trial amounted to a denial of due process . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right .
Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) .
"DEATH-QUALIFICATION" OF THE JURY
Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it refused to grant a mistrial after
it became known that he was only fifteen at the time of the crimes, and therefore,
ineligible for the death penalty under KRS 640 .040(1), yet the trial was allowed to
proceed with a "death-qualified"' jury.
That is, juries from which those venirepersons who would not or could not impose the
death penalty are excluded .
2
Apparently, at some point during the trial, the Commonwealth discovered that
Appellant was only fifteen years old when the crimes were committed . The
Commonwealth withdrew the death penalty from consideration but did not explain its
reason for doing so . It was not until approximately one day later that defense counsel
also figured out that Appellant had never been eligible for the death penalty, and at that
point a motion was made for a mistrial . The trial court refused to grant Appellant a
mistrial and informed the jury that the death penalty was no longer an option due to the
mutual agreement of the parties.
The United States Supreme Court has twice addressed the issue of whether
death qualification of a jury deprives a defendant of a fair trial . The Court held in
Lockhart v. McCree , 476 U .S . 162, 177, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1767, 90 L. Ed . 2d 137, 150
(1986), that death qualification of a jury did not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community . The Court
also found no merit to McCree's claim that a death-qualified jury is per se more
conviction-prone .2 Id. at 171-172.
The defendant in McCree , supra , was in fact eligible to receive the death penalty,
whereas in the case sub judice, Appellant was never eligible to receive the death
penalty. In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U .S. 402, 107 S. Ct . 2906, 97 L . Ed . 2d 336
(1987), however, the defendant was not eligible for the death penalty, but was jointly
tried with an eligible co-defendant by a death-qualified jury. The Court in Buchanan
reaffirmed its holding in McCree that a death-qualified jury did not deny a defendant his
right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, even though
2 In fact, the Court, for purposes of the opinion, assumed that the studies submitted by
McCree, that found a death-qualified jury to be somewhat more conviction-prone, were
valid . The Court held that even in spite of these findings, the Constitution did not
prohibit death qualification of juries . _Id . at 173 .
3
in that case the death penalty was only sought against the co-defendant. Id . at 415.
We believe McCree and Buchanan , although somewhat factually dissimilar from the
case at bar, lend enough guidance to require that we also reject Appellant's claim .
Appellant attempts to distinguish Buchanan from his case by noting that the
Court in Buchanan only upheld the death qualification of the jury because the state had
a legitimate interest in trying the defendants jointly . 483 U .S . 402 at 418-419 . It is true
that the Buchanan Court indicated that the state had a significant interest in trying
certain co-defendants jointly ; however, the Court did not rely solely on this fact as the
basis for its holding . See Furman v. Wood , 190 F .3d 1002, 1005 (9t" Cir. 1999) (stating
that there was clearly no negative implication from Buchanan that the state must have a
compelling interest in order to try a non-capital defendant by a death-qualified jury; and
thus the defendant, who was never legitimately eligible for the death penalty, but was
tried by a death-qualified jury, was not prejudiced) .
Appellant seems to argue that our decision in Brown v. Commonwealth , Ky., 890
S .W.2d 286 (1994), also by negative implication, stands for the proposition that it is
error for the state to try a non-capital defendant before a death-qualified jury, when in
fact, in Brown , supra, we did not reach the issue of whether death qualification of the
jury was appropriate for a non-capital defendant because Kentucky did have jurisdiction
to charge the defendant with a capital offense in that case . Id. at 288. Appellant's
argument otherwise is unpersuasive .
In Buchanan , supra, the Supreme Court emphasized that. . .
the particular concern about the possible effect of an
"'imbalanced' jury" in the "special context of capital
sentencing," is not present with respect to the guilt and
sentencing phases of a noncapital defendant in this case.
For, at the guilt phase, the jury's discretion traditionally is
more channeled than at a capital-sentencing proceeding,
4
and, at the penalty phase, the jury's sentence is limited to
specific statutory sentences and is subject to review by the
judge .
