ALAN L . STANDIFER V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : MAY 22, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
AS MODIFIED : AUGUST
,$ixlarr lEvurf of
2000-SC-0526-MR
2001-SC-0910-TR
ALAN L. STANDIFER
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY L . WILLETT, JUDGE
NO. 98-CR-2978
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
REVERSING AND REMANDING
( . INTRODUCTION
Appellant was convicted of first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to
twenty years in prison . In two separate matter-of-right appeals,' Appellant makes
eleven (11) arguments in support of a reversal of his conviction . In the direct appeal of
his conviction ,2 he argues that ten (10) reversible errors occurred during the course of
his trial, and additionally, he appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence .3 The ten arguments related to his trial are as follows: (1)
denial of defense counsel's motion to strike two jurors for cause ; (2) admission of
testimony regarding the owner of a knife found in close proximity to the victim's body at
' Ky . Const. §110(2)(b) .
2Appeal No . 2000-SC-526-MR .
3Appeal No. 2001-SC-910-TR, which was transferred from the Court of Appeals .
the crime scene; (3) admission of police officer's testimony that she first became aware
of Appellant's self-defense claim during opening statements ; (4) admission of police
officer's testimony that the stabbing of the victim was aggressive ; (5) admission of
irrelevant evidence that Appellant gave two young women a knife that they later
discarded in the Ohio River; (6) admission of alleged irrelevant threats made to
Appellant's girlfriend ; (7) use of juvenile conviction to impeach Appellant during the guilt
phase of his trial; (8) erroneous jury instruction on self-protection; (9) erroneous jury
instructions on second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide ; and (10)
erroneous omission of a jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance . We reverse
Appellant's conviction and remand for a new trial because the trial court committed
reversible error in allowing the use of Appellant's juvenile adjudications for
impeachment during the guilt phase of the trial.
II . BACKGROUND
The charges against Appellant arise out of a drug transaction gone awry in a
West Louisville neighborhood . Appellant testified that on Halloween night, while en
route to a party at the residence of his friend, Tony Young, he met Bobby Lee Whitaker
at the intersection of 25t" and Columbia Streets . Perhaps prompted by Appellant's
reputation in the Portland area as a drug dealer, Whitaker indicated an interest in
purchasing some cocaine from Appellant . The two men continued down Columbia
Street, Appellant on a bike and Whitaker on foot, until they reached the home of
Whitaker's friend, Billy Hensley. Hensley was home along with friend Robin Hurt. While
Appellant waited outside, Whitaker knocked on the door and asked to borrow a dollar to
purchase a beer at a nearby liquor store. While Whitaker was inside, presumably
waiting to receive the dollar and/or to get some money for the crack cocaine, Hurt
emerged from the Hensley home and asked Appellant his name . According to
Appellant, she repeatedly urged him to come in the house, and Appellant chose instead
to wait for Whitaker on the street outside the home . Shortly thereafter, Whitaker
returned to join Appellant and Hurt outside, and both of them asked Appellant to "front"
them some crack cocaine but he refused .
Appellant testified that, after his refusal to give her any drugs without immediate
payment, Hurt went back inside, and Appellant, straddling the bicycle, walked down
Columbia Street with Whitaker following along to his right and slightly to his rear. Next,
Appellant claims that he was taken by surprise when Whitaker attacked him from his
right rear. Appellant states that he could not see Whitaker from this angle because he is
blind in his right eye as the result of an injury received when he was the victim in a
previous robbery. According to Appellant, Whitaker grabbed him around the neck and
forcibly removed him from the bicycle, and a struggle ensued with Appellant screaming
to no avail for Whitaker to let go of him. Whitaker then pulled out a knife and began
swinging it at Appellant . In his defense, Appellant claims that he pulled out his own
knife, which he regularly kept on his person because it reminded him of his grandfather.
The two men continued to struggle with Whitaker attempting to pull Appellant's shirt
over his head . Next, Whitaker fell and Appellant noticed that he was bleeding .
