RONALD DOUGLAS CRAWLEY V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
RONALD DOUGLAS CRAWLEY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D . PAYNE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO . 2000-CR-00396-2
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE STUMBO
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant, Ronald Douglas Crawley, was convicted in the Fayette Circuit Court of
first-degree robbery and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) for
participating in the armed robbery of Thee Clubhouse, an adult dancing establishment
in Lexington, Kentucky . Appellant was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment
and appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. ยง 110(2)(b) . Appellant
advances four issues on appeal, namely that: (1) he was improperly denied his right to
testify on his own behalf ; (2) the jury instructions for complicity to robbery did not
include the element of intent ; (3) he was effectively denied the ability to call a witness to
testify about a co-conspirator's motive to lie ; and (4) the Commonwealth failed to
provide notice of its intention to introduce evidence of Appellant's prior bad acts
pursuant to KRE 404(c) .
We reverse and remand because the trial court did not
sufficiently determine that Appellant's waiver of his right to testify on his own behalf was
knowingly and intelligently made .
1 . DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY ON HIS OWN BEHALF
At the close of the defense case, Appellant's counsel approached the bench and
moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion and asked if, before
closing arguments began, counsel would like to put on the record that Appellant was
aware he had the right to testify on his own behalf but that he was waiving such right.
Counsel responded that she did not wish to do so because Appellant wanted to testify
but she had not allowed him to take the stand . Again, during closing arguments,
counsel told the jury that they were not to hold against the defendant the fact that he did
not testify because he had in fact wanted to, but she would not allow it.
The right of a defendant to testify on his own behalf is firmly established by the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution . See also Rock v . Arkansas , 483 U .S . 44, 107 S . Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed . 2d 37
(1987). Further, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution . . .
grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is the
accused, not counsel, who must be "informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation," who must be "confronted with the witnesses against him,
and who must be accorded "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor."
Id. a t 52, 107 S . Ct. at 2709, 97 L . Ed . 2d at 46-47 (quoting Faretta v. California , 422
U .S. 806, 819, 95 S . Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L. Ed . 2d 562, 572 (1975)) . "As a constitutional
right 'essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process,' a defendant's waiver
of the right to testify must be knowing and intelligent ." United States v. Pennycooke , 65
F .3d 9, 11 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) . Although trial courts are not generally
required to advise a defendant that he has a right to testify, there are certain
circumstances, as in the case at bar, where a direct colloquy with a defendant is
necessary to protect his constitutional right to testify at his own trial. Penn cooke ,
supra at 12 . The Pennycooke court held in relevant part:
[w]here, in furtherance of trial strategy, defense counsel nullifies a
defendant's right to testify over the defendant's protest, the defendant
clearly has been denied the right to testify . In such a case, it may be
advisable that the trial court inquire discreetly into the disagreement and
ensure that constitutional rights are not suppressed wrongly .
Id . at 13.
This Court examined the reasoning of the Pennycooke court in our opinion in
Riley v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 91 S .W.3d 560 (2002). There, however, we noted that
"the trial court was aware only that [Riley] was dissatisfied with the representation he
received, but the court had no indication that [Riley's] attorney frustrated his desire to
testify ." Id . at 562 . The facts are different here . Although Appellant here did not
protest his counsel's decision to keep him from testifying, the trial court knew that
Appellant wanted to testify but was kept from the stand by defense counsel . Since the
court was aware of the conflict, it had a duty to further inquire into the situation . When
the trial court failed to do so, it failed to insure that Appellant's silence was the result of
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to testify and such was error. Therefore, we
hold that a trial court has a duty to conduct further inquiry when it has reason to believe
that a defendant's waiver of his right to testify was not knowingly or intelligently made or
was somehow wrongly suppressed .
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLICITY TO ROBBERY
Appellant contends that the jury instructions did not require the jury to find that
Appellant, as an accomplice, intended that the principal commit robbery . Instruction
No. 3, under which Appellant was convicted, states:
-3-
You will find Defendant, Ronald Crawley, guilty of First-Degree Robbery
under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A . That in this county on or about the 28th day of February, 2000 and
before the finding of the Indictment herein, he, alone or in complicity with
another, stole money from Angie Sullivan, an employee of Thee
Clubhouse .
