KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION v. BRIAIJ REEVES
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AMENDED:
.
January 2, 2002
TO f3E PUBLISHED
200 1 -SC-0558-KB
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
v.
IN SUPREME COURT
BRIAIJ REEVES
RESPONDENT
OPINION AND ORDER
I. FACTS
Respondent, Brian Reeves, who currently resides in Florida, was admitted to tile
practice of law on October 1, 1976. In June 1999, the Inquiry Commission chargeil
Respondent with four counts of professional misconduct. The Board of Governors
found Respondent guilty of one count and not guilty of the remaining three counts
The
Board recommended a suspension of one year. Neither Respondent nor the Kentucky
Bar Association filed a notice of review, and this Court hereby adopts the Board’s
recommendation
Respondent and Shari Lynn Foty wer, divorced in 1986. In 1987, the Warren
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Circuit Court entered a Dissolution Decree awarding joint custody of the four chi!dren to
f?esponderlt
and Foty. In June 1988, Foty announced her intention to remarl-y and to
nlove to I\;l;nnesota
The parties agreed to split custody of the children, with the
provts~or~ that each parent would have a four week visitation period each year with ail
four of the children. In July 1988, during Respondent’s four week visitation with the
children, he filed in the Warren District Court an ex parte motion for an emergency
order seeking custody based on the allegation that Foty’s husband, Michael Foty, had
sexually abused one of the daughters. The allegation stemmed from an accusation in
Foty’s own divorce proceeding. After lengthy hearings, the circuit court awarded
custody of all four children to Respondent. Foty appealed. On March 9, 1990, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s opinion, but noted that Respondent had
manipulated the social services and legal systems to his advantage.
Following the Court of Appeals’ 1990 ruling, the Warren Circuit Court limited
Foty’s visitation rights by an order entered in January 1992. Foty again appealed.
During the pendency of this appeal, Judge Benjamin Dickinson of the Barren Circuit
Court was appointed Special Judge in the case on December 6, 1993. On September
2, 1994, the Court of Appeals vacated the 1992 visitation order and remanded the
matter for further hearings. The Court of Appeals once again criticized the Respondent
for manipulating the proceedings.
On December 16, 1994, before the Court of Appeals opinion was final, Judge
Dickinson held a hearing and entered an order which awarded visitation to Foty and
which criticized Respondent. In March 1995, Judge Dickinson denied Respondent’s
motion to recuse. Judge Dickinson suggested that Foty file a motion for a permanent
change of custody. Based on Foty’s motion for permanent change of custody, Judge
Dickinson scheduled a hearing on the motion for August 4, 1995.
Meanwhile, Respondent’s employee, JoAnn Grinstead, was in the midst of
divorce proceedings. She was sole custodian of her children’s stock accounts
maintained by Hilliard/Lyons at its Bowling Green office. In 1995, Grinstead became
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concerned because she thought that her children’s accounts had been wrongfully
transferred to her husband’s control or had been “zeroed out.” She was unable to
obtain information regarding her accounts from the Hilliard/Lyons’ Bowling Green office.
Judge Dickinson’s son, Samuel Dickinson, was the account executive for Grinstead’s
accounts. Grinstead attempted to contact her divorce attorney, but he was unavailable.
She then contacted Judy Schwank, an attorney who works with Grinstead and
Respondent. Schwank advised Grinstead to contact Respondent regarding the matter.
In late July 1995, Grinstead talked to Respondent while the two were in a Kroger
parking lot. Grinstead informed Respondent about her concerns with HilliardILyons and
Respondent agreed to help. On July 27, 1995, Respondent drafted the following letter
to HilliardlLyons’ Louisville office and sent a courtesy copy to Samuel Dickinson:
Brian Reeves
Attorney at Law
1890 Lyda Avenue, Suite 303 Bowling Green, Kentucky 42104(502) 782-2611
July 27, 1995
J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc.