Appellant claims that he was unaware that he had stabbed Whitaker until he
looked down and saw his knife in his hand . Appellant testified that he retaliated against
Whitaker in self-defense because he feared that, as on previous occasions in this
particular neighborhood, he was again a robbery target . Furthermore, when Whitaker
began brandishing a knife, he testified that he felt the need to protect himself. Appellant
claimed that when Hurt came running outside and began screaming, that he did not
know what to do, so he fled on his bike .
III . IMPEACHMENT WITH JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
During the guilt phase of the trial and in response to a question from the
prosecutor, Appellant denied having been convicted of a felony . In an effort to attack
Appellant's credibility, the Commonwealth was then allowed over Appellant's objection
to introduce evidence of Appellant's previous juvenile adjudications for charges of
receipt of stolen property and of third-degree burglary . This evidence was ruled
admissible on the theory that the charges would have been felonies if committed by an
adult and thus admissible for purposes of impeachment .
This precise issue was recently addressed in Manns v. Commonwealth ,4 and we
will not burden this case by repeating again Justice Cooper's thorough analysis of this
issue. In that case, we held that a defendant's prior juvenile adjudication shall not be
admissible during either phase of a trial for the purpose of impeachment . Here, like in
Manns , the juvenile adjudications were introduced during the guilt phase of Appellant's
trial for impeachment purposes . Accordingly, Appellant's conviction must be reversed .
IV. OTHER ISSUES
Because we are reversing and remanding for a new trial, we will address other
issues likely to affect retrial .
A. THREATS MADE BY APPELLANT TO GIRLFRIEND
Jackie Witt, Appellant's girlfriend and the mother of his child, was called as a
witness for the Commonwealth, and she testified that Appellant, during his pre-trial
incarceration on the present charge, threatened her when she declined to marry him . It
4Ky., 80 S.W .3d 439 (2002) .
was the Commonwealth's theory that Appellant's threats were an attempt to keep Witt
from testifying against him because he thought, albeit mistakenly, that Witt could not
testify against him if she was his wife .5
"Any attempt to suppress a witness' testimony by the accused, whether by
persuasion, bribery, or threat, or to induce a witness not to appear at the trial or to
swear falsely, or to interfere with the processes of the court is evidence tending to show
guilt. ,,6 Accordingly, relevant threats in support of the Commonwealth's theory were
admissible . But, here, the Commonwealth failed to make the threats relevant . The
Commonwealth admits to the lack of direct evidence supporting its theory that
Appellant's attempted coercion of marriage was to prohibit Witt's testimony; rather, the
Commonwealth maintains that Appellant's threats to harm her, when coupled with his
attempts to have her lie and tamper with evidence, supported a reasonable inference
that the attempted coercion of marriage was for the purpose of suppressing her
testimony. We disagree ; the evidence is just too attenuated to support such an
inference . The evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that Appellant believed
that his marriage to Witt would silence her. In fact, the only evidence as to Appellant's
state of mind regarding the availability of husband-wife privilege came from Appellant
during the Commonwealth's cross-examination of him and during his redirect
examination when he testified that he did not know whether a wife could testify against
her husband in Kentucky.
5 Husband-wife privilege extends only to events occurring after marriage and
communication occurring during marriage . KRE 504.
6Foley v. Commonwealth , Ky. 942 S.W.2d 876, 887 (1996). See also , Graves v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 17 S .W .3d 858 (2000) ; KRE 402 .
