KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY VS. SAMONS (LINDA KAYE), ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF KENNETH R. CRUM
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RENDERED: JUNE 17, 2011; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-001659-MR
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00622
LINDA KAYE SAMONS,
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF KENNETH R. CRUM
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, LAMBERT, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: The issue presented in this appeal is whether an insurance
company providing insurance to the driver of an uninsured motor vehicle that he
did not own is required to pay basic reparation benefits to a pedestrian who was hit
and injured by the vehicle. The Floyd Circuit Court held that Kentucky Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Kentucky Farm Bureau) was responsible for
the payment of basic reparation benefits under these circumstances. After
thoroughly reviewing this issue, we find the circuit court’s ruling to be in error.
Hence, we reverse.
On August 25, 2001, twenty-eight-year-old Kenneth R. Crum was
riding a horse on Route 3381 in Floyd County, Kentucky. Originally from that
area, Crum lived in North Carolina, and was in Kentucky visiting his family.
While he was riding the horse, Crum was hit by a motor vehicle driven by
Raymond K. Ousley. Crum suffered severe injuries to his left leg and heel, and
was hospitalized. Crum did not have any personal automobile insurance.
Ousley, the driver, grew up and lived in that area of Floyd County. At
the time of the accident, Ousley was test driving an older model car owned by
Rhonda Ward. Ward’s fiancé, John Reed, was a passenger in the car. Ward did
not carry insurance on the car, but Ousley had indicated to them that he was
covered by two insurance policies. The record reflects that these two policies were
issued by Kentucky Farm Bureau, and the one at issue in this case was policy
number 4248070 naming Ousley as the insured and a 1989 Mercury Grand
Marquis as the insured vehicle. Among other coverages, the policy provided
$10,000.00 in coverage for personal injury protection (PIP).
On November 5, 2001, Crum filed suit against Ousley seeking
damages for negligence due to the injuries he incurred in the motor vehicle
accident, including past and future medical expenses as well as pain and suffering.
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Eleven months later, Crum moved to join Kentucky Farm Bureau as a defendant
and file an amended complaint. The circuit court granted his motion, and the
amended complaint was filed October 22, 2002. In the amended complaint, Crum
alleged claims against Kentucky Farm Bureau regarding Crum’s ability to collect
basic reparation benefits, or no-fault PIP benefits, including whether the company
acted in bad faith or violated provisions of the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act (UCSPA) for its failure to pay basic reparation benefits to him. In its
answer, Kentucky Farm Bureau stated that Crum’s claims against it were barred by
the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (MVRA) as well as by the terms of the policy.
On Kentucky Farm Bureau’s motion, the circuit court bifurcated the tort claim
from the coverage issue and the bad faith claim. Also on Kentucky Farm Bureau’s
motion, the circuit court entered a summary judgment on the amount of liability
coverage available, limiting it to $25,000.00 from a single policy, rather than
permitting stacking of the two policies.
Crum settled his claims against Ousley for the sum of $25,000.00, and
his complaint against Ousley was dismissed by agreed order entered July 18, 2003.
Unfortunately, Crum passed away on November 20, 2005, at his home in North
Carolina. The record does not reflect that his death was related to the injuries he
received in the 2001 motor vehicle accident. The probate court in North Carolina
appointed Crum’s sister, Linda Kay Samons,1 as his administratrix on June 15,
2006. On behalf of the estate, Samons moved the circuit court to revive the suit
1
The notice of appeal incorrectly spells her last name as “Sammons.”
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pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 395.278, which the court granted in
November 2006.2
Beginning in 2003, Kentucky Farm Bureau and Crum have litigated in
multiple motions and court appearances concerning whether Kentucky Farm
Bureau was responsible for the payment of basic reparation benefits to Crum due
to his status as a pedestrian.3 Kentucky Farm Bureau has consistently argued that it
was not responsible for two reasons: 1) Because Kentucky Farm Bureau did not
provide any security covering the vehicle which struck Crum and because Crum
himself was not covered by a policy, he had to recover basic reparation benefits
from the Assigned Claims Plan by operation of KRS 304.39-050 and KRS 304.30160, which he did; and 2) Ousley’s policy excluded coverage from Crum because
Crum was not an insured under the terms of the policy and was not struck by
Ousley’s covered automobile.