483 U .S. at 420 (citations omitted) . Buchanan implicitly recognized that a non-capital
defendant tried during the guilt phase by a death-qualified jury is not denied his right to
an impartial jury. See Furman , supra at 1005 ; U .S . v. Edelin , 118 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45-50
(D.D .C. 2000) . Further, "'the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair
cross section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual
viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously
and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular
case ."' Buchanan , supra , at 420 (quoting McCree , supra at 184). Death qualification of
a jury does not erase this supposition . Accordingly, we hold that Appellant was not
denied an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community, in violation of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, when he was tried by a death-qualified jury .
Appellant also contends that our decision in Lawson v. Commonwealth , Ky., 53
S.W.3d 534 (2001), mandates that we reverse his convictions because during voir dire
the jury was misled as to the proper penalty ranges. In Lawson , the question before this
Court was how much information to give potential jurors during voir dire regarding the
possible range of penalties . Id . at 543. We held that "in all non-capital criminal cases
where a party or the trial court wishes to voir dire the jury panel regarding its ability to
consider the full range of penalties for each indicted offense, the questioner should
define the penalty range in terms of the possible minimum and maximum sentences . . .
." Id . at 544. However, McCree and Buchanan properly govern the case at bar, and as
stated above, Appellant was not prejudiced by the questioning of potential jurors about
their ability to follow statutory guidelines and impose a penalty within the permissible
range .
RECKLESS HOMICIDE INSTRUCTION
Appellant next contends that the trial court's failure to give the jury an instruction
on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide was prejudicial error requiring
reversal for a new trial . The trial court gave the jury instructions on murder (KRS
507 .020) and second-degree manslaughter (KRS 507.040). Appellant argues that it is
possible that the jury could have believed that he was not able to fully understand the
consequences of his actions due to his age, thus requiring a finding that Appellant's
conduct was merely reckless rather than intentional or wanton . The trial court ruled that
there was no way a jury could have believed that Appellant failed to perceive the
"substantial and unjustifiable risk" involved in holding a loaded gun to the neck of David
Chavous . KRS 501 .020(4). Appellant urges us to consider his infancy, not as a
defense to his actions, but instead as a factor in determining whether the trial court
erred in not issuing a reckless homicide instruction .
"Although a trial judge has a duty to prepare and give instructions on the whole
law of the case, including any lesser included offenses which are supported by the
evidence. . . . that duty does not require an instruction on a theory with no evidentiary
foundation ." Neal v . Commonwealth , Ky., 95 S .W.3d 843, 850 (2003). Appellant offers
no credible evidence that he did not perceive the substantial risk that the death of the
victim would result from his actions.
"An instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if, considering the
totality of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty
of the lesser offense ." Id . Regardless of Appellant's age at the time of the crimes, we
do not feel that an instruction on reckless homicide was warranted based on the
evidence. In fact, the jury was given the option of convicting Appellant of the less
culpable offense of second-degree manslaughter, which requires that a defendant
"wantonly3 cause[ ] the death of another person," KRS 507.040, yet it chose instead to
convict Appellant of murder. Accordingly, we do not believe that the jury could have
reasonably convicted Appellant of the even less culpable offense of reckless homicide .
Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury an instruction on reckless
homicide.
DIRECTED VERDICT ON FIRST-DEGREE BURGLARY
Appellant argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the burglary charge
because there was no evidence that he knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in the
building with the intent to commit a crime . KRS 511 .020. Appellant maintains that he
was invited into the victim's home to wait for a friend to return . He also asserts that he
fled the house immediately after the victim was shot.
Appellant refers us to Robey v. Commonwealth , Ky., 943 S.W.2d 616 (1997),
where this Court held that the elements of first-degree burglary were not met because
the defendant had been invited to stay the night and immediately fled the victim's home
after raping her. Here, however, there was evidence that Appellant remained in the
victim's house briefly after shooting him in the neck. Contrary to the assertions in
Appellant's brief, the victim's girlfriend testified that after Appellant demanded, "give me
all you've got," he shot the victim while he was reaching into his pockets, and then
3 Defined as an awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that death will result . KRS 501 .020(3) .
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walked the victim back towards the kitchen. The girlfriend ran out the front door and it is
unclear what transpired between Appellant and the victim while in the kitchen .
