M .M ., A JUVENILE V HENRY WILLIAMS, SUPERINTENDENT, WOODBEND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER AND RALPH KELLY, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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M .M ., A JUVENILE
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
2001-CA-1291
MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT NO . 01-CI-00067
V
HENRY WILLIAMS, SUPERINTENDENT,
WOODBEND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT
CENTER AND RALPH KELLY,
COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE
APPELLEES
AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE GRAVES
AFFIRMING
On January 4, 2001, Appellant, M.M ., a juvenile, pled guilty in the Floyd District
Court to charges of third-degree assault and attempted escape, which occurred while
he was in custody at the Big Sandy Area Detention Center. The Floyd District Court
thereafter released Appellant to his parent's custody and transferred the case to the
Laurel District Court for final disposition since Appellant was a resident of Laurel
County .
On March 22, 2001, the Laurel District Court entered an order committing
Appellant to the Clark County Detention Center pending placement by the Department
of Juvenile Justice . Appellant appealed to the Laurel Circuit Court and sought release
pending the appeal pursuant to RCr 12.04 . The Laurel Circuit Court denied the motion
for release . The Department for Juvenile Justice subsequently placed Appellant in a
facility in Morgan County.
Appellant thereafter sought habeas corpus relief in the Morgan Circuit Court to
preclude further enforcement of the March 22, 2001, order of the Laurel District Court
pending resolution of his appeal to the circuit court. In granting Appellant's petition for
relief, the Morgan Circuit Court ruled :
Appeals from juvenile court orders "shall be taken in the manner
provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure ." KRS 610.130 .
RCr 12.04(4) provides that "the timely filing of a notice of appeal
from the judgment of the district court shall stay proceedings on
the judgment as long as the case remains on appeal, except for
the requirement of bail ." KRS 610 .190 provides that "The law
relating to bail shall not be applicable to children detained in
accordance with this chapter . . . ." In light of the foregoing
authority, the May 22, 2001 order was stayed by operation of
law pending resolution of the appeal . Consequently there
presently is no enforceable judgment which would permit the
Respondents to retain custody of Petitioner .
A split panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the Morgan Circuit Court, holding
that Appellant's habeas petition was procedurally improper, and that Appellant instead
should have sought relief through the normal appellate procedures or through a petition
for a writ of mandamus . The Court of Appeals declined to address the application of
RCr 12 .04 to juvenile proceedings . This Court thereafter granted discretionary review .
As he did in the courts below, Appellant argues that KRS 610 .190 clearly
provides that appeals from juvenile court orders "shall be taken in the manner provided
by the Rules of Criminal Procedure ." Further, RCr 12 .04 states, in pertinent part, that
"the timely filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment of the district court shall stay
proceedings on the judgment as long as the case remains on appeal . . . ." As such,
Appellant contends that the Laurel District Court's March 22, 2001, order of
commitment was stayed by operation of law when he timely filed his appeal in the
circuit court . Consequently, Appellant believes that he was properly entitled to habeas
relief since he was illegally detained in the Morgan County facility .
The Commonwealth counters that the sole issue in this case concerns whether
"a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum - the Great Writ - is an appropriate remedy to
executive branch detention that has been authorized by a court of competent
jurisdiction ." The Commonwealth asserts that the appropriate remedy lies directly in a
writ of mandamus rather than collaterally in a petition for habeas . Like the Court of
Appeals, we need not reach the RCr 12 .04 issue, for we also conclude that this case
solely concerns the proper application of habeas corpus.
KRS 419 .020 provides :
The writ of habeas corpus shall be issued upon petition on
behalf of anyone showing by affidavit probable cause that he
is being detained without lawful authority or is being
imprisoned when by law he is entitled to bail. The writ may be
issued by any circuit judge on any day at any time and his
power to issue such writs shall be coextensive with the
Commonwealth .
The statute is a codification of the constitutional right of an individual to petition a court
to determine the legality of his detention . U.S . Const. art. I § IX; Ky . Const . § 16 .
However, in Smith v. Henson , 298 Ky. 182, 182 S.W.2d 666, 668 (1944), our
predecessor court explained :
[W]here there has been a judgment in the case, a habeas
corpus proceeding is a collateral attack on that judgment. It
lies only where the judgment is void and does not lie to
obtain . . . an appeal or release from custody by establishing
error or disclosing some latent or hidden fact which may
have affected the result .