Just as consistently, Crum has argued that pursuant to the stated
purpose of the MVRA in KRS 304-39.100(1), all contracts of liability insurance
covering motor vehicles are deemed to provide basic reparation benefits, regardless
of any exclusion in the policy. He has also argued that Ousley’s policy stated that
it would cover the payment of basic reparation benefits for any covered vehicle.
2
For ease of understanding, we shall continue to refer to the plaintiff/appellee as Crum.
3
There appears to be some confusion as to what Crum is actually claiming on this issue.
Kentucky Farm Bureau has described Crum’s claims on this issue as two-fold: 1) to recover
basic reparation benefits and 2) for bad faith in its handling of Crum’s request for basic
reparation benefits. Pursuant to his reply brief, however, Crum specifically states that he is not
making a claim to recover basic reparation benefits, but rather is seeking damages for bad faith
due to damages and injuries he incurred because of Kentucky Farm Bureau’s allegedly reckless
conduct in the handling of his claim for these basic reparation benefits.
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Finally, he has argued that the doctrine of reasonable expectations invalidates the
exclusion in Ousley’s policy because it was not plain or conspicuous.
On July 15, 2010, the circuit court entered an order and declaration as
to coverage, finding in favor of Crum that Kentucky Farm Bureau was required to
pay basic reparation benefits with regard to the subject motor vehicle accident.4
The circuit court found that the policy issued to Ousley, which promised to cover
him for the ownership, maintenance, or use of any auto, specifically insured a
pedestrian struck by any motor vehicle pursuant to the MVRA. It also found that
the policy exclusion was invalid both because it violated the mandated policy of
compulsory insurance under the MVRA and because it violated the doctrine of
reasonable expectations. The circuit court then denied Kentucky Farm Bureau’s
motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order, except to the extent that it made the
prior order final and appealable. This appeal now follows.
On appeal, Kentucky Farm Bureau continues to argue that the circuit
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Crum based both on the
procedure set forth in the MVRA in KRS 304.39-050 and on the policy exclusion.
It further argues that Crum lacks standing to seek basic reparation benefits because
Crum had already received those benefits from the Assigned Claims Plan. In his
4
We note that the record contains an order addressing the same issue signed by Judge Caudill on
September 30, 2009, prior to the time he left the bench. That order ruled in favor of Crum as
well, stating that Ousley’s policy was deemed to provide basic reparation benefits to Crum and
that the policy exclusion did not clearly or conspicuously manifest Kentucky Farm Bureau’s
intent to exclude basic reparation benefits for pedestrians injured in such a situation. However,
the order was not entered or mailed to counsel until August 26, 2010, after Judge Harris had
assumed the bench. While neither party has raised the propriety of or even mentioned this
ruling, we assume that it is has no legal effect based upon the timing of its entry.
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brief, Crum continues to argue that Ousley’s policy was deemed to provide basic
reparation benefits in this situation and that the exclusion violated the MVRA and
the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Crum also argues that Kentucky Farm
Bureau’s standing argument is not properly before this court because it was not
first raised below and because he was not actually seeking those benefits. Rather,
he asserts that any issue regarding the payment of basic reparation benefits went
solely to whether Kentucky Farm Bureau acted in bad faith.
In addition, Crum has pointed out that Kentucky Farm Bureau failed
to include a copy of the July 15, 2010, order in the appendix of its brief pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 75.12(4)(c)(vii) or to address all of the
court’s factual findings and legal conclusions. While it perhaps would have been
more proper to have included the first order in the appendix, Kentucky Farm
Bureau complied with the Civil Rules by attaching the August 27, 2010, order to
its brief. Kentucky Farm Bureau has adequately addressed the circuit court’s
rulings in its brief.
