RUBEN RIOS SALINAS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED : JUNE 13, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court
Of Kentuc
2000-SC-0126-MR
1
RUBEN RIOS SALINAS
V.
PELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LAURANCE B . VAN METER, JUDGE
98-CR-1270
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE COOPER
REVERSING AND REMANDING
Appellant Ruben Rios Salinas was convicted by a Fayette Circuit Court jury of
murdering Aubrey L. ("AI") Nuckolls, for which he was sentenced to life in prison, and
for kidnapping Nuckolls, for which he was sentenced to life in prison without benefit of
probation or parole . He appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. §
110(2)(b) . We reverse and remand for a new trial because of (1) the improper
introduction of hearsay evidence and (2) an improper instruction on the aggravating
circumstance necessary for imposition of capital punishment.
At about 3:00 p.m . on Thursday, September 10, 1998, Nuckolls told his wife,
Gayle, that he was going to a pharmacy to refill his prescription medication . He drove
away in his red 1988 Pontiac automobile and did not return . The next morning, Gayle
Nuckolls found a note inside the front storm door of her home stating that her husband
was "fine" and directing her to dial his pager number. She did so, and, when the call
was returned, an unknown voice advised her that her husband had been in a "drug deal
gone wrong," that he was in serious trouble, and that she needed to get a lot of money
together in order to save him . Mrs . Nuckolls advised the caller to "throw him off a cliff'
and reported her husband's disappearance and the telephone call to the police . Mrs .
Nuckolls explained that her unusual response to the caller was because her husband
had previously been engaged in narcotics trafficking but had assured her that he was
no longer involved in criminal activities . In fact, at the time of his disappearance,
Nuckolls was under investigation for possible narcotics trafficking, gun smuggling, and
counterfeiting . After his disappearance, police investigators found $10,000 .00 worth of
marijuana in a rental storage facility controlled by Nuckolls and his wife .
Nuckolls's girlfriend, Nancy Burd, testified that Nuckolls called her home "800"
number on September 10, 1998, to tell her that he was taking a trip to Ohio . At about
5:00 a.m . on Friday, September 11, 1998, Burd received a telephone call from an
unknown person advising her that Nuckolls had been in a "drug deal gone bad," that he
was in danger, and that she needed to send him $20,000 .00 . Burd assumed the caller
was talking about money for a bail bond . Three hours later, she received another
telephone call from the same unknown person asking if she intended to "help Al ." She
responded, "No, I am going to work," which she did . Early Sunday morning, September
13, 1998, Burd received another telephone call from the same unknown person
advising her that Nuckolls had been kidnapped and was being held for $20,000 .00
ransom .
On September 13, 1998, Appellant telephoned Anne Gautier, an "acquaintance,"
and asked her if he could park an automobile on the rural Jessamine County property
where Gautier resided with her husband, Guy Gautier, and their two children . Gautier
agreed, and Appellant brought a vehicle to her property later that day. The vehicle was
later identified as the red 1988 Pontiac belonging to AI Nuckolls .
On Monday, September 14, 1998, Gayle Nuckolls received a letter, postmarked
September 11, 1998, threatening not only her husband, but also herself and her father,
if she did not respond positively to the previous demand for money. She gave the letter
to the police . Approximately one month later, Al Nuckolls's dead body was found in the
trunk of the red 1988 Pontiac still parked on the Gautier property . His legs and arms
were bound together with baling wire, and his body was wrapped in cardboard and
tarpaulin and covered with lime. He had been shot twice, once in the back of the head
and once in the right temple .
