KENNETH BRUCE HOLBROOKS V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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MODIFIED : OCTOBER 3, 2002
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
#uvrttut Taud of Xrnturkv
1997-SC-1005-DG
KENNETH BRUCE HOLBROOKS
V.
LLANT
jo I, 7 _,~
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
1996-CA-0482-MR
LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT NO. 94-CR-0023
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
REVERSING AND REMANDING
1 . INTRODUCTION
This Court accepted discretionary review of a Court of Appeals opinion affirming
a Letcher Circuit Court judgment that sentenced Appellant to a five (5) year term of
imprisonment following his conviction for First-Degree Perjury (KRS 523.020) . At a
previous trial under the same, single-count indictment, a jury had advised the trial court
in writing that it agreed unanimously that Appellant was guilty not of the indicted felony
offense, but of a misdemeanor offense, Second-Degree Perjury (KRS 523 .030) . The
first jury was unable to agree, however, as to an appropriate penalty . The trial court
refused to accept the jury's finding as a verdict, subsequently declared a mistrial, and
later empaneled a new jury to try the case . Appellant appeals from the judgment
entered upon the second jury's verdict convicting Appellant of First-Degree Perjury.
a.
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We hold that the first jury's verdict constituted a double jeopardy bar to Appellant's
further prosecution under Letcher Circuit Court Indictment Number 94-CR-0023 .
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to
the trial court for it to vacate its judgment convicting Appellant of First-Degree Perjury
and instead enter judgment in accordance with the first jury's verdict.
II . FACTUAL BACKGROUND
When arrested on an unrelated felony charge, and using the assumed name of
Roy Easterling, Appellant signed an affidavit of indigency' certifying his eligibility for
representation by the Department of Public Advocacy. The Letcher County Grand Jury
indicted Appellant for one (1) count of First-Degree Perjury for "falsely stating his name,
under oath, in his affidavit of indigency, in violation of KRS 31 .120 and KRS 523 .020 ."
The indictment also charged Appellant as a First-Degree Persistent Felony Offender
(PFO) .
Appellant was tried twice under this indictment. At the first trial, the trial court
sent the jury to its deliberations with instructions and verdict forms allowing the jury to
find the defendant: (1) not guilty of any offense ; (2) guilty of the indicted offense of First
Degree Perjury; or (3) if the jury had reasonable doubts as to whether Appellant's false
statement occurred in an official proceeding, guilty of the lesser-included offense of
Second-Degree Perjury. Instruction Number Seven (7) provided that the jury's verdict
"must be in writing, must be unanimous, and must be signed by one of you as
foreperson ."
The trial court's Second-Degree Perjury instruction informed the jury:
' See KRS 31 .120
If you find the Defendant guilty under this Instruction, you
shall fix his punishment at confinement in the county jail for
a period not to exceed 12 months, at a fine not to exceed
$500 .00, or at both confinement and fine, in your discretion .
The verdict form for Second-Degree Perjury required the jury to indicate:
We the Jury do agree and find the defendant GUILTY of
PERJURY IN THE SECOND (2"°) DEGREE, and fix his
punishment at confinement in the county jail for
months, or a fine of $
, or at both confinement and
fine .
FOREPERSON
The jury did not indicate a jury verdict on the forms provided, but instead submitted a
writing to the trial court that was signed by the jury foreperson :
We the jury find the defendant guilty in the second degree of
perjury . We cannot agree on punishment. We, the jury ask
if Judge Wright will impose sentencing .
/s/ Irene Seals
Foreman
After bringing the jury into the courtroom and reading the jury's finding
(characterized by the trial court as "the question") in open court, the trial judge informed
the jury that "it is the jury's responsibility and job to impose sentence according to your
findings, so I will be sending you back to the jury room for further deliberations." When
the jury again returned deadlocked, the trial court instructed it in accordance with RCr
9.57 and, for a second time, asked the jury to retire for further deliberations. When the
jury again returned to the courtroom and informed the trial court that it remained
deadlocked as to sentencing, the trial court dismissed the jury, but did not declare a
mistrial at that time . Approximately three (3) months later, the trial court denied
Appellant's motion asking it to enter judgment on the jury's verdict finding Appellant
guilty of Second-Degree Perjury and granted the Commonwealth's motion for a mistrial.