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is
entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal ." Mills v. Commonwealth , Ky., 996 S .W.2d 473,
489 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S .W.2d 186, 187 (1991)) .
Therefore, in light of the testimony of the victim's girlfriend, it would not have been
clearly unreasonable for the jury to have believed that Appellant remained inside the
house subsequent to shooting David Chavous . The trial court correctly denied
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
DIRECTED VERDICT ON TAMPERING WITH THE EVIDENCE
Appellant argues that it would be absurd to apply KRS 524.100 to his case
because, as a child, he did not have the foresight necessary to perceive that a criminal
investigation would be initiated against him . The Commonwealth contends that this
issue is not preserved for our review because at trial Appellant only argued that there
was insufficient evidence of tampering . The Commonwealth points out that the first time
Appellant raises the issue of lack of knowledge of a criminal investigation is on appeal
to this Court. We agree. We have consistently held that an appellant "will not be
permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the appellate court."
Kennedy v. Commonwealth , Ky., 544 S.W.2d 219, 222 (1976) . Therefore, this issue is
not preserved for our review .
SENTENCING
Appellant next submits that he was impermissibly sentenced beyond the
maximum allowable range permitted by KRS 532 .110, KRS 532 .080, and KRS 640.040 .
Appellant was sentenced to a total of sixty-five years imprisonment . KRS 640 .040(1) is
applicable due to Appellant's status as a youthful offender and it reads in relevant part:
No youthful offender who has been convicted of a capital
offense who was under the age of sixteen (16) years at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced to
capital punishment . . . . A youthful offender convicted of a
capital offense regardless of age may be sentenced to a
term of imprisonment appropriate for one who has
committed a Class A felony and may be sentenced to life
imprisonment without benefit of parole for twenty-five (25)
years .
Likewise, KRS 532 .110(1)(c) limits multiple sentences of imprisonment by stating :
The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not
exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which
would be authorized by KRS 532 .080 for the highest class of
crime for which any of the sentences is imposed . In no
event shall the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate
terms exceed seventy (70) years .
The authorized maximum term for a person convicted of a Class A felony is not less
than twenty years nor more than fifty years, or life imprisonment . KRS 532.060 ; KRS
532 .080 . Since Appellant, a youthful offender, was convicted of a capital offense and
sentenced to a term of years, he was eligible for the punishments appropriate for a
Class A felony offender . KRS 532.110 limits that sentence to no more than fifty years
imprisonment, which is what Appellant received . His other sentences run concurrently
still result in a total of less than the limit imposed by KRS 532 .110(1)(c) . There is no
error .
JUVENILE MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS
Appellant next argues that the trial court erroneously submitted information
regarding a prior misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana to the jury during
the penalty phase of the trial. KRS 532 .055(2)(a)(6) states that "[j)uvenile court records
of adjudications of guilt of a child for an offense that would be a felony if committed by
9
an adult" may be offered by the Commonwealth at the sentencing hearing . Since the
prior possession of marijuana conviction was only a misdemeanor, the jury was not
entitled to hear evidence related to that conviction . However, the trial court admonished
the jury to disregard the conviction and overruled Appellant's motion for a mistrial .
"[F]or a mistrial to be proper, the harmful event must be of such magnitude that a
litigant would be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect could be
removed in no other way." Maxie v . Commonwealth , Ky., 82 S.W.3d 860, 863 (2002) .
Appellant has not shown how he was prejudiced by this information, particularly in light
of the fact that the jury had already properly heard information regarding two prior felony
convictions for wanton endangerment and first-degree assault . Here, the trial court
properly admonished the jury to disregard the evidence relating to Appellant's
misdemeanor conviction and we are to presume that the jury followed that admonition .
Id . Therefore, any error was harmless and the trial court properly overruled Appellant's
motion for a mistrial .