Our standard of review in this case is problematic because Kentucky
Farm Bureau views this case as one arising from the ruling on a summary
judgment. While Crum contends that the applicable standard of review is for a
declaratory judgment action, meaning that the circuit court’s findings of fact must
be reviewed for abuse of discretion. We presume that the findings of fact to which
Crum refers arose from the entry of the order containing the declaration of
coverage. We recognize that the standard of review on an appeal from a
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declaratory judgment is whether the judgment was clearly erroneous. See CR
52.01; Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Bradley, 244 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Ky. App.
2007). However, we agree with Kentucky Farm Bureau that the ruling in this case
is more akin to a ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Both parties had been
seeking summary judgment on the issue of coverage since 2003, and Crum did not
file a separate action seeking a declaratory judgment pursuant to KRS Chapter 418.
And, even in declaratory actions, the summary judgment procedure may be
utilized. See CR 56.01; Ladd v. Ladd, 323 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Ky. App. 2010) (“In
cases where a summary judgment has been granted in a declaratory judgment
action and no bench trial held, the standard of review for summary judgments is
utilized.”).
Accordingly, we shall review this case using the standard of review
for summary judgment:
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court
grants a motion for summary judgment is “whether the
trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v.
Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). Because
summary judgment involves only legal questions and the
existence of any disputed material issues of fact, “an
appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision
and will review the issue de novo.” Lewis v. B & R
Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001).
Ladd, 323 S.W.3d at 776. Despite any argument to the contrary, there does not
appear to be any genuine issues of material fact on the coverage question that
remain disputed. Rather, the circuit court’s “findings” are legal conclusions based
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on its interpretation of the MVRA and the specific policy provisions. Therefore,
we shall review the decision of the circuit court on a de novo basis to determine
whether summary judgment was properly entered in favor of Crum as a matter of
law.
By way of background, Kentucky’s legislature enacted the MVRA in
1974, when it “established for the first time a system of compulsory insurance for
the owners and operators of motor vehicles in Kentucky.” Bishop v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 623 S.W.2d 865, 865 (Ky. 1981). The act requires the owners and operators
of motor vehicles to “provide minimum security covering payment of no-fault
BRB [basic reparation benefits] and payment of tort liability for personal injuries
and property damages.” Id. at 865-66.
In Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975), the Supreme Court
of Kentucky upheld the validity of the MVRA. The Court described the provisions
creating compulsory insurance:
Except for governmental agencies, every owner of an
automobile registered in Kentucky or operated by him in
Kentucky must carry or provide insurance covering the
payment of (a) tort liabilities for personal injuries
(minimum $10,000 per person, $20,000 per accident) and
property damage (minimum $5,000) and (b) no-fault
‘basic reparation benefits’ (hereinafter called BRB). An
owner or registrant who operates or permits his vehicle to
be operated in this state without the required tort liability
coverage commits a misdemeanor punishable by fine of
not less than $50 nor more than $500.
Id. at 772 (footnotes omitted). The Court then described the benefits and liabilities
imposed by the act:
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Regardless of fault, every person suffering economic loss
from a personal injury arising out of the maintenance or
use of an automobile is entitled to BRB unless he has
exercised the option to reject limitation of his tort rights.
On the other side of the ledger, every person who
registers, operates, maintains or uses an automobile on
the public roadways of Kentucky is deemed, as a
condition thereof, to have accepted certain limitations
upon his tort rights unless he has filed with the
Department of Insurance a written rejection. This is the
heart of the no-fault plan.
Id. at 772-73 (footnotes omitted).
The MVRA provides for the recovery of basic reparation benefits in
KRS 304.39-030(1): “If the accident causing injury occurs in this Commonwealth
every person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle has a right to basic reparation benefits, unless he has rejected the
limitation upon his tort rights as provided in KRS 304.39-060(4).” The legislature
defined “basic reparation benefits” as “benefits providing reimbursement for net
loss suffered through injury arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of a
motor vehicle, subject, where applicable, to the limits, deductibles, exclusions,
disqualifications, and other conditions provided in this subtitle.” KRS 304.39020(2).
Kentucky Farm Bureau’s primary argument is that it did not provide
the security for the automobile in the incident and is therefore not responsible for
the payment of basic reparation benefits.