Approximately a week after the trial court entered its order declaring that the first
trial ended with a hung jury mistrial, the trial court conducted a second jury trial under
this indictment . At the second trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Appellant guilty of
the felony offense of First-Degree Perjury. During the combined Truth-inSentencing/PFO phase, the trial court, on its own motion, amended Count Two in the
indictment to reflect Second-Degree PFO status and instructed the jury in accordance
with the amendment . After the defense completed its closing argument, the
Commonwealth asked the Court to reconsider its ruling . The trial court reversed itself,
"scrapped" its original PFO/Truth-in-Sentencing phase instructions, re-instructed the
jury as to First-Degree PFO, and gave the defense an opportunity to re-present its
closing argument. Defense counsel declined the opportunity . The jury's penalty phase
verdict found Appellant subject to enhancement as a First-Degree PFO and
recommended the maximum terms of imprisonment of five (5) years for the underlying
offense and twenty (20) years following PFO-enhancement.
Prior to final sentencing, the trial judge recused himself from the case and a
special judge was appointed . The special judge vacated the First-Degree PFO
conviction and sentenced Appellant to the five (5) year term of imprisonment which the
jury had recommended on the underlying offense .
On direct appeal from the judgment of the Letcher Circuit Court, the Court of
Appeals affirmed . Appellant sought discretionary review in this Court, which we granted
on May 13, 1998 . Appellant timely filed a brief, but this Court subsequently struck the
brief on the Commonwealth's motion because the brief did not conform with CR 76.12 .
On October 9, 1998, this Court entered an order granting the Commonwealth's motion
to dismiss the appeal after Appellant's counsel failed to file a brief. On September 17,
1999, however, the Court granted Appellant's pro se motion to reinstate the appeal.
Now that both parties have filed their briefs, and the case has been orally argued, the
matter is finally before this Court for a determination of the merits .
Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by: (1) conducting another trial under
the indictment after the first jury found Appellant guilty of Second-Degree Perjury; (2)
failing to direct a verdict of acquittal because Appellant's act of signing an affidavit using
a false name was not "a material . . . statement . . . in any official proceeding" 2;
(3)
incorrectly omitting materiality as an element of the offense in each of the perjury
instructions ; and (4) at the second trial, allowing the Commonwealth to introduce
testimony, allegedly in violation of the KRE 503 Lawyer-Client Privilege, from the
attorney appointed to represent Appellant as to the work he performed in connection
with that representation . Because we hold that the trial court erroneously declared a
mistrial following the first trial instead of entering judgment on the jury's Second-Degree
Perjury verdict, however, we do not reach Appellant's allegations of error that relate
only to First-Degree Perjury (i .e., the portion of Appellant's second argument concerning
whether his false statement occurred in an official proceeding) or that concern evidence
introduced only in the second trial (i .e., Appellant's fourth allegation of error) . We
address Appellant's remaining allegations of error.
III. ANALYSIS
A. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Appellant argues that the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional
protections against double jeopardy when it subjected him to retrial under Letcher
2 KRS 532.020(1) .
Circuit Court Indictment No. 94-CR-0023 after jeopardy attached during his first trial .
Appellant contends that the jury's finding - written (in language parallel to the trial
court's verdict forms) and signed by a juror as foreperson, as required by the trial
court's instructions - constituted a verdict convicting him of Second-Degree Perjury.
Accordingly, Appellant argues that the trial court should have accepted the jury's
"verdict" as to his guilt, and should have declared a mistrial only as to punishment. We
agree with Appellant and hold that the trial court erred when it failed to enter judgment
on the jury's verdict following the first trial and when it empaneled a second jury to
deliberate Appellant's guilt .
While the Commonwealth asserts that this error is not preserved for our review
because Appellant did not appeal from the trial court's order declaring a mistrial and
setting the case for trial, we observe that Appellant had no right to appeal from the
interlocutory order declaring a mistrial, and that Appellant properly elected to appeal
from a subsequent final judgment rather than pursue extraordinary relief in the form of a
writ of prohibition . Thus, we find no merit in the Commonwealth's argument
concerning preservation.
The General Assembly has codified the fundamental double jeopardy principles
relating to former prosecutions :
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory
provision and is based upon the same facts as a former
'See CR 54.01 ; Macklin v. Ryan , Ky., 672 S .W .2d 60, 61 (1994) ("Since a
mistrial, by definition, does not dispose of the merits of a case or necessarily preclude
future litigation, the appellant did not have an adequate remedy by appeal from the
mistrial order."