Hilliard Lyons Center
P.O. Box 32760
Louisville, KY 40232-2760
Re: JoAnn Grinstead
I have been retained by JoAnn Grinstead to represent her interests
in a matter involving accounts she had with Hilliard Lyons. Ms. Grinstead
has advised me of the following information:
She is involved in a divorce action from her estranged
husband, Chris Grinstead. (I do not represent her in the
divorce case.) Chris Grinstead is a cousin of Samuel
Dickinson, the account executive who handled her account
at Hilliard Lyons. At her husband’s behest, Samuel
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Dickinson transferred from Bowling Green to other locations
and into other names, a joint investment account which was
in both her name and that of her husband as well as two
accounts where she believes she was the sole guardian for
her two children.
Samuel Dickinson was aware of the pending divorce when
he assisted her estranged husband in transferring these
assets to other locations and into other names. Samuel
Grinstead [sic] did not seek her consent to the changes, nor
inform her of them. The mailing address on the accounts
were [sic] changed so that mail about them would be routed
to Chris Grinstead’s place of employment, thereby depriving
her of access to knowledge about the changes. She
believes Chris Grinstead and Samuel Dickinson conspired to
conceal assets from her.
When Ms. Grinstead first learned that some transfers may
have taken place, she attempted to call Samuel Dickinson,
but he would not return her calls for some time. When he
finally did return her calls, he was not forthcoming
J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc.
July 27, 1995
Page Two
about his actions. A few minutes after the two hung up,
Chris Grinstead called her complaining that she had called
Samuel Dickinson. Apparently, even though Samuel
Dickinson did not inform Ms. Grinstead when transferring
money from her name without her permission, he did find it
necessary to let Chris Grinstead know she had found out
about the transfers.
She has talked with Hilliard Lyons representatives about this
situation and was given some information about it over the telephone.
She has asked that appropriate action be taken. She has not received a
further response.
To this end, on behalf of Ms. Grinstead, I demand the following:
1.
That you send to me all documentation of each and every
account on which JoAnn Grinstead appears or appeared. This
documentation should include all information about those accounts held in
your files or in your computers. By way of illustration only, we demand
copies of all documents signed by Ms. Grinstead when each account was
opened, all trade information, all additions to, or withdrawals from each
account.
2.
That you send me all information you have in writing or on
computer about the transfers by Samuel Dickinson of the assets in those
accounts. Included should be all documentation of any sort including, but
not limited to, letters, confirmations, internal or external memoranda, all
notes, telephone logs or messages, and change of address documents.
3.
That you inform me what actions have been taken against
Samuel Dickinson as a result of the actions outlined by Ms. Grinstead
above.
Once we have received and reviewed the above information, we
will make decisions about what further steps might be appropriate,
perhaps including seeking monetary damages against Hilliard Lyons,
Samuel Dickinson, or both.
In the interim, Ms. Grinstead insists: (1) that appropriate sanctions
be taken against Samuel Dickinson for violating his fiduciary obligations to
her and (2) that procedures be instituted to make certain that Samuel
Dickinson is unable to take similar actions against the financial interests of
others. Your response to this interim demand may impact the nature of
further actions by Ms. Grinstead.
J.J.B. Hilliard, W.L. Lyons, Inc
July 27, 1995
Page Three
Ms. Grinstead and I would appreciate an expeditious response to
the matter addressed in this letter.
Sincerely yours,
ISI
Brian Reeves
BR:st
pc: Samuel Dickinson
JoAnn Grinstead
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Brian Reeves
Attorney at Law
1890 Lyda Avenue, Suite 303 Bowling Green, Kentucky 42104(502) 782-2611
July 27, 2001
Samuel Dickinson
Hilliard Lyons
102 East Wayne Street
Glasgow, KY 42141
Re: JoAnn Grinstead
Dear Mr. Dickinson:
Enclosed for your records is a courtesy copy of a letter I sent today
to Hilliard Lyons in Louisville on behalf of JoAnn Grinstead.