-5-
"While reasonable inferences are permissible, a jury verdict must be based on
something other than speculation, supposition or surmise . It is, of course, often difficult
to draw the line between a reasonable inference and speculation . But evidence that will
support a reasonable inference must indicate the probable, as distinguished from a
possible cause ."' Here, the evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable
inference that Appellant believed marriage would silence Witt. This was a condition of
fact that the Commonwealth was required to fulfill before the threats became relevant .s
If the Commonwealth had fulfilled this condition of fact, then the jury could reasonably
believe that the purpose of the threats were to suppress Witt's testimony. However, the
Commonwealth failed to fulfill this condition of fact, and if upon retrial the
Commonwealth again fails to fulfill this condition of fact and make Appellant's threats
relevant, the threats shall be excluded from evidence . Because of the highly prejudicial
nature of the threats and because of the Commonwealth's failure in the first trial to
show the relevancy of the threats, the trial court on retrial shall require the
Commonwealth to make a preliminary showing of relevancy before allowing Witt to
testify as to Appellant's threats . 9
B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON SELF-DEFENSE
Appellant claims error regarding the self-protection instructions given by the trial
court . Rather than specifically addressing this argument - with which we tend to agree
7Briner v. General Motors Corp. , Ky., 461 S .W.2d 99, 101 (1970) .
8 KRE 104(b) ("When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a
condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence
sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition .") .
9KRE 104(x) & (b) .
- we will simply refer the trial court and the parties to Commonwealth v. Hage "which
was rendered subsequent to the trial in this case. With the benefit of Hager, the claimed
errors in the instructions should not be repeated on retrial.
C. EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding
extreme emotional disturbance (EED) . We agree ; however, because Appellant was not
convicted of murder but first-degree manslaughter, this error was harmless.
Extreme emotional disturbance is a temporary state of mind
so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's
judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the
impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather
than from evil or malicious purposes. It is not a mental
disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed
emotional state does not constitute an extreme emotional
disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse therefor, the reasonableness of which is to be
determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's
situation under circumstances as defendant believed them
to be.'
Appellant testified that he believed Whitaker was attempting to rob him when he
stabbed Whitaker. While an attempted robbery may justify the use of deadly force by
the intended victim,' 2 additionally, it may "so enrage[ ], inflame[ ], or disturb[ ] [one] as to
1 °Ky., 41 S.W .3d 828 (2001) .
11 McClellan v. Commonwealth , Ky., 715 S .W .2d 464, 468-469 (1986) .
12
KRS 503 .050 :
(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon
another person is justifiable when the defendant believes
that such force is necessary to protect himself against the
use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other
person .
(2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant
upon another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only
when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to
protect himself against death, serious physical injury,
overcome one's judgment, and cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force
of the extreme emotional disturbance ." Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded
that Appellant was acting under the influence of EED when he stabbed Whitaker and
thereby caused his death, and "[o]nce evidence is introduced to prove the presence of
EED, its absence becomes an element of the offense of murder . 03 Consequently, in
addition to entitling Appellant to an instruction on self-protection, his belief that Whitaker
was attempting to rob him was also sufficient to warrant an instruction setting forth the
absence of EED as an element of murder . Further, we would note that Appellant
testified that he had been the victim of multiple robberies while traveling through this
particular West Louisville neighborhood . In the course of one such robbery, Appellant
stated that he was shot with a pellet gun and lost the sight in his right eye . When
Appellant's past history is also included, the evidence undisputedly required an
instruction on EED.
Although the trial court erred in failing to incorporate EED into the murder
instruction, the error was harmless . Evidence of EED is only a defense to an intentional
murder charge and entitles a defendant to an instruction on the lesser offense of first
degree manslaughter, the crime of which Appellant was convicted . Accordingly, he was
not prejudiced by the failure of the trial court to incorporate EED into the murder
instruction . However, if the evidence is the same on retrial, in addition to an instruction
under KRS 507 .030(1)(a), an instruction will be warranted under subsection (b) .
kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled by force or
th reat .
Id.
'3Coffey v. Messer , Ky, 945 S .W.2d 944, 946 (1997) .
-8-
D. POLICE OFFICER'S TESTIMONY
After receiving his Miranda 14 warnings, Appellant denied to the police that he had
any involvement in Whitaker's death . Instead, he told police that he was with his
girlfriend on the night that Whitaker was killed. Detective Amy Phelps was permitted by
the trial court to testify that she was not aware of a self-defense claim until defense
counsel's opening statement at trial. Appellant claims that this testimony should have
been excluded . We agree, but not for all of the reasons advanced by Appellant .