4St. Clair v. Roark , Ky., 10 S.W.3d 482, 485 (2000) ("[A]Ithough double jeopardy
is an appropriate subject for a writ of prohibition, it is not mandatory that it be addressed
in that context .") .
prosecution, it is barred by the former prosecution under the
following circumstances :
(1)
The former prosecution resulted in :
(a)
An acquittal, or
(b)
A conviction which has not subsequently
been set aside; or
(4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated after
the first witness was sworn but before findings were
rendered by a trier of fact. Termination under either of the
following circumstances is not improper :
(a) The defendant expressly consents to the
termination or by motion for mistrial or in some
other manner waives the right to object to the
termination ; or
(b) The trial court, in exercise of its discretion,
finds that the termination is manifestly
necessary.'
The Commonwealth argues that what it refers to disparagingly as "the scrap of
paper" did not constitute a "true verdict" because it did not satisfy the formalities
required by rule and statute - i .e., it was not returned in open court,' the trial court did
not "make inquiry of the jury as to whether [the writing was] their verdict,"' and the trial
court did not ask the parties if either of them wished the court to poll the members of
the jury. $ The Commentary to KRS 505.030, however, indicates that "[t]he existence of
an 'acquittal' or a 'conviction', for purposes of this statute, should not be made to
depend at all upon the formal entry of a judgment or order."9 Here, the jury did
everything within its power to communicate its verdict, and we thus find unpersuasive
'KRS 505 .030.
'See RCr 9.82(1) .
'KRS 29A .320(3)(c) .
8KRS 29A .320(3)(d) .
'KRS 505 .030, Official Commentary (Banks/Baldwin 1974) .
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the Commonwealth's contention that the jury's written finding did not constitute a verdict
because the trial court failed to recognize that finding as a verdict .
Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that the jury's inability to agree on a
penalty means that the jury failed to reach a "final verdict," and that the trial court thus
correctly declared a mistrial.
In support of this argument, the Commonwealth relies
upon the pre-Truth-in-Sentencing case of Commonwealth v. Crooks ," in which we
permitted Crooks's retrial on a PFO charge after the jury at his first trial unanimously
agreed that Crooks was a First-Degree PFO, but could not agree upon a penalty ." The
Commonwealth's argument in this case, however, rests on a recently-debunked myth
concerning the correct procedure for assessing lesser-included misdemeanor penalties
in felony cases. In Commonweath v. Philpott," we certified the law as to how Truth-inSentencing altered the procedure for jury instructions regarding the penalty ranges of
lesser-included misdemeanor offenses in felony cases :
[I]n the trial of a "felony case," i.e., any trial in which a jury
could return a verdict of guilty of a felony offense, the jury
shall not be instructed on the penalty ranges of any offense,
whether the primary or a lesser included offense . If, upon
the conclusion of such a trial, the jury returns a verdict of
guilty of a lesser included misdemeanor offense, no
additional evidence shall be admitted, the jury shall
immediately be instructed on the penalty range for that
offense, and the attorneys shall be allowed additional
arguments only on the issue of punishment, following which
the jury shall retire to deliberate its verdict on that issue."
"Ky ., 655 S.W.2d 475 (1983).
"I d . at 476.
"Ky ., 75 S .W.3d 209 (2002) .
''Id . a 213 .
The trial court's jury instructions erroneously required the jury, if it found Appellant guilty
of the lesser-included misdemeanor offense, to set a penalty for that misdemeanor
conviction during the same deliberations . However, in its self-created written verdict
form, the jury returned a complete verdict as to the issue of Appellant's guilt by
indicating that it found Appellant guilty of Second-Degree Perjury - and, therefore
acquitted him of First-Degree Perjury." Accordingly, KRS 505.030(1) prohibited
Appellant's retrial under the same indictment, and the trial court erred when it
empaneled another jury to determine Appellant's guilt. We thus reverse the Court of
Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for it to vacate the orders and
judgments it erroneously entered upon its belief that the first jury's finding was
incomplete .