The Fann Court addressed the responsibility for basic reparation
benefits, explaining:
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BRB is paid by the insurer of the vehicle occupied by the
injured person, or, if he was a pedestrian, by the insurer
of the vehicle by which he was struck, or, if neither
vehicle had such coverage, by the issuer of any policy
under which the injured person is entitled to BRB. KRS
304.39-050. If there is no applicable BRB coverage,
payment is made through an ‘assigned claims plan.’
KRS 304.39-160.
Fann, 534 S.W.2d at 786 n.8.
In addition, Kentucky Farm Bureau brings our attention to KRS
304.30-050, in which the legislature set up the priority for the payment of basic
reparation benefits. That statute provides:
(1) The basic reparation insurance applicable to bodily
injury to which this subtitle applies is the security
covering the vehicle occupied by the injured person at the
time of the accident or, if the injured person is a
pedestrian, the security covering the vehicle which struck
such pedestrian. . . . A pedestrian, as used herein, means
any person who is not making “use of a motor vehicle” at
the time his injury occurs.
(2) If there is no security covering the vehicle, any
contract of basic reparation insurance under which the
injured person is a basic reparation insured shall apply.
“Security” is defined as “any continuing undertaking complying with this subtitle,
for payment of tort liabilities, basic reparation benefits, and all other obligations
imposed by this subtitle.” KRS 304.39-020(17). “Security covering the vehicle” is
in turn defined as “the insurance or other security so provided. The vehicle for
which the security is so provided is the ‘secured vehicle.’” KRS 304.39-080(1).
Kentucky Farm Bureau argues that because the automobile that hit Crum
was not secured by a policy of insurance and because Crum was not a basic
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reparation insured under any other insurance contract, Crum’s avenue of relief was
through KRS 304.39-160, the Assigned Claims Plan. This statute provides that a
person who is entitled to basic reparation benefits may obtain such benefits
through the plan if “(a) [b]asic reparation insurance is not applicable to the injury
for a reason other than those specified in the provisions on converted vehicles and
intentional injuries[.]”
In support of its argument, Kentucky Farm Bureau cites to State Automobile
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Outlaw, 575 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. Ap. 1978), in which this
Court described the proper procedure to follow:
The plaintiff-appellee, Anna B. Outlaw, was a pedestrian
who suffered serious injuries when struck by an
automobile driven by Jerry L. Taylor and owned by
Allen L. Taylor. Therefore, Outlaw was entitled to basic
reparation benefits under the Kentucky Motor Vehicle
Reparations Act (MVRA). KRS 304.39-030(1).
However, the Taylor automobile was uninsured, and
Outlaw was not a “basic reparation insured” within the
meaning of KRS 304.39-020(3). There being no policy
of basic reparation insurance applicable to her injury,
Outlaw filed a claim with the Kentucky Assigned Claims
Bureau. KRS 304.39-160(1)(a). Outlaw’s claim was
then assigned to the defendant-appellant, State
Automobile Mutual Insurance Company, which had the
same obligations as though it had issued a policy of basic
reparation insurance applicable to her injury. KRS
304.39-170(2).
Outlaw, 575 S.W.2d at 490.
Kentucky Farm Bureau also cites to our opinion of Rees v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co., 715 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. App. 1986). In Rees, this Court addressed the
validity of an escape clause in a dealership’s garage policy with United States
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Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF & G), which specifically excluded its
customers from the status of an insured unless there was no other available
insurance. The Court held that while the escape clause addressed tort liability, it
did not speak to basic reparation benefits:
The legislative policy as announced in KRS 304.39050(1) is that the basic reparation insurance applicable to
bodily injury “is the security covering the vehicle
occupied by the injured person at the time of the
accident.” The “security covering the vehicle” in the
present case is the policy written by USF & G, see KRS
304.39-080, which is, therefore, primarily liable for the
payment of basic reparation benefits to the injured
passenger. We have been referred to nothing in the
MVRA which permits shifting the liability for the
payment of basic reparation benefits as is the case with
respect to the payment of tort liabilities.