We would exclude Detective Phelps's testimony because she did not interview
Appellant, and therefore, her testimony was necessarily based on what she was told by
other officers. In other words, her testimony was pure and simple hearsay' s and does
not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule . Accordingly, it was inadmissible . 16
Additionally, Appellant argues that Detective Phelps's testimony was
inadmissible because it was "prejudicial ." This argument might be relevant on retrial so
we will briefly address it . We would first note that a claim of evidence being prejudicial,
standing alone, is not grounds for its exclusion . Most evidence that parties seek to
introduce is prejudicial . At least, they hope it is. That usually means that it is probative .
It is only where the evidence's probative value is outweighed by danger of "undue
prejudice" that it is not admissible .'
14
384 U .S. 436, 86 S .Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed . 2d 694 (1966).
5KRE 801 .
16
Id .
17KRE 403.
For his "prejudice" argument, Appellant cites Romans v. Commonwealth 18 and
Doyle v. Ohio. ' 9 Romans, which relied on Doyle , held that the trial court erred when "the
Commonwealth was permitted over objection to elicit from a police detective, and also
from the defendant himself on cross-examination, that when he was arrested and
interrogated and after he had received the Miranda warnings [the defendant] did not
come forth with the explanation or story upon which he ultimately relied for his
defense . .
."2°
In Doyle , the Supreme Court "conclude[d] that use of the defendant's
post-arrest silence in this manner violate[d] due process . .
."2'
and reversed the
defendant's conviction . We therefore assume that Appellant, under his prejudice
argument, seeks to exclude this evidence as being an improper use by the
Commonwealth of Appellant's post-arrest silence . If so, we disagree . Although Romans
and Doi clearly prohibit the introduction of evidence, including cross-examination of
rle
the defendant, about the defendant's post-arrest silence, they are clearly
distinguishable from what happened in this case. Here, Appellant was not silent; rather,
he made a statement to the police denying any involvement in Whitaker's death.
Appellant's statement was admissible 22 - but only by a person who heard the statement
- and it is Appellant's post-arrest statement, not his silence, that the Commonwealth
used in his trial . Appellant's lawyer informed the jury during his opening statement that
Appellant killed Whitaker in self-defense, and Appellant, himself, also testified that he
18Ky
.,
547 S .W .2d 128 (1977).
19
426 U .S . 610, 96 S .Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed .2d 91 (1976).
20
Romans v. Commonwealth , supra note 18, at 130 .
2 ' Doyle v. Ohio , supra note 19, at 426 U .S . 611, 96 S.Ct. 2241, 49 L. Ed.2d 94.
22
KRE 801A(b)(1).
-10-
was acting in his self-protection when he caused Whitaker's death. Accordingly,
Appellant's contradictory post-arrest statement, if properly admitted into evidence, may
be inquired into during the trial and commented upon during closing argument by the
Commonwealth's Attorney . This is not a comment upon his silence, but proper
comment upon a statement made by Appellant .
E. KNIFE THROWN IN RIVER
During the trial, it was established that the knife thrown in the river by Appellant's
friends was not relevant to this case. Accordingly, evidence regarding this knife should
not be admitted during Appellant's retrial .
F. HENSLEY'S KNIFE
The trial court correctly sustained Appellant's hearsay objection to Detective
Phelps's testimony that the knife found near Whitaker's body was owned by Hensley.
We therefore assume that the Commonwealth will not attempt on retrial to elicit such
testimony again from Detective Phelps. We would also caution the Commonwealth not
to refer in closing argument to evidence that has been excluded by the trial court.