Appellant, a person of Mexican heritage, testified that he was engaged in the
business of importing merchandise from Mexico to Lexington, Kentucky, for resale . His
family lived in Texas ; and, when in Lexington, he lived in a house that he shared with
Chris Kaluski . Appellant admitted that he was acquainted with Nuckolls and that the
two had often discussed possible business transactions but had actually participated in
only one small, joint transaction . Appellant testified that, on September 10, 1998,
Nuckolls came to his residence demanding money. Appellant admitted killing Nuckolls
but claimed he did so in self-defense. He also admitted that he, with the assistance of
Kaluski's employee, Gary Wade, loaded Nuckolls's body into the trunk of the Pontiac,
and that he then drove the vehicle to the Gautier property and parked it . Finally, he
admitted that he placed the note in the front door of the Nuckolls residence, wrote the
threatening letter received by Gayle Nuckolls on September 14, 1998, and made the
telephone calls described by Gayle Nuckolls and Nancy Burd . He claimed the
kidnap/ransom story was a hoax designed to steer suspicion away from himself.
After his arrest, Appellant wrote a letter to Anne Gautier advising her that the
police were in possession of a "flow chart" identifying both her and her husband as
members of the "Bluegrass Conspiracy" organization headed by Al Nuckolls . The letter
also indicated that the Gautiers were acquainted with Chris Kaluski and suggested that
"[y]ou will probably feel like taking a long vacation, depending on the calendar ."
Appellant wrote another letter to Kaluski informing him that the Gautiers were on the
"Bluegrass Conspiracy" flow chart and that "Gary needs to go away about a month
before and stay away."
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT.
Appellant asserts that the indictment was insufficient to establish subject matter
jurisdiction because the charges did not describe every element of each offense, i.e .,
whether the murder was committed intentionally or wantonly and whether the
kidnapping was committed for ransom or reward, as opposed to another of the four
purposes enumerated in KRS 509.040(1) . As pointed out in Thomas v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 931 &W.2d 446, 448-50 (1996), an indictment is not insufficient
because of its failure to detail the formerly "essential" factual elements of the offense so
long as it informs the accused of the specific offense with which he is charged and does
not mislead him. Count One charged Appellant with murder, capital offense, for killing
Aubrey Nuckolls in violation of KRS 507 .020; Count Two charged him with kidnapping,
capital offense, for kidnapping Aubrey Nuckolls in violation of KRS 509.040 . Per
Thomas, supra, that was sufficient to inform Appellant of the specific offenses with
which he was charged . See also Harris v. Commonwealth , Ky., 793 S.W.2d 802, 804
(1990), cert. denied , 499 U .S . 924 (1991) .
II. DEATH-QUALIFICATION OF THE JURY.
Appellant asserts that (1) he was not eligible for the death penalty because there
was no aggravating circumstance, KRS 532.025(3) ; (2) imposition of the death penalty
for kidnapping violates the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment; and (3) he was prejudiced by the death-qualification of the jurors in his
case because death-qualified jurors are more prone to convict. None of these
objections were raised at trial; thus, none are preserved for appellate review.
Nevertheless, we have held that the murder of the kidnapping victim is an aggravating
circumstance authorizing imposition of the death penalty for the offense of kidnapping .
St. Clair v. Roark , Ky ., 10 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (1999) ; Harris v. Commonwealth , supra
at 805 . Contrary to Appellant's assertion, the United States Supreme Court has not
held otherwise . His reliance on Coker v . Georgia, 433 U .S. 584, 97 S.Ct . 2861, 53
L.Ed .2d 982 (1977) and Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S . 917, 97 S .Ct . 2994, 53 L.Ed.2d
1104 (1977) (memorandum opinion), is misplaced . In neither of those cases was the
victim of the rape or kidnapping also murdered. And it is now well established that
death-qualification of prospective jurors does not violate a defendant's constitutional
right to a fair and impartial jury. Buchanan v. Kentucky , 483 U.S . 402, 414-15, 107
S .Ct. 2906, 2913-14, 97 L.Ed .2d 336 (1987); Lockhart v . McCree , 476 U .S . 162, 177,
106 S .Ct. 1758, 1767, 90 L.Ed .2d 137 (1986). That is especially true where, as here,
Appellant's offenses qualified him for the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois 391
U .S. 510, 88 S .Ct. 1770, 20 L .Ed .2d 776 (1968) .