B. That in the course of doing so and with intent to accomplish the theft,
he, alone or in complicity with another used or threatened the immediate
use of physical force upon Angie Sullivan, an employee of Thee
Clubhouse . AND
C. That when he did so, he, alone or in complicity with another was armed
with a gun .
Robbery requires not only the element of an intent to accomplish a theft, but also
the element of the use or threat of immediate use of physical force upon the victim.
KRS 515 .020(1)(c) . Thus, the instruction also should have required that Appellant, as
an accomplice, intended that the principal use or threaten the immediate use of
physical force upon the victim . Often, this element of intent is satisfied by giving a
separate instruction defining complicity. However, the instructions used in this case
defined complicity as :
Complicity means that a person is guilty of an offense committed by
another person when, while acting recklessly with regards to another's
conduct, he solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such
other person to engage in that conduct, or aids, counsels, or attempts to
aid such person in planning or committing such conduct .
(Emphasis added) .
The instructions therefore erroneously failed to require that Appellant intended
that the principal commit the robbery. Harper v. Commonwealth , Ky., 43 S.W .3d 261,
263-265 (2001) . Appellant concedes this issue is not preserved ; we address it merely
because the issue may occur upon remand . We note that a better instruction defining
complicity would read :
A person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, with
the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense , he
solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such other person to
commit the offense, or aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in
planning or committing the offense .
KRS 502.020(1)(a) and (b) (emphasis added).
III. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF APPELLANT'S WITNESS ADAM BREWSTER
Appellant intended to call Adam Brewster to testify about William Searight's
(Appellant's co-conspirator) possible bias against Appellant . Appellant would have
asked Brewster to testify that Searight had made statements to him while the two were
in prison together that indicated Searight was "out to get" Appellant because of his
relationship with Angela Banta, thus giving Searight a motive to lie in his testimony
against Appellant at trial . The Commonwealth argued that if Brewster were called to
testify it should be allowed to ask Brewster on cross-examination if he thought there
were any other reasons that Searight might dislike Appellant . Brewster testified on
avowal that he thought Searight could be angry (and that hypothetically he himself
would be angry) at Appellant because Searight had received a twenty-year sentence in
connection with the robbery. However, Brewster would not have testified to any direct
statements made to him by Searight regarding this matter . As a result of the trial
court's ruling that the Commonwealth would be allowed to cross-examine Brewster on
this issue, Appellant chose not to call Brewster as a witness . However, avowal
testimony pursuant to RCr 9.52 was taken from Brewster.
In Hayes v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 58 S .W.3d 879 (2001), we addressed a similar
situation . There, the defendant who was charged with rape claimed to have been
precluded from testifying at his trial by an erroneous evidentiary ruling made by the trial
court . Specifically, the trial court ruled that should the defendant take the stand and
testify that sexual contact with the complaining witness was consensual, the
Commonwealth could use evidence of a prior conviction of misdemeanor sexual assault
for impeachment purposes . The defendant chose not to testify and no avowal
testimony was taken . This Court made a broad ruling that an alleged error of denial of
the right to testify by implication can only be preserved by the defendant taking the
stand . Avowal is insufficient . Haves, supra at 882 .
While the Hayes case involved the testimony of a defendant as opposed to a
defense witness, we believe the reasoning therein to be sound when applied to this
case. It is only when the complained of testimony is considered in light of the record of
the entire trial that its impact can be judged. Luce v. United States , 469 U .S. 38, 105 S .
Ct . 460, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984) . Because Appellant's witness, Brewster, did not
testify, the alleged error is not preserved and will not be addressed .
IV. INTRODUCTION OF PRIOR BAD ACTS INTO EVIDENCE
It is also not necessary to address Appellant's contention that the
Commonwealth failed to provide notice of its intention to introduce evidence of
Appellant's prior bad acts as required by KRE 404(c) . For purposes of retrial, Appellant
now has notice of the Commonwealth's intention to introduce such evidence .
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court is
reversed and the case is remanded to said court for a new trial .
Lambert, C.J . ; Cooper, Graves, and Johnstone, JJ ., concur as to Issue I .