If you have any information that the events Ms. Grinstead has
described to me as set forth in that letter are false, please let me know
immediately. We will be looking to you to make Ms. Grinstead whole for
any loss she may suffer as a result of any violation you may have made of
your fiduciary obligation to her.
Sincerely yours,
IS/
Brian Reeves
BR:st
pc: JoAnn Grinstead
Enclosure
The location of the stock accounts was resolved quickly and Samuel Dickinson
was absolved from all fault and liability. Shortly after Respondent mailed the letter,
Respondent initiated, through his attorney, a second motion to recuse Judge Dickinson
in Respondent’s custody case. Judge Dickinson refused to recuse himself for the
August 4, 1995, hearing and questioned Respondent regarding the letter sent to
HilliardILyons. Judge Dickinson informed Respondent that he had forwarded the letter
to the county attorney’s office for a possible criminal investigation of Respondent for
intimidating a judicial officer. Eventually, Judge Dickinson entered an order recusing
himself from Respondent’s custody proceedings. The Barren County Grand Jury
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ultimately returned an indictment against Respondent for violation of KRS 524.120
(Intimidating a Judicial Officer), and KRS 514.080 (Theft by Extortion), which was
transferred to the Jefferson Circuit Court on a change of venue. The indictment was
subsequently dismissed upon the agreement of Respondent to voluntarily withdraw
from the practice of law in Kentucky for a period of two years.
Judge Dickinson also
filed a complaint against Respondent with the Kentucky Bar Association.
II. THE CHARGES
The Inquiry Commission charged Respondent with four counts of professional
misconduct. Count I alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-4.1, which prohibits a lawyer, in
the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of material
fact or law to a third party. The complaint alleged that Respondent had violated this
rule by purporting in his letter to Hilliard/Lyons that he was retained by JoAnn Grinstead
to represent her. Both the trial commissioner and the Board of Governors found
Respondent ‘not guilty,” on the basis that Grinstead had sought the Respondent’s
assistance regarding the stock accounts after she had been unsuccessful in receiving
help from two other attorneys. Count II alleged a violation of SCR 3.130-4.4, which
prohibits a lawyer from knowingly using means that have no substantial purpose other
than to embarrass, delay or burden a third person. Both the trial commissioner and the
Board of Governors, by a 15 to 4 vote, found Respondent guilty of this charge and
recommended a one year suspension of Respondent’s law license. Count III alleged a
violation of SCR 3.130-3.5, which prohibits a lawyer from seeking to influence a judge
by illegal means. The KBA argued that Respondent’s letter was an attempt to
intimidate Judge Dickinson. Both the trial commissioner and the Board of Governors
found Respondent “not guilty” of Count III, as they found that the purpose of the letter
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was not to intimidate Judge Dickinson, but rather to create grounds for his recusal from
Respondent’s custody proceedings. Count IV alleged that Respondent engaged in
conduct which violated SCR 3.130-8.3, which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. The Kentucky Bar
Association argued that the Respondent’s letter misrepresented JoAnn Grinstead’s
communications with him. However, because no evidence was presented to the trial
commissioner or to the Board of Governors showing that the letter contained false
information, the trial commissioner and the Board of Governors found Respondent “not
guilty” of Count IV.
Ill. Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4
Respondent was found guilty of violating Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct
4.4, which provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person, or knowingly use methods of obtaining evidence that violate
the legal rights of others.
The trial commissioner in his “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” stated:
The Demand Letter could well be viewed as having a legitimate
“substantial purpose.” The Demand Letter addressed Mrs. Grinstead’s
concerns about the stock accounts at Hilliard/Lyons, requested punishment of
wrongdoers, and informed Hilliard/Lyons that pursuit of “monetary damages
against Hilliard Lyons, Samuel Dickinson, or both” was a possibility. On the
other hand, the Demand Letter can easily be viewed as having a ‘substantial
purpose,” though an illegitimate one. Only with tunnel vision can the Demand
Letter be deemed, when viewed in its entirety, to have had a solely legitimate
“substantial purpose.” The application of common sense to the making of a
finding of the “purpose” or motive of Reeves in composing and mailing the
Demand Letter strongly suggests, and the Trial Commissioner finds, that
Reeves’ purpose and motive was to.“embarrass, delay or burden a third person.”