WITNESS PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION
Appellant contends that the manner in which two photo packs were shown to
witness, James Ingram, was unduly suggestive because Mr. Ingram was only able to
identify Appellant after he was shown a second photo pack where Appellant's picture
was the only picture repeated . Mr. Ingram later testified and identified Appellant at trial .
The Commonwealth responds that Mr. Ingram was hesitant to identify Appellant from
the first photo pack because the picture was several years old and blurry. After the
police showed Mr. Ingram a more recent photo of Appellant, approximately eight days
later, he had no trouble in identifying Appellant .
"A conviction based on identification testimony following pretrial identification
violates the defendant's constitutional right to due process whenever the pretrial
identification procedure is so 'impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification ."' Dillingham v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 995 S .W.2d 377, 383 (1999) (quoting Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir.
1986) . There is a two-step inquiry to determine if the in-trial identification violated
Appellant's due process . Id . First, the court is to determine if the identification prior to
trial was unduly suggestive. If the court determines that the pre-trial identification was
not unduly suggestive, there is no need to reach the second step that requires the court
to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if the identification was still
reliable. Id .
Here, the trial court ruled that the pre-trial identification made by Mr. Ingram was
not unduly suggestive primarily because the two photos of Appellant were different .
The trial court stated that there was quite a bit of difference between the two photos of
Appellant . Detective Mike Crask testified that the first photo pack contained a picture of
Appellant obtained from Appellant's school and that the photo was several years old.
We also note that Mr. Ingram had an opportunity to observe Appellant for approximately
thirty seconds to one minute prior to Appellant entering the victim's house and again for
approximately twenty to thirty seconds after leaving the house . Mr. Ingram testified that
he got a good look at Appellant and that he had seen him around the neighborhood
before . Therefore, we agree with the trial court's assessment that the pre-trial
identification by Mr. Ingram was not the result of an unduly suggestive procedure and in
violation of Appellant's due process rights . There was no error.
FAILURE TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE TO THE GRAND JURY
Appellant argues that the prosecutor failed to present evidence to the grand jury
that several witnesses at the scene failed to identify Appellant as the shooter. Appellant
contends that this was exculpatory evidence that the grand jury was entitled to hear
before returning an indictment.
A prosecutor is not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
United States v. Williams , 504 U .S. 36, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 118 L . Ed . 2d 352 (1992). In
fact, "requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence
would alter the grand jury's historical role, transforming it from an accusatory to an
adjudicatory body." Id . at 51 . Therefore, Appellant's argument has no merit and his
motion to dismiss the indictment was properly overruled .
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Appellant alleges that the prosecutor's behavior surrounding the withdrawing of
the death penalty and her comments during closing arguments amounted to
prosecutorial misconduct. The Commonwealth responds that neither of these
arguments is preserved for our review . We agree. Nevertheless, there was no
allegation that the Commonwealth willfully attempted to impose the death penalty on an
ineligible juvenile and we have already ruled that being tried by a death-qualified jury did
not prejudice Appellant . Therefore, no error occurred .
Likewise, the prosecutor's comment during closing argument that it was time to
"strip [Appellant] of this presumption of innocence" was not error. Reversal due to
prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument is only required if the conduct was
flagrant. Barnes v. Commonwealth , Ky., 91 S .W.3d 564, 568 (2002) . Accordingly,
regardless of preservation, Appellant's arguments are without merit .
CUMULATIVE ERROR
As stated above, any errors during Appellant's trial were harmless. The
cumulative effect of these errors did not deprive Appellant of a fundamentally fair trial.
See Tamme v. Commonwealth , Ky., 973 S .W.2d 13, 40 (1998) ; cf . Funk v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 842 S.W.2d 476, 483 (1992) . Appellant's argument to the contrary
is therefore rejected .
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is hereby affirmed .
Lambert, C .J . ; Graves, Johnstone, Stumbo and Wintersheimer, JJ., concur.
Cooper, J ., concurs in result only. Keller, J ., dissents without separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Suzanne Hopf
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Todd D . Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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