Cooper, J ., concurs by separate opinion as to Issue I, with Graves, J., joining that
opinion . Keller, J., dissents by separate opinion as to Issue I . Wintersheimer, J.,
dissents by separate opinion as to Issue I . All concur as to Issue II . Lambert, C .J. ;
Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, and Keller, JJ., concur as to Issue III. Cooper, J ., concurs
by separate opinion as to Issue III, with Graves, and Johnstone, JJ ., joining that
opinion . Wintersheimer, J ., concurs in result only as to Issue III. Stumbo, J ., dissents
by separate opinion as to Issue III . All concur as to Issue IV.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
John Palombi
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane, Suite 302
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
Capitol Building
Frankfort, KY 40601
Anitria M . Franklin
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
'SixprrntP 010urf of ~Pufixxhv
2001-SC-0002-MR
RONALD DOUGLAS CRAWLEY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
2000-CR-396-2
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE COOPER
I . DENIAL OF RIGHT TO TESTIFY .
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S .W.2d 412 (1994), held that, assuming
mental competency to make such a decision, a defendant is "the master of his own
defense and pilot of the ship." Id . a t 418 . Counsel may have had good reasons for
believing that Appellant should not take the stand in his own defense . However, her
duty was to give Appellant her reasoned advice . The decision whether to accept or
reject that advice ultimately belonged to Appellant -- assuming his proposed testimony
would not have been perjurious . United States v. Curbs, 742 F .2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir.
1984) ("[A] defendant's personal constitutional right to testify truthfully in his own behalf
may not be waived by counsel as a matter of trial strategy . . . . It is equally clear,
however, that a defendant has no constitutional right to testify perjuriously in his own
behalf .") . Once the trial judge was informed of Appellant's desire to testify, it was error
to fail to inquire as to the accuracy of that information and, if accurate, to permit
Appellant to testify . Ortega v. O'Leary , 843 F .2d 258, 261-62 (7th Cir. 1988) . Although
Omega found the error to be harmless because Ortega's proposed testimony would
have been cumulative of that of other witnesses, id . at 262, we, of course, do not know
what Appellant's testimony would have been . ( Ortega was an appeal from a denial of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus .) Regardless, my view is that the right of a
defendant to testify in his own behalf is so important as to withstand any "cumulative
evidence" analysis .
Apart from what appellant would have testified to, his presence on
the stand would have afforded him the opportunity to have the jury
observe his demeanor and judge his veracity firsthand. As one Circuit
Judge has noted, "The facial expressions of a witness may convey much
more to the trier of facts than do the spoken words."
United States v. Walker, 772 F .2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v.
Irvin , 450 F.2d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1971) (Kilkenny, J ., dissenting)) .
Nor do I agree that this case should be remanded for a retrospective hearing on
voluntary waiver. Appellant's attorney has already told the trial judge that Appellant
wished to testify but that she would not allow him to take the stand . I cannot imagine
Appellant testifying to the contrary on remand .
II. CROSS-EXAMINATION OF BREWSTER .
I agree with the Hayes analysis in the majority opinion . Hayes v.
Commonwealth , Ky ., 58 S.W.3d 879 (2001). However, because this case is being
remanded for a new trial, I would further note that the trial judge's ruling on the
proposed cross-examination of Brewster was incorrect. Brewster's testimony in
response to the Commonwealth's proposed rehabilitation of Searight's credibility, as
preserved by avowal, would have been as follows :
Q.
Were you aware that Mr. Searight went to prison for twenty years
because of Mr. Crawley's statements?
A.
No, ma'am.
Q.
That would make you not like someone very much, wouldn't
it?
A.
Yes, ma'am .
Thus, Brewster's testimony would not have been that Searight had expressed
animosity towards Appellant because Appellant's statements to the police had caused
Searight to receive a twenty-year prison sentence. (In fact, no foundation had been laid
for such testimony . KRE 613(a) .) Brewster would have testified only that he, himself,
"would . . . not like someone very much" whose statements to the police had caused
him to receive a twenty-year sentence. Of course, Brewster's hypothetical animosity
was not in issue . Thus, it was irrelevant, and the attempted rehabilitation should have
been suppressed for that reason alone .
Furthermore, this alleged rehabilitation was, in fact, only additional impeachment.
Searight had other reasons in addition to jealousy for testifying against Appellant . Of
course, the Commonwealth's real reason for this proposed inquiry was to inform the jury
that Searight had received a twenty-year sentence for his participation in these crimes,
ergo, Appellant should receive the same sentence . Searight did not even know that
Appellant had received a twenty-year sentence. Thus, even if relevant, the probative
value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice . KRE 403 .
Accordingly, I concur only in the result reached by the majority opinion in this
case.
Graves J., joins this concurring opinion . Johnstone, J ., joins this concurring
opinion as to Part 11 (Issue III in the majority opinion) only.