Early Kentucky decisions concerning the application of habeas corpus limited the
inquiry to whether the court had jurisdiction of the offense and the person of the
accused . Thomas v . Maggard , Ky., 313 S.W .2d 271 (1958) (Judgment is not void if the
court had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and of the defense charged) ; Owen
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 280 S .W.2d 524 (1955) (Denial of a constitutional right will not
render a judgment void if the court had jurisdiction of the person and of the offense) ;
Hoskins v. Buchanon , 311 Ky. 246, 223 S .W.2d 904 (1949) (Inquiry is addressed not to
error committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to question of whether the
proceedings or judgment are void); Department of Public Welfare v. Polsgrove, 250 Ky.
517, 63 S .W .2d 603 (1933) (Mere irregularities or errors of judgment in the exercise of
jurisdiction must be corrected by the court issuing the process or in regular appellate
proceedings) .
In 1963, the Court rendered Rice v. Davis , Ky ., 366 S.W.2d 153 (1963), wherein
it adopted the "federal" view of habeas corpus that "A judgment may be void and
thereby subject to attack for certain extreme irregularities other than the lack of
jurisdiction of the offense and the person ."
In Rice , the defendant produced prima
facie evidence that trial counsel had committed numerous errors, had worked a
substantial injustice on his client, and had failed to make a record for appeal, thus
closing that avenue of relief. The Court concluded that habeas relief was warranted .
Interestingly, RCr 11 .42 was in effect at the time and would have also offered postconviction relief, although not specifically mentioned in the opinion . See John S . Gillig,
Kentucky Post Conviction Remedies , 83 Ky. L .J . 265, 309-310 (1994-95) .
With the evolution of post-conviction relief under RCr 11 .42, habeas corpus has
remained an extraordinary remedy only available under limited circumstances . This
Court in Commonwealth v. Marcum , Ky., 873 S.W.2d 207, 211-212 (1994) stated :
Thus, we recognize as the general rule that the RCr 11 .42
procedure is adequate for a collateral attack by a prisoner in
custody under a judgment which he believes to be defective for one
reason or another . But we recognize as an exception that the
prompt relief available by writ of habeas corpus remains for a
prisoner who can establish in a summary procedure that the
judgment by which he is detained is void ab initio .
In the context of this case, habeas relief would have only been proper had
Appellant been detained without lawful authority under a void judgment. Appellant
maintains that the Laurel District Court's order of commitment was unenforceable since
he filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court. However, the flaw in Appellant's
argument is that the district court's order was a legitimate legal order. And, at no point
does he allege that either the Laurel District or Circuit Court lacked personal or subject
matter jurisdiction . Indeed, Appellant properly appealed the district court's order of
commitment to the circuit court . KRS 610.130 .
Once the Laurel Circuit Court, being a
court of competent jurisdiction, denied Appellant's motion for release pending appeal,
any challenge to that decision, even assuming that such was erroneous, necessarily
vested in that court or in an appellate court.
Contrary to Appellant's position, he had an available remedy by appeal or an
original action to the Court of Appeals under CR 76.36 for a writ of mandamus . A writ
of mandamus is not inadequate simply because it may be more time consuming than a
petition for habeas . See generally Richard v . Howard , Ky., 448 S .W .2d 49 (1969) (RCr
11 .42 not inadequate because it may take longer than habeas) .
In this case, had Appellant sought a writ of mandamus compelling the Laurel
Circuit Court to stay the proceedings on the order of commitment, the dictate would
have been issued by an appellate court upon a lower court. However, the Morgan
Circuit Court's grant of Appellant's habeas petition resulted in two orders from two
coequal courts . As recognized by our predecessor court, "Under our system of
procedure, it would be unseemly to vest power in one circuit court to annul, or refuse to
give effect to, the valid judgment of another circuit court." Sharpe v. Commonwealth ,
292 Ky. 86, 165 S.W.2d 993 (1942), cert. denied , 320 U.S . 767 (1943) .
Notwithstanding the merits of Appellant's claim under RCr 12.04, habeas relief
was not a proper substitute for other available remedies . Lear v. Commonwealth , Ky.
884 S .W.2d 657 (1994) . Appellant's remedy to the adverse ruling lay in appeal or
mandamus, not in a habeas petition to another circuit court.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed .
All concur .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Timothy G. Arnold
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A.B. Chandler III
Attorney General
Matthew D. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601
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