G. POLICE OFFICER'S DESCRIPTION OF STAB WOUNDS.
Detective Phelps described Whitaker's stab wounds as "very aggressive." The
trial court ruled that Detective Phelps was testifying on the basis of her observations
and experience as a homicide detective and overruled Appellant's objection to her
description of the stab wounds . Appellant argues that Detective Phelps was not
qualified to express such an opinion . We agree .
Before a witness may render an expert opinion on a subject matter, in addition to
other requirements, the witness must be "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
23 S tringer .
v Commonwealth , Ky., 956 S .W.2d 883, 891 (1997) ("Expert opinion
-11-
experience, training, or education" to render such opinion, 24 and the subject matter
must be one properly subject to expert opinion . A determination of these matters are
committed to the discretion of the trial court, and therefore, the trial court's ruling on
these matters is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard . 27 We conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Detective Phelps to testify on this subject .
First, the record does not support a finding that the matter is one properly subject
to expert opinion . A matter is proper for expert opinion only if it is subject to "scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge [and] will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue ."28 Although stab wounds have been the
subject of expert testimony as to whether the wounds were of the "defensive-type,"29
the Commonwealth did not establish in this case, nor did the trial court find, that stab
wounds are subject to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" in
evidence is not admissible unless the witness is qualified to render an opinion on the
subject matter, (2) the subject matter satisfies the requirements of Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc . , 509 U .S . 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed .2d 469 (1993), (3)
the subject matter satisfies the test of relevancy set forth in KRE 401, subject to the
balancing of probativeness against prejudice required by KRE 403, and (4) the opinion
will assist the trier of fact per KRE 702.")
24
KRE 702 .
25 R .
Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 6 .15 II, at 287 (3rd ed.
Michie 1993).
26
KRE 104(a).
27Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co . v Thompson , Ky., 11 S .W .3d 575 (2000).
28KRE 702 .
29Rogers v . Commonwealth , Ky., 86 S .W .3d 29 (2002)(autopsy revealed that
victim had defensive wounds on his hands and arms) ; Smith v. Commonwealth . , Ky.,
904 S .W .2d 220 (1995) (corner classified certain cuts on victim as "defensive-type"
wounds) .
- 1 2-
determining whether they are of the "aggressive-type ." Second, assuming that such
determination is a proper subject matter for expert testimony, Detective Phelps was not
shown to possess the required qualifications to express an expert opinion . The
Commonwealth was required to show that she was "qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education .,,30 This too, the Commonwealth
failed to do . Based on the record, Detective Phelps's qualifications consisted of having
investigated 4 or 5 stabbing cases as a homicide detective. This does not qualify her to
express an expert opinion that the stab wounds were "very aggressive." We would note
that the pathologist refrained from characterizing the manner in which the stab wounds
were inflicted . Detective Phelps based her opinion on the facts that Whitaker had more
than one stab wound, that the wounds were deep, and that all of the wounds were
centrally located around the heart and lung area . Considering the facts on which
Detective Phelps based her opinion, we doubt that her opinion will assist the jury in
understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue .31 Accordingly, the trial
court abused its discretion in allowing Detective Phelps to testify as an expert witness
regarding Whitaker's stab wounds, and upon retrial, if the evidence remains the same,
Detective Phelps should not be allowed to testify that the stab wounds were "very
aggressive."
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Appellant's conviction and remand the
indictment to Jefferson Circuit Court for a new trial .
Lambert, C.J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller and Stumbo, JJ ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J., dissents by separate opinion .
30 KRE 702.
31
Id .
-1 3-
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Daniel T. Goyette
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
Frank William Heft, Jr.
Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
J. David Niehaus
Office of the Public Defender for
Jefferson District Public Defender
200 Civic Plaza
719 West Jefferson Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE :
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
Courtney J . Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
RENDERED : MAY 22, 2003
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
0sixprMtcr (90urf of
tufurkg
2000-SC-0526-MR
2001-SC-0910-TG
ALAN L. STANDIFER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY L. WILLETT, JUDGE
NO. 98-CR-2978
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the trial judge did not
commit error when he permitted the prosecution to impeach Standifer by using a prior
juvenile adjudication .
