COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY V. HONORABLE R. CLETUS MARICLE, JUDGE, CLAY CIRCUIT COURT AND DONALD R. PHILLIPS and MARY ANN PHILLIPS
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RENDERED: APRIL 20,200O
TO BE PUBLISHED
PETITIONER
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
V.
ORIGINAL ACTION IN SUPREME COURT
HONORABLE R. CLETUS MARICLE,
JUDGE, CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
RESPONDENT
AND
DONALD R. PHILLIPS and
MARY ANN PHILLIPS
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE JOHNSTONE
DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
AND WRIT OF MANDAMUS
The Commonwealth of Kentucky petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition to
prevent the trial court from enforcing its order precluding the Commonwealth from
seeking the death penalty against Respondent, Donald R. Phillips. Additionally, the
Commonwealth seeks a writ of mandamus to order the trial court to allow the case to
proceed as a capital case. We deny the petition for prohibition as moot and deny the
petition for mandamus as not being ripe for review.
Osa Lee Maggard and Geneva Young were found shot to death on Maggard’s
porch in Leslie County on July 22, 1999. Donald and Mary Ann Phillips were taken into
custody in connection with the murders on July 23, 1999. Donald was indicted for the
murders on August 4, 1999, and Mary Ann was indicted for the murders on September
1, 1999. Subsequently, “[o]n representation by the Commonwealth Attorney, Gary
Gregory, that this would not be a death penalty case and that the Commonwealth would
not seek the death penalty, trial was scheduled for January 18, 2000.” Opinion and
Order, 99-CR-00027-001 and 99-CR-00027-002 (Leslie Circuit Court, entered January
17, 2000).
The trial court granted Commonwealth Attorney Gregory’s motion to withdraw as
prosecutor on November 23, 1999. A special prosecutor from the Attorney General’s
Office entered as counsel of record for the Commonwealth on November 15, 1999. In
spite of Gregory’s previous assurances that the Commonwealth would not seek the
death penalty, the special prosecutor filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
on December 10,1999.
Donald Phillips filed a motion to exclude death as a potential penalty on
December IO, 1999. Arguments on the motion were made before the trial court on
January 5,200O. A telephonic conference was held on the matter on January 7,2000,
at which time the trial court advised all parties that the death penalty would be excluded
as a potential penalty for Donald Phillips for the trial scheduled on January 18, 2000.
The Commonwealth then filed the instant petition for a writ of prohibition and
mandamus along with a motion to stay the proceedings in the trial court. We granted
the motion to stay the proceedings by order on January 14, 2000. Oral argument was
heard on the Commonwealth’s petition on February 15, 2000.
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We granted the Commonwealth’s motion to stay the proceedings before the trial
court could reduce its order excluding the death penalty to written form. Nonetheless,
the trial court subsequently reduced its oral ruling to a written opinion and order “so
there will be no misunderstanding as to what the ruling was.”
Opinion and Order,
supra. The referred to ruling is the ruling precluding the Commonwealth from seeking
the death penalty against Donald Phillips made pursuant to the January 7 telephone
conference. No argument is made that the written order does not accurately reflect the
substance of the trial court’s oral order of January 7, 2000. Thus, we assume that the
oral order and the written order are one and the same.
The Commonwealth “petitions this Court for a writ prohibiting the Respondent
Judge from amending the charges herein from capital murder to non-capital murder
prior to commencement of the trial. The Commonwealth further petitions for
mandamus relief requiring the Respondent Judge to permit this case to proceed as a
capital prosecution.” The Commonwealth’s plea for relief misstates and misinterprets
the trial courts Opinion and Order, which was narrowly drawn and states in pertinent
part:
The defendant, Don Roland Phillips relie[s] on the
case of Smith v. Commonwealth, KY., 845 S.W.2d 534
(1993), to support [his] position why the death penalty
should not be considered in this case. In that case the
Commonwealth had given notice of intention to seek the
death penalty but had practiced the case as though it [was]
not a death penalty case until six days before the trial.