Rees, 715 S.W.2d at 906 (emphasis added).
Crum, in turn, relies upon the legislature’s pronouncement in KRS 304.39100(1) that “[a]n insurance contract which purports to provide coverage for basic
reparation benefits . . . has the legal effect of including all coverages required by
this subtitle.” In subsection (2) of that statute, the legislature required an insurer
authorized to transact business in the Commonwealth to file a form with the
insurance commissioner stating that “in any contract of liability insurance for
injury, wherever issued, covering the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle other than motorcycles while the vehicle is in this Commonwealth shall be
deemed to provide the basic reparation benefits coverage and minimum security
for tort liabilities required by this subtitle[.]”
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Crum further relies on Commonwealth Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Manis, 549 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Ky. App. 1977), for its statement that “[i]t is true the
vehicle was not insured by its owner but the insurance coverage of the operator
provided the minimum coverage required by KRS 304.39-020.” Therefore, Crum
contends that Ousley’s policy for his own automobile obtained from Kentucky
Farm Bureau provided the security for Reed’s otherwise uninsured vehicle, leading
to the conclusion that Kentucky Farm Bureau was responsible for the payment of
basic reparation benefits.
We have thoroughly reviewed the statutes and caselaw cited by the parties,
and we must agree with Kentucky Farm Bureau that under this unusual factual
situation, Ousley’s policy of insurance did not act as the “security covering the
vehicle” for purposes of the payment of basic reparation benefits to Crum.
Specifically, Rees provides that the security covering the vehicle was responsible
for the payment of basic reparation benefits. In addition, we have recently stated,
“BRB follows the vehicle, not the person.” Stewart v. ELCO Administrative
Services, Inc., 313 S.W.3d 117, 123 (Ky. App. 2010). We have also sought
guidance from a treatise addressing the payment of basic reparation benefits:
If the vehicle which the injured person was driving or in
which he was a passenger is covered by a no-fault policy,
the insurer of the vehicle is responsible for BRB
payments. This is true even if the policy has an escape
clause (see § 12:4, Escape clauses providing no liability
if there is other insurance) purporting to shift liability to
another insurer. That insurer is also responsible if the
vehicle strikes a pedestrian. If a pedestrian is struck by
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two cars in the same accident, he may pursue either or
both, regardless of which may have caused his injuries.
If the vehicle is not covered, but the injured driver,
passenger or pedestrian, is a “basic reparations
insured,” he may recover under his policy, even though
the vehicle involved in the accident is not mentioned in
the policy. There is coverage in this situation even if the
insured vehicle is not in Kentucky at the time of the
accident.
Robert D. Monfort, Ky. Motor Veh. Ins. Law § 11:7 (2010-2011 ed.) (footnotes
omitted, emphasis added).
We agree with Kentucky Farm Bureau’s argument that while the policy
provided Ousley with liability coverage as a “basic reparations insured,” the policy
did not provide security for Reed’s vehicle itself or for Crum as a basic reparations
insured. Because no security covered the vehicle Ousley was driving for purposes
of basic reparation benefits and such liability may not be shifted, Kentucky Farm
Bureau cannot be held liable for the payment of these benefits to Crum.
Furthermore, the MVRA provides for a situation such as this where a pedestrian is
struck and injured by an automobile that is not covered by insurance. Therefore,
Crum properly sought payment of basic reparation benefits due to him from the
Assigned Claim Plan by operation of KRS 304.39-050 and 304.39-160.
We also agree with Kentucky Farm Bureau that Ousley’s policy properly
excludes coverage to a person in Crum’s situation. We find no merit in Crum’s
argument that this exclusion violates the MVRA or the doctrine of reasonable
expectations.
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Part B/1 sets forth the policy specifications for the payment of basic
reparation benefits. It states that Kentucky Farm Bureau “will pay, in accordance
with the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, personal injury protection
benefits to or for an ‘insured’ who sustains ‘bodily injury.’ The ‘bodily injury’
must be caused by an accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of a
‘motor vehicle’ as a vehicle.” The definitions section defines an “insured” as:
1. The “named insured” or any “family
member” while:
a. “Occupying”; or
b. A “pedestrian” struck by;
any “motor vehicle.”