Instead of declaring a mistrial and empaneling a new jury to deliberate
Appellant's guilt under the indictment, the trial court should have entered judgment on
the first jury's verdict. As to the question of sentencing, upon which the first jury was
hung, the trial court should have proceeded as the first jury requested . The jury's
written verdict indicated : "We cannot agree on punishment . We, the jury ask if Judge
Wright will impose sentencing ." Our Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "the court
may fix the penalty . . . (b) in cases where the court is otherwise authorized by law to fix
the penalty ."'5 And, the Truth-in-Sentencing Statute provides that:
"See id. at 212 ("Instructing the jury on a lesser included misdemeanor offense
does not transform a felony case into a misdemeanor case . That does not occur until
and unless a verdict is returned convicting the defendant of the misdemeanor offense
and thereby acquitting him/her of the felony offense ." (emphasis added)) . See also
Slaven v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S .W.2d 845, 856 (1998) ("Although a lesser
included offense is not a defense within the technical meaning of those terms as used
in the penal code, it is, in fact and principle, a defense against the higher charge .") .
'SRCr 9 .84( 1)
In the event that the jury is unable to agree as to the
sentence or any portion thereof and so reports to the judge,
the judge shall impose the sentence within the range
provided elsewhere by law."
Because Appellant also argues that the trial court committed errors in the first trial that
denied him due process of law, however, we must evaluate those allegations before we
can ascertain the proper remedy in this case.
B. MATERIALITY
Appellant raises two (2) allegations of error concerning the trial court's handling,
during the first trial, of the issue as to whether Appellant's knowing adoption of
another's name in connection with the affidavit of indigency constituted a "material false
statement." Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) failed to
find Appellant's false statement regarding his identity immaterial as a matter of law and
to direct a verdict of acquittal ; and (2) failed to provide instructions requiring the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant's false statement was material . We find
no error in the trial court's rulings .
We review Appellant's allegation of error concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence under the often-quoted standard articulated in Commonwealth v. Benham,"
"On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole,
it would be clearly unreasonable . . . to find guilt, only then is the defendant entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal ."" We conclude that the trial court properly denied
16KRS 532.055(4).
17
Ky ., 816 S .W.2d 186 (1991) .
' l id . at 187. See also Sawhill v. Commonwealth , Ky., 660 S .W.2d 3, 4-5 (1993)
("The clearly unreasonable test seems to be a higher standard for granting a directed
verdict . . . constituting] an appellate standard of review .") ; Trowel v. Commonwealth ,
Ky ., 550 S.W.2d 530, 533 (1977).
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Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal after determining that Appellant's
misrepresentation of his identity constituted a "material false statement."
KRS 523.010(1) defines a "material false statement" as "any false statement,
regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence which could have affected the
outcome of the proceeding ." The Commentary to KRS 523 .020 explains that the
drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code intended a broad construction of "material":
What is traditionally a troublesome element of the offense
of perjury, the requirement of materiality has been included
in virtually every modern revision as an element of first
degree perjury . . . . Although unduly narrow construction of
the term has in many jurisdictions, impaired effective
prosecution for perjury offenses, the rationale for retention of
the requirement is that "a false answer to a trivial or
irrelevant question will not usually hamper government and
is unlikely to indicate antisocial propensities in the
declarant ." Such immaterial false statements should not be
treated as constituting a serious crime .
In order to make the included requirement part of a
practical and workable statutory scheme which is not overly
restrictive to prosecution, the definition of materiality (KRS
523.020(1)) specifically includes all false statements which
could have affected the outcome of the proceeding,
regardless of the actual effect or admissibility of the
statement. If the statement would tend to influence the
course of the proceeding, the declarant is not exempt from
criminal liability merely because he failed to object to the
question on the basis of technical rules of evidence . This
approach parallels the former requirement that the
statement be relevant in some degree . . . . 19
' 9 KRS 523.020, Official Commentary (Banks/Baldwin 1974) (citations omitted) .
In Commonwealth v. Thurman," this Court explained that "[i]t is not necessary that
testimony, to be material ; must relate to the principal issue in a case. It is sufficiently
material if it has the potential to influence a tribunal or a jury.""
Here, we believe that the trial court reasonably concluded that Appellant's false
statement concerning his identity "could have affected the outcome of the proceeding ."
Although Appellant argues that the testimony at trial demonstrates the irrelevance of a
person's identity in connection with determinations of eligibility for appointment of
counsel, we believe the trial court properly concluded that a person's identity could
influence the trial court's decision to appoint counsel - e.g ., in a situation where the
trial court is familiar with the assets of an individual known to the trial judge by
reputation. Further, we agree with the Commonwealth that the issue of materiality
extends beyond the issue of appointed counsel, and we recognize that Appellant's
giving of a false name in connection with his affidavit of indigency could also have
"affected the outcome of the proceeding" by influencing the criminal justice system's
ability to ascertain accurately Appellant's criminal record - a factor relevant not only in
courts' decisions as to pretrial release, but also the Commonwealth's decision whether
to seek a PFO indictment. Accordingly, we believe the trial court properly denied
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal .