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
,,$uyrrmr (~ourf of RrnfurhV
2001-SC-0002-MR
APPELLANT
RONALD DOUGLAS CRAWLEY
V.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO . 2000-CR-00396-2
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLER
I agree with the majority that "a trial court has a duty to conduct further inquiry
when it has reason to believe that a defendant's waiver of his right to testify was not
knowingly or intelligently made or was somehow wrongfully suppressed ."' And, as to
the case at bar, I agree that Appellant's trial counsel's in-court representations
suggested that counsel "might be overriding the defendant's decision to take the
stand," 2 and thus demonstrated "exceptional circumstances' under which the trial court
should have inquired further into whether Appellant had knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to testify . I dissent from the result reached by the majority, however,
because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that this error mandates reversal and
remand for a new trial . Quite simply, I can find no authority to support the view that, in
' MJority Opinion ,
S.W.3d
(200_) (Slip Op. at 3) .
2United States v. Ortiz , 82 F .3d 1066, 1071 (D.C . Cir. 1996), citing United States
v. Pennycooke , 65 F .3d 9, 12-13 (3rd Cir. 1995) .
a jurisdiction like Kentucky that applies the general "no inquiry" rule, per se reversible
error results whenever a trial court erroneously fails to conduct an on-the-record
colloquy (required by "extraordinary circumstances" present in the case) as to whether
the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify . In fact, I have not
found a single case - not in Appellant's briefs, not in the majority opinion, and not in my
own research - where an appellate court, presented with this issue in this procedural
posture, reversed a criminal conviction .
It appears that the majority has taken at face value Appellant's trial counsel's
statements to the effect that Appellant wanted to testify, but that she would not allow
him to do so. Although counsel's statements certainly could be interpreted literally i .e., that counsel willfully obstructed her own client's constitutional right to decide for
himself whether to testify and then decided to broadcast her professional misconduct
both at a bench conference and again before the jury during closing argument - I find it
exceptionally hard to believe that, although both the trial judge and the Assistant
Commonwealth Attorney were present, neither's interest was at all piqued by these bold
declarations. This suggests to me that, in context, trial counsel's statements may have
been intended, and understood, other than literally . Specifically, I recognize the
possibility that counsel's "I'm not going to let him testify" declaration may have been
merely an extremely poor choice of words to communicate in shorthand that counsel
had discussed Appellant's rights with him, and that, although Appellant had initially
wanted to "tell his side of the story," Appellant was persuaded, and himself decided, not
to testify after counsel discussed with him the costs and benefits of taking the stand . 3 If
31 observe that Appellant's First-Degree Robbery conviction was enhanced as a
result of his First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) status, so one (1) possible
opportunity cost of taking the stand and testifying would be the probability of
-2-
this is the case, and despite counsel's representations, Appellant actually did knowingly
and voluntarily elect not to testify, then the only thing that Appellant was "deprived of" is
the colloquy in which Appellant would have confirmed his waiver before the trial court.
If so, the majority grants Appellant a windfall of epic proportions when it reverses his
conviction and grants him a new trial.
Accordingly, instead of reversing the judgment of the Fayette Circuit Court and
remanding this indictment for a new trial, I would vacate the judgment, and remand this
case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Appellant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify at his prior trial . Following this
hearing, if the trial court either determines that Appellant did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his right to testify or is, for any reason, unable to make a
determination, Appellant should receive a new trial .
However, if the trial court finds that
Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify, it should reinstate the
judgment, and Appellant should be permitted to seek appellate review of the trial court's
finding .
I agree with both the majority's conclusion that the trial court's jury instructions as
to First-Degree Robbery were erroneous and its statement that the allegation of error as
to those instructions, which Appellant did not preserve by contemporaneous objection
and which is not a palpable error that would justify relief under RCr 10.26, warrants
discussion "merely because the issue may appear upon remand . "4 For the record, I
disagree with the majority opinion's suggestion that the "better instruction defining
complicity" it proposes is a panacea for this error. I have argued on prior occasions that
impeachment as a convicted felon . See KRE 609 .
4 Maiority Opinion , supra note 1 at
(Slip Op. at 4).