III. ADMONITION UPON SEPARATION .
RCr 9 .70 provides :
The jurors, whether permitted to separate or kept in charge of
officers, must be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to permit
anyone to speak to, or communicate with, them on any subject connected
with the trial, and that all attempts to do so should be immediately
reported by them to the court, and that they should not converse among
themselves on any subject connected with the trial, nor form, nor express
any opinion thereon, until the cause be finally submitted to them . This
admonition must be given or referred to by the court at each adjournment.
Appellant complains that, on several occasions during voir dire, the trial court
either failed to admonish the jury as required by RCr 9 .70 or gave an incomplete
admonition . Again, defense counsel did not object to any of these perceived failures ;
thus, the issue is not preserved for appellate review. Spencer v. Commonwealth , Ky.,
467 S .W.2d 128, 130-131 (1972). Furthermore, Appellant does not identify any
instance where any member of the jury conducted him/herself contrary to the mandate
of the admonition . Commonwealth v. Messex, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 341 (1987);
Schweinfuss v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 395 S.W.2d 370 (1965). Thus, if any error
occurred, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
IV. KIDNAPPING : SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE .
Appellant asserts there was insufficient evidence that Nuckolls was restrained
prior to his death to convict him of kidnapping . That would be true if the jury were
required to believe Appellant's version of the events, i .e ., that he first killed Nuckolls,
then bound his arms and legs with baling wire and wrapped his body in cardboard and
tarpaulin . However, kidnapping can be proven by circumstantial evidence. In Meredith
v. Commonwealth , Ky., 959 S .W.2d 87, 90 (1997), the victim's body was found
alongside a highway rolled up in a carpet with coaxial cable wrapped around her neck
and right wrist, and with duct tape wound loosely around her neck that arguably was a
gag that had slipped to her neck during decomposition . Such evidence was held
sufficient to support a conviction of kidnapping despite other uncontradicted evidence
that the victim was last seen voluntarily entering the defendant's truck. Here, the jury
could reasonably believe that Nuckolls was restrained by being bound with baling wire
and/or wrapped in cardboard and tarpaulin before he was killed, that Appellant's
demands for ransom were not a hoax, and that Appellant did not kill Nuckolls until it
became apparent that no ransom would be forthcoming . The evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction of kidnapping . Commonwealth v. Benham , Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186
(1991).
Appellant's argument that his kidnapping conviction was precluded by the
exemption statute, KRS 509.050, is equally meritless . That statute precludes conviction
of kidnapping if (1) the accused's criminal purpose was the commission of an offense
other than kidnapping, i.e ., murder; (2) the restraint relied upon as an element of the
kidnapping occurred immediately with and incidental to the commission of the primary
offense ; and (3) the restraint did not exceed that ordinarily incident to the commission of
the primary offense . Griffin v. Commonwealth , Ky., 576 S .W.2d 514, 516 (1978).
Appellant's version was that the restraint occurred after Nuckolls was killed, in which
event there could be no kidnapping . However, as explained above, a jury could
reasonably believe that Appellant's primary purpose was to kidnap Nuckolls for ransom
or reward and that he killed Nuckolls only after the ransom scheme failed .
V. HEARSAY.
Detective Shane Ensminger was not involved in the investigation of the murder
of Nuckolls . He was, however, investigating Nuckolls's alleged involvement in
narcotics, gun smuggling, and counterfeiting in Kentucky, Ohio and West Virginia .
Ensminger had recruited a confidential informant who claimed to have been involved in
Nuckolls's counterfeiting activities and who was awaiting sentencing in West Virginia on
a counterfeiting conviction . Ensminger testified that he asked the informant if he had
any information that might be helpful in solving the murder case and that the informant
sent him a handwritten "flow chart" purporting to identify members of an organization
known as "Old Bluegrass Conspiracy (BGC) ."' The informant did not testify at trial, and
Ensminger admitted he had no personal knowledge as to the accuracy of the chart.
Nevertheless, over Appellant's objection, the chart was introduced into evidence as
Commonwealth's Exhibit 59. Ensminger then proceeded to describe the contents of the
chart in detail .