Death penalty was imposed, and the case was reversed.
Even though that is one possible interpretation of Smith v.
Commonwealth, supra, the Court did not adopt that
interpretation but rather found that for&-six davs was not
sufficient notice for seekina the death penaltv. Even thouah
the Commonwealth araued in its written motions that such
was sufficient notice. the Commonwealth conceded on the
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date of the hearinas on Januarv 5. 2000. that forty-six days
was not sufficient time.
The defendant, Donald R. Phillips, also filed a
demand for speedy trial. The Commonwealth responded
citing the four factors to be considered when determining
whether [the] right to speedy trial has been violated. One is
the length of delay[,] which at this time could be substantial.
Two is the reason for delay, which at this time [the]
Commonwealth is responsible. Three is the defendants
assertion of his right to a speedy trial, which the defendant
has demanded. Four is prejudice to the defendant, who is
presently incarcerated.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of the
defendant to exclude the death penalty in the trial scheduled
for January 18,2000, as to the defendant Don Roland
Phillips, is [granted] only to the extent that it will not be a
permissible penalty for the trial scheduled January 18, 2000.
Ooinion and Order, supra (emphasis added).
Upon review of the trial courts Opinion and Order and the transcript of the
hearing on the Phillips’ motion to exclude the death penalty, it is clear that the trial court
relied heavily on our decision in Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 845 S.W.2d 534 (1993).
In Smith, we stated:
Six days’ notice is inadequate notice to prepare for
the guilt phase of a capital trial. . . .
In the instant case the inadequate notice led to
inadequate preparation for the penalty phase of the trial. It
has long been held in Kentucky that the constitutional right
to be represented by counsel includes the right to have
reasonable time and opportunity for preparation. Davis v.
Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 360, 220 S.W.2d 844 (1949). If
defense counsel is not given adequate time in which to
prepare for the penalty phase of a capital trial, the
adversarial system has most certainly malfunctioned.
Id. at 537. Our ultimate holding was to “affirm the guilt phase of appellant’s trial, but
reverse and remand for a resentencing hearing to be conducted consistent with this
opinion.” Id. at 539. Thus, under Smith, a defendant cannot be made to face the
sentencing phase of a capital trial unless he or she is first given sufficient notice of the
Commonwealth’s intention to seek the death penalty.
In the instant case, the trial court found that the Commonwealth had not provided
Phillips sufficient notice to give him adequate time to prepare for a possible penalty
phase in which death was an option. We cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion in finding that forty-six days was insufficient notice under M o r e o v e r ,
Smith.
the Commonwealth conceded as much in the January 5 hearing. The trial court’s order
excluding death as a possible penalty was specifically limited to the January 18 trial
date. That trial date has long come and gone and no trial was held. Therefore, to the
extent that the Commonwealth’s petition seeks to prohibit the trial court from enforcing
this order, the issue is moot.
The Commonwealth also seeks a writ of mandamus to order the trial court to
allow this case to proceed as a capital prosecution. As the trial court’s order excluding
death as a possible punishment was limited to the now past January 18 trial date, this
part of the Commonwealth’s petition is not ripe for review.
Obviously, a new trial date will have to be set in this case. This Court is not
clairvoyant; we cannot predict whether Phillips will renew his motion to exclude death as
a possible penalty once a new trial date is set. Further, if Phillips does renew the
motion, we cannot predict what grounds he will raise in the motion.
In order for us to
order the trial court to allow this case to proceed as a capital trial, we would have to
decide issues neither raised nor decided by the trial court. Such a result is utterly
contrary to the general and sound rule that this Court is limited to the review of those
issues that were raised and ruled on by the trial court. Robinette v. Commonwealth.
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Department of Hiohwavs, KY., 380 S.W.2d 78, 81 (1964). Nor will we address issues
raised, but not decided by the trial court. Gailor v. Alsabi, Ky., 990 S.W.2d 597, 602
(1999).