The Commonwealth asked Standifer on cross-examination if he had previously
been adjudicated a felon . He denied any such adjudication . After a bench conference,
the trial judge rejected the argument by defense counsel that such impeachment was
impermissible because the statutes forbidding it did not go into effect until after the
adjudication . The trial judge determined that KRS 610.320(4) and KRS 532 .055(1)(a)
allowed such adjudications to be used for impeachment purposes . On the advice of
counsel, Standifer conformed his testimony accordingly . The Commonwealth then
asked him if he had been adjudicated a felon and he replied affirmatively .
Pursuant to KRS 610 .320(4) and KRS 532 .025(1)(a), certain juvenile court
records can be properly used for impeachment during the guilt phase and at
sentencing . KRS 610 .320(4) reads as follows :
Subject to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, juvenile court
records of adjudications of guilt of a child for an offense
which would be a felony if committed by an adult shall be
admissible in court at any time the child is tried as an adult,
or after the child becomes an adult, at any subsequent
criminal trial relating to that same person . Juvenile court
records made available pursuant to this section may be
used for impeachment purposes during a criminal trial, and
may be used during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial.
However, the fact that a juvenile has been adjudicated
delinquent of an offense which would be a felony if the child
had been an adult shall not be used in finding the child to be
a persistent felony offender based upon that adjudication .
I agree with the Commonwealth that the statutes allow a procedural change
rather than a substantive one . Trial procedure is governed by rules which exist at the
time of trial, and not the rules of procedure that existed at the time the defendant was
adjudicated of these offenses in juvenile court. See Commonwealth v. Reneer, Ky.,
734 S.W.2d 794 (1987). Thus, the trial judge properly permitted the impeachment of
Standifer using the offenses and the introduction of the same during the sentencing
phase .
To the average layman, there is something fundamentally flawed in reasoning
that results in allowing a record of serious criminal offenses being ignored simply
because they were committed when the defendant was a juvenile . Here, Standifer was
ultimately convicted of first-degree manslaughter . In this case, the entire criminal
episode arose out
of
a drug transaction which had gone bad. The previous juvenile
adjudications were for charges of receiving stolen property and third degree burglary .
Such offenses would have been felonies
if
committed by an adult.
Understandably, the majority relies on Manns v. Commonwealth , Ky., 80 S .W.3d
439 (2002). As I noted in my dissent in that case, the decision was incorrect. A
defendant may be properly impeached under the plain language of KRS 610 .320 and
KRS 532.055 . Those statutes control, and to the extent that KRS 610 .320(4) and KRS
635 .040 are in conflict, the former statute controls. In Manns , supra, the defendant was
convicted of first-degree manslaughter for killing a victim during an argument over the
outcome of a computer basketball game. The defendant was 18 years of age at the
time of the killing . The principal issue on appeal was the admission of a prior juvenile
adjudication for first-degree wanton endangerment .
In this case, as well as in Manns, I continue to believe that the trial judge was
correct in allowing impeachment by means of using prior juvenile adjudications both at
the guilt and penalty phase of the trial .
I would affirm this conviction in all respects.
,*uyrrmr Cf'.ouurf of
irnfurhV
2000-SC-0526-MR and 2001-SC-0910-TR
ALAN L. STANDIFER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BARRY L . WILLETT, JUDGE
NO . 98-CR-2978
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR MODIFICATION
AND MODIFYING OPINION
The Court having considered the Petition for Modification filed by the Appellee,
hereby denies said Petition and, on motion of Appellant, modifies the Opinion rendered
May 22, 2003, by correcting a typographical error located in the third full sentence on
page 8 of the opinion, wherein "Whitaker" be replaced with "Appellant ."
Lambert, C .J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone, Keller and Stumbo, JJ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J ., would grant Appellee's petition and would also grant Appellant's
motion .
Entered : August 21, 2003
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