The chart shows two lines flowing from "Old Bluegrass Conspiracy (BGC) ." The
first line leads to Mike and Bonnie Kelly and members of their family . The Kellys were
identified by Ensminger as murderers of a Florida prosecutor . The second, broken line,
accompanied by a question mark (?), leads to A. L . Nuckolls . Other lines lead from
both Mike Kelly and Nuckolls to Anne and Guy Gautier. The chart identifies Anne
Gautier as Mike Kelly's cousin and Guy Gautier as an "associate of A. L." and a cocaine
' "Bluegrass Conspiracy" was the name given to a narcotics and smuggling
organization with Lexington, Kentucky, connections in a locally sensational book of the
same name. Sally Denton, The Bluegrass Conspiracy (Doubleday 1990) . The book
purports to be nonfiction . It also contains an index of every person, place and business
mentioned in the text of the book . The index does not include the names of Appellant,
Nuckolls, the Gautiers, Kaluski, or Wade.
distributor for "BGC ." Other lines lead from Nuckolls to the Kellys and to sundry other
persons, including a "gun dealer in Middleport, Ohio," and "New York and New Jersey
Italian Families ." Each line identifies the criminal activity engaged in by the person to
whom the line leads . A line labeled "dope and checks" runs from Nuckolls to a person
identified only as "Mexican hitter ." Another line connects "Mexican hitter" with the "New
York and New Jersey Italian Families" and with "Charles Albano ." Ensminger did not
know the true identity of "Mexican hitter ." Of course, Appellant was the only person of
Mexican heritage charged with murder in this case .
Exhibit 59 and Ensminger's repetition of its contents, including the very existence
of an alleged organization known as the "Old Bluegrass Conspiracy," were pure
hearsay, i .e ., out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted .
KRE 801(c) ; KRS 802; cf. Gosser v . Commonwealth , Ky ., 31 S .W.3d 897, 900-03
(2000) (diagrams prepared out-of-court by absent witnesses or based on information
furnished by absent witnesses were inadmissible hearsay) . In Gosser, the error was
cured when the witnesses who furnished the information subsequently testified and
verified the accuracy of the diagrams . Here, the error was not cured .
The prejudicial effect of Exhibit 59 is obvious. Although the "flow chart" did not
specifically identify Appellant as the "Mexican hitter" with presumably mafia
connections, it did connect the "Mexican hitter" to Nuckolls, whom Appellant admittedly
killed, connected Nuckolls to the Gautiers, on whose property Appellant hid Nuckolls's
body, and connected both Nuckolls and the Gautiers to other alleged murderers, Mike
and Bonnie Kelly. The obvious implication was that Appellant, a person of Mexican
heritage, was the "Mexican hitter" and was involved with Nuckolls and the Gautiers in a
major criminal operation . From that, it would take only a small leap of inference for the
jury to conclude that Appellant was a professional killer who had not killed a casual
acquaintance in self-defense, but who had kidnapped and "hit" (murdered) a criminal
associate for the purpose of monetary reward . (There was also evidence that Appellant
went to the rental storage shed after Nuckolls's disappearance but was unable to open
the shed with Nuckolls's key because the shed had both a key lock and a combination
lock .)
The Commonwealth does not claim on appeal that Exhibit 59 was not hearsay.
It asserts that the document was relevant because of references to it in the letters
Appellant wrote to Anne Gautier and Chris Kaluski . Of course, inadmissible hearsay
does not become admissible simply because it is relevant . Most incompetent evidence
is offered precisely because it is highly relevant . To be admissible, however, evidence
must be both relevant and competent. Moseley v. Commonwealth , Ky., 960 S .W.2d
460, 461 (1997).