In the instant case, the only issue decided by the trial court in its order was
whether the Commonwea.lth could seek the death penalty against Donald Phillips at the
trial set to begin on January 18, 2000. Only the issues both raised and decided in this
order are subject to our review. We have already addressed the issue of whether the
trial court abused its discretion in finding that forty-six days was insufficient time to
prepare for a death penalty case under the holding of Smith, supra. The only other
issue raised in the order concerned Phillips’ right to a speedy trial. However, that issue
was not decided by the trial court except, perhaps, to the extent that the January 18 trial
date did not violate Phillips’ right to a speedy trial.
In his motion to exclude death as a possible penalty, Phillips raised a number of
issues in addition to his argument that he was not given sufficient notice to prepare for
a death penalty case. One argument he advanced was that to allow the
Commonwealth to try his case as a death case would violate his right to a speedy trial.
Phillips argued that to allow the Commonwealth to seek the death penalty would
necessitate the granting of a lengthy continuance in order to allow him needed time to
prepare an adequate defense to the enhanced penalty.
In the January 5 hearing on Phillips’ motion to exclude the death penalty, the
Commonwealth indicated that forty-six days was not sufficient time to prepare a death
case. While it suggested that a continuance might cure the inadequate notice, the
Commonwealth never moved for a continuance. Rather, it put the cart before the horse
by suggesting that Phillips could make such a motion after the trial court had denied the
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motion to exclude death as a possible punishment. Thus, the question of whether a
continuance beyond the January 18 trial date would violate Phillips’ right to a speedy
trial was neither raised nor resolved in the trial court’s order excluding death as a
possible penalty.
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument on appeal, the trial court did not find
that the Commonwealth was bound by Commonwealth Attorney Gregory’s
representation that the case against Donald Phillips would not be tried as a death case.
In other words, the trial court’s order does not preclude death as a possible punishment
on grounds that an agreement between the Commonwealth and Phillips had been
struck such that the Commonwealth could not go back on its promise. See e.g.,
Workman v. Commonwealth, KY., 580 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1979), overruled on other
grounds, Morton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 218 (1991) (Commonwealth could
not welsh on its bargain with defendant to dismiss charges if the defendant took and
passed a polygraph examination). Thus, this issue is not before us. For the sake of
clarity, we note that we do not hold that Gregory’s representation is binding on the
Commonwealth. Nor do we hold that the Commonwealth is precluded from seeking the
death penalty against Phillips once a new trial date is set.
We decline to reach the merits of the Commonwealth’s petition for mandamus to
order the trial court to allow the case against Donald Phillips to proceed as a death
case. The trial court’s order does not preclude the Commonwealth from seeking the
death penalty against Donald at a future date. Thus, the issue is not an actual case or
controversy before this Court; the issue is not ripe for review. To grant the
Commonwealth’s petition for a mandamus would require the rendition of an advisory
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opinion, which is beyond the constitutional powers of this Court. In re Constitutionality
of House Bill No. 222., Ky., 90 S.W.2d 692, 693 (1936).
For the reasons set forth above, the Commonwealth’s petition is hereby denied.
All concur.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
A. B. Chandler III
Attorney General of Kentucky
David A. Smith
Dana M. Todd
Assistant Attorneys General
Criminal Appellate Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
Karen M. Timmel
Bill Pettus
Assistant Attorneys General
Special Prosecutions Division
Office of the Attorney General
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, KY 40601-8204
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:
Honorable R. Cletus Maricle
Judge, Clay Circuit Court
P. 0. Box 412
Manchester, KY 40962
COUNSEL FOR DONALD R. PHILLIPS:
Stephan Charles
304 Bridge Street
Manchester, KY 40962
COUNSEL FOR MARY ANN PHILLIPS:
Roger A. Gibbs
Kristen A. Bailey
Assistant Public Advocates
P. 0. Box 277
London, KY 40743
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