In the “Recommendation” section of the trial commissioner’s findings, the trial
commissioner further states:
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In other words, Mr. Reeves used his signature as an attorney on the
Demand Letter, not solely to accomplish legitimate ends for his client, but
rather, principally, to achieve an advantage in a personal matter unrelated
to the representation of his client.
Respondent’s letter had a dual purpose, one legitimate and one illegitimate. We
agree that Respondent’s act of contacting Hilliard/Lyons was designed to try to achieve
the recusal of Judge Benjamin Dickinson from his custody hearing. Another purpose
was to assist his client. The main issue in this case is the means that Respondent
employed in his representation of JoAnn Grinstead. Although Respondent was entitled
to inquire about the stock accounts on behalf of Grinstead, the fact remains that the
means that he chose to contact Hilliard/Lyons,(the letter) exceeded the bounds of
legitimate representation and demands for relief. He knew or should have known it was
beyond available legal relief to demand that Hilliard Lyons terminate Samuel Dickinson.
Respondent’s personal animus toward the Dickinson family became apparent in the last
paragraph on the second page of the letter.
Further, the tone and hostility of the letter, as well as the personal references to
Samuel Dickinson, reveal that Respondent was attempting to provoke the Dickinson
family. Respondent’s attempts to recuse
Judge Dickinson were successful. Although
Judge Dickinson at first refused to remove himself from Respondent’s case, eventually
Respondent successfully provoked Judge Dickinson to the point that Judge Dickinson
admitted that he could not be impartial and unbiased. As a result, Respondent’s
custody case hearing was delayed until another judge was appointed. Such conduct by
Respondent is unprofessional and should be sanctioned. No attorney should pervert a
legitimate inquiry on behalf of a client by incorporating personal provocative language
demanding remedies not available in the legal system and thereby using it as a means
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to further his own interests in his own case. Respondent’s letter to HilliardILyons
was
done to further both his interests and the interests of JoAnn Grinstead. However, his
personal attack on Samuel Dickinson furthered only his own interests. Therefore, we
adopt the recommendation of the Board of Governors and suspend Respondent, Brian
Reeves, from the practice of law for one year.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that:
1. Counts I, Ill, and IV of the charges against Respondent are dismissed
2. Respondent is adjudged to have violated the Rules of Professional Conduct
as described in Count II, and is hereby suspended from the practice of law In the
Commonwealth of Kentucky for one year. The period of suspension shail commence on
entry of this opinion and order and continue until such time as Respondent is rernstated
to the practice of law by order of this Court pursuant to SCR 3.510 or any controllIng
amendment to SCR 3 510.
3. Pursuant to SCR 3.390, Respondent shall, within ten (10) days from the entry
Uer, if he has not alread,/ done so, notify all clients ln wr1ti:7g of his inability to
of this orA
represent them. and notify all courts in which he has matters pending of his suspension
from the practice of law, and furnish copies of said letters of notice to the Director of the
Kentucky Bar Fissociatron
Lambert,
concur.
C.J., Graves, Johnstone, Stumbo and Wintersheimer, JJ.,
Keller, J., concurs in result only.
ENTERED: December 20, 2001.
Cooper, J., not sitting.
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
PETITIONER
IN SUPREME COURT
RESPONDENT
BRIAN REEVES
ORDER AMENDING
The To Be Published opinion and order, entered December ‘20, 2001, in
the above-styled case, is hereby amended to the extent that page 10 has been
replaced with an amended page, attached hereto, in order to amend the Court’s vote.
This amendment does not change the holding of the opinion.
ENTERED: January 2, 2002.
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