2. Any other person while:
a. “Occupying”; or
b. A “pedestrian” struck by;
“your covered auto.”
“Your covered auto” is defined as a motor vehicle:
a. To which the bodily injury liability coverage of this
policy applies and for which a specific premium is
charged; and
b. For which the “named insured” is required by the
Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act to maintain
security.
Kentucky Farm Bureau’s interpretation of the policy is that for Crum to be
covered under the policy, he had to meet the definition of an “insured.” Because
he was a pedestrian who was neither the named insured nor a family member,
Crum would have had to be struck by Ousley’s covered automobile, which in this
case was the Mercury because Ousley paid a specific premium for coverage of that
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vehicle. However, Crum was not hit by the Mercury, but by another automobile
owned by another person. This exclusion is in line with the MVRA in that the
legislature created a specific procedure in KRS 304.39-050 and 304.39-160 to
address this situation. This exclusion does not render Ousley uninsured, but
merely means that the vehicle he was driving at the time of the accident was not
covered by the terms of his policy.
Crum also contends that the exclusion is invalid because it violated the
doctrine of reasonable expectations since it was not conspicuously and
unequivocally located in the “Exclusions” section of the policy, but rather was in
the “Definitions” section. He argues that the phrase “specific premium” is also
ambiguous. The circuit court found that the exclusion violated the doctrine for
these same reasons. We disagree.
Both Crum and the circuit court cited to Simon v. Continental Insurance Co.,
724 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1986), to support this position. Simon addressed a situation
where the insured and the insurance company differed on how much
underinsurance coverage was available in the policy. The Supreme Court looked
to whether the policy was ambiguous, explaining that the insured is entitled to all
of the coverage he could reasonably expect:
An essential tool in deciding whether an insurance policy
is ambiguous, and consequently should be interpreted in
favor of the insured, is the so-called “doctrine of
reasonable expectations.” This is a principle abstracted
from numerous cases and first elaborated by Prof. Robert
Keeton in his Basic Text of Insurance Law, § 6.3(a), at
351 (1971). See Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Stanfield, Ky., 581
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S.W.2d 555, 558 (1979). The nature of the doctrine of
reasonable expectations is summarized in R.H. Long’s
The Law of Liability Insurance, § 5.10B, which states, in
pertinent part:
“The gist of the doctrine is that the insured
is entitled to all the coverage he may
reasonably expect to be provided under the
policy. Only an unequivocally conspicuous,
plain and clear manifestation of the
company’s intent to exclude coverage will
defeat that expectation.
....
The doctrine of reasonable expectations is
used in conjunction with the principle that
ambiguities should be resolved against the
drafter in order to circumvent the technical,
legalistic and complex contract terms which
limit benefits to the insured.”
Simon, 724 S.W.2d at 212-13.
We agree with Kentucky Farm Bureau that the doctrine of reasonable
expectations plays no role in this case. Crum, who was not a party to the policy,
could not have any expectation related to coverage under Ousley’s policy. The
doctrine would only be applicable to Ousley as the person who contracted for the
policy with Kentucky Farm Bureau, and because Ousley was covered as an
insured, his reasonable expectations never came into play. We further agree with
Kentucky Farm Bureau that the language of the policy is neither ambiguous nor
inconspicuous. Rather, the language is straightforward and clear upon a reading of
the provisions in the policy.
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Accordingly, we must hold that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in
declaring that Kentucky Farm Bureau was required to pay basic reparation benefits
to Crum with regard to the motor vehicle accident and in denying Kentucky Farm
Bureau’s motion to alter, amend, or vacate that ruling.
Based upon our holding, we need not address Kentucky Farm Bureau’s
argument that Crum lacks standing to make a claim for basic reparation benefits.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Floyd Circuit Court are reversed,
and this matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Deborah R. Lewis
Hazard, Kentucky
Nathaniel Collins
Hindman, Kentucky
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