Next, the Commonwealth asserts that Appellant's objection is unpreserved . The
log of the videotaped trial proceedings reflects that Exhibit 59 was admitted into
evidence at 8 :51 :44 on December 14, 1999 . A review of the videotape indicates that, at
that time, Ensminger had identified the flow chart as the document he received from his
confidential informant but had not yet described its contents . The prosecutor is seen
handing the exhibit to the court clerk who then appears to write something on the
exhibit. Defense counsel immediately objected and the trial judge responded, "O .K." A
proper and timely objection was made to the admission of Exhibit 59, and -we must
conclude that, by "O .K .," the trial judge meant to overrule the objection since the exhibit
was, in fact, admitted into evidence .
Finally, the Commonwealth argues that defense counsel's subsequent crossexamination of Ensminger concerning the contents of Exhibit 59 constituted a waiver of
his previous objection. If that were true, any party against whom evidence was
improperly admitted would be required to forego cross-examination and enhance the
risk of losing at trial, or attempt to cross-examine in an effort to mitigate the prejudicial
effect of the evidence and thereby be deemed to have acquiesced in the error. We find
that proposition untenable, and we specifically disapprove any dictum to the contrary in
Frank v . Commonwealth , Ky., 907 S .W.2d 771 (1995). Frank cited Asher v.
Commonwealth , Ky., 275 S.W.2d 416 (1955) for the proposition that "[a] defendant's
objection to evidence is waived by subsequent cross-examination of a prosecution
witness in respect to the same matter." Frank, at 773 . In Asher, however, the
defendant subsequently presented the same evidence to which he had previously
objected during cross-examination of other witnesses who had not previously testified
to that same evidence. Asher, at 418-19 .
VI. INSTRUCTION ON AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE .
Appellant was convicted of intentional murder and kidnapping . There was no
aggravating circumstance that would authorize capital punishment for the murder
conviction . Jacobs v . Commonwealth ,
Ky.,
58 S .W.3d 435, 450 (2001) . However, the
murder of the victim of a kidnapping is an aggravating circumstance authorizing capital
punishment for the kidnapping conviction . St. Clair v. Roark , supra, at 486-87 ; Harris v .
Commonwealth , supra, at 805 . Here, the guilt phase instruction on capital kidnapping
properly required the jury to find as an element of that offense that the victim was not
released alive. KRS 509.040(2). That is the element that enhances kidnapping from a
Class B felony to a capital offense. However, the penalty phase instruction identified
that same fact as the aggravating circumstance authorizing capital punishment :
INSTRUCTION NO . 17
COUNT 2
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
In fixing a punishment for the Defendant for the Kidnapping of
Aubrey Nuckolls, you shall consider the following aggravating
circumstance if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt:
The Defendant committed the offense of Kidnapping and Aubrey
Nuckolls was not released alive .
In reaching its verdict as to the penalty, the jury made the following finding :
We the jury, by unanimous vote, find that the aggravating
circumstance described in Instruction No. 17, "The Defendant committed
the offense of kidnapping and Aubrey Nuckolls was not released alive"
has been proven from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
FOREMAN
As stated above, the fact "that the victim was not released alive" is the element
that enhances kidnapping from a Class B felony to a capital offense . However, that fact
is not an aggravating circumstance necessary to authorize imposition of capital
punishment under KRS 532 .025(2). Although there was sufficient evidence for the jury
to find the aggravating circumstance of murder committed during the course of the
kidnapping, the instruction did not require that finding, and the verdict did not include
that finding . If the evidence is the same on retrial, the jury shall be instructed to the
effect that capital punishment cannot be imposed absent a finding that Appellant
murdered Nuckolls during the course of the kidnapping . See generally Cooper, 1
Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) §§ 12 .07 and 12.10A.
Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed in this case are
reversed and this case is remanded to the Fayette Circuit Court for a new trial in
accordance with this Opinion .
Lambert, C.J. ; Graves, Johnstone and Stumbo, JJ ., concur. Wintersheimer, J .,
dissents without separate opinion . Keller, J ., not sitting .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
Thomas M . Ransdell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Suite 302
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Frankfort, KY 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B. Chandler, III
Attorney General
State Capitol
Frankfort, KY 40601
Ian G . Sonego
William L. Daniel, II
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
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