-3-
"definitional instructions" that duplicate or replace other instructions containing the
substantive elements of criminal offenses not only confuse juries 5 but also may create
the risk of a non-unanimous verdict if the trial court does not tailor its "definition" to the
proof at trials Accordingly, I would suggest that, instead of utilizing a different, standalone complicity definition in its instructions, the trial court could cure the error by
correctly incorporating KRS 502 .020(1) "complicity to the act" culpability within its
substantive instruction as to First-Degree Robbery.'
5 Tharp v . Commonwealth , Ky., 40 S .W.3d 356, 369-370 (2001) (Keller, J.,
concurring) .
6 Commonwealth v. Whitmore , Ky., 92 S .W.3d 76, 83 (2003) (Keller, J .,
concurring) .
7 Ray v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 550 S .W.2d 482, 484-5 (1977) .
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixyrrntr C~oixxf of ~QxrfixxhV
2001-SC-0002-MR
RONALD DOUGLAS CRAWLEY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D . PAYNE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 2000-CR-00396-2
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE STUMBO
Chief Justice Lambert's concurring opinion in Hayes v. Commonwealth , Ky ., 58
S .W.3d 879 (2001), pointed out that the majority overruled relatively recent precedent
sua sponte, even though it was not necessary to do so to resolve the issue. Mathews
v . Commonwealth , Ky., 997 S .W .2d 449 (1999), became final little more than a year
before this trial was held . Defense counsel followed the procedure set forth in that
opinion when he placed avowal testimony into the record . The error alleged was
preserved and remained so until October of 2001, when Hayes was decided, some
three months after Appellant's initial brief was filed. We should review this issue on the
merits rather than foreclosing it procedurally, particularly since we have already ordered
the case reversed for a new trial . Judicial economy, at minimum, demands it.
A review of the avowal reveals that it meets the standard we set in Mathews : it
contains the substance of the witnesses' testimony and is sufficient for the Court to
determine the correctness of the trial court's ruling .
I would hold that the trial court erred in ruling that Brewster could be crossexamined to elicit speculation about another witness' possible motives to testify as he
did.
KRE 611 (b) states that "[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter
relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility." Further, the scope of crossexamination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court . Moore v. Commonwealth ,
Ky., 771 S .W.2d 34, 38 (1988). Although Kentucky recognizes a "wide open" crossexamination, there remain some limitations . In Commonwealth v. Maddox , Ky., 955
S .W.2d 718, 721 (1997), this Court held that there must be some connection between
the proposed cross-examination and the facts that are in evidence . Here, Brewster was
not being asked to testify to statements made to him by Searight . Rather, he was being
asked to speculate as to other possible motives Searight may have had to testify
against Appellant . There are facts in the evidence that support Appellant's contention
that Searight may have disliked Appellant because of Angela Banta . There is no
evidence in the record to support any other theories as to why Searight might have
disliked Appellant . Further, even if there were, Brewster's opinion of whether Searight
might have been upset with Appellant for receiving a twenty-year sentence was
irrelevant . Therefore, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it held
that the Commonwealth could cross-examine Brewster on this matter . Appellant was
effectively denied due process of law when he was prevented from calling Brewster to
help establish that Searight, a material witness against Appellant, had a motive to lie .
RENDERED : JUNE 12, 2003
TO BE PUBLISHED
,Sixpremr 1 .1.Vurf
;
.off ~rnfurhV
2001-SC-0002-MR
RONALD DOUGLAS CRAWLEY
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GARY D. PAYNE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 2000-CR-00396-2
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the trial judge did
not have an absolute blanket duty to inquire into the disagreement as to the tactical
decision to refuse to allow the accused to testify .
Appellate counsel for Crawley admits that this issue is not properly preserved for
appellate review by means of an objection. Trial counsel told the trial judge that there
was no need to inquire about whether the defendant wanted to testify . Crawley does
not contend that he was not advised that he had a right to testify . If he believes that his
lawyer did not properly counsel him, then he should pursue other avenues of relief.
The claim of an involuntary waiver of the right to testify is not clearly supported
by the record . Even the authority relied on by the majority does not mandate an
automatic inquiry by the trial judge . United States v. Pennycooke , 65 F.3d 9 (3d Cir.
1995) states that, "in such a case, it may be advisable that the trial court inquire
discreetly into the disagreement and ensure that constitutional rights are not
suppressed wrongly ." Id. at 13 . (Emphasis added) .
The mild advisory admonition of Pennycooke, supra , clearly shows a deference
to the sound discretion of the trial judge . We should not interfere with it in this case .
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.