Likewise, we find no merit in Appellant's argument that the trial court's jury
instructions should have defined "materiality" and required the jury to decide whether
"Ky., 691 S.W.2d 213 (1985) .
Id . at 215 (citing May v. United States , 280 F .2d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 1960). See
also Barkley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 297 (1954) ("It is usually sufficient to
constitute perjury if the false statement is collaterally, remotely, or circumstantially
material, or if it has a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove some fact that is
material, irrespective of the main fact in issue." (quoting 41 Am .Jur., § 13 (Perjury)) .
2'
-1 2-
Appellant's false statement was material . KRS 523.010(1) specifically states that
"Whether a falsification is material in a given factual situation is a question of law."22 In
Commonwealth v . Stallard ,23 we explained that trial courts, not juries, determine
whether a statement is material :
Whether a false statement is "material" in a given factual
situation is a question of law to be resolved by determining,
pursuant to KRS 523 .010(1), whether the statement "could
have affected the outcome of the proceeding ." This Court is
not inclined to establish a rigid or inflexible standard that trial
courts must follow in deciding whether a "material false
statement" has been made . Instead, that determination
should, on a case by case basis, be left to the sound
judgment of Kentucky's trial court judges .
Thus, the trial court's Second-Degree Perjury instruction assigned the proper factfinding role to the jury.
Because we find no reversible error in Appellant's first trial, we hold that upon
remand the trial court should, in accordance with the discussion above in Part III(A) of
this Opinion : (1) accept the first jury's verdict finding Appellant guilty of Second-Degree
Perjury; (2) set a penalty for Appellant's conviction of Second-Degree Perjury as
authorized by law;25 and (3) impose a final judgment of conviction that reflects the first
jury's verdict and the trial court's sentencing decision .
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand this matter to the Letcher Circuit Court for it to: (1) vacate the final judgment it
22
KRS 523.010(1).
23Ky ., 958 S.W.2d 21 (1997).
24 Id. at 25 (emphasis added) .
25 See KRS 532.090(1) .
-1 3-
entered on February 12, 1996 (following the second trial) imposing a five (5) year
sentence for First-Degree Perjury; (2) vacate its order of October 24, 1994 "declaring a
hung jury and mistrial of the [first] trial of this case" ; (3) accept the first jury's verdict
finding Appellant guilty of Second-Degree Perjury; (4) set an appropriate penalty for
Second-Degree Perjury in accordance with KRS 532.055(5); and (5) enter a final
judgment of conviction and sentence that reflects the first jury's verdict and the trial
court's decision as to an appropriate sentence.
Lambert, C.J . ; Cooper, Graves, Johnstone and Stumbo, JJ ., concur.
Wintersheimer, J., dissents by separate opinion .
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT :
David T. Eucker
Department of Public Advocacy
100 Fair Oaks Lane
Suite 302
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
A. B . Chandler, III
Attorney General
William L. Daniel, II
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Attorney General
Criminal Appellate Division
1024 Capital Center Drive
Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204
RENDERED : SEPTEMBER 26, 2002
TO BE PUBLISHED
*uprtwt (mart of Wentucktj
1997-SC-1005-DG
KENNETH BRUCE HOLBROOKS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
1996-CA-0482-MR
LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT NO . 94-CR-0023
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE WINTERSHEIMER
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the signing, under
oath, of any affidavit of indigency constitutes an official proceeding as contemplated by
KRS Chapter 523 .
KRS 31 .120(6), clearly states that the intent of the legislature is that a person
who makes a false statement on an affidavit is subject to prosecution for first-degree
perjury . Here, the evidence is undisputed that the truth was exposed rather than the
falsity retracted . See KRS 523 .090 .
1 would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court.
#itprtnu Toud of WrnturkLa
1997-SC-1005-DG
KENNETH BRUCE HOLBROOKS
V.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
1996-CA-0482-MR
LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT NO. 94-CR-0023
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
ORDER
On the Court's own motion, the Opinion of the Court By Justice Keller Reversing
and Remanding, rendered September 26, 2002, shall be amended on page 8, footnote
12, as attached hereto . Said modification does not affect the holding .
Entered : October 3, 2002 .
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